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Reportabl e

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.305     OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9276 of 2012)

Surender Kaushik and others ...  Appellants

Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh and others                    ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. The  present  appeal,  by  special  leave,  is  directed  

against  the order  dated 12.10.2012 passed by the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.  

15077 of 2012 wherein the High Court has declined  

to quash the FIR No. 442 of 2012 registered at P.S.  

Civil Lines, Meerut, that has given rise to Crime No.

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491 of 2012 for offences punishable under Sections  

406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the Indian  

Penal Code (for short “the IPC”).   

3. At the very outset, it is requisite to be stated that the  

appellants had invoked the jurisdiction under Article  

226 of the Constitution for quashment of the FIR on  

two counts,  namely,  first,  that no prima facie case  

existed for putting the criminal law into motion and,  

second, when on the similar and identical cause of  

action  and  allegations,  FIR  No.  425  of  2012  

corresponding to Crime No. 475 of 2012 had already  

been registered, a second FIR could not have been  

lodged  and  entertained.   The  High  Court,  by  the  

impugned order,  has opined that it  cannot be held  

that no prima facie case is disclosed and, thereafter,  

proceeded to  issue certain  directions  in  relation to  

surrender before the concerned court  and grant of  

interim bail in view of the decision rendered by the  

Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Amrawati  

and another v. State of UP1 and Lal Kamlendra  

1 2005 Cri. L.J. 755

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Pratap  Singh  v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  

others2.   

4. We are not adverting to the second part of the order  

as the controversy in this regard has not emerged  

before this Court in the present case.  The assail to  

the validity of registration of second FIR has not been  

dealt  with  by  the  High  Court.   Mr.  Nagendra  Rai,  

learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,  

did not advance any contention and, rightly so, with  

regard  to  the  existence  of  a  prima  facie  case  for  

registration of the FIR, but emphatically put forth the  

proponements  pertaining  to  the  validity  of  

entertaining the second FIR despite the lodgment of  

an earlier FIR in respect of the same cause of action  

and the same incident.  Therefore, we shall restrict  

our delineation to the said sentinel issue exclusively.

5. From  the  factual  background  which  has  been  

exposited in this appeal and the documents annexed  

thereto,  it  is  limpid  that  FIR  No.  274  of  2012  was  

lodged by the appellant No. 1, Surender Kaushik, as  

the Secretary of Sanjeev Memorial Education Society  2 (2009) 4 SCC 437

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on 29.5.2012 against Dr. Subhash Gupta, Dr. Harshu  

Gupta and Yunus Pahalwan, members of the society,  

alleging  that  in  collusion  with  one  Surya  Prakash  

Jalan,  they  had  prepared  fake  and  fraudulent  

documents.   It  was  further  alleged  that  their  

signatures  had  been  forged  indicating  their  

participation  in  various  general/executive  meetings  

of the society, though they had not attended the said  

meetings.  On the basis of the said FIR, a crime under  

Sections  420,  467,  468  and  471  of  the  IPC  was  

registered.

6. One Dr.  Subhash Gupta filed an application before  

the  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Meerut,  

under  Section  156(3)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure (for brevity “the Code”) alleging, inter alia,  

that he was never a member of the Sanjeev Memorial  

Education  Society,  Ghaziabad  and  further  he  was  

neither present in the meetings of the society which  

were held on 1.10.2008 and 16.4.2009 nor was he a  

signatory  to  the  resolutions  passed  in  the  said  

meetings.   It  was  further  asseverated  in  the  

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application  that  the  accused persons,  namely,  P.C.  

Gupta,  Seema  Gupta,  Surender  Kaushik,  Kamlesh  

Sharma and Vimal Singh, had fabricated an affidavit  

on  15.12.2008  with  forged  signatures  and  filed  

before the Deputy Registrar, Society Chit and Fund,  

Mohanpuri,  Meerut.   The  said  petition  was  

entertained and on the basis of the direction of the  

learned Magistrate, FIR No. 425 of 2012 was lodged  

on  21.8.2012  for  the  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the  

IPC.

7. As the facts would further unfurl, FIR No. 442 of 2012  

which  gave  rise  to  Crime  No.  491  of  2012  was  

registered on 4.9.2012 and it is apt to note that the  

said FIR came to  be registered on the basis  of  an  

order  passed  by  the  learned  Magistrate  under  

Section 156(3)  of  the Code.   In  the said  case,  the  

complainant  was  Smt.  Nidhi  Jalan,  one  of  the  

members of the Governing Body of the society, and it  

was  alleged  that  she  is  a  member  of  the  society  

which runs an educational institution, namely, Mayo  

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International  School,  and  the  accused  persons,  

namely,  P.C.  Gupta,  Seema  Gupta,  Vikash  Jain,  

Bhawna  Jain,  Sushil  Jain,  Shubhi  Jain,  Surender  

Kaushik,  Kamlesh  Sharma,  Rajender  Sharma,  

Virender  Bhardwaj,  Vimal  Singh and Renu Sharma,  

having  entered  into  a  conspiracy  had  prepared  

forged  documents  regarding  meetings  held  on  

different dates, fabricated signatures of the members  

and  filed  before  the  competent  authority  with  the  

common intention to grab the property/funds of the  

society.  Be it noted, the members had filed affidavits  

before the competent authority that they had never  

taken  part  in  the  meetings  of  the  school  

management  and  had  not  signed  any  papers.   As  

already  stated,  the  said  FIR  pertained  to  offences  

punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471,  

504 and 506 of the IPC.

8. It is submitted by Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior  

counsel, that the FIR No. 442 of 2012 could not have  

been  lodged  and  entertained  as  law  prohibits  

lodgment of the second FIR in respect of the same  

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cognizable offence and it is propounded by him that  

when  there  is  a  legal  impediment  for  setting  the  

criminal  law  in  motion,  the  decision  in  State  of  

Haryana and others  v.  Bhajan Lal and others3  

gets  attracted.   To  bolster  the  contention that  the  

second  FIR  could  not  have  been  entertained,  the  

learned  senior  counsel  has  commended  us  to  the  

decisions in  T.T. Antony  v.  State of Kerala and  

others4,  Pandurang  Chandrakant  Mhatre  and  

others v. State of Maharashtra5 and Babubhai v.  

State of Gujarat and others6.

9. Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel for the State,  

per  contra,  submitted  that  there  is  no  absolute  

prohibition in law for lodgment of a second FIR and,  

more so, when allegations are made from different  

spectrum or, for that matter, when different versions  

are  put  forth  by  different  persons  and  there  are  

different accused persons.  It is urged by him that the  

decisions  relied  upon  by  the  appellants  are  

3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 4 (2001) 6 SCC 181 5 (2009) 10 SCC 773 6 (2010) 12 SCC 254

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distinguishable  on facts  and the proposition of  law  

laid  down  therein  is  not  applicable  to  the  case  at  

hand.   The  learned  senior  counsel  would  further  

contend  that  the  principles  stated  in  Ram  Lal  

Narang  v.  State  (Delhi  Administration)7 and  

Upkar  Singh  v.  Ved  Prakash  and  others8 are  

attracted to the case at hand.

10. Mr.  Altaf  Ahmed,  learned senior  counsel  appearing  

for  the  complainant,  the  fourth  respondent  herein,  

has submitted that on certain occasions, same set of  

facts  may  constitute  different  offences  and  when  

there  are  two  distinct  offences  having  different  

ingredients,  there  would  be  no  embargo  for  

registration of two FIRs.  It is further canvassed by  

him that  on  certain  occasions,  two FIRs  may have  

some overlapping features but it is the substance of  

the allegations which has to be looked into, and if a  

restricted view is taken, then no counter FIR can ever  

be lodged.  The learned senior counsel would further  

submit that the investigation by the police cannot be  

7 (1979) 2 SCC 322 8 (2004) 13 SCC 292

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scuttled and the accused persons cannot be allowed  

to pave the escape route in this manner.  It has been  

highlighted by him that lodging of second FIR for the  

same  cause  of  action  or  offence  is  based  on  the  

principle that  a person should not  be vexed twice,  

but  if  there  are  offences  having  distinctive  

ingredients  and  overlapping  features,  it  would  not  

invite the frown of Article 20 of the Constitution of  

India.  The pronouncement in State (NCT of Delhi)  

v.  Navjot  Sandhu  alias  Afsan  Guru9 has  been  

commended to us.

11. Chapter XII of the Code deals with information to the  

police and their powers to investigate.  As provided  

under  Section  154  of  the  Code,  every  information  

relating to commission of a cognizable offence either  

given orally or in writing is required to be entered in  

a  book  to  be  kept  by  the  officer-in-charge  of  the  

concerned police station.  The said FIR, as mandated  

by law, has to pertain to a cognizable case.  Section  

9 (2005) 11 SCC 600

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2(c) of the Code defines “cognizable offence” which  

also deals with cognizable cases.  It reads as follows:-

“cognizable offence” means an offence for  which,  and  “cognizable  case”  means  a  case  in  which,  a  police  officer  may,  in  accordance  with  the  First  Schedule  or  under any other law for the time being in  force, arrest without warrant;”

12. If  the  primary  requirement  is  satisfied,  an  FIR  is  

registered and the criminal law is set in motion and  

the officer-in-charge of the police station takes up the  

investigation.   The  question  that  has  emerged  for  

consideration  in  this  case  is  whether  after  

registration  of  the  FIR  and  commencement  of  the  

investigation,  a  second  FIR  relating  to  the  same  

incident  on  the  basis  of  a  direction  issued  by  the  

learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code  

can be registered.

13. For  apposite  appreciation  of  the  issue  raised,  it  is  

necessitous  to  refer  to  certain  authorities  which  

would  throw  significant  light  under  what  

circumstances  entertainment  of  second  FIR  is  

prohibited.  In  Ram Lal Narang  (supra), this Court  

was dealing with the facts  and circumstances of  a  

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case where two FIRs were lodged and two charge-

sheets were filed.  The Bench took note of the fact  

that the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of  

the second case could not be said to be identical with  

the conspiracy which was the subject-matter of the  

first one and further the conspirators were different,  

although  the  conspiracy  which  was  the  subject-

matter of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have  

turned out to be a part of the conspiracy which was  

the  subject-matter  of  the  second  case.   After  

adverting to the various facets,  it  has been opined  

that  occasions  may  arise  when  a  second  

investigation started independently of the first may  

disclose  wide  range  of  offences  including  those  

covered by the first investigation.  Being of this view,  

the Court did not find any flaw in the investigation on  

the basis of the subsequent FIR.

14. In  T.T. Antony (supra), it was canvassed on behalf  

of  the  accused  that  the  registration  of  fresh  

information in respect of the very same incident as  

an FIR under Section 154 of the Code was not valid  

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and,  therefore,  all  steps  taken  pursuant  thereto  

including investigation were illegal  and liable to be  

quashed.  The Bench, analyzing the scheme of the  

provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169,  

170 and 173 of the Code, came to hold that only the  

earliest  or  the  first  information  in  regard  to  the  

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  satisfies  the  

requirements  of  Section  154  of  the  Code  and,  

therefore,  there  can  be  no  second  FIR  and  

consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on  

receipt of every subsequent information in respect of  

the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence  

or  incident  giving  rise  to  one  or  more  cognizable  

offences. It was further observed that on receipt of  

information about a cognizable offence or an incident  

giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on  

entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer  

in charge of a police station has to investigate not  

merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but  

also  other  connected offences  found to  have been  

committed in the course of the same transaction or  

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the same occurrence and file one or more reports as  

provided in Section 173 of the Code.

15. It is worth noting that in the said case, the two-Judge  

Bench  explained  and  distinguished  the  dictum  in  

Ram Lal Narang (supra) by opining that the Court  

had indicated that the real question was whether the  

two  conspiracies  were  in  truth  and  substance  the  

same and held that the conspiracies in the two cases  

were not identical. It further proceeded to state that  

the  Court  did  not  repel  the  contention  of  the  

appellant  regarding the illegality of the second FIR  

and the investigation based thereon being vitiated,  

but  on  facts  found  that  the  two  FIRs  in  truth  and  

substance were different since the first was a smaller  

conspiracy and the second was a larger conspiracy as  

it  turned  out  eventually.  Thereafter,  the  Bench  

explained thus: -

“The  1973  CrPC  specifically  provides  for  further  investigation  after  forwarding  of  report under sub-section (2) of Section 173  CrPC  and  forwarding  of  further  report  or  reports to the Magistrate concerned under  Section 173(8) CrPC. It follows that if the  gravamen of the charges in the two FIRs —  the first and the second — is in truth and  

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substance  the  same,  registering  the  second FIR and making fresh investigation  and forwarding  report  under  Section 173  CrPC will be irregular and the court cannot  take cognizance of the same.”

16. In  Upkar Singh  (supra),  a  three-Judge Bench was  

addressing the issue pertaining to the correctness of  

law laid down in the case of  T.T. Antony (supra).  

The  larger  Bench  took  note  of  the  fact  that  a  

complaint was lodged by the first respondent therein  

with Sikhera Police Station in Village Fahimpur Kalan  

at  10.00  a.m.  on  20th May,  1995  making  certain  

allegations against  the appellant  therein  and some  

other persons.  On the basis of the said complaint,  

the police had registered a crime under Sections 452  

and  307  of  the  IPC.   The  appellant  had  lodged  a  

complaint in regard to the very same incident against  

the  respondents  therein  for  having  committed  

offences punishable under Sections 506 and 307 of  

the IPC as against him and his family members.  As  

the  said  complaint  was  not  entertained  by  the  

concerned  police,  he,  under  compelling  

circumstances, filed a petition under Section 156(3)  

of  the  Code  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  who  

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having  found  a  prima  facie  case,  directed  the  

concerned police station to register a crime against  

the  accused  persons  in  the  said  complaint  and  to  

investigate the same and submit a report.  On the  

basis of the said direction, Crime No. 48-A of 1995  

was  registered  for  offences  punishable  under  

Sections  147,  148,  149  and  307  of  the  IPC.  

Challenging the direction of the Magistrate, a revision  

was preferred before the learned Sessions Judge who  

set aside the said direction.  Being aggrieved by the  

order  passed  by  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  a  

Criminal Miscellaneous petition was filed before the  

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the High  

Court,  following its earlier decision in  Ram Mohan  

Garg  v.  State  of  U.P.10,  dismissed  the  revision.  

While dealing with the issue, this Court referred to  

paragraph 18 of T.T. Antony (supra) and noted how  

the same had been understood: -

“11. This  observation  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  said  case  of  T.T.  Antony is  understood by the learned counsel for the  respondents  as  the  Code  prohibiting  the  filing  of  a  second complaint  arising  from  

10 (1990) 27 ACC 438

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the same incident. It is on that basis and  relying on the said judgment in T.T. Antony  case an argument is addressed before us  that  once  an  FIR  is  registered  on  the  complaint of one party a second FIR in the  nature of a counter-case is not registrable  and  no  investigation  based  on  the  said  second complaint could be carried out.”

17. After so observing, the Court held that the judgment  

in T.T. Antony (supra) really does not lay down such  

a proposition of law as has been understood by the  

learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  therein.   The  

Bench referred to the factual score of  T.T. Antony  

(supra) and explained thus:-

“Having carefully gone through the above  judgment, we do not think that this Court  in the said cases of T.T. Antony v. State of  Kerala has precluded an aggrieved person  from filing a counter-case as in the present  case.”

To arrive at such a conclusion, the Bench referred to  

paragraph  27  of  the  decision  in  T.T.  Antony (supra)  

wherein  it  has  been  stated  that  a  case  of  fresh  

investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not  

being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or  

connected  cognizable  offence  alleged  to  have  been  

committed in the course of the same transaction and in  

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respect  of  which  pursuant  to  the  first  FIR  either  

investigation is  under way or final  report  under Section  

173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit  

case for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code  

or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Thereafter,  

the three-Judge Bench ruled thus:

“In our opinion, this Court in that case only  held  that  any  further  complaint  by  the  same  complainant  or  others  against  the  same  accused,  subsequent  to  the  registration of a case, is prohibited under  the Code because an investigation in this  regard  would  have  already  started  and  further  complaint  against  the  same  accused will amount to an improvement on  the  facts  mentioned  in  the  original  complaint, hence will  be prohibited under  Section 162 of the Code.  This prohibition  noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does  not  apply  to  counter-complaint  by  the  accused  in  the  first  complaint  or  on  his  behalf  alleging  a  different  version  of  the  said incident.”

18. Be it noted, in the said verdict, reference was made  

to  Kari Choudhary  v.  Sita Devi11,  wherein it  has  

been opined that there cannot be two FIRs against  

the same accused in respect of the same case, but  

when there are rival versions in respect of the same  

episode, they would normally take the shape of two  

11 (2002) 1 SCC 714

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different  FIRs  and investigation  can  be carried  out  

under  both  of  them  by  the  same  investigating  

agency.  Reference was made to the pronouncement  

in  State of Bihar  v.  J.A.C. Saldanha12 wherein it  

has  been  highlighted  that  the  power  of  the  

Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code to direct  

further investigation is clearly an independent power  

and does not stand in conflict with the power of the  

State Government as spelt out under Section 3 of the  

Police Act.

19. It is worth noting that the Court also dealt with the  

view  expressed  in  Ram  Lal  Narang (supra)  and  

stated thus: -

“22. A  perusal  of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Ram Lal  Narang v.  State  (Delhi  Admn.) also  shows  that  even  in  cases  where  a  prior  complaint  is  already  registered,  a  counter-complaint  is  permissible but  it  goes further  and holds  that even in cases where a first complaint  is registered and investigation initiated, it  is  possible  to  file  a  further  complaint  by  the  same  complainant  based  on  the  material  gathered  during  the  course  of  investigation.  Of  course,  this  larger  proposition  of  law  laid  down  in  Ram Lal  Narang case is not necessary to be relied  

12 (1980) 1 SCC 554

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on by us in the present case. Suffice it to  say that the discussion in Ram Lal Narang  case is  in  the same line as  found in  the  judgments in Kari Choudhary and State of  Bihar v.  J.A.C. Saldanha. However, it must  be noticed that in  T.T. Antony case,  Ram  Lal Narang case was noticed but the Court  did not express any opinion either way.”

20. Explaining further, the Court observed that if the law  

laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony (supra) is to  

be accepted to have held that a second complaint in  

regard  to  the  same  incident  filed  as  a  counter  

complaint  is  prohibited  under  the  Code,  such  

conclusion  would  lead  to  serious  consequences  

inasmuch  as  the  real  accused  can  take  the  first  

opportunity  to  lodge  a  false  complaint  and  get  it  

registered by the jurisdictional police and then that  

would preclude the victim to lodge a complaint.   

21. In  Pandurang Chandrakant  Mhatre (supra),  the  

Court  referred  to  T.T.  Antony (supra),  Ramesh  

Baburao  Devaskar  v.  State  of  Maharashtra13  

and Vikram v. State of Maharashtra14 and opined  

that  the  earliest  information  in  regard  to  the  

commission of a cognizable offence is to be treated  

13 (2007) 13 SCC 501 14 (2007) 12 SCC 332

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as the first information report and it sets the criminal  

law in motion and the investigation commences on  

that basis.   Although the first  information report is  

not expected to be an encyclopaedia of events, yet  

an  information  to  the  police  in  order  to  be  first  

information report under Section 154(1) of the Code,  

must contain some essential and relevant details of  

the  incident.   A  cryptic  information  about  the  

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  irrespective  of  

the nature and details of such information may not  

be  treated  as  first  information  report.   After  so  

stating, the Bench posed the question whether the  

information  regarding  the  incident  therein  entered  

into  general  diary  given  by  PW-5  is  the  first  

information report within the meaning of Section 154  

of the Code and, if so, it would be hit by Section 162  

of  the Code.   It  is  worth noting that analyzing the  

facts, the Court opined that information given to the  

police to rush to the place of the incident to control  

the situation need not necessarily amount to an FIR.

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22. In  Babubhai (supra), this Court, after surveying the  

earlier decisions, expressed the view that the court  

has to examine the facts and circumstances giving  

rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to  

be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to  

the same incident in respect of the same occurrence  

or  are in  regard to the incidents which are two or  

more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is  

in  the  affirmative,  the  second  FIR  is  liable  to  be  

quashed.  However,  in  case  the contrary  is  proved,  

where the version in the second FIR is different and  

they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes,  

the second FIR is permissible.  In case the accused in  

the first FIR comes forward with a different version or  

counterclaim  in  respect  of  the  same  incident,  

investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.

23. It  is  worth  noting  that  in  the  said  case,  the  Court  

expressed the view that the High Court had correctly  

reached the conclusion that the second FIR was liable  

to  be quashed as in  both the FIRs,  the allegations  

related to the same incident that had occurred at the  

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same place in close proximity of time and, therefore,  

they were two parts of the same transaction.

24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that  

the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect  

of  one  and  the  same  incident.   The  concept  of  

sameness has been given a restricted meaning.  It  

does not encompass filing of a counter FIR relating to  

the same or connected cognizable offence.  What is  

prohibited  is  any  further  complaint  by  the  same  

complainant  and  others  against  the  same accused  

subsequent to the registration of the case under the  

Code, for an investigation in that regard would have  

already  commenced  and  allowing  registration  of  

further complaint would amount to an improvement  

of the facts mentioned in the original complaint.  As  

is  further  made clear  by  the  three-Judge  Bench  in  

Upkar Singh (supra), the prohibition does not cover  

the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR  

alleging  a  different  version  of  the  same  incident.  

Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident  

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do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment  

of two FIRs is permissible.

25. In the case at hand, the appellants lodged the FIR No.  

274 of  2012 against  four  accused persons alleging  

that  they  had  prepared  fake  and  fraudulent  

documents.  The second FIR came to be registered  

on the basis of the direction issued by the learned  

Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  in  exercise  of  

power  under  Section  156(3)  of  the  Code  at  the  

instance of another person alleging, inter alia, that he  

was  neither  present  in  the  meetings  nor  had  he  

signed any of the resolutions of the meetings and the  

accused  persons,  five  in  number,  including  the  

appellant  No.  1  herein,  had  fabricated  documents  

and filed the same before the competent authority.  

FIR No. 442 of 2012 (which gave rise to Crime No.  

491  of  2012)  was  registered  because  of  an  order  

passed by the learned Magistrate.  Be it noted, the  

complaint  was  filed  by  another  member  of  the  

Governing Body of the Society and the allegation was  

that  the  accused  persons,  twelve  in  number,  had  

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entered  into  a  conspiracy  and  prepared  forged  

documents relating to the meetings held on different  

dates.   There  was  allegation  of  fabrication  of  the  

signatures  of  the  members  and  filing  of  forged  

documents before the Registrar of Societies with the  

common intention to grab the property/funds of the  

Society.  If the involvement of the number of accused  

persons  and  the  nature  of  the  allegations  are  

scrutinized,  it  becomes crystal  clear that every FIR  

has a different spectrum.  The allegations made are  

distinct  and  separate.   It  may  be  regarded  as  a  

counter  complaint  and  cannot  be  stated  that  an  

effort has been made to improve the allegations that  

find place in the first FIR.  It is well-nigh impossible to  

say  that  the  principle  of  sameness  gets  attracted.  

We are inclined to think so, for if the said principle is  

made  applicable  to  the  case  at  hand  and  the  

investigation  is  scuttled  by  quashing  the  FIRs,  the  

complainants in the other two FIRs would be deprived  

of  justice.   The  appellants  have  lodged  the  FIR  

making the allegations against certain persons, but  

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that does not debar the other aggrieved persons to  

move the court for direction of registration of an FIR  

as there have been other accused persons including  

the  complainant  in  the  first  FIR  involved  in  the  

forgery  and  fabrication  of  documents  and  getting  

benefits from the statutory authority.  In the ultimate  

eventuate,  how  the  trial  would  commence  and  be  

concluded  is  up  to  the  concerned  court.   The  

appellants or any of the other complainants or the  

accused persons may move the appropriate court for  

a  trial  in  one  court.   That  is  another  aspect  

altogether.  But to say that it is a second FIR relating  

to the same cause of action and the same incident  

and there is sameness of occurrence and an attempt  

has been made to improvise the case is not correct.  

Hence,  we  conclude  and  hold  that  the  submission  

that  the  FIR  lodged  by  the  fourth  respondent  is  a  

second FIR and is,  therefore,  liable to  be quashed,  

does not merit acceptance.

26. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  premised  reasons,  the  

appeal, being sans substance, stands dismissed.

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……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

……………………………….J.                                            [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; February 14, 2013

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