SWAPNA MOHANTY Vs THE STATE OF ODISHA STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS. SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF ODISHA
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE
Case number: C.A. No.-008425-008425 / 2018
Diary number: 38140 / 2015
Advocates: SURESH CHANDRA TRIPATHY Vs
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.8425 of 2018 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.32405 of 2015)
Swapna Mohanty .... Appellant
Versus
The State of Odisha & Ors. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
Leave granted.
The controversy in this case pertains to the
competing claim of the Appellant and Respondent No.4
to the 1st post of Lecturer, English in Indira Gandhi
(Junior) Mahavidyalaya, Nimapara in Odisha. The
decision by the State Education Tribunal, Odisha, in
favour of the Appellant was reversed by the High
Court. Hence, the Appeal.
1 | P a g e
( I )
1. The Appellant was appointed as a Lecturer in
English against the 2nd post in the Indira Gandhi
(Junior) Mahavidyalaya, Nimapara (hereinafter referred
to as “the College”). On 24th November, 1991, the
Appellant was elevated to the 1st post of Lecturer in
English due to the resignation of Chaudhury
Ramakanta Dash. Respondent No.4 was appointed
against the 2nd post which was held by the Appellant
prior to her being appointed to the 1st post of Lecturer.
The services of the Appellant were terminated on 29th
July, 2001 by the Special Officer of the College.
Thereafter, Respondent No.4 was appointed to the 1st
post of Lecturer in English on 14th October, 2001. On
3rd August, 2002, the Appellant filed an appeal
challenging the order of termination of her service.
The College was admitted to grant-in-aid w.e.f. 1st
January, 2004. By a letter dated 7th July, 2005,
the Appellant requested the Director, Higher Education
to expedite the hearing of her Appeal dated 3 rd
August, 2002. The Director, Higher Education vide 2 | P a g e
order dated 21st February, 2006 allowed the appeal
and set aside the order dated 29th July, 2001 by which
the Appellant’s services were terminated. The
Appellant was reinstated as Lecturer in English in the
1st post on 28th February, 2006.
2. The Appellant approached the State Education
Tribunal, Odisha by filing GIA Case No.120 of 2006
under Section 24-B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969
seeking a direction to the Government of Odisha and
the Director, Higher Education to approve her
appointment against the 1st post of Lecturer in
English in the College and to release grant-in-aid w.e.f.
1st January, 2004. The State Education Tribunal by its
judgment dated 3rd December, 2008 allowed GIA Case
No.120 of 2006 by granting the relief prayed for.
Aggrieved by the non-implementation of the directions
issued by the State Education Tribunal, the Appellant
filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Odisha which
was allowed by a judgment dated 25th November,
2009. The State Government was directed to
implement the judgment of the State Education
3 | P a g e
Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 within a period of
six months.
3. Respondent No.4 filed GIA Case No. 36 of 2010 in
the State Education Tribunal seeking approval of his
appointment in the 1st post of Lecturer in English in the
College. During the pendency of the said appeal, the
State Government approved the appointment of the
Appellant in the 1st post of Lecturer in English by an
order dated 13th January, 2011 and released the
grant-in-aid in favour of the Appellant. It is relevant to
note that the appeal filed by the State Government
against the order dated 3rd December, 2008 of the
State Education Tribunal was rejected by the High
Court. The Tribunal dismissed GIA Case No. 36 of 2010
filed by Respondent No.4. Respondent No.4
challenged the judgment of the State Education
Tribunal in the High Court. The High Court allowed the
appeal filed by Respondent No.4. Respondent No.4
was declared to be entitled to receive the grant-in-aid
against the 1st post of Lecturer in English. ( II )
4 | P a g e
4. While dismissing the GIA Case No.36 of 2010 filed
by Respondent No.4, the State Education Tribunal held
that the Appellant is admittedly senior to Respondent
No.4. It was further held that the Appellant
was entitled for release of grant-in-aid in respect of the
1st post of Lecturer in English as a natural consequence
of the order of termination of her services being set
aside. The High Court reversed the order passed by
the State Education Tribunal on the ground that the
order passed in favour of the Appellant by the State
Education Tribunal on 3rd December, 2008 was in
violation of principles of natural justice and thus, void.
The High Court held that Respondent No.4 ought to
have been impleaded by the Appellant in the case filed
by her before the Tribunal. Another ground which
found favour with the High Court is that the Director,
Higher Education had no jurisdiction to decide the
appeal filed by the Appellant against the order of
termination of her service. ( III )
5. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the
appeal preferred by the Appellant to the Director, 5 | P a g e
Higher Education was filed on 7th July, 2005. The High
Court found fault with the Appellant for filing an appeal
after a delay of four years from the date of the order of
termination of her service on 29th July, 2001. As the
College was admitted to grant-in-aid on 20th February,
2004, the High Court held that Director, Higher
Education did not have jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal.
6. The counsel for the Appellant referred to the
letter dated 7th July, 2005 addressed to the Director,
Higher Education which was only a reminder with a
request to dispose of the appeal that was filed earlier
on 3rd August, 2002. To satisfy ourselves about the
correctness of the claim of the Appellant, we directed
the counsel appearing for the State of Odisha to
produce the records pertaining to the Appeal. Mr. Sibo
Sankar Mishra, learned counsel for the State of Odisha
informed us that the Appeal dated 3rd August,
2002 is missing from the records. He submitted that
the letter dated 7th July, 2005 is available which would
indicate that an Appeal was indeed filed on 3rd August,
6 | P a g e
2002. If the High Court was aware of the Appeal being
filed on 3rd August, 2002, it would not have
concluded that there was a delay of four years in filing
the Appeal and that the Director, Higher Education did
not have jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal. The
College was admitted to grant-in-aid on 20th February,
2004 w.e.f. 1st January, 2004 and undisputedly, the
Director, Higher Education was the competent
authority to entertain appeals till then. The State
Education Tribunal gets jurisdiction to decide the
appeals in respect of colleges only from the date on
which they are admitted to grant-in-aid. The High
Court concluded that the Director, Higher Education
did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal which
was filed on 7th July, 2005 i.e. after the College was
admitted to grant-in-aid which is factually incorrect.
The Appeal was filed on 3rd August, 2002 itself when
the Director, Higher Education was competent to
entertain the Appeal. We have also examined the
point pertaining to the competence of the Director,
Higher Education to hear the Appeal after the College
7 | P a g e
was admitted to grant-in-aid. In other words, even if
the Appeal could be entertained by the Director,
Higher Education when it was filed on 3rd August, 2002,
the point to be examined is whether the Director,
Higher Education could have decided the Appeal after
the College was admitted to grant-in-aid. The Appeal
was allowed by the Director, Higher Education on 21st
February, 2006 which was, admittedly, after the
College came into the fold of grant-in-aid. We are of
the opinion that the Director, Higher Education
continued to have jurisdiction to decide the Appeal
that was filed before him prior to the admission of the
College to grant-in-aid as there is no provision in the
Odisha Education Act providing for a change-over of
proceedings to the Tribunal. In a similar fact situation,
this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa
v. Dhadi Sahu1 held as follows: “18. It may be stated at the outset that the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are
1 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257
8 | P a g e
pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try them.”
( IV ) 7. The other point which was found in favour of
Respondent No.4 by the High Court is that there is
violation of principles of natural justice which resulted
in the order dated 3rd December, 2008 in GIA Case No.
120 of 2006 being void. This is for the reason that the
Appellant did not implead Respondent No.4 in the said
case. The subject matter of GIA Case No.120 of 2006
filed by the Appellant was approval of her appointment
against the 1st post of Lecturer in English in the
College. There is no doubt about the order of
termination of the services of the Appellant being set
aside. The said order became final when the Appeal
filed by the Government was rejected by the High
Court. There is no dispute that the Appellant was
holding the 1st post of Lecturer in English in the College
on the date of termination of her services. It was only
after the termination of the services of the Appellant,
Respondent No.4 was appointed to the 1st post of
9 | P a g e
Lecturer in English in the resultant vacancy. The
natural consequence of the order of termination being
set aside is that the Appellant has to be appointed to
the 1st post of Lecturer in English in the College. There
is no doubt that only one post of Lecturer in English
out of the two occupied by the Appellant and
Respondent No.4 is admitted to grant-in-aid. The
request of the Appellant was consequential to the
order dated 21st February, 2006 by which she was
directed to be reinstated in the 1st post of Lecturer in
English. Respondent No.4 is not a necessary party
either to proceedings pertaining to the termination of
services of the Appellant or the consequential
proceedings arising therefrom. A person whose
presence before a forum may be necessary in order to
enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon
and settle all the questions involved in the dispute is a
necessary party. A necessary party is one without
whom no order can be made effectively. A proper
party is one in whose absence an effective order can
be made, but whose presence is necessary for
10 | P a g e
complete and final decision on the question involved in
the proceedings. [See:- Udit Narain Singh
Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of
Revenue, Bihar & Anr. 2 ]
8. As GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 emanates from a
dispute pertaining to the termination of services of the
Appellant and the only dispute before the Tribunal
being the grant of consequential benefits, we are of
the considered opinion that Respondent No.4 was not a
necessary party. We are aware of the fact that as a
consequence of appointment of the Appellant in the 1st
post of Lecturer in English, Respondent No.4 has to be
relegated back to his original post i.e. 2nd post of
English. But, as stated earlier, that is a natural
consequence of the order of termination of the
services of the Appellant being set aside.
9. The counsel appearing for Respondent No.4 has
submitted that there was delay of more than a year in
the filing of an Appeal against the order of termination
dated 3rd August, 2002 and there was no application
filed for condoning the said delay. He further
2 AIR 1963 SC 786
11 | P a g e
contended that both the Appellant and Respondent
No.4 did not have requisite qualifications to hold the
post of Lecturer in English in the College at the time of
their initial appointment. Respondent No.4 acquired
the necessary qualifications prior to the Appellant and
so, he should be treated as senior to the Appellant
which would entitle him to be appointed in the 1st post
of Lecturer in English. It is not necessary for us to
adjudicate on the points which were not raised and
considered by either the Tribunal or the High Court.
The High Court is not right in finding the Appellant to
have played fraud on the Court by filing an Appeal
before the Director, Higher Education who did not have
jurisdiction or by not impleading Respondent No.4 as a
party before the Tribunal. 10. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of
the High Court is set aside and the Appeal is allowed.
.....................................J. [S.A. BOBDE]
.....................................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi, August 21, 2018.
12 | P a g e