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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1680  OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No.9816 of 2009]

Surya Baksh Singh        .....Appellant  

       Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh       ....Responde

nt     

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1. This appeal brings to the fore the rampant manipulation and misuse of  

the statutory right to appeal by an ever increasing number of convicts who  

take  recourse to  this  remedy with the objective  of  defeating the  ends  of  

justice  by  obtaining  orders  of  bail  or  exemption  from  surrender,  and  

thereupon  escape  beyond  the  reach  of  the  law.  Jural  compulsions  now  

dictate that this species of appeals should be consciously dismissed on the  

ground  of  occasioning  a  gross  abuse  of  the  judicial  process  and  an  

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annihilation of justice. The need to punish every transgressor of the law is  

ubiquitously  accepted  in  all  legal  persuasions  throughout  the  ages.  

Kautilya’s  Arthasastra  opines  that  -  “By  not  punishing  the  guilty  and   

punishing those not deserving to be punished, by arresting those who ought   

not to be arrested and not arresting those who ought to be arrested; and by   

failing to protect subjects from thieves etc. through these causes - decline,   

greed and dis-affection are produced among the subjects. It is punishment   

alone which maintains both this world and the next.”  In similar antiquity it  

has been observed by Plato in his celebrated treatise Laws  “....not that he is   

punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone,   

but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may   

utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing”. In the  

present  time,  and  from  another  segment  of  the  globe  the  necessity  of  

punishment has been articulated thus -  “By enforcing a public system of   

penalties government removes the grounds for thinking that others are not   

complying with the rules.  For this reason alone,  a coercive sovereign is   

presumably  always  necessary,  even  though  in  a  well-ordered  society   

sanctions are not severe and may never need to be imposed. Rather, the   

existence  of  effective  penal  machinery  serves  as  men's  security  to  one   

another” -  A Theory of Justice by Rawls.

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2. It is necessary to distinguish dismissal of appeals in instances where  

steps  have  been  taken  by  the  Court  for  securing  the  presence  of  the  

Appellant  by  coercive  means,  including  the  issuance  of  non-bailable  

warrants  or  initiation  of  proceedings  for  declaring  the  Appellant  a  

proclaimed offender by recourse to Part C of Chapter VI of the Code of  

Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (CrPC  for  short)  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  

where the Appellant may incidentally and unwittingly be absent when his  

appeal is called on for hearing. The malaise which we are perturbed about is  

the wilful withdrawal of the convict from the appellate proceedings initiated  

by  him  after  he  has  succeeded  in  gaining  his  enlargement  on  bail  or  

exemption from surrender.

3. The legal  provisions  on this  subject  are  to  be  found principally  in  

Chapter XXIX of the CrPC. Section 372 reiterates the general principle of  

law that an appeal is not a right unless it is granted by a statute. This Section  

states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal Court  

except as provided for by the CrPC or by any other law for the time being in  

force.  Section 374(2) thereafter stipulates that any person convicted in a  

trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or in a trial  

held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than  

seven  years  has  been  passed  against  him  or  against  any  other  person  

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convicted at the same trial, may appeal to the High Court. These provisions  

must  immediately  be  compared  with  the  preceding  Chapter  XXVIII  

containing  a  fasciculus  dealing  with  a  Death  Sentence  which  becomes  

efficacious only on its being confirmed by the High Court. The proviso to  

Section 368 enjoins that an order of confirmation shall not be made until the  

period  allowed  for  preferring  an  appeal  has  expired,  or,  if  an  appeal  is  

presented within such period, until such appeal is disposed of. The presence  

or absence of the accused/convict in the cases of Death References, makes  

little  difference  since  High  Courts  are  duty-bound to  give  the  matter  its  

utmost  and undivided attention.  Indubitably,  the assistance  of  Counsel  is  

very important and helpful to the Court in coming to its conclusion.  Since it  

is conceivable that an appeal may not be filed in the High Court by a convict  

who is to undergo more than seven years imprisonment, the efficacy, legal  

correctness and propriety of  such a sentence is  not  always dependent on  

receiving the imprimatur of the High Court.

4. Section 378 of the CrPC inter alia declares that no appeal to the High  

Court  against  an  order  of  acquittal  shall  be  entertained  except  with  its  

express leave.  Accordingly, appeals against acquittal are distinct from all  

others. Section 383 prescribes that if the Appellant is in jail he may present  

his appeal to the officer in-charge of the jail who shall thereupon forward it  

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to  the appropriate  Appellate  Court.  Section 384 enables  the  dismissal  of  

appeals summarily or in limine provided the Appellant or his pleader has  

received a reasonable opportunity of being heard.  Where appeals are not  

dismissed summarily, Section 385 prescribes the issuance of notice to the  

Appellant or his pleader by the State Government indicating the time and  

place when the appeal has been scheduled to be heard. While the Appellate  

Court has the option to call for the records of the case at the stage of the  

initial hearing of an appeal under Section 384 by virtue of use of the word  

“may”, it becomes mandatory for it to do so at the time of the final hearing.

5. Section 386 of the CrPC is of importance for the purposes before us.  

It requires the Appellate Court to peruse the records, and hear the Appellant  

or  his  pleader  if  he  appears;  thereafter  it  may  dismiss  the  appeal  if  it  

considers that there is insufficient ground for interference. In the case of an  

appeal from an order of acquittal (State Appeals in curial parlance) it may  

reverse the order and direct that further inquiry be carried out or that the  

accused be retried or committed for trial. Even in the case of an appeal from  

an order of acquittal the Appellate Court is competent to find him guilty and  

pass  sentence  on  him  according  to  law.  The  proviso  to  this  Section  

prescribes that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had  

an opportunity of showing cause against such a proposal, thereby mandating  

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that an accused must be present and must be heard if an order of acquittal is  

to be upturned and reversed.  It is thus significant, and so we reiterate, that  

the Legislature has cast an obligation on the Appellate Court to decide an  

appeal  on its  merits  only in  the case  of  Death References,  regardless  of  

whether or not an appeal has been preferred by the convict.

6. Last, but not least in our appreciation of the law, Section 482 of the  

CrPC stands in solitary splendour. It  preserves the inherent power of  the  

High Court. It enunciates that nothing in the CrPC shall be deemed to limit  

or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may  

be necessary, firstly, to ‘give effect to any order under the CrPC’, words  

which are not to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereafter  

referred to as ‘CPC’). Ergo, the High Court can, while exercising inherent  

powers  in  its  criminal  jurisdiction,  take all  necessary  steps  for  enforcing  

compliance of its orders. For salutary reason Section 482 makes the criminal  

Court much more effective and all pervasive than the civil Court insofar as  

ensuring  obedience  of  its  orders  is  concerned.  Secondly,  Section  482  

clarifies that the CrPC does not circumscribe the actions available to the  

High  Court  to  prevent  abuse  of  its  process,  from  the  inception  of  

proceedings  till  their  culmination.  Judicial  process  includes  compelling  a  

respondent  to  appear  before it.  When the Court  encounters  a  recalcitrant  

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Appellant/convict who shows negligible interest in prosecuting his appeal,  

none of the Sections in Chapter XXIX of the CrPC dealing with appeals,  

precludes or dissuades it from dismissing the appeals.  It seems to us that  

passing such orders would eventually make it clear to all that intentional and  

repeated failure to prosecute the appeal would inexorably lead not merely to  

incarceration but more importantly to the confirmation of the conviction and  

sentence consequent  on the dismissal  of  the appeal.  Thirdly,  none of  the  

provisions of the CrPC can possibly limit the power of the High Court to  

otherwise secure the ends of justice. While it is not possible to define the  

concept of ‘justice’, suffice it to say that it encompasses not just the rights of  

the convict, but also of victims of crime as well as of the law abiding section  

of society who look towards the Courts as vital instruments for preservation  

of peace and the curtailment or containment of crime by punishing those  

who transgress the law. If convicts can circumvent the consequence of their  

conviction, peace, tranquility and harmony in society will be reduced to a  

chimera.  Section  482  emblazons  the  difference  between  preventing  the  

abuse of the jural process on the one hand and securing of the ends of justice  

on the other.  It appears to us that Section 482 of the CrPC has not been  

given due importance in combating the rampant malpractice of filing appeals  

only for scotching sentences imposed by criminal Courts.

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7. This Court was called upon to construe Section 423 of the old CrPC  

(which corresponds to Section 386 of the current CrPC) in the wake of the  

dismissal by the High Court of an Appeal on the very next date of hearing  

after the issuance of notice. In Shyam Deo Pandey v. State of Bihar, (1971)  

1 SCC 855 : AIR 1971 SC 1606,  the High Court had recorded – “No one  

appears to press the appeal. On perusal of the judgment under appeal, I find  

no  merit  in  the  case.  It  is  accordingly  dismissed”.   An  application  for  

restoration of the appeal  filed on the same day was also rejected for  not  

disclosing sufficient  grounds for  recalling the dismissal  orders.  The  ratio  

decidendi of this decision is that the records of the lower Court must  be  

available with the Appellate Court if the condition of ‘perusal’ is to stand  

complied with, and therefore the High Court was found to have erred.

8. This  conundrum thereafter  engaged the attention of  a  Three Judge  

Bench in Kishan Singh v. State of U.P. [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 305 :  1993 (3)  

SCALE 312 : (1996) 9 SCC 372 decided on November 2, 1992.  The Bench  

overruled the observations in the dismissal  order passed in  Ram Naresh  

Yadav v.  State  of  Bihar  AIR 1987 SC 1500 and approved  Shyam Deo  

Pandey;  it  also  adverted  to  similar  opinions  expressed  in  Emperor v.  

Balumal Hotchand AIR 1938 Sind 171.  It noted the disparate language in  

Section 384 of the CrPC and Order 41 Rule 17 of the CPC before quoting  

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that it is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider the appeal as well as the  

judgment under challenge on its merits.  However, it pithily observed that  

“where the Appellant has been sentenced to imprisonment and he is not in  

custody when the appeal is taken up for preliminary hearing, the Appellate  

Court can require him to surrender, and if  he fails to obey the direction,  

other considerations may arise, which may render the appeal liable to be  

dismissed without consideration of the merits…..”  It is of significance that  

the other Three Judge Bench in Bani Singh v. State of U.P. 1996 (4) SCC  

720 : AIR 1996 SC 2439 adopted this very dialectic and approach, without  

reference to  Kishan Singh.  It is unfortunate that Law Journals have now  

adopted the practice of reporting almost every order passed by this Court  

without  caring  to  consider  its  precedential  value.   Orders,  in  

contradistinction to Judgments, contain only the decision of the Court.  The  

pronouncements of the Apex Court command adherence essentially when it  

is clear that the law has been considered in detail and that its articulation is,  

therefore, an elucidation and exposition of the law.  Faciously,  Ram Naresh  

Yadav does  not  fall  in  this  category;  in  any  event,  it  has  been  stoutly  

overruled by Three Judge Bench.  The words in Kishan Singh quoted by us  

above are  encouragement  for  applying Section 482 of  the CrPC to cases  

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where the Appellant/convict chooses not to prosecute the appeal after being  

enlarged on bail or being exempted from surrender.

9. Bani Singh, a Three Judge Bench decision, posits that if an appeal is  

not dismissed summarily, then the Appellate Court should, after perusing the  

records, hear the Appellant or his pleader. This Court clarified that “the law  

does not enjoin that the court shall adjourn the case if both the Appellant and  

his lawyer are absent.  .....  It  can dispose of the appeal after perusing the  

record and judgment of  the Trial  Court.  .....  if  the accused is  in jail  and  

cannot, on his own, come to Court, it would be advisable to hear the case  

and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the accused/Appellant if  

his lawyer is not present. If the lawyer is absent,  and the Court deems it  

appropriate to appoint a lawyer at State expense to assist it, there is nothing  

in  the  law  to  preclude  it  from  doing  so”.  Indeed,  the  Court  was  not  

confronted  by  the  wilful  abscondence  of  the  concerned  Appellant.  It  is  

noteworthy that the High Court had not taken steps calculated to secure the  

presence of the Appellant before it.  On the contrary it had palpably adopted  

the  less  tedious  course  of  simply  dismissing  the  appeal.  Bani  Singh  

overruled the Order in  Ram Naresh Yadav which had prescribed that  a  

criminal  appeal  could  be  disposed  of  on  merits  only  after  hearing  the  

Appellant or his counsel. Signally, the Court had observed that in order to  

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enforce discipline the appeal could be dismissed for non-prosecution. In both  

these cases it  is  apparent that the High Court had not taken any steps to  

secure  the  presence  of  the  Appellant;  in  other  words,  that  there  was  no  

material to manifest that the Appellant had abandoned his appeal or had no  

intention to prosecute it. In Bani Singh attention of the Court was not drawn  

to the views of a Coordinate Bench in  Kishan Singh decided four years  

previously on 2.11.1992. Having carefully read through both the opinions  

we think it important to clarify that Bani Singh does not cogitate or reflect  

upon the options available to the Court which is faced with a recalcitrant  

Appellant who is not prosecuting his appeal, in flagrant violation and abuse  

of the bail orders granted in his favour.  Kishan Singh deals precisely with  

the options open to the Appellate Court  at the preliminary hearing of  an  

appeal.  

10. Any discourse on this aspect of the law would be incomplete without  

appreciating and assimilating Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. 2008 I AD (SC)  

597 : AIR 2008 SC 920 : JT 2008 (1) SC 172. The contention canvassed on  

behalf of the accused was that a miscarriage of justice had occurred since the  

Appellant had not been served with notice of the appeal by the High Court,  

which nevertheless decided the appeal ex parte. Reference was made to Bani  

Singh as also to CrPC’s Chapter XXIX in general, and Sections 385 and 386  

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in  particular;  conspicuously  Section  482  of  the  CrPC  was  not  even  

mentioned. The learned counsel for Dharam Pal had expressed his inability  

to argue the case before the High Court. As in the case in hand, this Court  

had perused the impugned Judgment of the High Court and found it to be  

well-merited and duly predicated on a careful consideration of the material  

on record. It was observed that – “The position, of course, would have been  

different if the High Court had simply dismissed the appeal without going  

into the merits...... That being the position, it cannot be said that the High  

Court had ignored the basic principles of criminal justice while disposing of  

the appeal ex parte”. Dharam Pal and for that matter Bani Singh or Shyam  

Deo Pandey neither proscribe the invocation of Section 482 of the CrPC nor  

opine that dismissal of an appeal under Section 482, for good reasons which  

are  lucidly  spelt  out,  is  improper.  It  has  not  hithertofore  even  been  

considered that Section 482 of the CrPC should be applied in circumstances  

of  the  wilful  abscondence  of  the  Appellant/convict  in  contumacious  and  

deliberate disregard and disobedience of the terms and conditions on which  

he was enlarged on bail or exempted from surrender.

11. The discussion would not be complete without noticing the Orders  in  

Parasuram Patel v.  State of Orissa,  (1994) 4 SCC 664 and  Madan Lal  

Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar, (2007) 7 SCC 623. In neither of these cases had  

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the Appellate Court taken steps available to it to ensure the attendance of the  

Appellant. Instead, it appears that the concerned High Court had adopted the  

obviously  less  tedious  approach  of  dismissing  the  appeals  only  because  

neither the Appellant nor his counsel were present when the case was called  

on  for  hearing.  The  Court  did  not  ruminate  upon  the  curial  malpractice  

which has now become endemic, viz. the filing of appeals by convicts with  

the obvious intent to frustrate and circumvent sentences passed by criminal  

Courts.  We cannot close our eyes to the reality that less than twenty per cent  

of prosecutions are successful; the rest are futile largely because of inept,  

shoddy or substandard investigation and prosecution. Even in cases where  

the prosecution succeeds in proving the guilt of the accused, punishment is  

emasculated  by convicts  not  because  of  their  succeeding  in  having their  

conviction overturned and reversed by the Appellate Court,  but by going  

underground and disappearing from society  after  receiving reprieve from  

incarceration from the Appellate Court. We are convinced that the interests  

of society at large are being repeatedly sacrificed for the exaggerated, if not  

misplaced  concern  for  what  is  fashionably  termed  as  ‘human  rights’  of  

convicts.  Recent judgments of the Court contain a perceptible dilution of  

legal principles such as the right of silence of the accused. The Supreme  

Court has, in several cases, departed from this rule in enunciating, inter alia,  

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that the accused are duty bound to give a valid explanation of facts within  

their  specific  and personal  knowledge in  order  to  dispel  doubts  on  their  

complicity. Even half a century ago this would have been a jural anathema.  

Given  the  woeful  success  rate  of  the  prosecution,  if  even  the  relatively  

niggard  number  of  convicts  are  permitted  to  circumvent  their  sentences,  

crime is certain to envelop society. Law is dynamic and not immutable or  

static.  It  constantly  adapts  itself  to  critically  changing  compulsions  of  

society. (See State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd.  (2004) 11  

SCC 26). The criminal justice delivery system is being held to ransom by  

convicts who have developed the devious and dishonest practice of escaping  

punishment or sentence by filing appeals,  obtaining bail or suspension of  

sentence and thereafter disappearing beyond the reach of the arms of the  

law.  The  inherent  powers  under  Section  482  of  the  CrPC,  which  the  

Supreme Court has on several occasions expounded to have existed from  

time immemorial, predating the present as well as the previous CrPC, must  

be  pressed  into  action  lest  the  already  fragile  policing  and  prosecuting  

branches of governance are rendered redundant.  Since Section 482 of the  

CrPC was not considered by either of the Three Judge Benches of this Court,  

we have not found it  necessary to resort to recommending the matter for  

being laid before a Larger Bench.  The facts and pronouncement in  Bani  

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Singh cannot be extrapolated to the factual matrix before us. On the contrary  

the opinion in Ram Naresh Yadav as well as in Kishan Singh are available  

to us to ensure that preventive action is devised to combat the abuse of Court  

process so that facilitative steps are taken to secure the ends of justice.  

12. Section 482 of the CrPC is of singular and seminal significance. The  

statutory provision which immediately comes to mind is Section 151 of the  

CPC because to a great extent the language is identical. We are juxtaposing  

the two Sections for the facility of reference:-  

Section 482 of CrPC Section 151 of CPC Saving of inherent power of High  Court. – Nothing in this Code shall  be  deemed  to  limit  or  affect  the  inherent powers of the High Court  to  make  such  orders  as  may  be  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any  order  under  this  Code,  or  to  prevent abuse of the process of any  Court  or  otherwise  to  secure  the  ends of justice.

Saving of inherent powers of Court.  –  Nothing  in  this  Code  shall  be  deemed to limit or otherwise affect  the inherent power of the Court to  make  such  order  as  may  be  necessary for the ends of justice or  to prevent abuse of the process of  the Court.

13. It is at once obvious that whereas Section 482 of the CrPC is available  

only to the High Courts, Section 151 can be resorted to at any stage of civil  

judicial proceedings in any of the hierarchical tiers. Secondly, the use of the  

word  ‘otherwise’  in  Section  482  has  the  avowed  effect  of  boundlessly  

broadening the boundaries of inherent powers of the High Court in exercise  

of its criminal jurisdiction. Thirdly, Section 482 can be employed to ensure  

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obedience of any order passed by the Court because of the phrase “to give  

effect to any order under this Code”. State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy,  

(1977)  2  SCC 699  enunciates  that  in  exercise  of  its  inherent  powers  in  

criminal  matters  “the  High  Court  is  entitled  to  quash  a  proceeding  if  it  

comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be  

an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that  

the proceeding ought to be quashed.....The ends of justice are higher than the  

ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws  

made  by  the  Legislature.  The  compelling  necessity  for  making  these  

observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of  

the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to  

do  justice  between  the  State  and  its  subjects,  it  would  be  impossible  to  

appreciate  the  width  and  contours  of  that  salient  jurisdiction”.  A Three-

Judge Bench clarified in  Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 that  

although a second Revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first  

one  by  the  Court  of  Sessions  is  barred  by  Section  397(3),  the  inherent  

powers of the High Court under Section 482 are nevertheless available albeit  

with restraint so as to avoid needless multiplicity of the proceedings. This  

Court  had opined that  “when the High Court  notices that  there has been  

failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or  

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order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent  

the  abuse  of  the  process  or  miscarriage  of  justice  or  to  correct  

irregularities ..... The inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred  

by  the  Code  but  one  which  the  High  Court  already  has  in  it  and  it  is  

preserved by the Court”. Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR  

1980 SC 258 considered the question whether the inherent  power of  the  

High Court  under  Section  482 stand  repelled  when  the  revisional  power  

under Section 397 overlaps. The view was that- “Section 482 contradicts this  

contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the  

amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language  

of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law;  

when a specific provision is made, easy resort to inherent power is not right  

except  under  compelling  circumstances.  Not  that  there  is  absence  of  

jurisdiction but  that  inherent  power should not  invade areas set  apart  for  

specific power under the same Code”. In State of Punjab v.  Kasturi Lal,  

(2004) 12 SCC 195 : 2004 Crl. L.J. 3866, after cautioning against reckless  

use of Section 482 this Court has observed– “Inherent jurisdiction under the  

section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution  

and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in  

the  section  itself.  It  is  to  be  exercised ex  debito  justitiae to  do  real  and  

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substantial  justice  for  the  administration  of  which  alone  Courts  exists.  

Authority of the Courts exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt  

is  made to abuse that  authority so as to produce injustice,  the Court  has  

power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to  

allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of  

justice.  In exercise  of  the powers Court  would be justified to  quash any  

proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the  

process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the  

ends of justice”.  Advanced Law Lexicon by P.  Ramanatha Aiyar defines  

Justice as – “The exercise of authority or power in maintenance of right;  

vindication  of  right  by  assignment  of  reward  or  punishment;  the  

administration of law or the form and processes attending it; the principle of  

just dealing”.

14. It seems to us that it is necessary for the Appellate Court which is  

confronted  with  the  absence  of  the  convict  as  well  as  his  counsel,  to  

immediately proceed against the persons who stood surety at the time when  

the  convict  was  granted  bail,  as  this  may  lead  to  his  discovery  and  

production in Court.  If even this exercise fails to locate and bring forth the  

convict, the Appellate Court is empowered to dismiss the appeal.  We fully  

and respectfully concur with the recent elucidation of the law, profound yet  

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perspicuous, in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 721.  

After a comprehensive analysis of previous decisions our learned Brother  

had distilled the legal  position into six  propositions:-   (a)  That  the High  

Court  cannot  dismiss  an  appeal  for  non-prosecution  simpliciter  without  

examining the merits; (b) That the Court is not bound to adjourn the matter  

if both the Appellant or his counsel/lawyer are absent; (c)   That the Court  

may, as a matter of prudence or indulgence, adjourn the matter but it is not  

bound to do so; (d)  That it can dispose of the appeal after perusing the  

record and judgment of the trial court.  (e)  That if the accused is in jail and  

cannot, on his own, come to court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case  

and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the Appellant-accused if  

his lawyer is not present, and if the lawyer is absent and the court deems it  

appropriate to appoint a lawyer at the State expense to assist it, nothing in  

law would preclude the court from doing so; and  (f) That if the case is  

decided  on merits  in  the  absence  of  the  Appellant,  the  higher  court  can  

remedy the situation.

15. The enunciation of the inherent powers of the High Court in exercise  

of  its  criminal  jurisdiction  already  articulated  by  this  Court  on  several  

occasions motivates us to press Section 482 into operation. We reiterate that  

there is an alarming and sinister increase in instances where convicts have  

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filed appeals apparently with a view to circumvent and escape undergoing  

the sentences awarded against them. The routine is to file an appeal, apply  

and get  enlarged on bail  or  get  exempted from surrender,  and thereafter  

wilfully to become untraceable or unresponsive. It is the bounden duty cast  

upon the Judge not merely to ensure that an innocent person is not punished  

but  equally  not  to  become  a  mute  spectator  to  the  spectacle  of  convict  

circumventing  his  conviction.  (See  Stirland v.  Director  of  Public  

Prosecutions,  1944  AC  315  quoted  with  approval  by  Arijit  Pasayat,  J.  

in State of Punjab v.    Karnail Singh   (2003) 11 SCC 271). If the Court is  

derelict in doing its duty, the social fabric will be rent asunder and anarchy  

will  rule  everywhere.  It  is,  therefore,  imperative  to  put  an  end  to  such  

practice by the expeditious disposal of appeals. The inherent powers of the  

High Court, poignantly preserved in Section 482 of the CrPC, can also be  

pressed into service but with care, caution and circumspection.

16. Reverting  back  to  the  facts  of  the  present  case  a  perusal  of  the  

impugned  order  makes  it  abundantly  evident  that  the  High  Court  has  

considered the case  in  all  its  complexities.  The argument  that  the High  

Court  was  duty-bound to  appoint  an  amicus  curiae  is  not  legally  sound.  

Panduranga correctly considers Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam (1996)  

4  SCC  729  as per  incuriam,  inasmuch  as  the  latter  mandates  the  

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appointment of an amicus curiae and is thus irreconcilable with Bani Singh.  

In the case in hand the High Court has manifestly discussed the evidence  

that  have  been  led,  and  finding  it  of  probative  value,  has  come  to  the  

conclusion that the conviction is above Appellate reproach correction and  

interference.   In view of the analysis of the law the contention raised before  

us  that  it  was essential  for  the High Court  to  have appointed an amicus  

curiae is wholly untenable.  The High Court has duly undertaken the curial  

responsibility that fastens upon the Appellate Court, and cannot be faulted  

on the approach adopted by it.  In this respect, we find no error.   

17. So far as the present Appeal is concerned, since a request for remand  

had  been  made  which  we  stoutly  reject,  and  since  the  convict  was  not  

represented through counsel before the High Court,  we think it proper to  

permit the Appellant an opportunity to argue the Appeal on its merits.  We  

therefore grant Leave and direct that the case be listed for Final hearing.  

...........................................J. [T.S. THAKUR]

...........................................J.                                            [VIKRAMAJIT SEN] New Delhi October 07, 2013.

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