13 September 2013
Supreme Court
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SUMIT MEHTA Vs STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI

Bench: P SATHASIVAM,RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001436-001436 / 2013
Diary number: 42782 / 2012
Advocates: JAYANT KUMAR MEHTA Vs D. S. MAHRA


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       REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1436 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of  

2013)

Sumit Mehta         …..Appellant(s)

Versus

State of N.C.T. of Delhi                   .... Respondent(s)

     J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,CJI.

1) Leave granted.

2) This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  order  dated  

18.12.2012 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in  

Bail  Application No.  1479 of  2012  whereby learned single  

Judge of the High Court while granting anticipatory bail to the  

appellant herein in a case registered against him vide FIR No.  

104  dated  22.08.2012  for  the  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code,  

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1860  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “IPC”)  directed  him  to  

deposit an amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/-  (one crore) in fixed  

deposit in the name of the complainant in any nationalized  

bank and to keep the FDR with the Investigating Officer.   

3) According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,  

the condition for depositing the amount in fixed deposit in  

the impugned order is untenable in law and is outside the  

purview of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1973  (in  short  “the  Code”).   He  further  pointed  out  that  

learned  single  Judge,  while  imposing  the  condition  for  

depositing  the  amount  in  fixed  deposit,  has  failed  to  

appreciate that the liberty for grant of anticipatory bail under  

Section 438 of the Code cannot be used for recovery of the  

alleged  cheated  amount  to  the  complainant.   He  further  

pointed out that while passing the impugned order, learned  

single Judge failed to consider that imposing a condition of  

depositing an amount of Rs. 1 crore in fixed deposit would  

make  the  grant  of  anticipatory  bail  impossible  for  the  

appellant.   He  also  pointed  out  that  the  said  direction  is  

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contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and results  

in denial of liberty to the appellant.

4) During  the  course of  hearing,  one Harnam Jaspal-the  

complainant, filed Criminal Misc. Petition 18718 of 2013 for  

intervention.  Intervention application is  allowed.  Learned  

counsel appearing for the intervener, after highlighting the  

transaction  between  the  intervener  and  the  appellant-

accused  and  various  factual  aspects,  contended  that  the  

High Court is fully justified in imposing such condition and  

there is no need to interfere with the same.

5) On behalf  of the respondent-State,  learned Additional  

Solicitor General submitted that taking note of the dispute  

between  the  complainant  and  the  appellant-accused,  the  

condition imposed for  grant  of anticipatory bail  cannot  be  

construed as onerous.

6) We have carefully considered the rival contentions and  

perused all the relevant materials.

7) The  only  point  for  consideration  in  this  appeal  is  

whether  the  condition  of  depositing  an  amount  of  Rs.  

1,00,00,000/-  in  fixed  deposit  for  anticipatory  bail  is  

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sustainable in law and whether such condition is outside the  

purview of Section 438 of the Code?

8) In order to answer the above question, it  is useful to  

refer Section 438 of the Code which reads as under:

“438.  Direction  for  grant  of  bail  to  person  apprehending arrest:-  (1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may  be  arrested  on  accusation  of  having  committed  a  non-  bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court  or the  Court of Session for a direction under this section that in  the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and  that Court may, after taking into consideration,  inter alia,  the following factors, namely:-

(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation;

(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the  fact  as  to  whether  he  has  previously  undergone  imprisonment  on  conviction  by  a  Court in respect of any cognizable offence;

(iii) the  possibility  of  the  applicant  to  flee  from  justice; and

(iv) where the accusation has been made with the  object of injuring or humiliating the applicant  by having him so arrested,

either  reject  the  application  forthwith  or  issue  an  interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail:

Provided that, where the High Court or, as the  case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed  any  interim  order  under  this  sub-section  or  has  rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail,  it  shall  be open to an officer  in-charge of  a police  station  to  arrest,  without  warrant  the applicant  on  the  basis  of  the  accusation  apprehended  in  such  application.

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(1A)  Where the Court grants an interim order under  sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not  less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such  order  to  be  served  on  the  Public  Prosecutor  and  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  with a  view to  give  the Public  Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when  the application shall be finally heard by the Court.

(1B) The  presence  of  the  applicant  seeking  anticipatory  bail  shall  be  obligatory  at  the  time of  final  hearing of the application and passing of final order by the  Court,  if  on  an  application  made  to  it  by  the  Public  Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary  in the interest of justice.   (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes  a  direction  under  sub-section  (1),  it  may  include  such  conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the  particular case, as it may thinks fit, including-  

(i) a  condition  that  the  person  shall  make  himself  available for interrogation by a police officer as and when  required;  (ii) a  condition  that  the  person  shall  not,  directly  or  indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any  person  acquainted  with  the  facts  of  the  case  so  as  to  dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to  any police officer;  (iii) a  condition  that  the  person  shall  not  leave  India  without the previous permission of the Court;  (iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub-  section  (3)  of  section  437,  as  if  the  bail  were  granted  under that section.  

(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant  by  an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  on  such  accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or  at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail,  he  shall  be  released on  bail;  and if  a  Magistrate  taking  cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should  issue  in  the  first  instance  against  that  person,  he  shall  issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of  the Court under sub- section (1).”

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A reading of the above provision makes it clear that a person  

should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the  

grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant.  The grant  

of bail under Section 438(1) of the Code is dependent on the  

merits and circumstances of a case.

9) A Bench of five-Judges of this Court in Shri Gurbaksh  

Singh Sibbia & Ors. vs.  State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC  

565, while dealing mainly with the question of considerations  

that  can  validly  weigh with  the  courts  while  granting  bail  

under Section 438, examined various facets of the issue and  

held as under:

“26.  We  find  a  great  deal  of  substance  in  Mr.  Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to  deprivation  of  personal  liberty,  the  Court  should  lean  against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the  scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions  have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that  section.  Section  438 is  a  procedural  provision  which  is  concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who  is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence  since  he  is  not,  on  the  date  of  his  application  for  anticipatory  bail,  convicted  of  the  offence  in  respect  of  which  he  seeks  bail.  An  over-generous  infusion  of  constraints  and conditions  which are not  to be found in  Section  438 can  make  its  provisions  constitutionally  vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be  made  to  depend  on,  compliance  with  unreasonable  restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section  438 must  be  saved,  not  jettisoned.  No doubt  can linger  after the decision in Maneka Gandhi [1978]2SCR621 that  

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in  order  to  meet  the  challenge  of  Article  21 of  the  Constitution,  the  procedure  established  by  law  for  depriving  a  person  of  his  liberty  must  be  fair,  just  and  reasonable.  Section  438,  in  the  form  in  which  it;  is  conceived by the legislature,  is open to no exception on  the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust  or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open  to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which  are not be found therein.”

The aforesaid decision gives an abundant clarity as to the  

intention  and  the  scope  of  Section  438  of  the  Code.  

Certainly,  the  power  conferred  must  be  exercised  very  

sparingly  and  judiciously.  However,  this  Court  has  always  

frowned on onerous condition being imposed as a condition  

precedent for granting anticipatory bail.

10) In Amarjit Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2009) 13  

SCC 769, this Court ruled as under:

“7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of  the present case, we have no hesitation in coming to the  conclusion that the imposition of condition to deposit the  sum of Rs. 15 lacks in the form of FDR in the Trial Court is  an unreasonable condition and, therefore, we set aside the  said  condition  as  a  condition  precedent  for  granting  anticipatory bail to the accused/appellant.”

11) In Sheikh Ayub vs. State of M.P. (2004) 13 SCC 457, it  

was held  that  a  direction to pay a  portion of the  amount  

misappropriated  by  the  accused  to  the  complainant  as  a  

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condition for bail is unwarranted. Similar view was adopted  

by  this  Court  in  I.  Glaskasden  Grace  and  Ors. vs.  

Inspector  of  Police  and  Anr. (2009)  12  SCC  769,  

Ramathal  and  Ors. vs.  Inspector  of  Police  and  Anr.  

(2009) 12 SCC 721 and Sandeep Jain vs. National Capital  

Territory  of  Delhi  Rep.  by  Secretary,  Home  Deptt.  

(2000) 2 SCC 66.

12) While exercising power under Section 438 of the Code,  

the  Court  is  duty  bound to  strike  a  balance  between  the  

individual’s  right  to  personal  freedom  and  the  right  of  

investigation of the police. For the same, while granting relief  

under Section 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed  

under  Section  438(2)  so  as  to  ensure  an  uninterrupted  

investigation. The object of putting such conditions should be  

to  avoid  the  possibility  of  the  person  hampering  the  

investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no reference to  

the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot  

be  countenanced  as  permissible  under  the  law.  So,  the  

discretion of the  Court  while  imposing conditions must  be  

exercised with utmost restraint.  

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13) The law presumes an  accused to be  innocent  till  his  

guilt  is  proved.  As  a  presumably  innocent  person,  he  is  

entitled to all the fundamental rights including the right to  

liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.  

14) We also clarify that while granting anticipatory bail, the  

Courts are expected to consider and keep in mind the nature  

and  gravity  of  accusation,  antecedents  of  the  applicant,  

namely, about his previous involvement in such offence and  

the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice.  It is also  

the duty of the Court to ascertain whether accusation has  

been made with the object of injuring or humiliating him by  

having him so arrested.  It is needless to mention that the  

Courts are duty bound to impose appropriate conditions as  

provided under sub-section (2) of Section 438 of the Code.

15) Thus,  in  the  case  on  hand,  fixed  deposit  of  Rs.  

1,00,00,000/- for a period of six months in the name of the  

complainant  and  to  keep  the  FDR  with  the  investigating  

officer as a condition precedent for grant of anticipatory bail  

is  evidently  onerous  and  unreasonable.  It  must  be  

remembered  that  the  Court  has  not  even  come  to  the  

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conclusion  whether  the  allegations  made  are  true  or  not  

which  can  only  be  ascertained  after  completion  of  trial.  

Certainly, in no words are we suggesting that the power to  

impose a condition of this nature is totally excluded, even in  

cases of cheating, electricity pilferage, white-collar crimes or  

chit fund scams etc.  

16) The words “any condition” used in the provision should  

not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a Court of  

law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any  

condition has  to  be  interpreted  as  a  reasonable  condition  

acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and  

effective in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the  

order of grant of bail.  We are of the view that the present  

facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  do not  warrant  such  

extreme condition to be imposed.

17) In the light of the above discussion, while retaining the  

order  granting anticipatory bail  in  favour of the appellant-

accused, namely,  Sumit  Mehta,  we set  aside the direction  

relating to deposit of FDR in the name of the complainant.  

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However,  the  appellant-accused has  to fulfill  the  following  

conditions:

(i) The  appellant  shall  make  himself  available  for  

interrogation  by  a  police  officer  as  and  when  

required;

(ii) The appellant shall not directly or indirectly make any  

inducement,  threat  or  promise  to  any  person  

acquainted  with  the  facts  of  the  case  so  as  to  

dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court  

or to any police officer;  

(iii) The  appellant  shall  furnish  his  address  to  the  

Investigating Officer who shall verify it and submit it  

to  the  trial  Court  under  his  signature.   In  case  of  

change of address, it must be communicated to the  

Investigating Officer who shall verify it and intimate  

the same to the court concerned under his signature;  

and

(iv) The  appellant  shall  not  leave  India  without  the  

previous permission of the trial Court.

18) The appeal is disposed of with the above directions.

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       ……...…………………………CJI.                     (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

       ………….…………………………J.                   (RANJANA PRAKASH  

DESAI)   NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 13, 2013

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