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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.5038 OF 2009

Surjeet Singh Bhamra  ……Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Bank of India & Ors. ……Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This  appeal  is  filed  against  the  final  judgment

and order dated 09.05.2007 passed by the High Court

of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No. 171

of 2006 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court

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dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant preferred

against the judgment and order dated 20.04.2006 of

the Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No.

3842 of 2002 by which the Single Judge dismissed the

writ  petition  of  the  appellant  wherein  the  challenge

was to the order dated 20.03.2001 passed by the Chief

Manager,  Bank  of  India  (respondent  No.3  herein)

imposing the punishment of reduction of his basic pay

by five stages on the appellant.

2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in this

appeal, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts in

brief infra.

3) The appellant  was an employee of  the  Bank of

India.   He was posted as Branch Manager,  Panagar

Branch,  Jabalpur  Region  from  04.07.1996  to

26.05.1999.   According  to  the  appellant,  during  his

tenure, the profits of the said Branch were increased

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from 2 lakhs to 30 lakhs, deposits were increased from

6 crores  to  11  crores  and  advances  were  increased

from 2 crores to 4 crores.  The appellant also claimed

that the NPA of the Branch fell down from 57 lakhs to

20 lakhs.  The appellant claimed that due to his good

performance,  his  Branch  won  the  award  of  Best

Branch of the Year.   

4) On 08.09.2000, a memo was issued by the Chief

Regional  Manager,  Bank  of  India,  Jabalpur  to  the

appellant mentioning therein that during his tenure as

Manager  of  Panagar  Branch,  certain

irregularities/lapses were reported in disbursement of

loans.  The details of several irregularities alleged to

have been committed by the appellant were mentioned

in the memo.  The appellant was asked to submit his

reply.   On  18.10.2000,  the  appellant  submitted  his

reply to the Chief Regional Manager, Jabalpur.   

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5) On 01.11.2000, the respondent-Bank announced

Voluntary  Retirement  Scheme,  2000  (in  short

‘Scheme’)  with  a  view to  lay  off  approx.  6000  extra

employees.  Accordingly, offers were made to the staff

in general for opting voluntary retirement pursuant to

the Scheme on or before 31.12.2000.     

6) In  response  to  the  said  Scheme,  the  Bank

received  7600  applications  as  against  6000.   The

appellant  also  applied  for  voluntary  retirement  on

16.11.2000.  The  appellant  on  05.01.2001  was

informed that his application is in the process.   

7) On  02.03.2001,  the  appellant  was  served  with

the charge-sheet.  The charges were in relation to the

irregularities  which  were  mentioned  in  the  memo

dated 08.09.2000.   

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8) The appellant filed his reply on 13.03.2001 to the

charge-sheet and accepted all  the charges contained

therein unconditionally.  

9) By order dated 20.03.2001, the Chief  Manager,

Dewas Branch and Disciplinary Authority, passed an

order awarding the consolidated penalty of reduction

in the pay of the appellant by five stages in the time

scale for a period of 3 years and on the expiry of such

period,  the  reduction  was  to  have  the  effect  of

postponing  the  future  increments  of  his  pay  to  the

extent in terms of Regulation No.4(1) of Bank of India

Officer Employees’  (Discipline & Appeal)  Regulations,

1976 ( in short “the Regulations”).   

10) After  passing  of  the  order  of  punishment,  the

Chief  Regional  Manager  accepted  the  appellant’s

application  for  voluntary  retirement  by  letter  dated

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19.06.2001.  In this way, the appellant stood retired

from the services of Bank w.e.f. 19.06.2001.

11) Being aggrieved by the said order of punishment,

the appellant preferred a departmental appeal before

the Zonal  Manager,  Bank of  India,  Ujjain Zone.   By

order  dated  21.06.2002,  the  Appellate  Authority

dismissed the appeal.

12) Challenging  the  said  order,  the  appellant

preferred  writ  petition  being  W.P.  No.3842  of  2002

before the High Court.  The Single Judge of the High

Court by order dated 20.04.2006, dismissed the writ

petition.

13) Against  the  order  of  the  Single  Judge,  the

appellant  filed an intra court  appeal  being W.A. No.

171  of  2006  before  the  High  Court.   The  Division

Bench  of  the  High  Court  by  impugned  order  dated

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09.05.2007  dismissed  the  appeal  and  upheld  the

findings of the Single Judge.

14) Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the

appellant-employee has preferred this appeal by way of

special leave before this Court.

15) Heard Mr. Mehul M. Gupta, learned counsel for

the appellant and Mr. S. Gopakumaran Nair, learned

senior counsel for the respondents.        

16) Mr.  Mehul  M.  Gupta,  learned  Counsel  for  the

appellant-employee  while  assailing  the  legality  and

correctness  of  the  impugned  order  urged  many-fold

submissions.   In  the  first  instance,  learned  counsel

contended that the High Court erred in dismissing the

appellant's  writ  petition  and  his  intra  court  appeal

thereby  erred  in  upholding  the  punishment  order

dated 20.03.2001 passed by the Bank.  

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17) It  was  his  submission  that  once  the  appellant

applied  for  voluntary  retirement  by  ensuring

compliance of the requirements of the Scheme then  it

was obligatory on the part of the Bank to have passed

an  order  either  by  accepting  or  rejecting  the

appellant’s  application  on  or  before  31.12.2000  as

prescribed in the Scheme.

18) Learned counsel pointed out that since the Bank

failed to pass any order on the appellant's application

on  or  before  31.12.2000,  its  effect  was  that  the

appellant's  application  was  deemed  accepted  by

“deeming fiction”  and as a consequence thereof,  the

appellant stood retired from the services of the Bank

on 31.12.2000.  

19) Learned  counsel  contended  that  in  these

circumstances,  the  relationship  of  employer  and

employee between the appellant and the Bank came to

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an end on 31.12.2000 and, therefore, the Bank had no

right  to take any action against the appellant  much

less to serve any charge-sheet and hold an inquiry into

those charges and impose a punishment by passing

order dated 20.03.2001.  

20) Learned counsel  further  urged that  though the

order of voluntary retirement was issued by the Bank

on 19.06.2001 yet according to him such order was

deemed to have been passed on 31.12.2000 because in

terms  of  the  Scheme,  an  order  of  acceptance  or

relieving  or  rejection  of  voluntary  retirement  was

required  to  be  passed  by  the  Bank  on  or  before

31.12.2000.  In other words, the submission was that

since the compliance of several clauses of the Scheme

was  mandatory  for  the  Bank  and,  therefore,  if  the

Bank failed to pass any order on the application by

31.12.2000, it only meant that either the application

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stood  automatically  allowed  on  31.12.2000  or  the

order passed on 19.06.2001 by which the appellant’s

application  had  been  accepted  was  deemed  to  have

been passed on 31.12.2000.  In either way, therefore,

the  appellant’s  retirement,  according  to  learned

counsel,  came  into  force  w.e.f.  31.12.2000  and  not

from 19.06.2001.  

21)  Learned  counsel  then  submitted  that  the

punishment  imposed  on  the  appellant  is  not  legally

sustainable  because  the  disciplinary  proceedings

which  culminated  in  passing  the  punishment  order

were initiated by the Bank after  31.12.2000,  i.e.  on

02.03.2001,  when  the  relationship  of  employee  and

employer between the parties had already ceased due

to acceptance of appellant’s application for voluntary

retirement on 31.12.2000 and hence the Bank had no

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right  to initiate  any disciplinary proceedings on and

after 31.12.2000 against the appellant.  

22) Learned counsel  lastly  submitted that  since on

assurance  of  the  Bank,  the  appellant  admitted  the

charges and,  therefore,  the  Bank ought  not  to  have

imposed any punishment on acceptance of appellant’s

application for voluntary retirement.  It was also urged

that in any case, looking to the past performance and

unblemished career of the appellant and having regard

to the gravity of the charges, the punishment inflicted

on the appellant is excessive and, therefore, liable to

be quashed.

23) In  reply,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent

(Bank)  while  supporting  the  impugned  order  urged

that no interference in the impugned order is called for

and the grounds on which punishment was upheld by

the High Court deserve to be upheld by this Court and

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lastly, the grounds urged by the learned counsel for

the appellant in support of this appeal also have no

merit.

24)  Learned counsel  elaborated his submission by

contending that the reading of the Scheme as a whole

would go to show that firstly,  the appellant was not

eligible  for  consideration  because  disciplinary

proceedings  were  in  contemplation  against  him and

later initiated also and even if, he was held eligible to

apply pursuant to the Scheme yet according to learned

counsel,  the  Bank  was  within  their  rights  to  pass

orders  on  his  application  made  for  voluntary

retirement  only  on  conclusion  of   disciplinary

proceedings and which the Bank also rightly passed by

accepting the application on 19.06.2001.  

25) Learned  Counsel  further  pointed  out  that  the

Scheme did not provide any consequence in case if the

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applications submitted by employees remain pending

on 31.12.2000.  It was urged that in the absence of

any specific  consequences not  being provided in the

Scheme  in  relation  to  pending  applications  on

31.12.2000, there could be no deemed acceptance of

such applications on 31.12.2000 as was urged by the

learned counsel for the appellant.  It was more so as

the learned counsel pointed out that the Scheme had

provided that no voluntary retirement of any employee

would come into force unless an order is passed by the

Bank  on  his  application.  In  other  words,  the

submission  was  that  every  application  made  by  the

employee was required to be disposed of by passing an

order by the Bank and, therefore, so long as the order

had not been passed, the applications would remain

pending.   

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26) Learned  counsel  urged  that  the  Scheme  was

directory in its  compliance insofar as the Bank was

concerned  and,  therefore,  the  Bank  was  within  its

rights  to  decide  the  pending  applications  even  after

31.12.2000 regardless of  any time constraint on the

Bank in deciding such applications. Learned counsel

urged that the principle of “deeming fiction” in these

circumstances had no application to the Scheme for

want of  any specific clause in the Scheme providing

such fiction.

27) Learned counsel  further  pointed out  that  since

the  appellant  was  in  services  of  the  Bank  till

19.06.2001, the Bank was within their rights to issue

charge-sheet  and  conclude  the  disciplinary

proceedings  before  19.06.2001  and  which  the  Bank

did when it served the charge-sheet on the appellant

on 02.03.2001 and passed the punishment order on

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20.03.2001  on  the  basis  of  admission  made  by  the

appellant admitting the charges leveled against him.   

28) Lastly,  learned  counsel  submitted  that  in  the

light of his above-mentioned submissions coupled with

the fact that there was no challenge to the order dated

19.06.2001  by  which  the  appellant’s  application  for

voluntary retirement  was accepted,  no case is  made

out  by  the  appellant  for  quashing  the  punishment

order dated 20.03.2001 which was rightly confirmed

by the Appellate Authority,  Writ Court and lastly by

the Division Bench.  

29) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no

substance in the submissions of learned counsel for

the appellant.

30) In our considered opinion, the fate of the appeal

largely depends upon answering three questions, viz.,

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firstly,  whether  the  Scheme  in  question  and,  in

particular,  its  relevant  clauses  are  mandatory  or

directory  for  ensuring  their  compliance  by  the

appellant and the Bank; Secondly, what is the effect of

the  Scheme  on  the  rights  of  the  appellant  and  the

Bank for deciding the legality of the punishment order

impugned  in  these  proceedings;  and  lastly,  whether

any  case  is  made  out  to  set  aside  the  punishment

order.  

31) At the outset, we may state that the appellant did

not  challenge the order dated 19.06.2001 passed by

the  Bank,  by  which  his  application  for  voluntary

retirement was accepted but confined his challenge in

these proceedings only to the order dated 20.03.2001

by which he was awarded punishment of reduction of

his basic salary in five stages in time scale for a period

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of 3 years and its consequential effect in pay fixation

as detailed in the order.  

32) Since  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have

extensively  referred  to  the  various  clauses  of  the

Scheme to show its object and effect for deciding the

legality  of  the  punishment  order,  we  consider  it

apposite to refer to these clauses infra:

“BANK OF INDIA VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT SCHEME-2000

A. ELIGIBILITY: All  permanent  employees  of  the  Bank

with 15 years of service or 40 years of age, as on 01.11.2000.  

The following employees are not eligible for Voluntary Retirement under the Scheme:-

a) Specialists  Officers/Employees  who have  executed  service  bonds  and  have  not completed  it,  Employees/Officers  serving abroad  under  Special  Arrangements/Bonds, will  not  be  eligible  for  VRS  (the  Board  of Directors may however waive this, subject to fulfillment of this bond/other requirements).

b) Employees  against  whom  disciplinary proceedings are contemplated/pending or are under suspension.

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c) Employees appointed on contract basis.

d) Any  other  category  of  employees  as may be specified by the Board.

F) The  Competent  Authority  may  accept or reject the application of an employee for voluntary  retirement  keeping  in  view  the organizational  requirements  or  any administrative reason and the decision of the Competent  Authority  shall  be  final.  No voluntary  retirement  shall  come into  effect unless the Competent Authority has passed orders  accepting  the  application  of  the employees  to  retire  voluntarily  under  the Scheme.  

G) Acceptance and Relieving/Rejection:

On  acceptance  of  the  application  for voluntary Retirement of an employee by the Competent Authority, the acceptance as well as  the  date  of  relieving  shall  be communicated to the employee through for controlling office/s. the employee shall stand relieved on the date stipulated in the above communication.  The  entire  process  of acceptance and relieving shall be concluded not later than 31.12.2000.  

In  case,  the  application  for  voluntary Retirement of an employee is rejected by the Competent Authority, an order giving reasons for  the  same  shall  be  passed  by  the Competent  Authority  and communicated to the employee through the controlling office, on or before 31.12.2000.  

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I. EFFECTIVE DATE:

The  Scheme  will  be  effective  from 15.11.2000  and  will  be  in  operation  for  a period of 1 month i.e. up to 14.12.2000 and can  be  withdrawn  at  the  discretion  of  the Bank  at  any  time  without  assigning  any reason.  J. RIGHT TO AMEND/ALTER :

The  Bank  reserves  the  right  to  alter and/or  amend  the  above  conditions  of  the Scheme.  The  applications  made  under  the Scheme will be irrevocable and the employees will  not  have  the  right  to  withdraw  the application once submitted.”  

33) Mere perusal of  the afore-quoted clauses would

go  to  show  that  the  application  for  voluntary

retirement was to be filed by the employee on or before

14.12.2000 and on such application being filed,  the

employee  had  no  right  to  withdraw  the  application.

The Scheme provided that any employee against whom

some  disciplinary  proceedings  are  contemplated  or

pending or if  he is under suspension then he is not

eligible  to  apply  for  voluntary  retirement  under  the

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Scheme.  The Scheme further provided that the Bank

is required to pass orders on the application (accepting

or  rejecting)  and  complete  all  proceedings  arising

therefrom on or before 31.12.2000. The Scheme also

provided that no voluntary retirement of an employee

would  come  into  effect  unless  the  Bank  passes  an

order on the application.  

34) Before we examine the questions arising in the

case, it is necessary to see the law, which applies to

the case in hand.

35) A  three-Judge Bench of  this  Court  in  Balwant

Singh  &  Ors.  vs.  Anand  Kumar  Sharma  &  Ors.,

(2003) 3 SCC 433 while examining the provisions of

Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act

explained as to under what circumstances, the duty

cast upon a private party is said to be mandatory and

why  it  is  said  to  be  directory  for  any  public

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functionary.  This is what was held in paragraph 7 of

this decision:  

“7. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which  cannot  be  lost  sight  of.  It  is  a well-settled  principle  that  if  a  thing  is required  to  be  done  by  a  private  person within  a  specified  time,  the  same  would ordinarily  be  mandatory  but  when  a  public functionary  is  required  to  perform a  public function within a time-frame, the same will be  held  to  be  directory  unless  the consequences  therefor  are  specified.  In Sutherland’s  Statutory  Construction,  3rd Edn., Vol. 3, at p. 107, it is pointed out that a statutory  direction  to  private  individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that  shall  follow  non-compliance  with  the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as follows:

“As a corollary of the rule outlined above,  the  fact  that  no consequences  of  non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered  as  a  factor  tending towards  a  directory  construction. But this is  only an element to be considered,  and  is  by  no  means conclusive.”

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36) Later,  a  question  arose  in  the  case  of  Visitor,

AMU & Ors. vs. K.S. Misra, (2007) 8 SCC 593  as to

whether a clause in a Statute of  the Benaras Hindu

University which  inter alia provided for doing certain

act   within a specified time by the party concerned, if

it is not done within the time specified in a particular

clause of the Statute then whether such clause would

be  construed  as  being  directory  or  mandatory  in

nature and secondly, what would be the effect if the

Statute did not provide for any consequence to accrue

in the event of non compliance of such clause or when

the  Statute  provided  for  some  consequence  in  the

event of non-compliance.  

37) Justice  GP  Mathur  speaking  for  the  Bench

examined the issue in the light of the aforementioned

principle  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Balwant  Singh

(supra) and after quoting the principle in paragraph 12

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applied the  same to examine the relevant clause of the

case and held as under:

“12. A three-Judge Bench in Balwant Singh v.  Anand  Kumar  Sharma  has  explained  in what  circumstances  the  duty  cast  upon  a private  party  can  be  said  to  be  mandatory and para 7 of the Report reads as under: (SCC p. 436, para 7) ………..“Principle quoted”…………………………

Therefore,  in accordance with the law laid  down  in  the  above  authority,  the provisions  of  Statutes  61(6)(iv)(b)  and  (c) should  be  treated  as  mandatory  as  it  is  a private party who has to do a particular act within a specified time.”

38) When we apply the aforesaid principle of law for

interpreting  the  clauses  of  the  Scheme  in  question

then we find that the Scheme is partly mandatory and

partly  directory.  In  other  words,  it  is  mandatory  in

compliance of some clauses so far as the employee is

concerned,  whereas  it  is  directory  in  compliance  of

some clauses so far as the Bank is concerned.

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39) This  is  clear  when  we  see  the  clause,  which

provides for filing an application by the employee by a

particular  date.   This  clause  is  mandatory  in  its

compliance for the employee because if  an employee

does not file the application before the due date then

he  has  no  right  to  file  the  application  thereafter,

whereas the clause which requires a Bank to pass the

orders  on  the  application  by  a  specified  date  and

complete  all  the  formalities,  it  is  directory  in  its

compliance.  

40) In other words, it is not mandatory for the Bank

to necessarily  complete all  the formalities before the

due date specified in the clause and if the Bank fails to

do  it  within  the  time  but  completes  the  formalities

after the specified date, it would be permissible for the

Bank to do so and the act so done would be regarded

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as  being  in  conformity  with  the  requirement  of  the

Scheme.    

41) This  we  say  for  several  reasons.  Firstly,  the

Scheme does not provide any consequence as to what

would follow,  if the Bank does not ensure compliance

within  the  time  fixed  in  the  clause.  Secondly,  the

appellant being a private individual, if he is required to

do some act within a specified time prescribed in the

Scheme then it is mandatory for him to do so within

the time specified.  Thirdly, the Bank being a public

functionary  is  required  to  perform  public  functions

and  hence  while  discharging  such  functions,  if  the

Scheme  has  not  provided  any  consequence  for

non-compliance  of  the  act  within  time,  then  the

Scheme would not be construed as mandatory but it

would be construed as directory insofar as the Bank is

concerned.   Fourthly,  since  the  Scheme  has  not

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provided  for  accrual  of  any  benefit  in  employee's

favour  by  "deeming  fiction”  in  the  event  of

non-compliance on the part of the Bank then no such

benefit  can  accrue  in  favour  of  an  employee

automatically  by  fiction  as  a  result  of  any

non-compliance.  In other words, in order to enable an

employee to claim any benefit by "deeming fiction" on

account  of  non-compliance  of  any  act  by  the  Bank

under the Scheme, it is necessary for the employee to

show that the Scheme contains a clause for conferral

of such benefit on the employee by “deeming fiction”.

There  is  no  such  clause  in  the  Scheme  and  lastly,

when  the  Scheme  has  provided  that  the  voluntary

retirement of any employee would come into effect only

when  the  order  is  passed  on  the  application  of  an

employee then there is no question of any application

being accepted by "deeming fiction".  In other words,

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when the Scheme has provided passing of  a specific

order  by  the  Bank  for  accepting  the  application  for

voluntary  retirement  then  the  application  cannot  be

held as accepted by “deeming fiction”.

42) In  view  of  foregoing  reasons,  we  are  of  the

considered  opinion  that  the  Scheme  in  question  is

partly  mandatory  for  its  compliance  so  far  as  the

employee  (appellant)  is  concerned  whereas  it  is

directory  for  its  compliance  so  far  as  the  Bank

(respondent) is concerned.  There can be no dispute for

the legal proposition that the Scheme can be partially

mandatory and partially directory.

43) In the light of what we have held above, we find

from the  facts  of  this  case  that  on  08.09.2000,  the

Bank  issued  a  memo  to  the  appellant  wherein  the

Bank set out the irregularities alleged to be  committed

by the appellant.  They were replied by the appellant

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on 18.10.2000. The Scheme, however, came into force

on  01.11.2000  which,  inter  alia, provided  that  the

application  for  voluntary  retirement  can  be  made

before 14.12.2000. The cut-off date for the Bank for

completing all the formalities was 30.12.2000.  

44) The appellant applied for voluntary retirement on

16.11.2000  whereas  he  was  served  with  the

charge-sheet  on  02.03.2001.  He,  however,  admitted

the charges on 13.03.2001. This resulted in imposition

of punishment on the appellant on 20.03.2001.  It was

followed by acceptance of his application for voluntary

retirement by the Bank on 19.06.2001.

45) In our considered opinion, the Bank was within

its rights to issue a charge-sheet to the appellant on

02.03.2001  because  firstly,  on  02.03.2001,  the

appellant  was  in  the  employment  of  the  Bank  and,

therefore,  he  could  be  subjected to  face  disciplinary

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proceedings  as  per  the  Rules.  Secondly,  since  the

memo  was  served  on  the  appellant  prior  to

introduction  of  the  Scheme,  the  disciplinary

proceedings  were  rightly  initiated  by  serving  a

charge-sheet on the appellant after coming into force

of the Scheme on 01.11.2000. Thirdly, in terms of the

Scheme,  the  appellant's  application  could  be

considered  only  after  conclusion  of  disciplinary

proceedings  and,  therefore,  the  Bank  was  right  in

considering the application and eventually accepting it

on 19.06.2001. Fourthly, the relationship of employee

and  employer  between  the  appellant  and  the  Bank

continued till 19.06.2001 and, therefore, the Bank was

within its rights to take any action under the service

rules against the appellant up to 19.06.2001.  It is not

in  dispute  that  the  Bank  took  all  the  disciplinary

actions  prior  to  19.06.2001  and  then  accepted  the

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application  for  voluntary  retirement  on  19.06.2001.

Such action, in our view, was just, legal and proper.  

46) In  the  light  of  foregoing  reasons,  we  cannot

accept  the  submission  of  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant when he contended that the appellant stood

deemed retired on 31.12.2000 because no order was

passed or/and communicated to him by the Bank on

or before 31.12.2000 on his application for voluntary

retirement and,  therefore,  the  Bank had no right  to

initiate  any  disciplinary  proceeding  and  pass  the

punishment  order  against  the  appellant  after

31.12.2000.  This  submission  is  devoid  of  any  merit

and is accordingly rejected.

47) Coming to the next question as to whether the

punishment imposed on the appellant was legal or not.

Learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point

out  any  illegality  or  perversity  in  the  disciplinary

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proceedings  or  in  the  punishment  order  dated

20.03.2001.  

48) As a matter of fact, since the appellant admitted

the charges leveled against him in the charge-sheet,

there  was  no  need  for  the  Bank  to  have  held  any

inquiry  into  the  charges.  When  the  charges  stood

proved on admission of the appellant, the Bank was

justified in imposing punishment on the appellant as

prescribed in the Rules.  We, therefore, find no ground

to interfere in the punishment order as we also find

that  having  regard to  the  nature  and gravity  of  the

charge,  the  punishment  imposed  on  the  appellant

appears to be just and proper, calling no interference

therein.

49) The next submission of the learned counsel for

the  appellant  that  since  the  appellant  had

unblemished career throughout in his service period,

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the  disciplinary  proceedings  initiated  against  the

appellant  were  not  called  for  and  deserve  to  be

quashed also have no substance.

50) Suffice it to say, once the appellant admitted the

charges, appropriate punishment as prescribed in the

Rules  could  be  inflicted  on  him.   It  was  for  the

Appointing Authority to have taken into account the

seriousness of the charge and overall performance of

the appellant while imposing punishment.  It was done

by the authorities concerned in this case as would be

clear from mere perusal of the punishment order.  The

relevant para of the punishment order reads as under:

     “The acts of misconduct committed by you are serious in nature but keeping in view facts and circumstances of the case, I have decided to take a lenient view in the matter and to impose upon you Consolidated Major Penalty of reduction in pay by five stages in a time scale for a period of three years with the further direction that you will not earn your normal increments of pay during the period of such reduction and reduction will have the

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effect of postponing your future increments to that extent in terms of clause 4(f) of Bank Of  India  Officer  Employees’  [Discipline  and Appeal] Regulations, 1976.

     I have considered your past record and all other  extenuating/mitigating  circumstances of the case. After a careful consideration, I find that the ends of justice would meet by imposition  of  the  aforesaid  consolidated penalty on you. I order accordingly.”  

51) In the light of  foregoing,  the submission of  the

learned counsel  for the appellant on the question of

imposition  of  punishment  and  on  the  issue  of

quantum  has  no  substance  and  is  accordingly

rejected.

52) In view of the foregoing discussion, all the three

questions  framed  above  are  answered  against  the

appellant and in favour of the Bank.  

53) The  appeal  thus  fails  and  is  accordingly

dismissed.  As a consequence, the impugned order is

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upheld though on reasons other than the one given by

the High Court.  No costs.

                                     .……...................................J.                     [J. CHELAMESWAR]                  

                    ………..................................J.                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi, February 08, 2016.

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