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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1333  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 7002 of 2012)

Sunil Dutt Sharma ... Appellant(s)

Versus

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. The  accused-appellant  was  tried  for  offences  under  

Sections 302 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter  

for short the “Penal Code”) for causing the death of his wife  

in the night intervening 16/17.05.92.  He has been acquitted  

of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code on the  

benefit  of doubt though found guilty for the offence under  

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Section  304-B  of  the  Penal  Code  following  which  the  

sentence  of  life  imprisonment  has  been  imposed.   The  

conviction  and  sentence  has  been  affirmed  by  the  High  

Court.  Aggrieved, the appellant had moved this Court under  

Article 136 of the Constitution.

2. Limited notice on the question of sentence imposed on  

the accused-appellant having been issued by this Court the  

scope  of  the  present  appeal  stands  truncated  to  a  

determination of the question as to whether sentence of life  

imprisonment  imposed  on  the  accused-appellant  for  

commission of the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal  

Code is in any way excessive or disproportionate so as to  

require interference by this Court.   

3. Section 304-B(2) of the Penal Code which prescribes the  

punishment  for  the  offence contemplated  by Section 304-

B(1) is in the following terms :

“Whoever  commits  dowry  death  shall  be  punished  with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less  than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment for life.” (emphasis is ours).

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4. Expressions similar to what has been noticed above are  to be found in different sections of the Penal Code which may  be taken note of : (i) Sections  115,  118,  123,  124,  

126, 127, 134, 193, 201, 214,  216, 216A, 219, 220, 221, 222,  225, 231, 234, 243, 244, 245,  247, 249, 256, 257, 258, 259,  260, 281, 293, 308, 312, 317,  325, 333, 363, 365, 369, 370,  380, 381, 387, 393, 401, 402,  404, 407, 408, 409, 433, 435,  437, 439, 452, 455, 466, 468,  472,  473,  474,  477A,  489C,  493, 494, 495 and  496

“may  extend  to  seven  years/ten years”;

(ii) Sections  122,  222,  225,  305,  371, 449, 450

“imprisonment  for  life  or  imprisonment  for  a  term not exceeding ten  years”

(iii) Sections 124A, 125, 128,  130,  194, 232, 238, 255 etc.

“imprisonment  for  life  or with imprisonment of  either  description  which  may  extend  to  ____ years”

(iv) Sections  122,  225,  305,  371,  449

“imprisonment  for  life  or with imprisonment of  either description for a  term not  exceeding  ___  years”

(v) Section 304B “imprisonment  for  a  term which shall not be  less  than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment  for  life”

(vi) Section 376 “imprisonment of either  description  for  a  term  which shall  not be less  than seven years or for  

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life or for a term which  may  extend  to  ten  years”

5. The  power  and  authority  conferred  by  use  of  the  

different expressions noticed above indicate the enormous  

discretion vested in the Courts in sentencing an offender who  

has  been  found  guilty  of  commission  of  any  particular  

offence.  No where, either in the Penal Code or in any other  

law in  force,  any  prescription  or  norm or  even  guidelines  

governing the exercise of the vast discretion in the matter of  

sentencing  has  been  laid  down  except  perhaps,  Section  

354(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  which, inter-

alia, requires the judgment of a Court to state the reasons for  

the sentence awarded when the punishment  prescribed is  

imprisonment for a term of years.  In the above situation,  

naturally, the sentencing power has been a matter of serious  

academic  and  judicial  debate  to  discern  an  objective  and  

rational  basis for the exercise of the power and to evolve  

sound  jurisprudential  principles  governing  the  exercise  

thereof.  In this regard the Constitution Bench decision of this  

Court in  Jagmohan Singh vs. The State of U.P.1 (under  1 (1973) 1 SCC 20

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the  old  Code),  another  Constitution  Bench  decision  in  

Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab2, a three Judge Bench  

decision  in  Machhi  Singh  and  Others  vs.  State  of  

Punjab3,   are watersheds in the search for jurisprudential  

principles  in  the  matter  of  sentencing.   Omission  of  any  

reference to other equally illuminating opinions of this Court  

rendered in scores of other monumental decisions is not to  

underplay the importance thereof but solely on account of  

need for brevity.  Two recent pronouncements of this Court in  

Sangeet  and  Another  vs.  State  of  Haryana4 and  

Shankar  Kisanrao  Khade  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra5  

reflect  the  very  labourious  and  painstaking  efforts  of  this  

Court to summarize the net result of the judicial exercises  

undertaken  since  Jagmohan  Singh (supra)  and  the  

unresolved  issues  and  grey  areas  in  this  regard  and  the  

solutions that could be attempted.  The aforesaid decisions of  

this Court though rendered in the context of exercise of the  

power to award the death sentence, whether  the principles  

2 (1980) 2 SCC 684 3 (1983) 3 SCC 470 4 (2013) 2 SCC 452 5 (2013) 5 SCC 546

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laid down, with suitable adaptation and modification, would  

apply to all ‘lesser’ situations so long the court is confronted  

with  the  vexed  problem of  unraveling  the  parameters  for  

exercise of the sentencing power is  another  question that  

needs to be dealt with.   

6. For the sake of precision it  may be sufficient to take  

note of the propositions held in  Bachan Singh (supra)  to  

have flown from Jagmohan Singh (supra) and the changes  

in  propositions  (iv)(a)  and  (v)(b)  thereof  which  were  

perceived  to  be  necessary  in  the  light  of  the  amended  

provision  of  Section  354(3)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure,  1973.   The  above  changes  were  noticed  in  

Sangeet  (supra)  and  were  referred  to  as  evolution  of  a  

sentencing  policy  by  shifting  the  focus  from  the  crime  

(Jagmohan  Singh)  to  crime  and  the  criminal  (Bachan  

Singh).   The two concepts were described as Phase-I  and  

Phase-II of an emerging sentencing policy.   

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7. The principles culled out from Jagmohan Singh (supra)  

in Bachan Singh (supra) and the changes in proposition (iv)

(a) and (v)(b) may now be specifically noticed.

Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab  2   

160. In the light  of  the above conspectus,  we will  now  consider  the  effect  of  the  aforesaid  legislative  changes  on  the  authority  and  efficacy  of  the  propositions laid down by this Court in Jagmohan case.  These propositions may be summed up as under:

“(i) The general legislative policy that underlines the  structure  of  our  criminal  law,  principally  contained  in  the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code,  is  to  define  an  offence  with  sufficient  clarity  and  to  prescribe only the maximum punishment therefor, and  to  allow  a  very  wide  discretion  to  the  Judge  in  the  matter of fixing the degree of punishment.

With the solitary exception of Section 303, the same  policy permeates Section 302 and some other sections  of the Penal Code, where the maximum punishment is  the death penalty.

(ii)-(a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or  mitigating  circumstances  which  should  be  considered  when sentencing an offender, is possible. “The infinite  variety of  cases and facets to each case would make  general standards either meaningless ‘boiler plate’ or a  statement  of  the  obvious  that  no  Jury  (Judge)  would  need.” (referred to McGoutha v. California)

(b) The impossibility of laying down standards is at  the  very  core  of  the  criminal  law  as  administered  in  India  which  invests  the  Judges  with  a  very  wide  discretion  in  the  matter  of  fixing  the  degree  of  punishment.

(iii)  The  view  taken  by  the  plurality  in  Furman v.  Georgia decided by the Supreme Court  of  the United  States,  to  the  effect,  that  a  law  which  gives  uncontrolled and unguided discretion to the Jury (or the  

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Judge)  to  choose  arbitrarily  between  a  sentence  of  death and imprisonment for a capital offence, violates  the Eighth Amendment, is not applicable in India. We do  not  have  in  our  Constitution  any  provision  like  the  Eighth Amendment, nor are we at liberty to apply the  test of reasonableness with the freedom with which the  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  America  are  accustomed to apply “the due process” clause. There  are grave doubts about the expediency of transplanting  western experience in our country. Social conditions are  different  and  so  also  the  general  intellectual  level.  Arguments which would be valid in respect of one area  of the world may not hold good in respect of another  area.

(iv)(a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to  be exercised by the Judge judicially, after balancing all  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  of  the  crime.

(b)  The  discretion  is  liable  to  be  corrected  by  superior  courts.  The  exercise  of  judicial  discretion  on  well  recognised principles is,  in the final  analysis,  the  safest possible safeguard for the accused.

In view of the above, it will be impossible to say that  there would be at all any discrimination, since crime as  crime may appear to be superficially the same but the  facts and circumstances of a crime are widely different.  Thus  considered,  the  provision  in  Section  302,  Penal  Code is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on  the ground that it confers on the Judges an unguided  and uncontrolled discretion in the matter  of awarding  capital punishment or imprisonment for life.

(v)(a)  Relevant  facts  and  circumstances  impinging  on the nature and circumstances of the crime can be  brought  before  the  court  at  the  preconviction  stage,  notwithstanding the fact that no formal  procedure for  producing  evidence  regarding  such  facts  and  circumstances  had  been  specifically  provided.  Where  counsel  addresses  the  court  with  regard  to  the  character  and standing of  the accused, they are duly  considered  by  the  court  unless there  is  something  in  the  evidence  itself  which  belies  him  or  the  Public  Prosecutor challenges the facts.

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(b)  It  is  to  be  emphasised  that  in  exercising  its  discretion  to  choose  either  of  the  two  alternative  sentences  provided  in  Section  302  Penal  Code,  “the  court  is  principally concerned  with  the  facts  and  circumstances  whether  aggravating  or  mitigating,  which  are  connected  with  the  particular  crime  under  inquiry. All such facts and circumstances are capable of  being proved in accordance with the provisions of the  Indian Evidence Act in a trial regulated by the CrPC. The  trial does not come to an end until all the relevant facts  are  proved  and  the  counsel  on  both  sides  have  an  opportunity  to address the court.  The only  thing that  remains  is  for  the  Judge  to  decide  on  the  guilt  and  punishment  and  that  is  what  Sections  306(2)  and  309(2),  CrPC purport  to  provide  for.  These provisions  are part of the procedure established by law and unless  it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons  they must be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered  to show that they are constitutionally invalid and hence  the death  sentence imposed after  trial  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  established  by  law  is  not  unconstitutional under Article 21”. (emphasis added)”

161. A study of the propositions set out above, will  show that, in substance, the authority of none of them  has been affected by the legislative changes since the  decision  in  Jagmohan  case.  Of  course,  two  of  them  require to be adjusted and attuned to the shift in the  legislative policy. The first of those propositions is No.  (iv)(a)  which  postulates,  that  according  to  the  then  extant Code of Criminal Procedure both the alternative  sentences provided  in  Section  302 of  the Penal  Code  are  normal  sentences  and  the  court  can,  therefore,  after  weighing  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances of  the particular  case, in its discretion,  impose  either  of  those  sentences.  This  postulate  has  now been modified by Section 354(3) which mandates  the court convicting a person for an offence punishable  with death or, in the alternative with imprisonment for  life or imprisonment for a term of years, not to impose  the sentence of death on that person unless there are  “special  reasons”  —  to  be  recorded  —  for  such  sentence.  The  expression  “special  reasons”  in  the  context of this provision, obviously means “exceptional  reasons”  founded  on  the  exceptionally  grave  circumstances  of  the  particular  case  relating  to  the  

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crime  as  well  as  the  criminal.  Thus,  the  legislative  policy now writ large and clear on the face of Section  354(3)  is  that  on  conviction  for  murder  and  other  capital  offences  punishable  in  the  alternative  with  death  under  the  Penal  Code,  the  extreme  penalty  should be imposed only in extreme cases.

163. Another proposition,  the application of which,  to an extent, is affected by the legislative changes, is  No. (v). In portion (a) of that proposition, it is said that  circumstances  impinging  on  the  nature  and  circumstances of  the crime can be brought  on record  before  the  pre-conviction  stage.  In  portion  (b),  it  is  emphasised that while making choice of the sentence  under  Section  302  of  the  Penal  Code,  the  court  is  principally concerned with the circumstances connected  with  the  particular  crime under  inquiry.  Now,  Section  235(2)  provides  for  a  bifurcated  trial  and  specifically  gives  the  accused  person  a  right  of  pre-sentence  hearing,  at  which  stage,  he  can  bring  on  record  material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant  to or connected with the particular crime under inquiry,  but  nevertheless,  have,  consistently  with  the  policy  underlined in Section 354(3), a bearing on the choice of  sentence.  The  present  legislative  policy  discernible  from Section 235(2) read with Section 354(3) is that in  fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice  of  sentence for  various  offences,  including one under  Section  302 of  the  Penal  Code,  the  court  should  not  confine its consideration “principally” or    merely   to the    circumstances connected with the particular   crime, but    also   give due consideration to the circumstances of the    criminal.

164. Attuned to the legislative policy delineated in  Sections 354(3) and 235(2), propositions (iv)(a) and (v) (b)  in  Jagmohan shall  have to be recast  and may be  stated as below:

“(a)  The normal  rule is that the offence of  murder  shall  be  punished  with  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule and  impose the sentence of death only if there are special  reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be recorded in  writing before imposing the death sentence.

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(b) While considering the question of sentence to be  imposed for the offence of murder under Section 302 of  the Penal Code, the court  must have regard to every  relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well as  the criminal. If the court finds, but not otherwise, that  the offence is of an exceptionally depraved and heinous  character and constitutes, on account of its design and  the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger  to the society at large, the court may impose the death  sentence.”

8. In  Sangeet  (supra)  the  Court  also  took  note  of  the  

“suggestions” (offered at the Bar) noticed in Bachan Singh  

(supra)  to  be  relevant  in  a  determination  of  the  

circumstances attending the crime (described as aggravating  

circumstances) as well as those which pertain to the criminal  

as distinguished from the crime (referred to as the mitigating  

circumstances).   The  attempt  at  evolution  of  a  principle  

based  sentencing  policy  as  distinguished  from  a  judge  

centric  one  was  noted  to  have  suffered  some  amount  of  

derailment/erosion.  In fact, the several judgments noted and  

referred to in  Sangeet (supra) were found to have brought  

in a fair amount of uncertainty in application of the principles  

in awarding life imprisonment or death penalty, as may be,  

and the varying perspective or responses of the court based  

on the particular facts of a given case rather than evolving  

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standardized jurisprudential principles applicable across the  

board.   

9. The  above  position  was  again  noticed  in  Shankar  

Kisanrao  Khade  (supra).   In  the  separate  concurring  

opinion  rendered  by  Brother  Madan  B.  Lokur  there  is  an  

exhaustive consideration of the judgments rendered by this  

Court  in  the  recent  past  (last  15  years)  wherein  death  

penalty has been converted to life imprisonment and also the  

cases wherein death penalty has been confirmed.  On the  

basis of the views of this Court expressed  in the exhaustive  

list  of  its  judgments,  reasons  which  were  considered  

adequate  by  the  Court  to  convert  death  penalty  into  life  

imprisonment as well as the reasons for confirming the death  

penalty  had  been  set  out  in  the  concurring  judgment  at  

paragraphs 106 and 122 of the report in Shankar Kisanrao  

Khade  (supra)  which  paragraphs  may  be  extracted  

hereinbelow to notice the principles that have unfolded since  

Bachan Singh (supra).   

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“106. A study of the above cases suggests that there  are several reasons, cumulatively taken, for converting  the  death  penalty  to  that  of  imprisonment  for  life.  However,  some  of  the  factors  that  have  had  an  influence in commutation include:

(1) the young age of the accused [Amit v.  State of  Maharashtra6 aged  20  years,  Rahul7 aged  24  years,  Santosh  Kumar  Singh8 aged  24  years,  Rameshbhai  Chandubhai  Rathod  (2)9 aged  28  years  and  Amit v.  State of U.P.10 aged 28 years];

(2) the possibility of reforming and rehabilitating the  accused (in Santosh Kumar Singh8 and Amit v. State of   U.P.10 the accused, incidentally, were young when they  committed the crime);

(3) the accused had no prior criminal record (Nirmal  Singh11,  Raju12,  Bantu13,  Amit v.  State of Maharashtra6,  Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal14, Rahul7 and Amit v. State of   U.P.10);

(4)  the  accused was not  likely  to  be a menace or  threat or danger to society or the community (Nirmal  Singh11,  Mohd. Chaman15,  Raju12,  Bantu13,  Surendra Pal   Shivbalakpal14, Rahul7 and Amit v. State of U.P.10).

(5) a few other reasons need to be mentioned such  as  the  accused having  been  acquitted  by  one of  the  

6 (2003) 8 SCC 93 7 Rahul v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 10 SCC 322 8 Santosh KumarSingh v. State, (2010) 9 SCC 747 9 Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod(2) v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 2 SCC 764 10 (2012) 4 SCC 107 8

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11 Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana (1999) 3 SCC 670 12 Raju v. State of Haryana (2001) 9 SCC 50 13 Bantu v State of M.P. (2001) 9 SCC 615 6

14 Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 127 7

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15 Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 2 SCC 28

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courts (State of T.N. v. Suresh16, State of Maharashtra v.  Suresh17,  Bharat  Fakira  Dhiwar18,  Mansingh19 and  Santosh Kumar Singh8);

(6)  the crime was not  premeditated  (Kumudi  Lal20,  Akhtar21, Raju12 and Amrit Singh22);

(7)  the  case  was  one  of  circumstantial  evidence  (Mansingh19 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha23).

In one case, commutation was ordered since there  was apparently no “exceptional” feature warranting a  death  penalty  (Kumudi  Lal20)  and  in  another  case  because the trial court had awarded life sentence but  the High Court enhanced it to death (Haresh Mohandas  Rajput24).

122. The  principal  reasons  for  confirming  the  death  penalty in the above cases include:  

(1)  the  cruel,  diabolic,  brutal,  depraved  and  gruesome  nature  of  the  crime  (Jumman  Khan25,  Dhananjoy Chatterjee26,  Laxman Naik27, Kamta Tiwari28,  Nirmal  Singh11,  Jai  Kumar29,  Satish30,  Bantu31,  Ankush  Maruti  Shinde32,  B.A.  Umesh33,  Mohd.  Mannan34 and  Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik35);  

16 (1998) 2 SCC 372 17 (2000) 1 SCC 471 18 State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, (2002) 1 SCC 622 19 State of Maharashtra v. Mansingh, (2005) 3 SCC 131 20 Kumudi Lal v. State of U.P., (1999) 4 SCC 108 21 Akhtar v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 60 22 Amrit Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 79 23 Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam, (2007) 11 SCC 467 24 Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 12 SCC 56 25 Jumman Khan v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 752 26 Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220 27 Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 28 Kamta Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 250 29 Jai Kumar v. State of M.P., (1999) 5 SCC 1 30 State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114 31 Bantu v. State of U.P., (2008) 11 SCC 113 32 Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667 33 B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 34 Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 35 Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37

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(2)  the  crime  results  in  public  abhorrence,  shocks  the judicial conscience or the conscience of society or  the  community  (Dhananjoy  Chatterjee26,  Jai  Kumar29,  Ankush Maruti Shinde32 and Mohd. Mannan34);  

(3) the reform or rehabilitation of the convict is not  likely  or  that  he  would  be  a  menace  to  society  (Jai   Kumar29, B.A. Umesh33 and Mohd. Mannan34);  

(4)  the  victims  were  defenceless  (Dhananjoy  Chatterjee26,  Laxman  Naik27,  Kamta  Tiwari28,  Ankush  Maruti  Shinde32,  Mohd.  Mannan34 and  Rajendra  Pralhadrao Wasnik35);  

(5) the crime was either unprovoked or that it was  premeditated (Dhananjoy Chatterjee26,  Laxman Naik27,  Kamta  Tiwari28,  Nirmal  Singh11,  Jai  Kumar29,  Ankush  Maruti Shinde32, B.A. Umesh33 and Mohd.Mannan34) and  in three cases the antecedents or the prior history of  the convict was taken into consideration (Shivu36,  B.A.  Umesh33 and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik35).”

However,  in  paragraph  123  of  the  report  the  cases  

where  the  reasons  for  taking  either  of  the  views  i.e.  

commutation or confirmation as above have been deviated  

from  have  been  noticed.   Consequently,  the  progressive  

march  had  been  stultified  and  the  sentencing  exercise  

continues to stagnate as a highly individualized and judge  

centric issue.   

36 Shivu v. High Court of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 713

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10. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a  

sound  jurisprudential  basis  for  imposing  a  particular  

sentence on an offender is destined to remain elusive and  

the  sentencing  parameters  in  this  country  are  bound  to  

remain judge centric?  The issue though predominantly dealt  

with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has  

tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the  

country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences  

under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are  

enumerated in the Penal Code,  punishment for which could  

extend  from a  single  day  to  10  years  or  even  for  life,  a  

situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same  

expressions  in  different  provisions  of  the  Penal  Code  as  

noticed in the opening part of this order.   

11. As noticed, the “net value” of the huge number of in  

depth exercises performed since  Jagmohan Singh  (supra)  

has  been  effectively  and  systematically  culled  out  in  

Sangeet  and   Shankar  Kisanrao  Khade  (supra).   The  

identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for  

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sentencing  thereby  minimizing  individualized  and  judge  

centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of  

affinity  to  the  principles  applied  in  foreign  jurisdictions,  a  

resume of which is available in the decision of this Court in  

State  of  Punjab  vs.  Prem Sagar  and  Others37.   The  

difference is not in the identity of the principles; it lies in the  

realm of application thereof to individual situations.  While in  

India application of the principles is left to the judge hearing  

the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are  

formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied  

on principles of categorization of offences which approach,  

however,  has  been  found  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Bachan Singh (supra)  to be inappropriate to our system.  

The  principles  being  clearly  evolved  and  securely  

entrenched,  perhaps,  the  answer  lies  in  consistency  in  

approach.   

12. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no  

reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this  

Court over the years through largely in the context of the  37 (2008) 7 SCC 550

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death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so  

long as the sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to  

award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of  

the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum.  In fact,  

we are reminded of the age old infallible logic that what is  

good  to  one  situation  would  hold  to  be  equally  good  to  

another  like  situation.   Beside  paragraph  163  (underlined  

portion) of Bachan Singh (supra), reproduced earlier, bears  

testimony to the above fact.   

13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an  

accused  found  guilty  of  the  offence  under  Section  304-B  

inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the  

accused on basis of a legal presumption?  This is the next  

question that has to be dealt with.    So long there is credible  

evidence of cruelty occasioned by demand(s) for dowry, any  

unnatural  death  of  a  woman  within  seven  years  of  her  

marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of  

such woman liable for the offence of “dowry death” under  

Section  304-B  though  there  may  not  be  any  direct  

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involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in  

question.  In a situation where commission of an offence is  

held  to  be  proved  by  means  of  a  legal  presumption  the  

circumstances  surrounding  the  crime  to  determine  the  

presence of aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not  

be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence  

of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of  

the accused with the crime to enable the Court to come to  

specific  conclusions  with  regard  to  the  barbarous  or  

depraved nature of the crime committed.  The necessity to  

combat  the  menace  of  demand  for  dowry  or  to  prevent  

atrocities  on  women  and  like  social  evils  as  well  as  the  

necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot  

be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as  

the said parameters would be common to all offences under  

Section  304-B  of  the  Penal  Code.   The  above,  therefore,  

cannot  be  elevated  to  the  status  of  acceptable  

jurisprudential  principles  to  act  as  a  rational  basis  for  

awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case  

basis.  The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an  

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offence  under  Section  304-B  of  the  Penal  Code  must,  

therefore,  lie  elsewhere.  Perhaps,  the  time spent  between  

marriage  and  the  death  of  the  woman;  the  attitude  and  

conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death;  

the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with  

and  the  manner  and  circumstances  of  commission  of  the  

cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime  

test.   Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused  

was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the  

Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge  

would be another  very relevant  circumstance.   As against  

this  the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which would  

determine the “criminal test” must be allowed to have a full  

play.   The  aforesaid  two  sets  of  circumstances  being  

mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a  

balance sheet as observed in  Sangeet (supra) but it is the  

cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances  

that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing  

decision.   This,  according  to  us,  would  be  the  correct  

approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far  

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as  the  offence  under  Section  304-B  of  the  Penal  Code  is  

concerned.   

14. Applying  the  above  parameters  to  the  facts  of  the  

present case it transpires that the death of the wife of the  

accused-appellant  occurred  within  two  years  of  marriage.  

There  was,  of  course,  a  demand  for  dowry  and  there  is  

evidence of cruelty or harassment.  The autopsy report of the  

deceased showed external marks of injuries but the cause of  

death of deceased was stated to be due to asphyxia resulting  

from strangulation.  In view of the aforesaid finding of Dr. L.T.  

Ramani  (PW-16)  who had  conducted  the  postmortem,  the  

learned Trial Judge thought it proper to acquit the accused of  

the  offence  under  Section  302  of  the  Penal  Code  on  the  

benefit of doubt as there was no evidence that the accused  

was,  in  any  way,  involved  with  the  strangulation  of  the  

deceased.  The proved facts on the basis of which offence  

under  Section  304-B  of  the  Penal  Code  was  held  to  be  

established,  while  acquitting  the  accused-appellant  of  the  

offence  under  Section  302  of  the  Penal  Code,  does  not  

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disclose any extraordinary, perverse or diabolic act on the  

part of the accused-appellant to take an extreme view of the  

matter.  Coupled with the above, at the time of commission  

of the offence, the accused-appellant was about 21 years old  

and as on date he is about 42 years.  The accused-appellant  

also  has  a  son  who  was  an  infant  at  the  time  of  the  

occurrence.   He  has  no  previous  record  of  crime.   On  a  

cumulative  application  of  the  principles  that  would  be  

relevant to adjudge the crime and the criminal test, we are of  

the view that the present is not a case where the maximum  

punishment  of  life  imprisonment  ought  to  have  been  

awarded to the accused-appellant.  At the same time, from  

the order of the learned Trial Court, it is clear that some of  

the injuries on the deceased, though obviously not the fatal  

injuries, are attributable to the accused-appellant.  In fact,  

the finding of the learned Trial Court is that the injuries No. 1  

(Laceration 1” x ½” skin deep on the side of forehead near  

hair margin) and 2 (Laceration 1 ½” x 1” scalp deep over the  

frontal  area)  on  the  deceased  had  been  caused  by  the  

accused-appellant with a pestle.  The said part of the order of  

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the learned Trial Court has not been challenged in the appeal  

before the High Court.  Taking into account the said fact, we  

are  of  the  view  that  in  the  present  case  the  minimum  

sentence prescribed i.e. seven years would also not meet the  

ends of justice.  Rather we are of the view that a sentence of  

ten years RI would be appropriate.  Consequently, we modify  

the  impugned  order  dated  4.4.2011  passed  by  the  High  

Court of Delhi and impose the punishment of ten years RI on  

the  accused-appellant  for  the  commission  of  the  offence  

under Section 304-B of the Penal Code.  The sentence of fine  

is  maintained.  The  accused-appellant  who  is  presently  in  

custody shall serve out the remaining part of the sentence in  

terms of the present order.   

15. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent  

indicated above.

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..………………………..………………………J.                                [SUDHANSU JYOTI  MUKHOPADHAYA]                     

..………………………..………………………J.                                [RANJAN GOGOI]                     

NEW DELHI OCTOBER  08, 2013

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