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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1366  OF 2010

SULTAN SINGH                      ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA                    ..... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the conviction  

and  sentence  of  the  appellant  under  Sections  304-B  and  

498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short the “IPC”). Under  

Section  304-B  IPC,  the  appellant  has  been  sentenced  to  

undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  7  years  while  under  

Section  498A,  IPC  he  has  been  sentenced  to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for three years, apart from sentence  

of fine.

2. The  appellant  was  married  to  the  deceased  Lavjeet  

Kaur  on 27th February,  1990.   On  17th June,  1994,  PW 4-

Gurmeet Singh lodged First Information Report to the effect  

that Lavjeet Kaur was burnt to death by the appellant and  

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his mother.   It was further stated that she was harassed for  

dowry soon before her death.  Apart from other demands of  

dowry,  it  was  stated  that  5-6  days  before  the  death,  the  

appellant  visited  the  parental  house  of  the  deceased and  

made a demand of Rs.30,000/- for purchase of land.   Since  

the  said  demand  was  not  met,  he  left  the  house  under  

protest.   On  the  fateful  day,  when  he  (PW-4)  visited  the  

house of the appellant he found that the appellant’s mother  

poured oil from a  ‘can’ on the deceased and the appellant  

ignited the fire.  He came to his parents and thereafter he  

went to the Civil Hospital where he learnt that the accused  

was referred to the PGI Chandigarh but she died on the way.

3. On  the  basis  of  this  First  Information  Report,  the  

investigation was conducted by PW 6-ASI, Madan Pal Singh  

and after investigation, the appellant and his mother (who  

has been acquitted by the High Court) were sent up for trial.

4. The  prosecution  examined  PW  4-Gurmeet  Singh,  

brother of the deceased, PW 5-Ujjagar Singh, father of the  

deceased, apart from evidence of Investigating Officer and  

the Medical Officer and other evidence.

5. The appellant denied the allegations and took the plea  

that the deceased caught fire accidentally while working on  

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a stove.   He had gone to the school  near their  house for  

giving  his  photo  for  the  Identity  Card  for  voting  purpose.  

When  he  learnt  about  the  accident,  he  immediately  took  

Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital.

6. The trial Court held that though the version of PW 4-

Gurmeet Singh and PW 5-Ujjagar Singh that they had seen  

the appellant setting the deceased on fire was not reliable,  

their reversion of demand of dowry soon before the death  

could not be rejected.   Since her death was within  seven  

years  of  marriage,  demand of  dowry was proved and the  

death  was  under  the  circumstances  other  than  normal,  

presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act  

could be raised.   Thus,  the commission of  offences under  

Sections 498-A           and 304-B, IPC was proved.  It was  

held that story of bursting of stove was not reliable.  The  

relevant discussion in this regard, is as follows :

“From the sworn testimony of PWs Gurmeet Singh   and Ujjagar Singh discussed above it has become  very  clear  that  deceased Smt.  Lavjeet  Kaur  was   subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused  persons for  the demand of  dowry right from the   beginning of her marriage till death.   Even soon   before her death she was subjected to cruelty by   the accused persons when father of the deceased   could  not  pay  a  sum of  Rs.30,000/-  to  accused   Sultan  Singh  5/6  days  prior  to  the  death  of   deceased.   Deceased  was  married  with  accused  

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Sultan  Singh  on  27.2.1990  and  she  died  on   17.6.1994  on  account  of  burn  injuries  at  the   matrimonial  home.   The  fact  that  the  deceased  died  on  account  of  burn  injuries  is  well  proved   from  the  medical  evidence  consisting  of  the  statements of  Dr.  S.K.  Gupta who medico-legally   examined the deceased immediately on arrival at   Civil  Hospital  Ambala  Cantt.,  and  also  of  Dr.   Gajinder  Yadav  PW-3  who  conducted  the  post   mortem  examination  of  the  dead  body  of   deceased.  The deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur aged   about 22 years had suffered 70% burn injuries and  died on account of the same.  Thus, it has been   well established that the death of deceased Smt.   Lavjeet Kaur was caused by burns and she died  unnatural death.  It has also been established that   she  died  within  a  period  of  seven  years  of  her   marriage.   As already discussed by me that it has   also been established that the deceased was also  subjected  to  cruelty  by  the  accused  persons  for   the demand of dowry soon before her death.  Thus   in view of the provisions contained in Section 113- B of the Indian Evidence Act it  can very well  be   presumed that the accused persons have caused  dowry death.    Since the deceased Lavjeet Kaur   was at the house of the accused and therefore now  it  is  for the accused persons to explain how she  died an unnatural death within a period of about 4-   ½  years of her marriage.

The explanation furnished by the accused persons  with respect to the death of Smt. Lavjeet Kaur in   the form of their defence version to the effect that   the deceased died just by mere accident as she   caught fire on account of bursting of stove when   she was cooking meals cannot be accepted.  The  investigating  officer  ASI  Madan  Pal  took  into   possession a plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling kerosene  oil and half burnt Gadda from inside the room of   the house.  If Smt. Lavjeet Kaur had been caught   fire while working on the stove I fail to understand  as to how the Gadda lying in the bed room of the   house  would  have  caught  fire.   Secondly  if  the  stove would have burst the same must have been  found  lying  at  the  place  of  occurrence,  but  the   same was not available to the Investigating Officer   when he visited the spot.  It clearly negatives the   defence version that Smt. Lavjeet Kaur caught fire   on account of bursting of stove.  The argument of   

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the learned defence counsel to the effect that PW  Gurmeet Singh has deposed that he had seen the   accused  setting  Smt.  Lavjeet  Kaur  on  fire  by   sprinkling kerosene oil upon her in the court yard  of the house does not effect the prosecution case   in  any way,  because I  have already observed in   the earlier part of the judgment that the deposition  of PW  Gurmeet Singh so far as he has given an   eye  version  account  cannot  be  believed  that   therefore the story of the court yard put forward  by  him  automatically  goes.   However,  the  fact   remains  that  the  Investigating  Officer  found  the  half burnt Gadda Ex.P-2 and the plastic can Ex.P-1   smelling  kerosene  inside  the  bed  room  of  the  house.   Thus,  the  non-availability  of  the  burst   stove on the spot itself  speaks that the defence   version is nothing but is simply made up story and  cannot be believed.

The  medical  evidence  as  pointed  out  by  the  learned  defence  counsel  also  does  not  help  the  accused persons in any way.  It has been deposed  by Dr. Gajinder Yadav that there were deep burns   on legs and chest of the deceased.  It has come in   the statements  of  both  the medical  officers  that   the deceased suffered 70% burn injuries and died   as  a  result  thereof.   It  has  been  categorically   stated by Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted the  post-mortem examination that the deceased died  on account of burn injuries which were sufficient to   cause death in the ordinary course of nature.  I fail   to understand as to what help the accused could   take from the statements of the medical officers   by  pointing  out  that  the  Medical  Officers  have  deposed that there was no smell of kerosene from  the body and clothes of the deceased.  If it was so   then it also smashes the defence version, because   if  the  deceased  had  caught  fire  by  bursting  of   stove then also there must be smell of kerosene oil   on her clothes.   In my view, the smell of kerosene   might  have  evaporated  in  between  the  time  of   occurrence  till  the  post  mortem  examination  because  the  occurrence  had  taken  place  on   17.6.1994 at about noon time, whereas the post   mortem examination was conducted on 18.6.1994.

Further, the deceased was unconscious when she   was admitted in  the hospital  and therefore,  it  is   not  known how the deceased could  tell  Dr.  S.K.   

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Gupta that she had caught fire while working on a   stove.  Another person from whom Dr. S.K. Gupta   derived  this  information  was  one  Amar  Nath  a   private Medical practitioner, who accompanied the   deceased  to  the  hospital.   However,  Shri  Amar   Nath  was  not  produced  in  defence  to  ascertain   whether he had told this fact to the Medical Officer   and  if  so  how  he  acquired  the  said  knowledge  whether  from  the  deceased  or  otherwise.   Moreover, in the ruka Ex.PC sent by Dr. S.K. Gupta   to the police there is no mentioning of the bursting   of stove, nor it has been mentioned as to how he   learnt that the deceased caught fire while working  on a stove.  It has simply been mentioned that the   deceased  was  alleged  to  have  sustained  burns   70% while working on a stove.  The word ‘bursting’   is missing in this ruka, whereas, it was so stated by  Dr.  S.K.  Gupta when he appeared in the witness   box.  If the story of bursting of stove came to his   knowledge  it  is  not  known  why  he  omitted  to  mention  this  fact  in  his  ruka Ex.  PC sent  to the   police.  Taking into consideration all the facts and  circumstances I  am of the definite view that the   statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta to the effect that there   was the history of burns allegedly sustained by the   deceased due to bursting of  stove while cooking   food  is  not  legally  sound  because  neither  Amar  Nath  was  produced,  nor  deceased  could  speak   anything before her death.”

7. The  appellant  preferred  an  appeal.   The  High  Court  

upheld the conviction of the appellant while acquitting his  

mother Mohinder Kaur, the co-accused, of the charge under  

Section 304-B, IPC but upheld her conviction under Section  

498A, IPC.  It was observed that the allegation of demand of  

dowry soon before the death was only against the appellant  

and not against his mother.  Rejecting the defence plea of  

accidental burning, the High Court observed as under :

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“The  accused  or  their  persons  might  have  accompanied  Lavjeet  Kaur  to  the  hospital.   The   accused  are  naturally  interested  to  save  themselves from legal punishment and such as the   said  history  might  have  been  given  by  them or   Amar  Nath  to  save the  accused.   PW-2 Dr.  S.K.   Gupta  has  no  personal  knowledge  about  the  occurrence and has stated that there was history   of burns sustained by Lavjeet Kaur due to bursting   of stove while cooking food.  So, that history was   given by the accused or Amar Nath, accompanying  the injured to the hospital.

One another circumstance which militates against   the case of the accused is that the police found the  blood  sustained  Gadda  in  the  room  where  the  occurrence is stated to have taken place and not   in the kitchen, as per stand of the accused.  That   fact belied the stand of accused.

The statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that history was   given by the patient  does not  appeal to reason.   The deceased was having 70% burn injuries and as   such  she  was  not  in  a  position  to  narrate  the   occurrence.  The police had no reason to change   the  place  of  occurrence  from the kitchen to  the  room as shown in the rough site plan.  There were   singeing of the skull hair of Lavjeet Kaur besides   having burn injuries on the chest and lower part of   the body.  The fact of bursting of stove and giving   the case history by Lavjeet Kaur is not mentioned   by Dr. S.K. Gupta in the record.  The doctor is not   supposed to orally know all  the facts.  It seems   that Dr. S.K. Gupta has stated that the history of   the case was given by the patient simply to favour   the accused, moreso when there is nothing in this   regard  on  the  record.   So,  no  reliance  can  be  placed on the statement made by Dr. S.K. Gupta,   in this regard.

PW-3  Dr.  Gajinder  Yadav,  has  stated  that  there  was  probability  of  the  deceased  receiving  burn   injuries by accidental fire but he has not stated it   with confidence that in all  probability,  the death  could  be  accidental,  in  the  present  case.   That   doctor  has  not  seen  the  other  circumstantial   evidence  at  the  spot  before  arriving  at  the   conclusion.  So, the learned trial Court has rightly   held that Lavjeet Kaur, deceased, has died due to   

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unnatural  injuries  and  not  by  accidental  burn   injuries.”

8. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  

perused the evidence on the record.

9. The  main  question  raised  for  our  consideration  is  

whether the evidence of demand of dowry soon before the  

death was reliable and whether it was a case of accidental  

death as pleaded by the defence.  The presumption under  

Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is attracted only in  

case of suicidal  or homicidal  death and not in case of  an  

accidental death.

10. We are unable to accept the submissions advanced on  

behalf of the appellant.

11. The  brother  and  father  of  the  deceased  have  made  

categorical allegation of demand of dowry which confirmed  

almost upto the date of death.  Even though version of PW 4,  

brother of the deceased, and  PW 5, father of the deceased,  

may be exaggerated to the extent of saying that they saw  

the accused and his mother causing burn injuries, there is no  

reason to disbelieve their version with regard to demand of  

dowry.    It  is  true  that  in  case  of  accidental  death  

presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act  

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is  not available but there is no reason to hold that in the  

present case, the burn injuries were by accident.   

12. Apart  from  the  following  reasons  given  by  the  trial  

Court and the High Court, namely;  

(i)  The  Investigating  Officer  found  the  plastic  can  (Exhibit  P-1)  smelling  kerosene oil  and a half  burnt   mattress (Exhibit P-2);

(ii)  The  burst  stove  was  not  found  at  the  place  of   occurrence as stated by the Investigating Officer;

(iii) The  deceased suffered 70% burn injuries which was   held to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary   course of injury, there are other reasons to reject the   plea of accident;

there are other reasons to support the findings.

12. While in the case of homicidal death, if  the victim is  

caught  unaware,  a  person may not  be able  to  make any  

effort  to  save himself/herself  and in  case of  suicidal  burn  

injuries  a  person  may  take  all  precautions  not  to  save  

himself/herself,  in  case  of  accidental  burn  injuries,  victim  

makes all possible efforts to save himself/herself which may  

leave evidence to show that the death was accidental.  Such  

a  person  may  raise  alarm  and  try  to  escape.   The  

Investigating  Officer  visiting  the  scene  of  occurrence  can  

notice the available evidence by recreating the scene.  In the  

present  case,  there  are  no  probabilities  to  support  the  

defence  plea  of  accident,  particularly  when  relations  

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between  the  deceased  and  the  appellant  were  not  

harmonious.   

13. Thus,  taking  of  plea  by  the  accused  to  save  

himself/herself is not enough.  The contention in the present  

case that PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta mentioned the history of burn  

due to bursting of stove was given by the patient and one  

Amar Nath who accompanied her is without any merit.  In  

the same statement the said witness states that the victim  

was unfit to make a statement.   Amar Nath, who is said to  

have given this information, has not been examined by the  

defence.  Statement of  Dr. S.K. Gupta that Amar Nath gave  

this information is hearsay.   Moreover, PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta  

has been examined as an expert witness to give his opinion  

about  the  health  condition  of  the  patient  based  on  his  

expertise.  He is not a witness of fact.  Similarly, contention  

that    PW  3-Dr.  Gajinder  Yadav  who  conducted  the  post  

mortem made a statement in cross examination that there  

was more probability of death being caused by accidental  

fire as there was no smell of kerosene oil from the body of  

the deceased and that the fire had started from the lower  

parts of the body towards upper parts is equally without any  

merit.   Such statement of an expert witness without being  

based  on any  specialized  knowledge cannot  be  accepted.  

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The  opinion  of  expert  witness  on  technical  aspects  has  

relevance but the opinion has to be based upon specialized  

knowledge and the data on which it is based has to be found  

acceptable  by  the  Court.     In  Madan  Gopal  Kakkad  

versus Naval Dubey.  1  , it was observed as under :

“34. A medical witness called in as an expert to  assist the Court is  not a witness of  fact and the  evidence given by the medical officer is really of   an  advisory  character  given on the  basis  of  the  symptoms  found  on  examination.  The  expert   witness  is  expected  to  put  before  the  Court  all   materials inclusive of the data which induced him  to come to the conclusion and enlighten the Court   on the technical aspect of the case by explaining   the terms of science so that the Court although,   not an expert may form its own judgment on those   materials after giving due regard to  the expert’s  opinion  because  once  the  expert’s  opinion  is   accepted,  it  is  not  the  opinion  of  the  medical   officer but of the Court.

35. Nariman, J. in  Queen v.  Ahmed Ally.2, while  expressing  his  view  on  medical  evidence  has   observed as follows:

“The  evidence  of  a  medical  man  or  other   skilled  witnesses,  however,  eminent,  as  to   what  he thinks may or  may not  have taken  place  under  particular  combination  of   circumstances, however, confidently, he may  speak, is ordinarily a matter of mere opinion.”

14. We may also note that the presumption under Section  

113B of the Indian Evidence Act has been enacted to check  

the  menace  of  the  dowry  deaths  and  in  appreciating  the  

evidence, the social background of the legislation cannot be  

1 (1992) 3 SCC 204 2 (1998) 3 SCC 309

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ignored.  In Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana  .  3  , it was  

observed:  

“11. It is true, as argued by learned counsel for   the  appellants,  that  in  criminal  jurisprudence   benefit of doubt is extendable to the accused. But   that benefit of doubt would arise in the context of   the application of penal law, and in the facts and  circumstances of a case. The concept of benefit of   doubt has an important role to play but within the   confines of the stringency of laws. Since the cause   of death of a married woman was to occur not in   normal circumstances but as a “dowry death”, for   which the evidence was not so easily available, as   it  is  mostly  confined  within  the  four  walls  of  a   house,  namely  the  husband’s  house,  where  all   likely  accused  reside.  Hence  the  aforesaid   amendments  brought  in  the  concept  of  deemed  “dowry death” by the husband or the relatives, as   the case may be. This deeming clause has a role to   play  and cannot  be taken lightly  and ignored  to  shield an accused, otherwise the very purpose of   the  amendment  will  be  lost.  Of  course,  the  prosecution  has  to  prove  the  ultimate  essential   ingredients  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  after   raising the initial  presumption of “deemed dowry   death”.

12. Explanation to Section 304-B refers to dowry   “as having the same meaning as in Section 2 of   the  1961  Act”,  the  question  is:  what  is  the  periphery  of  the  dowry  as  defined  therein?  The   argument is, there has to be an agreement at the  time of the marriage in view of the words “agreed   to be given” occurring therein, and in the absence   of any such evidence it would not constitute to be  a  dowry.  It  is  noticeable,  as  this  definition  by   amendment  includes  not  only  the  period  before   and  at  the  marriage  but  also  the  period   subsequent to the marriage.

13. When words in a statute are referable to more   than  one  meaning,  the  established  rule  of   construction  is  found  in  Heydon’s  case1 also  approved by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.  

3 11 WR Cr. 25

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v.  State  of  Bihar2 AIR  at  p.  674.  The  rule  is  to   consider four aspects while construing an Act:

(a) what was the law prior to the law which is   sought to be interpreted;

(b) what was the mischief or defect for which  new law is made;

(c) what is the remedy the law now provides;   and

(d) what is the reason of the remedy.

14. The Court must adopt that construction which,   “suppresses  the  mischief  and  advances  the  remedy”.

15. Applying  this  principle,  it  is  clear  that  the  earlier  law  was  not  sufficient  to  check  dowry   deaths hence aforesaid stringent provisions  were   brought  in,  so  that  persons  committing  such  inhuman  crimes  on  married  women  should  not   escape,  as  evidence  of  a  direct  nature  is  not   readily available except of the circumstantial kind.   Hence  it  is  that  interpretation  which  suppresses   the  mischief,  subserves  the  objective  and  advances the remedy, which would be acceptable.   The objective is that men committing such crimes   should  not  escape  punishment.  Hence  stringent   provisions were brought in by shifting the burden  onto  the  accused  by  bringing  in  the  deemed  clause. As aforesaid, the definition of “dowry” was   amended with effect from 19-11-1986, to include  the period even after the marriage.

16. The offence alleged against the appellants is   under Section 304-B IPC which makes “demand of   dowry”  itself  punishable.  Demand  neither  conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If   for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry is   to  be  proved,  hardly  any  offenders  would  come  under  the  clutches  of  law.  When  Section  304-B   refers  to  “demand  of  dowry”,  it  refers  to  the   demand  of  property  or  valuable  security  as   referred to in the definition of “dowry” under the  1961 Act. It was argued on behalf of the appellants   that mere demand of scooter or fridge would not   be a demand for dowry. We find from the evidence  on  record  that  within  a  few  days  after  the   marriage, the deceased was tortured,  maltreated  

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and harassed for not bringing the aforesaid articles   in  marriage.  Hence the demand is  in  connection   with  marriage.  The  argument  that  there  is  no  demand  of  dowry,  in  the  present  case,  has  no   force.  In  cases  of  dowry  deaths  and  suicides,   circumstantial  evidence  plays  an  important  role   and inferences can be drawn on the basis of such   evidence. That could be either direct or indirect. It   is significant that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, was   also amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, under   which it is an offence to demand dowry directly or   indirectly  from  the  parents  or  other  relatives  or   guardian  of  a  bride.  The  word  “agreement”   referred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  interpretation  that  the  appellant  seeks,  that  conviction  can only  be  if  there  is  agreement  for   dowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary to  the  mandate  and  object  of  the  Act.  “Dowry”  definition  is  to  be  interpreted  with  the  other   provisions  of  the  Act  including  Section  3,  which   refers  to  giving  or  taking  dowry  and  Section  4   which  deals  with  penalty  for  demanding  dowry,   under the 1961 Act and the Indian Penal Code. This   makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other   ingredients being satisfied is punishable. This leads   to the inference, when persistent demands for TV   and  scooter  are  made  from  the  bride  after   marriage or from her parents, it would constitute   to be in connection with the marriage and it would   be a case of demand of dowry within the meaning   of  Section  304-B IPC.  It  is  not  always  necessary   that there be any agreement for dowry.”

Again in Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi  .  4  ,   it  

was observed as under :

8. Section  304-B  IPC  which  deals  with  dowry  death, reads as follows:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a  woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or   occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances   within seven years of her marriage and it is shown   that soon before her death she was subjected to   cruelty  or  harassment  by  her  husband  or  any  

4 (2003) 8 SCC 80

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relative of her husband for, or in connection with,   any demand for dowry, such death shall be called   ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall   be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For  the  purpose  of  this  sub- section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in   Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of   1961).

(2)  Whoever  commits  dowry  death  shall  be   punished with imprisonment for a term which shall   not  be  less  than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend to imprisonment for life.” The  provision  has  application  when  death  of  a   woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or   occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances   within seven years of her marriage and it is shown   that soon before her death she was subjected to   cruelty  or  harassment  by  her  husband  or  any  relatives of her husband for, or in connection with   any  demand  for  dowry.  In  order  to  attract  application  of  Section  304-B  IPC,  the  essential   ingredients are as follows:

(i) The death of a woman should be caused by  burns or bodily injury or  otherwise than under a   normal circumstance.

(ii)  Such a death should have occurred within   seven years of her marriage.

(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or   harassment by her husband or any relative of her   husband.

(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or   in connection with demand of dowry.

(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have  been  meted  out  to  the  woman  soon  before  her   death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant   for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and  Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as   noted  earlier  by  Dowry  Prohibition  (Amendment)   Act  43  of  1986  with  a  view  to  combat  the   increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B  reads as follows:

“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When  the question is whether a person has committed   the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that  soon  before  her  death  such  woman  had  been  subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment  for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,   

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the  Court  shall  presume  that  such  person  had   caused the dowry death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,   ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in   Section  304-B  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of   1860).” The necessity  for  insertion  of  the two provisions   has been amply analysed by the Law Commission   of  India  in  its  21st  Report  dated  10-8-1988  on   “Dowry Deaths and Law Reform”. Keeping in view  the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing  evidence  to  prove  dowry-related  deaths,  the  legislature  thought  it  wise  to  insert  a  provision   relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of   certain  essentials.  It  is  in  this  background  that  presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has   been  inserted.  As  per  the  definition  of  “dowry   death” in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the  presumptive  Section  113-B  of  the  Evidence  Act,   one of the essential ingredients, amongst others,   in  both  the  provisions  is  that  the  woman  concerned  must  have  been  “soon  before  her   death” subjected to cruelty or harassment “for or   in  connection  with  the  demand  of  dowry”.   Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption   of  law.  On  proof  of  the  essentials  mentioned  therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise   a presumption that the accused caused the dowry   death.  The  presumption  shall  be  raised  only  on  proof of the following essentials:

(1)  The  question  before  the  court  must  be   whether  the  accused  has  committed  the  dowry  death  of  the  woman.  (This  means  that  the   presumption can be raised only if the accused is   being  tried  for  the  offence  under  Section  304-B  IPC.)

(2)  The  woman  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment by her husband or his relatives.

(3)  Such  cruelty  or  harassment  was  for  or  in   connection with any demand for dowry.

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before   her death.

9. A  conjoint  reading  of  Section  113-B  of  the   Evidence  Act  and  Section  304-B  IPC  shows  that   there must be material to show that soon before   her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or   harassment.  The prosecution has to rule out  the   

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possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to   bring  it  within  the  purview  of  “death  occurring   otherwise  than  in  normal  circumstances”.  The  expression  “soon  before”  is  very  relevant  where   Section  113-B  of  the  Evidence  Act  and  Section   304-B  IPC  are  pressed  into  service.  The  prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the  occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and   only in that case presumption operates. Evidence  in that regard has to be led by the prosecution.   “Soon  before”  is  a  relative  term  and  it  would   depend upon the circumstances of each case and  no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what   would  constitute  a  period  of  soon  before  the  occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any  fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a   proximity test both for the proof of an offence of   dowry death as well as for raising a presumption   under  Section  113-B  of  the  Evidence  Act.  The   expression  “soon  before  her  death”  used  in  the  substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  present  with  the  idea  of   proximity  test.  No  definite  period  has  been  indicated and the expression “soon before” is not   defined.  A  reference  to  the  expression  “soon   before” used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the  Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court   may presume that a man who is in the possession   of goods “soon after the theft, is either the thief or   has received the goods knowing them to be stolen,   unless he can account for their possession”.  The   determination of the period which can come within   the term “soon before” is left to be determined by   the  courts,  depending  upon  facts  and  circumstances of each case. Suffice,  however,  to   indicate that the expression “soon before” would   normally  imply  that  the  interval  should  not  be  much  between  the  cruelty  or  harassment  concerned and the death in question. There must   be existence of a proximate and live link between  the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and   the  death  concerned.  If  the  alleged  incident  of   cruelty  is  remote  in  time and has  become stale   enough not  to  disturb  the  mental  equilibrium of   the  woman  concerned,  it  would  be  of  no  consequence.

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15. Having regard to the entirety of material,  we do not  

find  any  ground  to  interfere  with  the  concurrent  finding  

recorded  by  the  courts  below  that  it  was  not  a  case  of  

accidental death but a death taking place in circumstances  

other than normal.    Thus, the presumption under Section  

113B of the Indian Evidence Act has been rightly  invoked  

and  the  offence  against  the  appellant  has  been  proved.  

There is no tangible circumstance to rebut the presumption.

17. For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in this  

appeal.  The appeal is dismissed.  The appellant who is on  

bail  is  directed  to  surrender  to  custody  to  undergo  the  

remaining sentence.

……..…………………………….J. [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

.….………………………………..J. NEW DELHI            [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ] September 26, 2014

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ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment      COURT NO.13               SECTION  IIB                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal  No(s).  1366/2010 SULTAN SINGH                                       Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA                                  Respondent(s)

Date : 26/09/2014 This appeal was called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s)  Mr. D.P. Singh, Adv.                      Mr. Sanjay Jain,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)  Mr. Manjit Singh, AAG

Mrs. Nupur Choudhary, Adv.  Mrs. Vivekta Singh, Adv.

                    Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta,Adv.                       

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the  judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble  Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda.  

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.       (VINOD KUMAR)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER  (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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