REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 917      OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8078 of 2010)

Sunita Kumari Kashyap  .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Bihar & Anr.                    .... Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.  918     OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8079 of 2010)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1)  Leave granted.

2)   The only issue for consideration in both the appeals is  

whether criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant herein  

at  Gaya  against  her  husband  and  his  relatives  are  

maintainable or not for lack of jurisdiction?

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3) Brief facts:

(a) The appellant herein got married to Sanjay Kumar Saini –  

respondent No.2 herein, on 16.04.2000 as per the Hindu rites  

and ceremonies at Gaya.  According to the appellant, at the  

time of marriage, her father gifted all the household utensils,  

Almirah, Double Bed, Dining Table, Fridge, Television and an  

amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- in cash.  In addition to the same,  

her father spent so much money to solemnize the marriage  

and for gifts to other family members of her husband.  In spite  

of the same, immediately after the marriage, she was blamed  

for  bringing  less  dowry  by  her  in-laws  and  they  started  

harassing  and  torturing  her.   Her  husband  also  used  to  

support his family members to torture her.  It is her further  

grievance that her husband demanded an additional amount  

of Rs. 4 lakhs from her parents for renovation of their house at  

Ranchi.  When she was pregnant, she was forcibly taken out of  

her matrimonial home at Ranchi and brought to her parental  

home  at  Gaya.   After  giving  birth  to  a  girl  child  the  

circumstances  became  even  worse  and  everyone  started  

blaming her  that she had brought an additional  burden on  

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them.   After some time, her husband came out with a new  

demand that unless her father gives his house at Gaya to him  

she will not be taken back to her matrimonial home at Ranchi.  

Having  continuous  torture  and  unbearable  nature  of  

treatment by her husband and in-laws for years and years,  

having  no  other  option,  the  appellant  lodged  a  First  

Information Report (in short “FIR”) being No. 66 of 2007 under  

Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal  

Code  (in  short  “IPC)  and  Sections  3  and  4  of  the  Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short “D.P. Act”) at Magadh Medical  

College Police Station, Gaya.

b) The Chief Judicial Magistrate, after perusal of the charge-

sheet, found a  prima facie case against the accused persons,  

accordingly,  took  cognizance  of  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections  

3 and 4 of the D.P. Act against all of them and transferred the  

case to the Court of sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Gaya  

for  trial.   Though  an  objection  was  raised  stating  that  the  

Court  at  Gaya  has  no  jurisdiction,  the  learned  Magistrate,  

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after  considering  all  the  relevant  materials  including  the  

allegations in the complaint, rejected the said objection.   

c) Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  accused  persons  

preferred Criminal Miscellaneous No. 42478 of 2009 before the  

High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Patna.   By  order  dated  

19.03.2010,  the  High  Court  found  that  the  proceedings  at  

Gaya are not maintainable for lack of jurisdiction and quashed  

the  entire  proceedings  in  Magadh  Medical  College  Police  

Station  Case  No.  66  of  2007  with  liberty  to  the  appellant  

herein to file  the same in appropriate Court.  Following the  

said order,  the  High Court  on 29.04.2010 allowed Criminal  

Miscellaneous No. 45153 of 2009 filed by Sanjay Kumar Saini  

–  the  husband  (respondent  No.2  herein)  and  quashed  the  

criminal proceedings lodged against him.

d)   Aggrieved  by  the  impugned  orders  passed  by  the  High  

Court  on  19.03.2010  in  Criminal  Misc.  Case  No.  42478  of  

2009 and 29.04.2010 in Criminal  Misc.  Case  No.  45153 of  

2009,  the  appellant-wife  has  filed  the  above  appeals  before  

this Court by way of special leave petitions.

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4) Heard Mr. Vivek Singh, learned counsel for the appellant  

and Mr.  S.B.  Sanyal,  learned senior counsel  for  respondent  

No.2  and  Mr.  Gopal  Singh,  learned  counsel  for  respondent  

No.1 – State.

5) Inasmuch  as  the  issue  is  confined  to  territorial  

jurisdiction  about  the  criminal  proceedings  initiated  by  the  

appellant-wife,  there  is  no  need  to  go  into  other  factual  

aspects.  Since the SDJM has found that the Court at Gaya  

has  jurisdiction  to  try  the  accused  persons  for  offences  

punishable under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34  

IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act and the High Court  

reversed the said decision and found that the proceedings at  

Gaya  are  not  maintainable  for  lack  of  jurisdiction,  it  is  

desirable to refer the relevant provisions and the contents of  

FIR.

6) Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in  

short “Code”) deals with jurisdiction of the criminal courts in  

inquiries and trials.  Sections 177-179 are relevant which are  

as follows:   

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“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial -. Every offence  shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within  whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

178. Place of inquiry or trial. (a) When it is uncertain in  which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area  and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it  consists of several  acts done in different local  areas,  

it  may  be  inquired  into  or  tried  by  a  Court  having  jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence  ensues.  When an act is  an offence by reason of  anything  which  has  been  done  and  of  a  consequence  which  has  ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court  within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or  such consequence has ensued.”

From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal rule is  

that the offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a  

court  within  whose  local  jurisdiction  it  was  committed.  

However, when it is uncertain in which of several local areas  

an offence was committed or where an offence is committed  

partly  in  one  local  area and partly  in  another  or  where  an  

offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in  

more  than one local  area  and takes place  in  different local  

areas as per Section 178, the Court having jurisdiction over  

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any of such local areas is competent to inquire into and try the  

offence.  Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happened  

as a consequence of the offence, the same may be inquired  

into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such  

thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.   

7) Keeping the above provisions in mind, let us consider the  

allegations  made in  the  complaint.   On 17.10.2007,  Sunita  

Kumari Kashyap – the appellant herein made a complaint to  

the  Inspector  In-charge,  Magadh  Medical  College  Police  

Station, Gaya.  In the complaint, the appellant, after narrating  

her  marriage  with  Sanjay  Kumar  Saini,  respondent  No.2  

herein  on  16.04.2000  stated  that  what  had  happened  

immediately after marriage at the instance of her husband and  

his  family  members’  ill-treatment,  torture  and  finally  

complained that she was taken out of the matrimonial home at  

Ranchi and sent to her parental Home at Gaya with the threat  

that unless  she gets her  father’s  house in the name of  her  

husband, she has to stay at her parental house forever.  In the  

said  complaint,  she  also  asserted  that  her  husband  

pressurized  her  to  get  her  father’s  house  in  his  name  and  

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when she denied she was beaten by her husband.  It was also  

asserted that after keeping her entire jewellery and articles, on  

24.12.2006,  her  husband brought her at  Gaya and left  her  

there warning that till his demands are met, she has to stay at  

Gaya  and if  she  tries  to  come back  without  meeting  those  

demands she will be killed.  It was also stated that from that  

date  till  the  date  of  complaint,  her  in-laws  never  enquired  

about her.  Even then she called them but they never talked to  

her.  Perusal of the entire complaint, which was registered as  

an FIR, clearly shows that there was ill-treatment and cruelty  

at the hands of her husband and his family members at the  

matrimonial home at Ranchi and because of their actions and  

threat she was forcibly taken to her parental home at Gaya  

where she initiated the criminal proceedings against them for  

offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406/34 IPC and  

Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act.  Among the offences, offence  

under Section 498A IPC is the main offence relating to cruelty  

by husband and his relatives.  It is useful to extract the same  

which is as under:    

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“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman  subjecting  her  to  cruelty  - Whoever,  being  the  husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,  subjects  such  woman  to  cruelty  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term which may extend to  three years and shall also be liable to fine.  

Explanation: For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"  means-  (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is  likely  to  drive  the  woman  to  commit  suicide  or  to  cause  grave  injury  or  danger  to  life,  limb or  health  (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or  

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment  is with a view to coercing her or any person related to  her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or  valuable security or is on account of failure by her or  any person related to her to meet such demand.”

8) Similar allegations as found in the complaint in the case  

on  hand  with  reference  to  the  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 498A, 406/34 IPC were considered by this Court in  

the following decisions:  

i) In  Sujata  Mukherjee  (Smt) vs.  Prashant  Kumar  

Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30, similar issue was considered by  

this Court and found that clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code  

is attracted and the Magistrate at wife’s parents’ place has also  

jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.  In the said decision,  

wife was the appellant before this Court and the respondents  

were the husband, parents-in-law and two sisters-in-law of the  

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appellant Sujata Mukherjee.  The gist of the allegation of the  

appellant,  Sujata  Mukherjee  was  that  on  account  of  dowry  

demands, she had been maltreated and humiliated not only in  

the house of her in-laws at Raigarh but as a consequence of  

such events, the husband of the appellant had also come to  

the house of her  parents at Raipur and assaulted her.   On  

behalf of the respondents therein, it was contended before the  

learned  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Raipur  that  the  criminal  

case  was  not  maintainable  before  the  said  learned  Chief  

Judicial  Magistrate  because  the  cause  of  action  took  place  

only at Raigarh which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of  

the learned Magistrate at Raipur.  A prayer was also made to  

quash  the  summons  issued  by  the  learned  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate  by  entertaining  the  said  complaint  of  Smt  

Mukherjee.  As the Chief Judicial Magistrate was not inclined  

either to quash the summons or to transfer the criminal case  

to  the  competent  court  at  Raigarh,  the  criminal  revision  

petitions were filed before the High Court, one by all the five  

respondents and another by four of the respondents excluding  

the husband presumably because there was specific allegation  

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against  the  husband  that  the  husband  had  also  gone  to  

Raipur  and  had  assaulted  the  appellant  and  as  such  the  

husband could not plead want of territorial jurisdiction. Both  

the said criminal revision cases were disposed of by a common  

order dated 31.08.1989 by the High Court  holding that the  

case  against  the  husband  of  the  appellant  alone  is  

maintainable  and in respect of  other respondents related to  

the incidents taking place at Raigarh, hence, the criminal case  

on  the  basis  of  complaint  made  by  the  appellant  is  not  

maintainable at Raipur.  The said order of the High Court was  

challenged by the appellant-Sujata Mukherjee in this Court.  It  

was submitted that it will be evident from the complaint that  

the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel  

treatment  persistently  at  Raigarh  and  also  at  Raipur  and  

incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but  

consequential  to  the  series  of  incidents  taking  place  at  

Raigarh. Therefore, it was contended that the High Court was  

wrong  in  appreciating  the  scope  of  the  complaint  and  

proceeding  on  the  footing  that  several  isolated  events  had  

taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken  

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place at Raipur. This Court basing reliance on Section 178 of  

the Code, in particular clauses (b) and (c), found that in view  

of  allegations  in  the  complaint  that  the  offence  was  a  

continuing one having been committed in more local areas and  

one of the local areas being Raipur, the learned Magistrate at  

Raipur  had  jurisdiction  to  proceed  with  the  criminal  case  

instituted in such court.  Ultimately, accepting the stand of  

the appellant, this Court held as under:

“We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the  appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a  continuing offence of  maltreatment and humiliation meted  out  to  the  appellant  in  the  hands  of  all  the  accused  respondents  and  in  such  continuing  offence,  on  some  occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other  occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore,  clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is  clearly attracted.”  

ii) In  State  of  M.P. vs.  Suresh  Kaushal  and  Another,  

(2003)  11  SCC  126,  again  in  a  similar  circumstance,  

considering the provisions of Section 179 with reference to the  

complaint  relating  to  the  offences  under  Section  498A read  

with Section 34 IPC, this Court held as under:

“6. The  above  Section  contemplates  two  courts  having  jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take place in any  one of those two courts. One is the court within whose local  jurisdiction the act has been done and the other is the court  within whose local jurisdiction the consequence has ensued.  When the  allegation  is  that  the  miscarriage  took place  at  

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Jabalpur it cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur  could  not  have  acquired  jurisdiction  as  the  acts  alleged  against the accused took place at Indore.”

9) Mr. S.B. Sanyal, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

respondents fairly stated that there is no dispute about the  

jurisdiction  of  the  Court  at  Gaya  insofar  as  against  the  

husband, however, in respect of other relatives of the husband  

in  the  absence  of  any  act  at  Gaya,  the  said  Court  has  no  

jurisdiction and if at all, the wife has to pursue her remedy  

only at Ranchi.  In support of his contention, he relied on a  

decision of this Court in  Y. Abraham Ajith and Others vs.  

Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 100  

in particular, paragraph 12 of the said decision which reads as  

under:  

“12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of  action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned.  In terms of Section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the  offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action  for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.”

It  is  true  that  Section  177  of  the  Code  refers  to  the  local  

jurisdiction  where  the  offence  is  committed.   Though  the  

expression  “cause  of  action”  is  not  a  stranger  to  criminal  

cases, in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code and in the  

light of the specific averment in the complaint of the appellant  

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herein,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  said  decision  is  not  

applicable to the case on hand.  

10) Mr.  Sanyal  also  relied  on  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Bhura Ram and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Another,  

(2008)  11  SCC  103  wherein  following  the  decision  in  Y.  

Abraham  Ajith  and  Others  (supra), this  Court  held  that  

“cause of action” having arisen within the jurisdiction of the  

court where the offence was committed, could not be tried by  

the court where no part of offence was committed.  For the  

same reasons, as mentioned in the earlier paragraph,  while  

there is no dispute as to the proposition in view of the fact that  

in the case on hand, the offence was a continuing one and the  

episode  at  Gaya was only  a  consequence  at  the  continuing  

offence  of  harassment  and  ill-treatment  meted  out  to  the  

complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted.  In view of  

the above reason, both the decisions are not applicable to the  

facts of this case and we are unable to accept the stand taken  

by Mr. Sanyal.  

11) We  have  already  adverted  to  the  details  made  by  the  

appellant in the complaint.  In view of the specific assertion by  

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the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the  

hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the  

fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental  

home  at  Gaya  by  her  husband  with  a  threat  of  dire  

consequences for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold  

that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the offence  

in this case was a continuing one having been committed in  

more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the  

learned Magistrate  at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with  

the  criminal  case  instituted  therein.   In  other  words,  the  

offence was a continuing one and the  episode at  Gaya was  

only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment of ill-

treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section  

178  is  attracted.   Further,  from  the  allegations  in  the  

complaint, it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill-

treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the  

hands  of  all  the  accused  persons  and  in  such  continuing  

offence,  on some occasion all  had taken part  and on other  

occasion one of the accused, namely, husband had taken part,  

therefore, undoubtedly clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is  

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clearly attracted.  

12) In  view  of  the  above  discussion  and  conclusion,  the  

impugned  order  of  the  High  Court  holding  that  the  

proceedings  at  Gaya  are  not  maintainable  due  to  lack  of  

jurisdiction cannot be sustained.  The impugned order of the  

High Court dated 19.03.2010 in Criminal Misc. No. 42478 of  

2009 and another order dated 29.04.2010 in Criminal Misc.  

Case No. 45153 of 2009 are set aside. In view of the same, the  

SDJM,  Gaya  is  permitted  to  proceed  with  the  criminal  

proceedings in trial Nos. 1551 of 2008 and 1224 of 2009 and  

decide the same in accordance with law.  It is made clear that  

we have not expressed anything on the merits and claims of  

both  parties  and  our  above  conclusion  is  confined  to  the  

territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Gaya.  Both the criminal  

appeals are allowed.       

       ………….…………………………J.                  (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

       ………….…………………………J.                  (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)                                   

NEW DELHI; APRIL 11, 2011.                    

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