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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1970 OF 2014 (@ out of SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.20625/2010)

Dr. Suhas H. Pophale             …    Appellant  

Versus

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Its Estate Officer  …  Respondents

J  U  D  G  E  M  E  N  T

H.L. Gokhale J.   

Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave raises the question as  

to  whether  the  rights  of  an  occupant/licensee/  tenant  

protected under a State Rent Control Act (Bombay Rent Act,  

1947  and its  successor  the  Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act,  

1999,  in  the instant  case),  could  be adversely  affected by  

application of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised

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Occupants) Act, 1971 (‘Public Premises Act’ for short)?  This  

question  arises  in  the  context  of  the  eviction  order  dated  

28.5.1993 passed by the respondent No. 2, Estate Officer of  

the  first  respondent,  invoking  the  provisions  of  the  Public  

Premises Act with respect to the premises occupied by the  

appellant  since  20.12.1972.   The  eviction  order  has  been  

upheld by the Bombay High Court in its impugned judgment  

dated 7.6.2010, rejecting the Writ Petition No.2473 of 1996  

filed by the appellant herein.

The facts leading to this appeal are this wise:-

3. One  Mr.  Eric  Voller  was  a  tenant  of  the  Indian  

Mercantile  Insurance Company Ltd.  (hereinafter  referred to  

as the erstwhile Insurance Co.), the predecessor in title of the  

first respondent in respect of the premises being Flat No.3,  

Second Floor, Indian Mercantile Mansion (formerly known as  

Waterloo  Mansion),  Wodehouse  Road,  Opposite  Regal  

Cinema, Colaba, Mumbai.  This Mr. Voller executed a leave  

and  licence  agreement  in  respect  of  these  premises  on  

20.12.1972 in favour of the appellant initially for a period of  

two years, and put him in exclusive possession thereof.  Mr.  

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Voller,  thereafter  migrated  to  Canada with  his  family.  The  

appellant is a practicing physician. The erstwhile insurance  

company  did  not  object  to  the  appellant  coming  into  

exclusive possession of the said premises.  In fact, it is the  

case of the appellant that when Mr. Voller sought the transfer  

of the tenancy to the appellant, the General Manager of the  

said  insurance  company,  by  his  reply  dated  16.1.1973,  

accepted the appellant as the tenant, though for residential  

purposes  only.   The  said  erstwhile  insurance  company,  

thereafter,  started  accepting  the  rent  directly  from  the  

appellant.   It  is  also  the  case  of  the  appellant  that  on  

14.3.1973, he wrote to the said General Manager seeking a  

permission for a change of user i.e. to use the premises for  

his clinic.  It is also his case that on 18.4.1973, the General  

Manager  wrote  back  to  him  that  the  erstwhile  insurance  

company had no objection to the change of user, provided  

the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Mumbai  gave  no  

objection.

4. The  erstwhile  insurance  company  subsequently  

merged on 1.1.1974 into the first respondent company which  

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is a Government Company. The management of the erstwhile  

insurance  company  had  however  been  taken  over  by  the  

Central Government with effect from 13.5.1971, pending its  

nationalisation  and  that  of  other  private  insurance  

companies.   The  first  respondent,  thereafter,  addressed  a  

notice  dated  12.7.1980  to  Mr.  E.  Voller  terminating  his  

tenancy with respect to the said premises, and then filed a  

suit for eviction against Mr. E. Voller and the appellant being  

R.A.E.  Suit  No.1176/3742  of  1981  in  the  Court  of  Small  

Causes  at  Mumbai,  under  the  provisions  of  the  then  

applicable Bombay Rents,  Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates  

Control Act, 1947 (‘Bombay Rent Act’ for short).  Initially the  

suit came to be dismissed for default, but an application was  

made under Order 9 Rule 9 of Code of Civil Procedure to set  

aside the said order.  The application was allowed, and the  

suit remained pending.   

5.  The appellant then sent a letter dated 22.11.1984  

to  the  first  respondent  requesting  them  to  regularize  his  

tenancy  as  a  statutory  tenant.   The  first  respondent,  

however, served the appellant notices under Section 4 and 7  

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of the Public Premises Act, to show cause as to why he should  

not  be  evicted  from  the  concerned  premises,  and  to  pay  

damages as specified therein for unauthorised occupation as  

claimed.  The first respondent followed it by preferring Case  

No.10 and 10A of 1992 before the respondent No. 2 Estate  

Officer under the Public Premises Act, to evict Mr. E. Voller  

and the appellant,  and also to recover the damages. After  

initiating these proceedings, the first respondent withdrew on  

22.2.1994 the suit filed in the Court of Small Causes.  It is,  

however,  relevant to note that in paragraph No.  4 of their  

case  before  the  Estate  Officer,  the  first  respondent  

specifically accepted that Mr. E. Voller had sublet or given on  

leave and licence basis or otherwise transferred his interest  

in  the said  flat  to  the  appellant  in  or  about  1972,  though  

without any authority from the respondent No. 1.  The first  

respondent  alleged  that  the  appellant  had  carried  out  

structural changes. The appellant denied the allegation.  He  

claimed that he had effected some essential minor repairs for  

maintenance of the premises since the first respondent was  

neglecting to attend the same.  The appellant  filed a reply  

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pointing out that he had been accepted as a tenant by the  

predecessor of the first respondent by their earlier referred  

letter  dated  16.1.1973.   The  first  respondent,  however,  

responded on 5.1.1993 stating that they did not have any  

record of the erstwhile insurance company prior to 1975.  The  

second respondent thereafter passed an order on 28.5.1993  

directing eviction of Mr. E. Voller and the appellant, and also  

for recovery of damages at the rate of Rs.6750 per month  

from 1.9.1980.   

6. Being aggrieved by the said order,  the appellant  

filed an appeal before the City Civil Court at Mumbai under  

Section  9  of  the  Public  Premises  Act,  which  appeal  was  

numbered as Misc. Appeal No.79/93.  The City Civil Court set  

aside the order of damages, and remanded the matter to the  

second respondent to reconsider that aspect, but upheld the  

order of eviction by its judgment and order dated 17.1.1996.  

The  appellant  thereupon  filed  a  writ  petition  bearing  

No.2473/1996  before  the  High  Court  on  15.4.1996  to  

challenge that part of the appellate order which upheld the  

order of eviction.  The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition,  

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by the impugned judgment and order dated 7.6.2010, with  

costs.

7. The  principal  contention  raised  by  the  appellant  

right  from  the  stage  of  the  proceedings  before  the  

respondent No. 2, and even before the High Court, was that  

his  occupation  of  the  concerned  premises  was  protected  

under the newly added S 15A of the Bombay Rent Act with  

effect  from  1.2.1973,  i.e.  prior  to  the  first  respondent  

acquiring  the  title  over  the  property  from  1.1.1974.  

Therefore, he could not be evicted by invoking the provisions  

of  Public  Premises  Act,  and  by  treating  him  as  an  

unauthorised occupant under that act.  The impugned order  

of the High Court rejected the said submission holding that  

the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act were not applicable to  

the premises concerned, and the said premises were covered  

under  the  Public  Premises  Act.  The  High  Court  principally  

relied  upon  the  judgment  of  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  

Court  in  Ashoka  Marketing  Ltd.  Vs.  Punjab  National  

Bank reported in 1990 (4) SCC 406.  As per the view taken  

by the High Court, this judgment rejects the contention that  

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the provisions of the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to  

the  premises  which  fall  within  the  ambit  of  a  State  Rent  

Control Act. The High Court held that the Public Premises Act  

became  applicable  to  the  concerned  premises  from  

13.5.1971 itself  i.e.  the  appointed date under  the General  

Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act,  1971 wherefrom the  

management of the erstwhile insurance company was taken  

over by the Central Government, and not from the date of  

merger  i.e.  1.1.1974.   It  is  this  judgment  which  is  under  

challenge in the present appeal.

8. Mr.  Rohinton  F.  Nariman,  learned  senior  counsel  

has  appeared  for  the  appellant  and  Mr.  Harin  P.  Raval,  

learned senior counsel has appeared for the respondents.

The principal issue involved in the matter:-

9. To  begin  with,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  

relationship between the erstwhile insurance company as the  

landlord and the appellant as the occupant,  at all  material  

times was governed under the   Bombay Rent Act.   Like all  

other rent control enactments, this Act has been passed as a  

welfare  measure,  amongst  other  reasons  to  protect  the  

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tenants  against  unjustified  increases  above  the  standard  

rent, to permit eviction of the tenants only when a case is  

made out under the specified grounds, and to provide for a  

forum  and  procedure  for  adjudication  of  the  disputes  

between  the  landlords  and  the  tenants.  The  legislature  of  

Maharashtra  thought  it  necessary  to  protect  the  licensees  

also in certain situations.  Therefore, this act was amended,  

and a section was inserted therein bearing Section No.15A to  

protect the licensees who were in occupation on 1.2.1973.  

This Section reads as follows:-

“15A.  Certain  licensees  in  occupation  on 1st February 1973 to become tenants (1) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  elsewhere in this Act or anything contrary in   any other law for the time being in force, or   in any contract where any person is on the   1st day of February 1973 in occupation of any   premises,  or  any part  thereof  which is  not   less than a room, as a licensee he shall on   that  date be  deemed to  have become,  for   the  purpose  of  this  Act,  the  tenant  of  the   landlord, in respect of the premises or part   thereof, in his occupation. (2) The provisions  of  sub-section (1)  shall   not  affect  in  any  manner  the  operation  of   sub-section (1) of section 15 after the date   aforesaid.”

We  may  note  that  S  15(1)  prohibits  sub-letting  of  premises.  

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10. As  far  as  the  insurance  business  in  India  is  

concerned,  prior  to  independence,  it  was  owned  and  

operated by private entities. The governing law for insurance  

in  India  was,  and  still  is  the  Insurance  Act,  1938.   Post-

independence, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 stated  

that  the  Life  Insurance  industry  in  India  was  to  be  

nationalised.  Therefore, the Life Insurance Corporation Act of  

1956  was  passed  creating  the  Life  Insurance  Corporation  

(LIC), as a statutory corporation, and transferring the assets  

of  all  the private life  insurance companies  in  India  to  LIC.  

Sometimes  around  1970-71,  it  was  felt  that  the  general  

insurance  industry  was  also  in  need  of  nationalisation.  

Therefore, first the General Insurance (Emergency Provisions)  

Act, 1971 was passed by the Parliament which provided for  

the  taking  over  of  the  management  of  general  insurance  

business.   Though  the  Act  received  the  assent  of  the  

President on 17.6.1971,  it  was deemed to have come into  

force on 13.5.1971 from which date the Central Government  

assumed the management of General Insurance Business as  

an initial  step towards the nationalisation.   Thereafter,  the  

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General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act,  1972 was  

passed on 20.9.1972. Section 16 of this Act contemplated the  

merger of the private insurance companies into certain other  

insurance companies. Consequently, these private insurance  

companies merged into four insurance companies viz.,  

(a) The National Insurance Company Ltd.,

(b) The New India Assurance Company Ltd.,

(c) The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., and

(d) The United India Insurance Company Ltd.

These four  companies  are fully  owned subsidiaries of  the  

General  Insurance  Corporation  of  India  which  is  a  

Government  Company  registered  under  Companies  Act,  

1956, but incorporated as mandated under Section 9 of the  

above referred Nationalisation Act.  The Central Government  

holds not less than 51 per cent of the paid up share capital of  

the  General  Insurance  Corporation.   The  above  referred  

Indian Mercantile Insurance Company Ltd.  merged into the  

first  respondent-Oriental  Insurance  Company  Ltd.  w.e.f.  

1.1.1974.    

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11. There is one more important development which is  

required to be noted.  The Public Premises Act, 1971 (40 of  

1971)  came  to  be  passed  in  the  meanwhile.   As  per  its  

preamble, it is “an act to provide for eviction of unauthorised  

occupants  from public  premises  and  for  certain  incidental   

matters”  such  as  removal  of  unauthorised  construction,  

recovery  of  arrears  of  rent  etc.   It  came  into  force  on  

23.8.1971,  but  Section  1(3)  thereof  states  that  it  shall  be  

deemed  to  have  come  into  force  on  16.9.1958,  except  

Section 11 (on offences and penalty) and Sections 19 and 20  

(on repeal and validation). This is because from 16.9.1958, its  

predecessor  Act  viz.  The  Public  Premises  (Eviction  of  

Unauthorised Occupants) Act (32 of 1958) was in force for  

similar  purposes,  and  which  was  repealed  by  the  above  

referred  Section  19  of  the  1971  Act.   As  provided  under  

Section  2  (e)  (2)  (i)  of  this  Act,  the  definition  of  ‘Public  

Premises’, amongst others, covers the premises belonging to  

or taken on lease by or on behalf of any company in which  

not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital  

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was held by the Central Government.  The definition of public  

premises under Section 2(e) of this Act reads as follows:-  

“2. Definitions….. [(e) “public premises” means— (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or   

requisitioned  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  the  Central   Government,  and  includes  any  such  premises   which  have  been  placed  by  the  Government,   whether  before  or  after  the  commencement  of   the  Public  Premises  (Eviction  of  Unauthorised   Occupants)  Amendment  Act,  1980,  under  the  control  of  the  Secretariat  of  either  House  of   Parliament  for  providing  residential   accommodation  to  any  member  of  the  staff  of   that Secretariat;

(2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by,   or on behalf of,— (i)  any company as defined in Section 3 of the   

Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not   less  than  fifty-one  per  cent  of  the  paid-up   share  capital  is  held  by  the  Central   Government  or  any  company  which  is  a   subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of   the first-mentioned company,

(ii)  any  Corporation  [not  being  a  company  as   defined  in  Section  3  of  the  Companies  Act,   1956  (1  of  1956),  or  a  local  authority]   established  by  or  under  a  Central  Act  and  owned  or  controlled  by  the  Central   Government,

(iii) any University established or incorporated by   any Central Act,

(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of   Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961),

(v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the   Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963),

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(vi)  the  Bhakra  Management  Board  constituted   under Section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation   Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and  when  renamed  as  the  Bhakra-Beas  Management  Board  under  sub-section  (6)  of   Section 80 of that Act;  

[(vii) any State Government or the Government of   any  Union  Territory  situated  in  the  National   Capital Territory of Delhi or in any other Union   Territory;

(viii)  any  Cantonment  Board  consitituted  under   the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924); and]

(3) in relation to the [National Capital Territory of   Delhi],— (i)  any  premises  belonging  to  the  Municipal   

Corporation  of  Delhi,  or  any  municipal   committee or notified area committee,

(ii)  any  premises  belonging  to  the  Delhi   Development  Authority,  whether  such  premises are in  the possession of,  or  leased   out by, the said Authority, [and]

[(iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease   or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State   Government or the Government of any Union   Territory;]”

12. The consequence of this development was that in  

view of the merger of the erstwhile insurance company into  

the first respondent, (of which not less than 51 per cent share  

holding  was  that  of  the  Central  Government,)  the  Public  

Premises Act  became applicable to  its  premises.   It  is  the  

contention of the appellant that although the Act is otherwise  

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deemed to have come into force from 16.9.1958, as far as  

the  present  premises  are  concerned,  the  Act  became  

applicable  to  them  from  1.1.1974  when  the  erstwhile  

insurance company merged into the first respondent.  Then  

only  it  could  be  said  that  the  premises  ‘belonged’  to  a  

Government  Company.  However,  since  the  appellant’s  

occupation of  the  said  premises  was  protected  by Section  

15A  of  the  Bombay  Rent  Act  which  Section  had  become  

enforceable prior thereto from 1.2.1973, he could not be said  

to be in ‘unauthorised occupation’ and, therefore, could not  

be evicted by invoking the provisions of the Public Premises  

Act.  On the other hand, the contention of the respondents is  

that  the  Public  Premises  Act  became  applicable  to  the  

concerned  premises  from  13.5.1971  itself,  when  the  

management of the erstwhile insurance company was taken  

over by the Central Government, and the rejection of the writ  

petition by the High Court on that ground was justified. The  

principal  issue  involved  in  this  matter  is  thus  about  the  

applicability  of  the  Public  Premises  Act  to  the  premises  

occupied by the appellant.  

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Submissions of the rival counsel:-  

13. Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellant,  Mr.  

Nariman submitted that the finding of the High Court that the  

Public Premises Act applies to these premises from 13.5.1971  

was  an  erroneous  one.   That  was  the  date  on  which  the  

Central  Government  assumed  the  management  of  the  

erstwhile  private  insurance  company.   The  erstwhile  

insurance company continued to exist until it merged in the  

appellant-company  w.e.f.  1.1.1974.   In  the  circumstances,  

although  the  Public  Premises  Act  came  into  force  on  

23.8.1971  (with  deemed  date  of  coming  into  force  being  

16.9.1958),  and although the appointed date for  assuming  

management was 13.5.1971, the premises could be said to  

have ‘belonged’ to the first respondent as per the definition  

under Section 2(E)(2)(i) of the Act, only from 1.1.1974, when  

the merger took place.  Prior thereto the Bombay Rent Act  

had been amended and the  licensees  in  occupation,  were  

declared as deemed tenants, by virtue of Section 15A of the  

said Act.  The appellant has been in continuous occupation of  

the  said  premises  as  a  licensee  from  20.12.1972.   On  

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1.2.1973 his status got elevated to that of a ‘deemed tenant’  

which was prior to the respondent No. 1 becoming owner of  

the building from 1.1.1974.  The submission of Mr. Nariman  

was that the appellant had a vested right under the statute  

passed by the State Legislature protecting the licensees, and  

since  the  Public  Premises  Act  became  applicable  from  

1.1.1974,  the  rights  of  the  tenants  and  also  those  of  the  

licensees  protected  under  the  State  Act  prior  to  1.1.1974,  

could  not  be  taken  away  by  the  application  of  the  Public  

Premises  Act  which  can  apply  only  prospectively.   In  his  

submission  the  eviction  proceedings  under  the  Public  

Premises Act against the appellant were therefore, null and  

void.  The only remedy available for the first respondent for  

evicting the appellant would be under the Bombay Rent Act  

or under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 which has  

replaced the said Act with effect from 31.3.2000.  We may  

note at this stage that Mr. Nariman made a statement that  

the appellant is making out a case on the basis of his legal  

rights as a protected licencee, and not on the basis of the  

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earlier mentioned correspondence between the appellant and  

the erstwhile insurance company.

14. Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondents  Mr.  

Raval,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  once  the  

management of the erstwhile insurance company was taken  

over, the Public Premises Act became applicable.  Therefore,  

it was fully permissible for the first respondent to initiate the  

proceedings to evict the appellant from the public premises.  

In his view, the legal position, in this behalf, has been settled  

by  the  judgment  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  the  above  

referred Ashoka Marketing case, and the view taken by the  

High Court  with  respect  to  the date  of  applicability  of  the  

Public  Premises  Act  was  in  consonance  with  the  said  

judgment.  

15. As  against  that,  it  is  the  submission  of  the  Mr.  

Nariman that the judgment in  Ashoka Marketing (supra)  

has to be understood in its context, and that it did not lay  

down any such wide proposition as Mr. Raval was canvassing.  

He  pointed  out  that  the  judgment  in  Ashoka  Marketing  

(supra) was  with  respect  to  the  overriding  effect  of  the  

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Public Premises Act vis-à-vis the Delhi Rent Control Act, which  

are  both  Acts  passed  by  the  Parliament,  and  where  the  

premises fall within the ambit of both the enactments.  In the  

instant case, we are concerned with one Act passed by the  

Parliament, and another by a State Legislature. That apart, in  

his submission, the Public Premises Act must firstly apply to  

the concerned premises, and in his submission the concerned  

premises did not fall within the ambit of that act. That being  

so, in any case, the rights of the tenants who were protected  

under the State Act prior to passing of this Act, could not be  

said to have been extinguished by virtue of coming into force  

of the Public Premises Act.

Consideration of the submissions

The Judgment in the case of Ashoka Marketing  

16. Inasmuch as, the judgment in the case of Ashoka  

Marketing (supra) is  crucial  for  determining the issue in  

controversy, it would be relevant to refer to the said decision  

in  detail.  When  we  analyse  the  judgment  in  Ashoka  

Marketing (supra), we have to first see as to what was the  

subject matter of the controversy before this Court in Ashoka  

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Marketing?  It  was  with  respect  to  the  eviction  of  the  

occupants from the premises owned by Punjab National Bank  

and Allahabad Bank which are both nationalised banks, and  

by  Life  Insurance  Corporation,  which  is  a  Statutory  

Corporation.   In  paragraph  1  of  this  judgment  of  the  

Constitution Bench, the question framed by the Court for its  

consideration was as follows:-  

“whether a person who was inducted as a tenant in   premises, which are public premises for the purpose of   the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)   Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Public Premises   Act’),  and whose tenancy has expired or has been  terminated, can be evicted from the said premises  as being a person in unauthorised occupation of the  premises under the provisions of the Public Premises Act   and whether such a person can invoke the protection of   the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  (hereinafter referred to   as  the  ‘Rent  Control  Act’).   In  short,  the  question  is,   whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act   would override the provisions of the Rent Control   Act  in  relation to  premises which fall  within  the  ambit of both the enactments.”

   (emphasis  

supplied)

17. We  may  refer  to  the  definition  of  

“unauthorised  occupation”  as  provided  under  Section  

2(g) of the Public Premises Act at this stage.  It reads as  

follows:-

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“2. Definitions…. (g)  “unauthorised  occupation”,  in   

relation to any public premises,  means the  occupation  by  any  person  of  the  public   premises  without  authority  for  such  occupation, and includes the continuance in   occupation  by  any  person  of  the  public   premises after the authority (whether by way   of grant or any other mode of transfer) under   which  he  was  allowed  to  occupy  the   premises  has  expired  or  has  been  determined for any reason whatsoever.”

As can be seen from this definition, it consists of two parts. In  

paragraph 30 of the above judgment also, this Court noted  

that  the  definition  of  ‘unauthorized  occupation’  in  Section  

2(g) of the Public Premises Act, was in two parts.  The first  

part  of  this  definition  deals  with  persons  who  are  in  

occupation of the Public Premises ‘without authority for such  

occupation’,  and  the  second  part  deals  with  those  in  

occupation of public premises, whose authority to occupy the  

premises ‘has expired or has been determined for any reason  

whatsoever’.  As stated in paragraph 1 of the judgment, the  

Constitution Bench was concerned with the second part of  

the definition. As far as these two parts are concerned, the  

Court observed in paragraph 30 as follows:-

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“30. The  definition  of  the  expression  ‘unauthorised occupation’ contained in Section   2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. In   the  first  part  the  said  expression  has  been  defined to mean the occupation by any person  of  the  public  premises  without  authority  for   such  occupation.  It  implies  occupation  by  a   person who has entered into occupation of any  public premises without lawful authority as well   as  occupation  which  was  permissive  at  the  inception but has ceased to be so. The second   part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it   expressly covers continuance in occupation by   any  person  of  the  public  premises  after  the   authority (whether by way of grant or any other   mode of transfer) under which he was allowed  to occupy the premises has expired or has been   determined  for  any  reason  whatsoever.  This   part covers a case where a person had entered   into occupation legally under valid authority but   who continues in occupation after the authority   under  which  he  was  put  in  occupation  has   expired  or  has  been  determined.  The  words   “whether by way of grant or any other mode of   transfer” in this part of the definition are wide in   amplitude  and  would  cover  a  lease  because  lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer   of Property Act. The definition of unauthorised   occupation  contained  in  Section  2(g)  of  the  Public  Premises  Act  would,  therefore,  cover  a   case  where  a  person  has  entered  into   occupation of the public premises legally as a   tenant  under  a  lease  but  whose  tenancy  has   expired or has been determined in accordance  with law.”

18. Thereafter, the Court dealt with the issue of conflict  

between  the  two  enactments  and  whether  the  Public  

Premises Act, would override the Delhi Rent Control Act.  As  

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this Court noted in paragraph 49 of the said judgment, both  

these statutes have been enacted by the same legislature,  

i.e.  Parliament,  in  exercise  of  the  legislative  powers  in  

respect  of  the matters enumerated in  the Concurrent  List.  

With respect to the rent control legislations enacted by the  

State Legislatures,  this Court observed in paragraph 46 as  

follows:-

“46. As regards rent control legislation   enacted by the State Legislature the position   is  well  settled  that  such  legislation  falls   within the ambit of Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List   III  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  (See.  Indu  Bhushan  Bose  Vs.   Rama  Sundari  Devi1,  V.  Dhanpal  Chettiar  case2;  Jai  Singh  Jairam  Tyagi  Vs.   Mamanchand  Ratilal  Agarwal3 and  Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd.   Vs. Union of India4.” 1.    (1969) 2 SCC 289 : (1970) 1 SCR 443,    2.  (1979) 4 SCC 214 : (1980) 1 SCR  

334

3. (1980) 3 SCC 162 : (1980) 3 SCR 224,    4.  (1988) 4 SCC 324   

19.  As  far  as  Public  Premises  Act  is  concerned,  

paragraph  48  of  this  judgment,  referred  to  the  earlier  

judgments in  Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt.  

Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in 1988 (4) SCC 324, and  

Smt.  Saiyada  Mossarrat  Vs.  Hindustan  Steel  Ltd.  

reported  in  1989  (1)  SCC  272.  In  Accountant  and  

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Secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court had held  

that the Public Premises Act is also referable to Entries 6, 7  

and 13 of the Concurrent List.  At the end of paragraph 48, of  

Ashoka Marketing this Court held:-

“………..There  is  no  inconsistency  between  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in   Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd.   and Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat case in as much  as in both the decisions it  is  held that the  Public Premises Act insofar as it deals with a   lessee  or  licensee  of  premises  other  than   premises  belonging  to  the  Central   Government has been enacted in exercise of   the legislative powers in respect of matters   enumerated in the Concurrent List. We are in   agreement with this view.”

20. Thereafter,  on  the  question  as  to  whether  the  

Public Premises Act overrides the Delhi Rent Control Act, this  

Court observed as follows at the end of paragraph 49:-

“In  our  opinion  the  question  as  to   whether  the  provisions  of  the  Public   Premises Act override the provisions of the   Rent Control Act will have to be considered   in  the  light  of  the  principles  of  statutory   interpretation  applicable  to  laws  made  by   the same legislature.”

In this context, the Court noted that the two principles which  

are to be applied are (i) later laws abrogate earlier contrary  

laws, and (ii) a general provision does not derogate from a  

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special  one.   In paragraph 54,  the Court noted that Public  

Premises Act is a later enactment having been enacted on  

23.8.1971, whereas the Delhi Rent Control Act, was enacted  

on 31.12.1958.  Thereafter the Court observed in paragraph  

55 as follows:-

“55. The  Rent  Control  Act  makes  a  departure  from  the  general  law  regulating  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant   contained  in  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act   inasmuch  as  it  makes  provision  for   determination  of  standard  rent,  it  specifies   the  grounds  on  which  a  landlord  can  seek   the  eviction  of  a  tenant,  it  prescribes  the  forum for  adjudication of  disputes between  landlords  and  tenants  and  the  procedure   which  has  to  be  followed  in  such  proceedings.  The  Rent  Control  Act  can,   therefore,  be  said  to  be  a  special  statute   regulating  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  in  the  Union  territory  of  Delhi.  The  Public  Premises  Act  makes  provision  for  a   speedy  machinery  to  secure  eviction  of   unauthorised  occupants  from  public   premises.  As  opposed  to  the  general  law   which provides for filing of a regular suit for   recovery  of  possession  of  property  in  a   competent court and for trial of such a suit in   accordance with the procedure laid down in   the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  the  Public   Premises Act confers the power to pass an   order  of  eviction  of  an  unauthorised  occupant  in  a  public  premises  on  a   designated  officer  and  prescribes  the  procedure to be followed by the said officer   before passing such an order. Therefore, the   

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Public Premises Act is also a special statute  relating  to  eviction  of  unauthorised   occupants  from  public  premises.  In  other  words,  both  the  enactments,  namely,   the  Rent  Control  Act  and  the  Public  Premises  Act,  are  special  statutes  in  relation  to  the  matters  dealt  with  therein. Since, the Public Premises Act is a  special statute and not a general enactment   the exception contained in the principle that   a  subsequent  general  law cannot  derogate   from  an  earlier  special  law  cannot  be  invoked and in accordance with the principle   that the later laws abrogate earlier contrary   laws,  the  Public  Premises  Act  must  prevail   over the Rent Control Act.”

(emphasis supplied)   21. In paragraph 62, this Court noted the objects and  

reasons of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which are as follows:-

62. ….(a) to devise a suitable machinery for   expeditious  adjudication  of  proceedings  between landlords and tenants; (b) to provide for the determination of the   standard  rent  payable  by  tenants  of  the  various categories of premises which should   be fair to the tenants, and at the same time,   provide  incentive  for  keeping  the  existing   houses  in  good  repairs,  and  for  further   investments in house construction; and (c) to  give  tenants  a  larger  measure  of   protection against eviction……..

22. In paragraph 63, this Court noted the statement of  

objects and reasons of the Public Premises Act, which are as  

follows:-

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“63………”The court decisions, referred  to above, have created serious difficulties for   the  government  inasmuch  as  the  proceedings  taken  by  the  various  Estate   Officers  appointed under  the Act  either  for   the  eviction  of  persons  who  are  in   unauthorised occupation of public premises   or for the recovery of rent or damages from   such persons stand null  and void....  It has  become  impossible  for  government  to  take expeditious action even in flagrant   cases  of  unauthorised  occupation  of  public premises and recovery of rent or   damages  for  such  unauthorised  occupation. It  is,  therefore,  considered  imperative to restore a speedy machinery for   the  eviction  of  persons  who  are  in   unauthorised occupation of public premises   keeping  in  view  at  the  same  time  the  necessity of complying with the provisions of   the  Constitution  and  the  judicial   pronouncements, referred to above.”

Thereafter, the Court observed:-

“63…….This  shows  that  the  Public   Premises Act, has been enacted to deal with   the  mischief  of  rampant  unauthorized  occupation of public premises by providing  a  speedy  machinery  for  the  eviction  of   persons in unauthorized occupation…….”

    (emphasis supplied)

23. In  paragraph  64,  this  Court  then  noted  that  the  

Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act operated in two  

different areas, and the properties ‘belonging to’ the Central  

Government, Government Companies or Corporations would  

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be excluded from the  application  of  the  Rent  Control  Act.  

The Court observed to the following effect:-

“64.  It would thus appear that, while the  Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the  general relationship of landlords and tenants in  respect  of  premises  other  than  government  premises, the Public Premises Act is intended  to deal with speedy recovery of possession of   premises  of  public  nature,  i.e.  property  belonging  to  the  Central  Government,  or  companies  in  which  the  Central  Government  has substantial interest or corporations owned  or controlled by the Central Government and certain   corporations,  institutions,  autonomous  bodies  and   local authorities. The effect of giving overriding effect   to the provisions of the Public Premises Act over the   Rent Control Act, would be that buildings belonging   to companies, corporations and autonomous bodies   referred to in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act   would  be  excluded  from  the  ambit  of  the  Rent   Control  Act  in  the  same  manner  as  properties   belonging to the Central Government.…….”

      (emphasis supplied)

Thereafter, the Court observed:-  

“…..The  reason  underlying  the  exclusion  of   property belonging to the Government from the ambit of   the  Rent  Control  Act,  is  that  the  Government  while  dealing  with  the  citizens  in  respect  of  property  belonging to it would not act for its own purpose  as  a  private  landlord  but  would  act  in  public   interest……”  

  (emphasis  

supplied)

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24. Paragraph 66 of the judgment makes it clear that  

this  Court  was  concerned  with  a  contractual  tenancy  and  

ruled out  a  dual  procedure  for  eviction.   In  that  context  it  

observed as follows:-   

“66……….This would mean that in order   to  evict  a  person  who  is  continuing  in   occupation  after  the  expiration  or   termination  of  his  contractual  tenancy  in   accordance  with  law,  two  proceedings  will   have  to  be  initiated.  First,  there  will  be   proceedings  under  Rent  Control  Act  before  the  Rent  Controller  followed  by  appeal   before the Rent Control Tribunal and revision   before  the  High  Court.  After  these  proceedings  have  ended  they  would  be  followed  by  proceedings  under  the  Public   Premises Act, before the Estate Officer and   the  Appellate  Authority.  In  other  words,   persons  in  occupation  of  public  premises   would  receive  greater  protection  than  tenants  in  premises  owned  by  private   persons.  It  could  not  be  the  intention  of   Parliament  to  confer  this  dual  benefit  on   persons in occupation of public premises.”

It is relevant to note that, it is in this context that the Court  

rendered its decision in Ashoka Marketing, and upheld the  

orders of eviction under Public Premises Act.

25. It  was submitted by Mr. Nariman, that as can be  

seen from above, the Court was concerned with the second  

part  of  the  definition  of  “unauthorised  occupation”  under  

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Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act, which is concerning  

expiry  or  determination  of  the  authority  to  occupy.  He  

submitted that the ‘determination of tenancy’ is referable to  

Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, and similarly the  

concept of expiry of the authority to occupy.  Paragraph 30  

quoted above specifically refers to the Transfer of Property  

Act.  He submitted that the latter part of this definition was  

indicating  a  reference  to  contractual  tenancy,  and  in  this  

behalf  referred  to  the  above  referred  paragraph  66  which  

also speaks about the contractual tenancy.  His submission  

was that since the first part of the definition under Section  

2(g)  referred  to  a  person  who  is  occupying  the  premises  

without  any  authority,  it  would  exclude  a  person  who  is  

occupying the premises under the authority of law.  In his  

submission, since the appellant was a deemed tenant under  

the  state  law,  such  a  statutory  tenant  will  have  to  be  

considered as protected by authority of law and cannot be  

called a person in “unauthorised occupation”.  He referred to  

the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Chandavarkar  Sita  Ratna  

Rao Vs.  Ashalata  S.  Guram  reported  in  1986 (3)  SCR  

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866, which  held  that  the  amendment  brought  about  by  

section 15A was an attempt to protect very large number of  

legitimate persons in occupation. The judgment also made a  

distinction in the position of a statutory tenant as against that  

of a contractual tenant.  In that judgment it is held that a  

statutory  tenant  is  entitled to  create  a licence,  whereas a  

contractual  tenant  can  create  a  sub-lease.   However,  the  

proposition  canvassed by  Mr.  Nariman would  mean  that  a  

licensee protected by statute will not be in an unauthorised  

occupation,  but  a  contractual  tenant  could  be,  since,  his  

authority to occupy can be determined, and he would be in  

an  unauthorised  occupation  thereafter.   Thus,  a  protected  

licensee would be placed on a pedestal higher than that of a  

principal contractual tenant.  In our view, this judgment does  

not state so, nor can it lead us to accept any such proposition  

as it would mean accepting an incongruous situation.  

From what date would the Public Premises Act apply  to the concerned premises?

26. The  question  that  is  required  to  be  examined,  

however,   is whether the tenants as well as licencees, who  

are  protected  under  the  State  Law,  could  be  called  

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unauthorised occupants by applying the Public Premises Act  

to their premises as ‘belonging’ to a Government Company,  

and if so from what date.  As we have noted earlier, to initiate  

the  eviction  proceedings  under  this  statute,  the  premises  

concerned  have  to  be  public  premises  as  defined  under  

Section  2(e)  of  the  Act.   Besides,  as  far  as  the  present  

premises  are  concerned,  it  is  necessary  that  they  must  

belong to a Government Company. The definition of public  

premises will,  therefore, have to be looked into, and it will  

have to be examined as to from what date the premises can  

be said to be belonging to a Government Company.  Section  

19  of  the  Public  Premises  Act,  1971  repeals  the  Public  

Premises  (Eviction  of  Unauthorised  Occupants)  Act,  1958.  

While  repealing  this  predecessor  Act,  Section  1(3)  of  the  

1971 Act lays down that it shall  be deemed to have come  

into  force  on  the  16th  day  of  September,  1958  except  

sections 11, 19 and 20 which shall come into force at once  

(i.e.  from 23.8.1971).   Section 11 deals  with  offences and  

penalties.   Section  19  is  the  repealing  Section  as  stated  

above,  and Section  20 is  the  section  on  validation  of  any  

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judgment,  decree  or  order  of  any  competent  court  which  

might have been passed under Public Premises (Eviction of  

Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958.  The conjoint reading of  

Section 1(3) and Section 2(e) defining Public Premises will be  

that although the provisions with respect to eviction under  

the Act of 1971 are deemed to have come into force from  

16.9.1958,  they will  apply  to  the concerned premises only  

from the date when they become public premises.   

27. Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  company  under  the  

Companies Act, 1956 as in the present case, it is necessary  

that the premises must belong to or must be taken on lease  

by a company which has not less than 51 per cent paid up  

share  capital  held  by  the  Central  Government.  The  

submission of the respondents is that the date on which the  

management of the erstwhile Insurance Company was taken  

over i.e. 13.5.1971 would be the relevant date, and from that  

date  the  premises  would  be  said  to  have  become  public  

premises. It was submitted that after coming into force of the  

said Act, it was not open to the erstwhile company to transfer  

or  otherwise  dispose  of  any  assets  or  create  any  charge,  

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hypothecation,  lease  or  any  encumbrance  thereto  without  

the previous approval of the persons specified by the Central  

Government.   It  was  contended  that  as  a  result,  the  

provisions of Bombay Rent Act will  have to be held as not  

applicable to the said premises from such date i.e. 13 th May,  

1971.

28. The submission of the respondent was accepted by  

the  High  Court  by  relying  upon  an  earlier  judgment  of  a  

Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of  M.  

Mohd vs. Union of India  reported in  AIR 1982 Bombay  

443.  In para 22 thereof, the High Court held as follows:-

“…..There  is  no  doubt  that  the  expression  “belonging  to”  does  not  mean  the   same thing as “owned by”.  The two expressions   have two different connotations. The expression   “belonging to” will take within its sweep not only   ownership  but  also  rights  lesser  than  that  of   ownership.”

It  is  relevant  to  note  that  the  appellants  therein  were  

government employees occupying premises allotted to them  

as service premises.  The premises were situated in privately  

owned  buildings,  and  taken  on  lease  by  the  Government.  

The appellants had retired from their services, but were not  

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vacating  the  premises,  and  hence  eviction  orders  were  

passed  against  them under  the  Public  Premises  Act.   The  

premises were admittedly taken on lease, and were therefore  

premises belonging to the Central Government.  At the end of  

paragraph 21 of its judgment, the High Court in terms held as  

follows, “Once the factum of lease is established, which has   

been done in the present case, the authorities under the act   

get jurisdiction to inquire under the act.”  The submission of  

the appellants therein was that the premises could not be  

said to be belonging to the respondents, and therefore, not  

public premises.  It is in this context that the High Court held  

that the expression ‘belonging to’ will take within its sweep  

rights  lesser  than  that  of  ownership.   The  observations  

quoted  above  will  have  to  be  read  in  that  context.   It  is  

however,  relevant  to  note  what  the  Division  Bench  has  

thereafter added:-  

“It  must  be  remembered  in  this   connection  that  the  expressions  used  in  the   statute are to be interpreted and given meaning   in the context in which they are used.”

It is material to note that it was not a case like the present  

one, where the occupant has claimed protection under the  

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State Rent Control Law available to him prior to the Public  

Premises Act becoming applicable. The High Court had relied  

upon a judgment of this Court in  Mahomed Amir Ahmad  

Khan  vs.  Municipal  Board  of  Sitapur  reported  in  AIR  

1965 SC 1923, wherein this Court has observed:-

“Though the word “belonging” no doubt   is  capable  of  denoting  as  absolute  title,  is   nevertheless  not  confined  to  connoting  that   sense.”

This was a matter wherein the appellant was alleged to have  

disputed the title of the respondent landlord by contending  

that the premises were belonging to the appellant.  The Court  

noted that all that he meant by using the word ‘belonging’  

was that he was a lessee, and nothing more.  It was in this  

sense that this Court observed as above while allowing his  

appeal.

29.   In the present matter we are concerned with the  

question,  whether  the  respondents  could  resort  to  the  

provisions  of  the  Public  Premises  Act  at  a  time  when  the  

merger  of  the  erstwhile  insurance  company  into  the  first  

respondent  was  not  complete.   The  question  is  whether  

taking over of the management of the erstwhile company can  

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confer upon the respondent No. 1  the authority to claim that  

the  premises  belong  to  it  to  initiate  eviction  proceedings  

under  the  Public  Premises  Act,  to  the  detriment  of  an  

occupant  who  is  claiming  protection  under  a  welfare  

enactment passed by the State Legislature. At this juncture  

we  may  profitably  refer  to  the  judgment  of  this  Court  

concerning  another  welfare  enactment  in  Rashtriya  Mill  

Mazdoor Sangh, Nagpur Vs. Model Mills, Nagpur and  

Anr.  reported in  AIR 1984 SC 1813.  The issue before the  

Court was  whether upon the appointment of an authorised  

controller under Section 18A of the Industries (Development  

and Regulation) Act,  1951 (IDR Act short) in respect of an  

industrial  undertaking,  when  it  is  run  by  him  under  the  

authority  of  a  Department  of  the Central  Government,  the  

employees of the undertaking would get excluded from the  

application of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, in view of the  

provision contained in Section 32(iv) of the Bonus Act.  The  

court made a distinction between the concept of taking over  

of management and taking over of ownership. Inasmuch as  

the taking over of the management did not result into the  

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Central Government becoming the owner of the textile mills,  

the  right  of  the  workmen  to  receive  bonus  was  not  

extinguished.   The Court held as follows:

“10.  Thus the significant consequence that ensues on  the  issue  of  a  notified  order  appointing  authorised   controller  is  to  divert  the  management  from  the   present  managers  and  to  vest  it  in  the  authorised   controller.  Undoubtedly,  the  heading  of  Chapter  III-A   appears to be slightly misleading when it says that the   Central  Government  on  the  issue of  a  notified  order   assumes  direct  management  of  the  industrial   undertaking,  in  effect  on  the  issuance  of  a  notified   order,  only  the  management  of  the  industrial   undertaking  undergoes  a  change.  This  change  of  management  does  not  tantamount  to  either  acquisition  of  the  industrial  undertaking  or  a  take over of its ownership because if that was to be  the intended effect of change of management, the Act   would have been subjected to challenge of Article 31   and  19  (1)  (f)  of  the  Constitution. One  can  say  confidently  that  was  not  intended  to  be  the  effect  of  appointment  of  an  authorised  controller.  The industrial  undertaking continues  to  be  governed  by  the  Companies  Act  or  the  Partnership Act or the relevant provisions of law  applicable  to  a  proprietary  concern. The  only  change is the removal of managers and appointment of   another  manager  and  to  safeguard  his  position   restriction on the rights of shareholders or partners or   original  proprietor.  This  is  the  net  effect  of  the   appointment of an authorised controller  by a notified   order.”

                                                                (emphasis  supplied)

A similar approach was adopted by the Court in Bhuri Nath  

and Ors. Vs. State of J&K and Ors. reported in AIR 1997  

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SC 1711.  Here the issue before the Court was with respect  

to the constitutionality of the Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata  

Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988 (XVI of 1988) which was made  

to  provide  better  management,  administration  and  

governance  of  Shri  Mata  Vaishno  Devi  Shrine,  its  

endowments,  all  temples,  and sum total  of  the properties,  

movable  and  immovable,  attached  or  appurtenant  to  the  

Shrine.  While  addressing an  argument  with  respect  to  the  

violation of Article 31 of the Constitution, the Court observed  

in para 29 as follows:  

“29.  ……….The right to superintendence  of  management,  administration  and  governance of the Shrine is not the property  which the State acquires. It carries with it no   beneficial  enjoyment of the property to the  State.  The  Act  merely  regulates  the  management, administration and governance  of the Shrine. It is not an extinguishment of   the  right. The  appellants-Baridarans  were  rendering  pooja,  a  customary  right  which  was   abolished  and  vested  in  the  Board.  The  management,  administration  and  governance  of   the Shrine always remained with the Dharamarth   Trust  from whom the  Board  has  taken  over  the   same for proper administration, management and  governance.  In  other  words,  the  effect  of  the   enactment  of  the  Act  is  that  the  affairs  of  the

functioning  of  the  Shrine  merely  have  got   transferred  from  Dharmarth  Trust  to  the  Board.   

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The  Act  merely  regulates  in  that  behalf;   incidentally, the right to collect offerings enjoyed   by  the  Baridarans  by  rendering  service  of  pooja   has been put to an end under the Act. The State,   resultantly, has not acquired that right onto itself.   ……..”                                                                         (emphasis  supplied)   

30.  As  far  as  the  present  matter  is  concerned it  is  

required to be noted that the Principal Agencies floated by  

the promoters of the erstwhile private Insurance Companies  

were controlling their business.  In the ‘History of Insurance  

of India’ published by Insurance Regulatory and Development  

Authority’ (IRDA) on its official website on 12.07.2007 under  

Ref: IRDA/GEN/06/2007 it is stated as follows:  

“The Insurance Amendment Act of 1950 abolished   Principal Agencies.  However, there were a large number or   insurance companies and the level of competition was high.   There were also allegations of unfair  trade practices.   The   Government  of  India,  therefore,  decided  to  nationalize   insurance business.”

Thus,  as  far  as  the  erstwhile  Insurance  Company  in  the  

present case is concerned, as an initial step, its management  

was taken over by the Central Government w.e.f. 13.5.1971,  

and it  was entrusted with  the custodian  appointed  by the  

Central Government.  It would definitely entail a right in the  

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custodian to take necessary steps to safeguard the property  

of the erstwhile insurance company.  But it was a transitory  

arrangement.   The  properties  of  the  erstwhile  insurance  

companies did not belong to the Government Companies or  

the  Government  at  that  stage.  The  Public  Premises  Act,  

undoubtedly  provides  a  speedy  remedy  to  recover  the  

premises  from the  unauthorised  occupants.   At  the  same  

time,  we  have  also  to  note  that  in  the  instant  case  the  

occupant  is  claiming  a  substantive  right  under  a  welfare  

provision of  the State Rent Control  Act,  which gave him a  

protected status in view of the amendment to that Act.  The  

question is whether this authority of management bestowed  

on the Government Company can take in its sweep the right  

to proceed against such protected tenants under the Public  

Premises Act, by contending that the premises belonged to  

the Government Company at that stage itself, and that the  

State Rent Control Act no longer protected them. Considering  

that  the  Rent  Control  Act  is  a  welfare  enactment,  and  a  

further protective provision has been made therein, can it be  

permitted to  be rendered otiose and made inapplicable  to  

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premises specifically sought to be covered thereunder, and  

defeated by resorting to the provisions of the Public Premises  

Act?  In  the  present  case,  it  must  also  be  noted  that  the  

appellant is seeking a protection under Section 15A  of the  

Bombay  Rent  Act,  which  has  a  non-obstante  clause.  The  

respondent No. 1 is undoubtedly not without a remedy, and it  

can  proceed  to  evict  an  unauthorised  occupant  under  the  

Rent Control Act, if an occasion arises.  It can certainly resort  

thereto  until  the  managerial  right  fructifies  into  a  right  of  

ownership.   However  by  enforcing  a  speedier  remedy,  a  

welfare  provision  cannot  be  rendered  nugatory.   The  

provisions  of  the  two  enactments  will  have  to  be  read  

harmoniously  to  permit  the  operation  and  co-existence  of  

both of them to the extent it can be done.  Therefore, the  

term ‘belonging to’  as  occurring in  the definition of  Public  

Premises  in  Section  2(e)  will  have  to  be  interpreted  

meaningfully to imply only the premises owned by or taken  

on lease by the Government Company at the relevant time.  

In the facts of this case what we find is that the appellant had  

the status of a deemed tenant under the Bombay Rent Act,  

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1947  prior  to  the  concerned  premises  ‘belonging  to  a  

Government Company’ and becoming public premises.  If at  

all he had to be evicted, it was necessary to follow the due  

process of law which would mean the process as available  

under  the  Bombay  Rent  Act  or  its  successor  Maharashtra  

Rent Control Act, 1999, and not the one which is provided  

under the provisions of the Public Premises Act.

Can the Public Premises Act  be given retrospective  

effect?

31. There is another aspect of the matter.  Mr. Raval,  

learned senior  counsel  for  the  respondents  has  contended  

that the appellant’s submission that he was protected under  

the  Bombay  Rent  Act,  and  that  protection  has  been  

continued under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, is  

not  available  before  the  Estate  Officer.   The  question,  

therefore,  comes  to  our  mind  as  to  what  happens  to  the  

rights of the appellant made available to him under the State  

Act at a time when the erstwhile company had not merged in  

the first respondent Government Company?  Can it be said  

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that he was occupying the premises without the authority for  

such occupation? Can it be said that with the application of  

the  Public  Premises  Act  to  the  premises  occupied  by  the  

appellant,  those  rights  get  extinguished? It  has  been  laid  

down by this Court time and again that if  there are rights  

created in favour of any person, whether they are property  

rights or rights arising from a transaction in the nature of a  

contract,  and  particularly  if  they  are  protected  under  a  

statute, and if they are to be taken away by any legislation,  

that legislation will have to say so specifically by giving it a  

retrospective  effect.   This  is  because  prima  facie  every  

legislation  is  prospective  (see  para  7  of  the  Constitution  

Bench  judgment  in  Janardan  Reddy  Vs.  The  State  

reported  in  AIR 1951 SC 124).   In  the  instant  case,  the  

appellant was undoubtedly protected as a ‘deemed tenant’  

under  Section  15A  of  the  Bombay  Rent  Act,  prior  to  the  

merger  of  the  erstwhile  insurance  company  with  a  

Government  Company,  and  he  could  be  removed  only  by  

following  the  procedure  available  under  the  Bombay  Rent  

Act.   A  ‘deemed  tenant’  under  the  Bombay  Rent  Act,  

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continued to be protected under the succeeding Act, in view  

of the definition of a ‘tenant’ under Section 7(15)(a)(ii) of the  

Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act,  1999.   Thus,  as  far  as  the  

tenants  of  the  premises  which  are  not  covered  under  the  

Public Premises Act are concerned, those tenants who were  

deemed tenants  under  the  Bombay Rent  Act  continued to  

have  their  protection  under  the  Maharashtra  Rent  Control  

Act, 1999.  Should the coverage of their premises under the  

Public  Premises  Act  make  a  difference  to  the  tenants  or  

occupants of such premises, and if so, from which date?   

32. It  has  been  laid  down  by  this  Court  through  a  

number  of  judgments  rendered  over  the  years,  that  a  

legislation  is  not  be  given  a  retrospective  effect  unless  

specifically provided for, and not beyond the period that is  

provided  therein.   Thus,  a  Constitution  Bench  held  in  

Garkiapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry reported in  

AIR 1957 SC 540 that in  the absence of anything in  the  

enactment to show that it is to be retrospective, it cannot be  

so  constructed,  as  to  have  the  effect  of  altering  the  law  

applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the act  

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was passed.  In that matter, the Court was concerned with  

the issue as to whether the appellant’s right to file an appeal  

continued to be available to him for filing an appeal to the  

Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  after  it  was  created  from the  

erstwhile Madras High Court.   The Constitution Bench held  

that the right very much survived, and the vested right of  

appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment,  

if it  so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and  

not otherwise.

33. Similarly,  in  Mahadeolal  Kanodia  Vs.  The  

Administrator General of West Bengal  reported in  AIR  

1960  SC  936,  this  Court  was  concerned  with  the  

retrospectivity of law passed by the West Bengal legislature  

concerning the rights of tenants and in paragraph 8 of the  

judgment the Court held that:-

“8. The  principles  that  have  to  be  applied for interpretation of statutory provisions of   this nature are well-established. The first of these is   that statutory provisions creating substantive rights   or  taking  away  substantive  rights  are  ordinarily   prospective;  they  are  retrospective  only  if  by   express words or by necessary implication……”

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34. In  Amireddi  Raja  Gopala  Rao  Vs.  Amireddi  

Sitharamamma  reported  in  AIR  1965  SC  1970,  a  

Constitution  bench  was  concerned  with  the  issue  as  to  

whether the rights of maintenance of illegitimate sons of a  

sudra as available under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law  

was affected by introduction of Sections 4, 21 and 22 of the  

Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.  The Court held  

that they were not, and observed in paragraph 7 as follows:-

“A statue has to be interpreted, if possible so as   to respect vested rights, and if the words are open   to another construction, such a construction should   never be adopted.”

The  same  has  been  the  view  taken  by  a  bench  of  three  

Judges of this Court in J.P. Jani, Income Tax Officer, Circle  

IV,  Ward  G,  Ahmedabad  Vs.  Induprasad  Devshanker  

Bhatt  reported  in  AIR 1969 SC 778 in  the  context  of  a  

provision  of  the  Income  Tax  Act,  1961,  in  the  matter  of  

reopening of assessment orders.   In that matter the Court  

was concerned with the issue as to whether the Income Tax  

Officer could re-open the assessment under Section 297(2)  

(d) (ii)  and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, although the  

right to re-open was barred by that time under the earlier  

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Income Tax Act, 1922.  This Court held that the same was  

impermissible and observed in paragraph 5 as follows:-

“5…… The reason is that such a construction   of Section 297 (2) (d) (ii)  would be tantamount to   giving  of  retrospective  operation  to  that  section   which  is  not  warranted  either  by  the  express   language of the section or by necessary implication.   The  principle  is  based  on  the  well-known  rule  of   interpretation that unless the terms of the statute   expressly so provide or unless there is a necessary   implication,  retrospective  operation  should  not  be   given to the statute so as to affect, alter or destroy   any right already acquired or to revive any remedy  already lost by efflux of time.”

35. In  Arjan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in  

AIR 1970 SC 703, this court was concerned with the issue of  

date  of  application  of  Section  32KK  added  into  the  Pepsu  

Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955.  This Court held in  

paragraph 4 thereof as follows:-

“4. It  is  a  well-settled rule  of  construction   that  no  provision  in  a  statute  should  be  given   retrospective  effect  unless  the  legislature  by   express  terms  or  by  necessary  implication  has   made it retrospective and that where a provision is   made retrospective,  care should be taken not  to   extend  its  retrospective  effect  beyond  what  was   intended.”

36. In  Ex-Capt.,  K.C. Arora Vs. State of Haryana  

reported in  1984 (3) SCC 281,  this  Court  was concerned  

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with a service matter and with the issue as to whether an  

amendment in the law could take away the vested rights with  

retrospective effect.  The Court held that such an amendment  

would be invalid if it is violative of the present acquired or  

accrued fundamental rights of the affected persons.

37. In  the  case  of  K.S.  Paripoornan  Vs.  State  of  

Kerala reported in AIR 1995 SC 1012, a Constitution Bench  

of this Court was concerned with the retrospective effect of  

Section 23(1A) introduced in the Land Acquisition Act.  While  

dealing  with  this  provision,  this  Court  has  observed  as  

follows:-

“44. A  statute  dealing  with  substantive   rights  differs  from  a  statute  which  relates  to   procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature   inasmuch  as  while  a  statute  dealing  with   substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless   it is expressly or by necessary implication made to   have  retrospective  effect,  a  statute  concerned   mainly with matters of  procedure or  evidence or   which is declaratory in nature has to be construed   as retrospective unless there is a clear indication   that such was not the intention of the legislature. A   statute is regarded retrospective if it operates on   cases  or  facts  coming  into  existence  before  its   commencement in the sense that it affects, even if   for the future only, the character or consequences   of transactions previously entered into or of other   past conduct. By virtue of the presumption against   retrospective  applicability  of  laws  dealing  with   

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substantive  rights  transactions  are  neither   invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with   formal  requirements  subsequently  imposed,  nor   open  to  attack  under  powers  of  avoidance  subsequently  conferred.  They  are  also  not   rendered  valid  by  subsequent  relaxations  of  the  law,  whether  relating  to  form  or  to  substance.   Similarly,  provisions in which a contrary intention   does not appear neither  impose new liabilities  in   respect  of  events  taking  place  before  their   commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities   then existing, and the view that existing obligations   were not intended to be affected has been taken in   varying  degrees  even  of  provisions  expressly   prohibiting proceedings.  (See:  Halsbury's  Laws of   England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, paras 921, 922, 925 and  926).”

38. In the case of Gajraj Singh Vs. State Transport  

Appellate  Tribunal  reported  in  AIR  1997  SC  412,  the  

Court was concerned with the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act  

and repealing of some of its provisions. In para 30 referring  

to Southerland on Statutory Construction (3rd Edition) Vol.I,  

the Court quoted the following observations:-

“30……Effect on vested rights Under common law principles of construction and   interpretation  the  repeal  of  a  statute  or  the   abrogation of a common law principle operates to   divest  all  the rights  accruing under  the repealed   statute or the abrogated common law, and to halt   all proceedings not concluded prior to the repeal.   However, a right which has become vested is not   dependent  upon the  common law or  the  statute   under which it was acquired for its assertion, but   

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has an independent existence.  Consequently,  the   repeal  of  the  statute  or  the  abrogation  of  the   common  law  from  which  it  originated  does  not   efface a vested right,  but  it  remains enforceable   without regard to the repeal. In  order  to  become vested,  the  right  must  be  a   contract right,  a property right,  or a right arising   from a transaction in the nature of a contract which   has  become  perfected  to  the  degree  that  the  continued existence of the statute cannot further   enhance its acquisition.……”

39. Having noted the aforesaid observations, it is very  

clear that in the facts of the present case,  the appellant’s  

status  as  a  deemed tenant  was  accepted under  the  state  

enactment,  and  therefore  he  could  not  be  said  to  be  in  

“unauthorised occupation”.   His right granted by the state  

enactment cannot be destroyed by giving any retrospective  

application  to  the  provisions  of  Public  Premises  Act,  since  

there is  no such express provision in the statute,  nor is  it  

warranted by any implication.  In fact his premises would not  

come within the ambit of the Public Premises Act, until they  

belonged to the respondent No.  1,  i.e  until  1.1.1974.   The  

corollary is that if the respondent No. 1 wanted to evict the  

appellant,  the  remedy  was  to  resort  to  the  procedure  

available  under  the  Bombay  Rent  Act  or  its  successor  

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Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act,  by  approaching  the  forum  

thereunder,  and  not  by  resorting  to  the  provisions  of  the  

Public Premises Act.

When are the provisions of Public Premises Act to be  resorted to?  

40. In the context of the present controversy, we must  

refer  to  one  more  aspect.   As  we  have  noted  earlier  in  

paragraph 63 of Ashoka Marketing, the Constitution Bench  

has referred to  the  objects  and reasons  behind the  Public  

Premises  Act  wherein  it  is  stated  that  it  has  become  

impossible  for  the  Government  to  take  expeditious  action  

even in ‘flagrant cases of unauthorised occupation’ of public  

premises.   The Court  has thereafter  observed in  that  very  

paragraph that  the Public  Premises Act  is  enacted to  deal  

with mischief of ‘rampant unauthorised occupation’ of public  

premises.   

41. It is relevant to note that there has been a criticism  

of the use of the powers under the Public Premises Act, and  

the manner in which they are used in an arbitrary way to  

evict the genuine tenants from the public premises causing  

serious hardships to them. The Central Government itself has  

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therefore, issued the guidelines to prevent such arbitrary use  

of  these  powers.  These  guidelines  were  issued  vide  

Resolution  No.  21012/1/2000-Pol.1,  dated  30th May,  2002,  

published in the Gazette of India, Part I, Sec.1 dated 8th June,  

2002.  They read as follows:-

”GUIDELINES  TO  PREVENT  ARBITRARY  USE  OF  POWERS  TO  EVICT  GENUINE  TENANTS  FROM  PUBLIC  PREMISES  UNDER  THE  CONTROL  OF  PUBLIC  SECTOR  UNDERTAKINGS  /  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS

1. The question  of  notification of  guidelines  to   prevent  arbitrary  use  of  powers  to  evict  genuine   tenants from public premises under the control of   Public Sector Undertakings/financial institutions has   been  under  consideration  of  the  Government  for   some time past. 2. To prevent  arbitrary  use  of  powers  to  evict   genuine tenants from public premises and to limit   the use of powers by the Estate Officers appointed   under section 3 of the PP(E) Act, 1971, it has been   decided by Government to lay down the following   guidelines: (i) The provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction   

of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 [(P.P.(E) Act,   1971]  should  be  used  primarily  to  evict  totally   unauthorised  occupants  of  the  premises  of  public   authorities  or  subletees,  or  employees  who  have  ceased to be in their service and thus ineligible for   occupation of the premises. (ii) The provisions of the P.P. (E) Act, 1971 should   

not be resorted to either with a commercial motive   or to secure vacant possession of the premises in   order to accommodate their own employees, where  the  premises  were  in  occupation  of  the  original   

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tenants to whom the premises were let either by the   public  authorities  or  the  persons  from  whom  the  premises were acquired. (iii) A person in occupation of any premises should   not  be treated or declared to be an unauthorised   occupant merely on service of notice of termination   of tenancy, but the fact of unauthorized occupation   shall be decided by following the due procedure of   law. Further, the contractual agreement shall not be  wound up by taking advantage of the provisions of   the P.P.(E) Act, 1971.  At the same time, it will be  open  to  the  public  authority  to  secure  periodic   revision  of  rent  in  terms  of  the  provisions  of  the   Rent  Control  Act  in  each  State  or  to  move under   genuine  grounds  under  the  Rent  Control  Act  for   resuming  possession.   In  other  words,  the  public   authorities  would  have  rights  similar  to  private   landlords under the Rent Control Act in dealing with   genuine legal tenants. (iv) It is necessary to give no room for allegations   that  evictions  were selectively  resorted to  for  the   purpose  of  securing  an  unwarranted  increase  in   rent, or that a change in tenancy was permitted in   order to benefit particular individuals or institutions.   In  order  to  avoid  such  imputations  or  abuse  of   discretionary  powers,  the  release  of  premises  or   change of tenancy should be decided at the level of   Board of Directors of Public Sector Undertakings. (v) All the public Undertakings should immediately   review all pending cases before the Estate Officer or   Courts  with  reference  to  these  guidelines,  and   withdraw  eviction  proceedings  against  genuine   tenants  on  grounds  otherwise  than  as  provided  under these guidelines.   The provisions under the   P.P. (E) Act, 1971 should be used henceforth only in   accordance with these guidelines. 3. These orders take immediate effect.”

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42.  Thus as can be seen from these guidelines, it is  

emphasized in Clause 2(i) thereof, that the Act was meant to  

evict  (a)  totally  unauthorised  occupants  of  the  public  

premises or subletees, or (b) employees who have ceased to  

be  in  their  service,  and  were  ineligible  to  occupy  the  

premises.  In Clause 2(ii), it is emphasized that the provisions  

should  not  be  resorted  to  (a)  either  with  a  commercial  

motive, or (b) to secure vacant possession of the premises in  

order  to  accommodate  their  own  employees,  where  the  

premises were in occupation of the original tenants to whom  

the premises were let out (i) either by the public authorities,  

or (ii)  by persons from whom the premises were acquired,  

indicating thereby the predecessors of the public authorities.  

Clause 2 (iii) of these guidelines is very important.  It states  

on the one hand that it will be open for the public authority to  

secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the provision of  

the  Rent  Control  Act  in  each  state,  and  to  move  under  

genuine  grounds  under  the  Rent  control  Act  for  resuming  

possession.  This  Clause on the other  hand states  that  the  

public  authorities  would  have  rights  similar  to  private  

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landlords under the Rent Control Act in dealing with genuine  

legal  tenants.   This  clause  in  a  way  indicates  that  for  

resuming possession in certain situations, where the tenants  

are protected under the State Rent Control Act prior to the  

Public  Premises  Act  becoming  applicable,  the  public  

authorities will have to move under the Rent Control Acts on  

the  grounds  which  are  available  to  the  private  landlords.  

Clause  2(iv)  seeks  to  prevent  imputations  or  abuse  of  

discretionary  powers  in  this  behalf  by  stating  that  there  

should  be  no  room  for  allegation  that  evictions  were  

selectively  resorted  for  the  purpose  of  securing  an  

unwarranted increase in rent or change in tenancy to benefit  

particular individuals or institutions.  It, therefore, states that  

the  release  of  premises  or  change  of  tenancy  should  be  

decided at the level  of  Board of  Directors of Public Sector  

Undertakings.  Clause 2(v) goes further ahead and instructs  

all  public undertakings that they should review all  pending  

cases before the Estate Officer or Courts with reference to  

these  guidelines,  and  withdraw  the  proceedings  against  

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genuine  tenants  on  grounds  otherwise  than  as  provided  

under the guidelines.    

43. The  instructions  contained  in  this  Resolution  are  

undoubtedly guidelines, and are advisory in character and do  

not confer any rights on the tenants as held in para 23 of  

New Insurance Assurance Company Vs.  Nusli  Neville  

Wadia reported in  2008 (3) SCC 279.   At the same time,  

the intention behind the guidelines cannot be ignored by the  

Public Undertakings which are expected to follow the same.  

When it comes to the interpretation of the provisions of the  

statute,  the  guidelines  have  been  referred  herein  for  the  

limited  purpose  of  indicating  the  intention  in  making  the  

statutory  provision,  since  the  guidelines  are  issued  to  

effectuate the statutory provision.  The guidelines do throw  

some light on the intention behind the statute. The guidelines  

are issued with good intention to stop arbitrary use of the  

powers under the Public Premises Act.  The powers are given  

to act for specified reasons, and are expected to be used only  

in justified circumstances and not otherwise.   

The overall consequence

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44.  In  Ashoka  Marketing  (supra),  this  Court  was  

concerned with the premises of two Nationalised Banks and  

the  Life  Insurance  Corporation.   As  far  as  Life  Insurance  

Corporation  is  concerned,  the  life  insurance  business  was  

nationalised under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.  

Therefore, as far as the premises of LIC are concerned, they  

will  come under the ambit of the Public Premises Act from  

16.9.1958, i.e the date from which the Act is  brought into  

force.  As  far  as  Nationalised  Banks  are  concerned,  their  

nationalization  is  governed  by  The  Banking  Companies  

(Acquisition  and  Transfer  of  Undertakings)  Act,  1970,  and  

therefore,  the  application  of  Public  Premises  Act  to  the  

premises of the Nationalised Banks will be from the particular  

date in  the year  1970 or  thereafter.   For  any premises to  

become public premises, the relevant date will be 16.9.1958  

or  whichever  is  the  later  date  on  which  the  concerned  

premises  become  the  public  premises  as  belonging  to  or  

taken  on  lease  by  LIC  or  the  Nationalised  Banks  or  the  

concerned  General  Insurance  Companies  like  the  first  

respondent.  All those persons falling within the definition of  

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a tenant occupying the premises prior thereto will not come  

under  the  ambit  of  the  Public  Premises  Act  and  cannot  

therefore,  be  said  to  be  persons  in  “unauthorised  

occupation”.  Whatever rights such prior tenants, members of  

their families or heirs of such tenants or deemed tenants or  

all of those who fall within the definition of a tenant under the  

Bombay Rent Act have, are continued under the Maharashtra  

Rent Control  Act,  1999.   If  possession of  their  premises is  

required,  that  will  have  to  be  resorted  to  by  taking  steps  

under the Bombay Rent Act or Maharashtra Rent Control Act,  

1999.   If  person  concerned  has  come  in  occupation  

subsequent to such date, then of course the Public Premises  

Act, 1971 will apply.   

45.  It is true that Section 15 of the Public Premises Act  

creates a bar of jurisdiction to entertain suits or proceedings  

in  respect  of  eviction  of  any  person  in  an  unauthorised  

occupation. However, as far as the relationship between the  

respondent No.  1,  the other General Insurance Companies,  

LIC,  Nationalised  Banks  and  such  other  Government  

Companies  or  Corporations,  on  the  one  hand  and  their  

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occupants/licencees/tenants on the other hand is concerned,  

such persons who are in  occupation prior  to  the premises  

belonging to or taken on lease by such entities, will continue  

to be governed by the State Rent Control Act for all purposes.  

The Public Premises Act will apply only to those who come in  

such occupation after such date.  Thus, there is no occasion  

to have a dual procedure which is ruled out in paragraph 66  

of  Ashoka  Marketing.  We  must  remember  that  the  

occupants  of  these  properties  were  earlier  tenants  of  the  

erstwhile  Insurance  Companies  which  were  the  private  

landlords.  They have not chosen to be the tenants of the  

Government Companies.   Their  status as occupants of  the  

Public Insurance Companies has been thrust upon them by  

the Public Premises Act.    

46.    This Court has noted in  Banatwala and Co. Vs.  

LIC reported in 2011 (13) SCC 446 that the Public Premises  

Act,  1971  is  concerned  with  eviction  of  unauthorised  

occupants  and recovery of  arrears  of  rent  or  damages for  

such  unauthorised  occupation,  and  incidental  matters  

specified  under  the  act.  As  far  as  the  Maharashtra  Rent  

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Control Act is concerned, this Court noted in paragraph 25 of  

that judgment that as per the preamble of the said Act, it is  

an Act relating to five subjects, namely (i) control of rent, (ii)  

repairs of certain premises, (iii) eviction, (iv) encouraging the  

construction  of  new  houses  by  assuring  fair  return  of  

investment by the landlord, and (v) matters connected with  

the purposes mentioned above. In that matter, the Court was  

concerned  with  the  issue  of  fixation  of  standard  rent  and  

restoration  and  maintenance  of  essential  supplies  and  

services by the landlord.  It was held that these two subjects  

were not covered under the Public Premises Act, and infact  

were  covered  under  the  Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act.  

Operative para 99(c) of the judgment therefore specifically  

held as follows:-

“99  (c)  The  provisions  of  the   Maharashtra  Rent  control  Act,  1999 shall  govern   the relationship between the public  undertakings   and their occupants to the extent this Act covers   the other aspects of the relationship between the   landlord and tenants, not covered under the Public   Premises Act, 1971.”

47.  A  judgment  of  a  bench  of  three  Judges  of  this  

Court  in  M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v.  L.I.C  

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reported in (1980) 4 SCC 435 was relied upon by Mr. Raval.  

In  this  matter  also  a  plea  was  raised  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant  tenant  for  being  covered  under  the  Delhi  Rent  

Control  Act,  1958  which  came  to  be  repelled.   Mr.  Raval  

stressed upon the observations in Para 5 of the judgment to  

the effect that Section 2(g) merely requires occupation of any  

public premises to initiate the action.  Mr.  Nariman on the  

other hand pointed out that in the earlier part of the very  

paragraph the Court had observed, although after referring to  

the provision of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction  

and  Rent  Recovery),  Act  1959  that  if  the  entry  into  

possession had taken place prior to the passing of the act,  

then obviously the occupant would not be an unauthorized  

occupant.   That  apart,  Mr.  Nariman  submitted  that  the  

judgment was essentially on the second part of Section 2(g)  

defining ‘unauthorised occupation’. It is, however, material to  

note that in that case the premises were owned by LIC from  

19.7.1958, i.e. prior to the Delhi Rent Control Act becoming  

applicable  from  9.2.1959.  Besides,  the  issue  of  protection  

under a welfare legislation being available to the tenant prior  

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to the premises becoming public premises, and the issue of  

retrospectivity was not under consideration before the Court.  

The observations of the Court in that matter will have to be  

understood in that context.  

48.  As far as the eviction of unauthorised occupants  

from public premises is concerned, undoubtedly it is covered  

under  the  Public  Premises  Act,  but  it  is  so  covered  from  

16.9.1958,  or  from  the  later  date  when  the  concerned  

premises become public premises by virtue of the concerned  

premises  vesting  into  a  Government  company  or  a  

corporation like LIC or the Nationalised Banks or the General  

Insurance Companies  like the respondent  no.1.  Thus there  

are two categories of occupants of these public corporations  

who get excluded from the coverage of the Act itself. Firstly,  

those who  are  in  occupation  since  prior  to  16.9.1958,  i.e.  

prior to the Act becoming applicable, are clearly outside the  

coverage  of  the  Act.  Secondly,  those  who  come  in  

occupation, thereafter, but prior to the date of the concerned  

premises  belonging  to  a  Government  Corporation  or  a  

Company,  and are covered under a protective provision of  

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the  State  Rent  Act,  like  the  appellant  herein,  also  get  

excluded.   Until  such  date,  the  Bombay  Rent  Act  and  its  

successor  Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act  will  continue  to  

govern  the  relationship  between  the  occupants  of  such  

premises on the one hand, and such government companies  

and corporations on the other. Hence, with respect to such  

occupants  it  will  not  be  open  to  such  companies  or  

corporations to issue notices,  and to proceed against such  

occupants  under  the  Public  Premises  Act,  and  such  

proceedings will be void and illegal.  Similarly, it will be open  

for such occupants of these premises to seek declaration of  

their  status,  and  other  rights  such  as  transmission  of  the  

tenancy to the legal heirs etc. under the Bombay Rent Act or  

its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, and also to seek  

protective  reliefs  in  the  nature  of  injunctions  against  

unjustified  actions  or  orders  of  eviction  if  so  passed,  by  

approaching the forum provided under the State Act which  

alone will have the jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings.

49. Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondents  Mr.  

Raval submitted that the judgment of the Constitution Bench  

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in  Ashoka Marketing had clarified the legal  position with  

respect to the relationship between the Public Premises Act  

and the  Rent  Control  Act.   However,  as  noted above,  the  

issue  concerning  retrospective  application  of  the  Public  

Premises  Act  was  not  placed  for  the  consideration  of  the  

Court,  and  naturally  it  has  not  been gone into  it.   It  was  

submitted  by  Mr.  Raval  that  for  maintenance  of  judicial  

discipline this bench ought to refer the issue involved in the  

present matter  to  a bench of  three Judges,  and thereafter  

that bench should refer it to a bench of five Judges.  He relied  

upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Pradip  

Chandra Parija Vs. Pramod Chandra reported in 2002 (1)  

SCC 1 in this behalf.  He also referred to a judgment of this  

Court  in  Sundarjas  Kanyalal  Bhatija  Vs.  Collector,  

Thane, Maharashtra and Ors.  reported in  1989 (3) SCC  

396 and particularly paragraph 18 thereof for that purpose.  

What is however, material to note is that this paragraph also  

permits discretion to be exercised when there is no declared  

position in  law.   The Bombay Rent  Act  exempted from its  

application only the premises belonging to the government or  

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a local authority.  The premises belonging to the Government  

Companies or Statutory Corporations were however covered  

under the Bombay Rent Act.  This position was altered from  

16.9.1958  when  the  Public  Premises  (Eviction  of  

Unauthorised  Occupation)  Act,  1958  came  in  force  which  

applied  thereafter  to  the  Government  Companies  and  

Statutory Corporations, and that position has been reiterated  

under the Public  Premises Act  of  1971 which replaced the  

1958 Act.  Under these Acts of 1958 and 1971, the Premises  

belonging  to  the  Government  Companies  or  Statutory  

Corporations are declared to be Public Premises.  Thus, the  

Parliament took away these premises from the coverage of  

the Bombay Rent Act under Article 254(1) of the Constitution  

of  India.  This  was,  however,  in  the matter  of  the subjects  

covered  under  the  Public  Premises  Act,  viz.  eviction  of  

unauthorised occupants and recovery of arrears of rent etc.  

as stated above. Thereafter, if the State Legislature wanted  

to  cover  these  subjects  viz.  a  viz.  the  premises   of  the  

Government  Companies  and Public  Corporations  under  the  

Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act,  1999,  it  had  to  specifically  

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state that  notwithstanding anything in  the Public  Premises  

Act  of  1971,  the  Government  Companies  and  Public  

Corporations would be covered under the Maharashtra Rent  

Control Act, 1999.  If that was so done, and if the President  

was to give assent to such a legislation, then the Government  

Companies and Public Corporation would have continued to  

be covered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 in  

view  of  the  provision  of  Article  254(2).   That  has  not  

happened.   Thus,  the  Government  Companies  and  Public  

Corporations are taken out of the coverage of the Bombay  

Rent Act,  and they are covered under Public Premises Act,  

1971, though from the date specified therein i.e. 16.9.1958.  

After  that  date,  the  Government  Companies  and  Public  

Corporations will be entitled to claim the application of the  

Public Premises Act, 1971 (and not of the Bombay Rent Act or  

its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999), but from  

the date on which premises belong to these companies or  

corporations and with respect to the subjects specified under  

the Public Premises Act.  In that also the public companies  

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and  corporations  are  expected  to  follow  the  earlier  

mentioned guidelines.  

50. We  have  not  for  a  moment  taken  any  position  

different from the propositions in  Ashoka Marketing.  We  

are infact in agreement therewith, and we are not accepting  

the  submission  of  Mr.  Nariman,  that  only  contractual  

tenancies were sought to be covered under that judgment,  

and not statutory tenancies.  Tenancies of both kinds will be  

covered by that judgment, and they will  be covered under  

the  Public  Premises  Act  for  the  subjects  specified  therein.  

The only issue is with effect from which date.  That aspect  

was not canvassed at all before the Constitution Bench, and  

that  is  the  only  aspect  which  is  being  clarified  by  this  

judgment.  We are only clarifying that the application of the  

Public Premises Act will be only from 16.9.1958, or from such  

later date when concerned premises become Public Premises  

on the concerned landlord becoming a Government Company  

or  Public  Corporation.   When  the  law  laid  down  by  the  

different Benches of this Court including by the Constitution  

Benches  on  retrospectivity  is  so  clear,  and  so  are  the  

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provisions of the Public Premises Act, there is no occasion for  

this Court to take any other view. When this judgment is only  

clarifying and advancing the proposition laid down in Ashoka  

Marketing, there is no reason for us to accept the objections  

raised  by  Mr.  Raval,  that  the  issues  raised  in  this  matter  

should not be decided by this bench but ought to be referred  

to a larger bench.  

51. In this context we may note that since the issue of  

retrospective  application  of  the  Public  Premises  Act,  to  

tenancies  entered  into  before  16.9.1958,  or  before  the  

property in question becoming a public premises, was neither  

canvassed  nor  considered  by  the  bench  in  Ashoka  

Marketing  (supra),  the  decision  does  not,  in  any  way,  

prevent  this  Bench  from  clarifying  the  law  regarding  the  

same. This follows from the judgment of the Supreme Court  

in  State  of  Haryana Vs. Ranbir  @  Rana reported  in  

(2006) 5 SCC 167 wherein it was held that a decision, it is  

well-settled, is an authority for what it decides and not what  

can  logically  be  deduced  therefrom.  The  following  

observations  of  this  court  from  paragraph  39  of  

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Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. M/s. Sun Engineering  

Works  (P.)  Ltd.  reported  in  AIR1993  SC  43 are  also  

pertinent:  

“The judgment must be read as a whole and  the observations from the judgment have to  be considered in  the light of  the questions  which were before this Court. A decision of this  Court takes its colour from the questions involved   in  the  case  in  which  it  is  rendered  and  while   applying the decision to a later  case,  the courts   must  carefully  try  to  ascertain  the true  principle   laid down by the decision of this Court and not to   pick  out  words or  sentences from the judgment,   divorced from the context of the questions under   consideration  by  this  Court,  to  support  their   reasonings.

                                                                     (emphasis  

supplied)

It  is  clear  from  a  reading  of  the  very  first  paragraph  of  

Ashoka  Marketing that  the  question  before  it  was  

‘whether  the  provisions  of  the  Public  Premises  Act  

would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act   

in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of   

both  the  enactments.’  The  Court  answered  this  in  the  

affirmative,  and  we  respectfully  agree  with  the  same.  

However,  Ashoka Marketing (supra) can not be said to be  

an  authority  on the  retrospective  application  of  the  Public  

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Premises Act, or where the premises fall within the ambit of  

only one act, as that issue was not before the Court.

52. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal  

and  set-aside  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

7.6.2010  rendered  by  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  in  Writ  

Petition No. 2473 of 1996.  The said Writ Petition shall stand  

allowed, and the judgment and order dated 17.1.1996 passed  

by the City Civil Court, Mumbai, as well as the eviction order  

dated 28.5.1993 passed by the respondent No. 2 against the  

appellant will  stand set aside. The proceedings for eviction  

from  premises,  and  for  recovery  of  rent  and  damages  

initiated by the first respondent against the appellant under  

the Public Premises Act, 1971, are held to be bad in law, and  

shall therefore stand dismissed.  We however, make it clear,  

that in case the respondents intend to take any steps for that  

purpose,  it  will  be  open  to  them to  resort  to  the  remedy  

available  under  the  Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act,  1999,  

provided they make out a case therefor.  The parties will bear  

their own costs.

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 …………………………………..J.  

[ H.L. Gokhale  ]          

                                               …………………………………… J.

[ J. Chelameswar ] New Delhi Dated: February 11, 2014

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