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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.1351     OF     2012   [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1288 OF 2011]

Shri Sudarshanacharaya … Appellant  

Versus

Shri Purushottamacharya & Anr. … Respondents  

JUDGMENT

(SMT.)     RANJANA     PRAKASH     DESAI,     J.   

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by grant of special leave, is directed against  

the judgment and order dated 10/12/2010 passed by the High  

Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench at  

Lucknow. The High Court dismissed Criminal Misc. Case  

No.4227 of 2010 filed by the appellant praying that Criminal  

Complaint Case No.13 of 2008 be quashed.

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3. Respondent 1 is the complainant (‘complainant’, for  

clarity).  He filed a complaint in the court of ACJM, Faizabad  

against the appellant.  According to the complainant, the  

temple of Lord Venkatesh situated in Ayodhya town is  

managed by a Trust.  The appellant is the adopted son of Smt.  

Hulasmani Devi, the Sarwarkar and President of Vaikunth  

Mandap Sri Venkatesh Mandir Trust Committee.  In short, the  

case of the complainant, as disclosed in Complaint dated  

09/09/1985, is that on 31/08/1973 considering religious  

nature of the appellant, the appellant was entrusted with  

several silver and gold articles, jewellery and other articles  

belonging to the temple so that he may propagate the sect.  In  

December, 1973, the appellant requested that he may be given  

certain more articles.  Accordingly, more articles were given to  

him.  The receipt of first set of articles was given by him but  

he did not give receipt of second set of articles.  The appellant  

never returned the articles. He misappropriated them and  

thus committed criminal breach of trust.  

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4. Certain facts, which can be gathered from the various  

orders which are on record and from the affidavit of Mr. R.K.  

Chaturvedi, S.S.P. Faizabad need to be stated.  As we have  

already noted, the complaint was filed on 09/09/1985.  On  

17/10/1985, the statement of the complainant was recorded.  

On 25/11/1985, the statement of witness Bashisht Pandey  

was recorded.  On 17/12/1985, the statement of Rakesh  

Kumar Mishra was recorded.  Both these witnesses confirmed  

the allegations made by the complainant.  On 07/03/1986,  

learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and the case  

was fixed for hearing on 18/06/1988.  On 18/06/1988, the  

complainant took time for producing evidence under Section  

244 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“the code”, for  

short).  Learned Magistrate posted the matter for hearing on  

25/08/1988.  But on 25/08/1988, the complainant and his  

advocate were absent.  The appellant’s advocate presented an  

application for exemption which was accepted.  Application  

preferred by the appellant under Section 245(1) of the Code  

was fixed for hearing on 26/08/1988.  On 26/08/1988,  

learned Magistrate discharged the appellant under Section  

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245 (1) of the Code on the ground that the complainant was  

absent on 25/08/1988, which was the date fixed for  

production of evidence.  

5. The complainant filed Criminal Revision No.91 of 1988  

before the Additional Sessions Judge, Faizabad challenging  

the said order of discharge.  Learned Sessions Judge observed  

that on 07/03/1986, learned Magistrate had summoned the  

appellant so as to inquire into the charge under Section 406 of  

the IPC but the appellant did not appear.  He finally appeared  

on 18/06/1988 i.e. after about two and half years.  This  

observation of the Sessions Court indicates that it is the  

appellant who kept himself away from the court.  Learned  

Sessions Judge further observed that on 27/05/1988, the  

appellant was released on bail and the case was adjourned to  

18/06/1988.  On the next date of hearing i.e. on 25/08/1988,  

the complainant as well as the appellant were absent.  The  

appellant’s advocate gave an application for exemption and  

also an application under Section 245(2) of the Code for  

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discharge.  The Magistrate fixed the hearing on 26/08/1988.  

On 26/08/1988 the appellant was absent.  His advocate field  

an application for exemption.  The complainant was present.  

He filed two applications.  In one application, he sought  

opportunity to produce evidence under Section 244 of the  

Code and in the other application, he requested learned  

Magistrate to take further action only after recording evidence.  

In his application, the complainant gave reasons for his  

absence in the court on 25/08/1988.  He stated that the date  

‘26/08/1988’  was fixed because of advocates’  strike.  The  

Sessions Court observed that if learned Magistrate was of the  

view that the appellant had to be discharged under Section  

245 of the Code, because evidence was not produced, he  

should have discharged the accused on the same day.  He,  

however, adjourned the case to 26/08/1988.  On that day, the  

complainant was present and he filed two applications.  

Pertinently, he had requested the Magistrate to allow him to  

produce evidence and take further action only after recording  

evidence. The Sessions Court observed that it was not proper  

for learned Magistrate to pass order on the application of the  

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appellant ignoring applications of the complainant, who was  

present.  No order was passed on the complainant’s  

applications.  The Sessions Court observed that the  

complainant had taken only two dates to produce evidence.  

The Sessions Court in the circumstances, by its order dated  

17/02/1990 set aside the discharge order and remanded the  

matter to the trial court with a direction to provide adequate  

opportunity to the complainant to produce evidence.  

6. Being aggrieved by this order, the appellant filed Criminal  

Revision No.59 of 1990 before the Allahabad High Court.  The  

High Court vide its order dated 28/01/2000 dismissed the  

said criminal revision and directed the trial court to rehear the  

parties after giving an opportunity to the complainant to  

produce evidence.  It is pertinent to note that the High Court  

has clearly stated in this order that the order passed by  

learned Sessions Judge does not suffer from any illegality or  

impropriety.  Thus, the findings of Sessions Court about the  

conduct of the appellant were confirmed by the High Court.  

This order of the High Court has assumed finality.  

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7. Thereafter on 21/07/2009, the appellant again preferred  

a discharge application stating, inter alia, that Smt.  

Hulasmani Devi who had executed power of attorney in favour  

of the complainant had died on 17/08/1985 and, therefore, all  

actions taken by the complainant have become null and void.  

Learned Magistrate observed that after the appellant got bail,  

it is only because of untiring efforts of the complainant in  

obtaining non-bailable warrant against him that the appellant  

appeared in the court on 20/04/2009.  Learned Magistrate  

observed that the appellant is a clever person.  By filing such  

application, he is willfully delaying the case.  Learned  

Magistrate observed that because of the conduct of the  

appellant, the case did not proceed for 22 years.  Learned  

Magistrate observed that the appellant knew about the death  

of Smt. Hulasmani Devi on 17/11/1994.  But when the  

Allahabad High Court was hearing his case on 28/01/2000,  

he did not bring this fact to the notice of the court.  Learned  

Magistrate, in the circumstances, dismissed the application by  

his order dated 22/09/2010.  The appellant then filed  

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Criminal Misc. Case No.4227 of 2010 in the High Court under  

Section 482 of the Code for quashing the complaint.  The High  

Court vide its order dated 10/12/2010 refused to quash the  

complaint on the ground that there was no ground for doing  

so.  The High Court expedited the proceedings and directed  

that the case will be heard on day-to-day basis.  It is this order  

which is challenged in this appeal.  

8. Affidavit in rejoinder is filed by the appellant denying all  

the allegations.  It is stated in the affidavit by the appellant  

that the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are  

taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not  

prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against  

the appellant.  It is further stated that the instant criminal  

proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides. The  

proceedings are instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking  

vengeance.  

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9. We have heard Shri S.B. Sanyal, senior advocate  

appearing for the appellant, as well as Shri Yatish Mohan,  

advocate appearing on behalf of respondent 1.  Shri Sanyal  

submitted that the appellant is about 72 years of age. It is  

clear from the affidavit of Shri Chaturvedi, S.S.P., Faizabad  

that the complainant consistently remained absent and,  

therefore, the case could not be proceeded with.  Counsel  

submitted that it is apparent that the complainant is not  

serious about prosecuting the complaint.  This is a case of  

sheer harassment to an old man of 72 years, against whom  

the complaint discloses no offence at all.  Relying on State     of    

Haryana     &     Ors.     V.     Bhajan     Lal     &     Ors  .1, counsel submitted  

that, examined in light of this judgment the instant complaint  

deserves to be quashed.  Counsel submitted that speedy trial  

is the right of an accused. This right is denied to the appellant.  

It is unfair to submit the appellant to the agony of a trial after  

a lapse of 8 years. Counsel submitted that the complaint was  

filed by the power of attorney holder of Sarwarkar of the  

temple.  Principal having died on 17/12/1994, power of  

1 (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335

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attorney holder’s right to continue the proceedings comes to  

an end because no substitution was made or ordered (Section  

201 of Indian Contract Act, 1872).  Counsel submitted that  

the case initiated on 09/09/1985 with respect to an offence of  

the year 1973 and 1976 is barred under Section 468 of the  

Code and, therefore, pre-charge proceedings should not be  

allowed to continue.  The appellant should have been  

discharged.  Counsel submitted that continuance of pre-

charge proceedings is an abuse of the process of the court.  In  

support of his contentions, counsel relied on Punjab     National    

Bank     &     Ors.     V.     Surendra     Prasad     Sinha  2, “  Common    

Cause  ”    A     registered     Society     v.     Union     of     India     &     Ors  .3  

(‘Common Cause-I’), Japani     Sahoo     v.     Chandra     Sekhar    

Mohanty  4   and Rajiv     Gupta     &     Ors.     V.     State     of     H.P.  5.  

10. Counsel for the respondents supported the impugned  

order.  

2 (1993) Supp 1 SCC 499 3 (1996) 4 SCC 33  4 (2007) 7 SCC 394 5 (2000) 10 SCC 68

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11. Having carefully perused the complaint, it is not possible  

for us to concur with learned counsel for the appellant that  

the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken  

at their face value, do not disclose any offence at all. The  

complaint states the relationship of the appellant with the  

President of Baikunth Mandap Venkatesh Mandir Trust  

Committee.  It clearly states that certain gold and silver  

articles were entrusted to the appellant. The particulars of the  

articles are clearly stated in the complaint.  It is further stated  

that for the first set of articles the appellant gave a receipt and  

for the second set of articles he did not give a receipt.  It is  

alleged that the appellant never returned the articles and thus  

committed criminal breach of trust. Facts are narrated in  

detail.  It cannot, therefore, be said that prima facie no offence  

is made out against the appellant. Judgment of this court in  

Bhajan     Lal   does not help the appellant. Punjab     National    

Bank  ’  s   case turns on its own facts and has no application to  

this case.  

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12. We are mindful of the fact that this court has repeatedly  

laid stress on the importance of speedy trials.  Undoubtedly,  

the right of an accused to speedy trial flows from Article 21 of  

the Constitution of India.  Speedy trial is an important  

component of the procedure established by law contemplated  

by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  But, in this case,  

reliance placed by Mr. Sanyal on ‘  Common     Cause  ’    A     Regd.    

Society       v.      Union     of     India  6     (  ‘  Common     Cause-II  ’  )   and Rajiv  

Gupta is totally misplaced. In Rajiv     Gupta  , reliance was  

placed on the judgments of this Court in Common     Cause-(I)    

and Common     Cause-(II)  .  In these cases, this court had given  

certain directions for expeditious disposal of trials.  This court  

had prescribed periods of limitation at the end of which the  

trial court would be obliged to terminate the criminal  

proceedings and necessarily acquit/discharge the accused.  

Following these cases, this court issued further directions in  

Raj     Deo     Sharma      v.      State     of     Bihar  7 (Raj     Deo     Sharma-I  )  

and Raj     Deo     Sharma     (II)       v.      State     of     Bihar  8     (Raj     Deo    

6 (1996) 6 SCC 775 7 (1998) 7 SCC 507 8 (1999) 7 SCC 604

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Sharma-II).  In P.     Ramachandra     Rao      v.      State     of    

Karnataka  9  , the Seven Judges Bench of this Court  

considered whether the directions given by this court in the  

above cases would apply to prosecutions under the Prevention  

of Corruption Act and other economic offences.  While dealing  

with these issues, this court also considered whether time  

limits of the nature mentioned in the above cases can, under  

the law, be laid down.  After an indepth examination of the  

relevant law on the point, this court came to the conclusion  

that the view taken by it in the above judgments ran counter  

to the view taken by the Constitution Bench in Abdul  

Rehman     Antulay      v.      R.S.     Nayak  10  .  This court was also of  

the view that prescribing periods of limitations at the end of  

which the trial court would be obliged to terminate the  

proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused,  

and further, making such directions applicable to all the cases  

in the present and for the future amounts to legislation which  

cannot be done by judicial directives and within the arena of  

the judicial law making power available to constitutional  

9 (2002) 4 SCC 578 10 (1992) 1 SCC 225

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courts, howsoever liberally Articles 32, 21, 141 and 142 of the  

Constitution may be interpreted.  This court, therefore, made  

it clear that in the above-mentioned cases the court could not  

have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of  

a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and  

must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or  

discharging the accused.  The relevant conclusion of this  

Court reads as under:

“It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially  permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for  conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits  or bars of limitation prescribed in the several  directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo  Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have  been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law.  The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial  or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of  time, as prescribed by the directions made in  Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and  (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in  those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of  the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when  they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind  to the facts and circumstances of the case before  them and determine by taking into consideration the  several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R.  Antulay case and decide whether the trial or  proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as  to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time- limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated  

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by any court as a bar to further continuance of the  trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the  court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge  the accused.”

13. It is clear, therefore, that it is not open to a court to  

prescribe the time limit for disposal of a case and direct that  

after termination of that period if the case does not get over,  

the accused should be acquitted or discharged.  As held in P.  

Ramachandra     Rao  , the court can always exercise its  

available powers under Sections 309, 311 and 253 of the Code  

to effectuate the right of an accused to speedy trial.  In an  

appropriate case, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section  

482 of the Code, the High Court can undoubtedly quash the  

proceedings.  Following the judgment in P.     Ramachandra    

Rao, this court has in Vakil     Prasad     Singh      v.      State     of    

Bihar  11   observed that where the court comes to the  

conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has  

been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may  

be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard  

to the nature of offence and relevant circumstances, quashing  

11 (2009) 3 SCC 355

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of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice.  This  

Court further observed that the power possessed by the High  

Courts under Section 482 of the Code is undoubtedly very  

wide but it has to be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito  

justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the  

administration of which alone the courts exist.  This Court  

further observed that the inherent powers do not confer an  

arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to  

whim or caprice.  This Court further observed that it is trite to  

state that the said powers have to be exercised sparingly and  

with circumspection only when the court is convinced, on the  

basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to  

continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that  

the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be  

quashed.   

14. We have already noted how the Sessions Court and the  

High Court have commented on the conduct of the appellant.  

It is true that from the affidavit filed by Mr. R.K. Chaturvedi,  

S.S.P., Faizabad, it appears that the complainant was also  

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negligent and casual at some stage. We are prima facie of the  

view that this observation of Mr. Chaturvedi does not appear  

to be wholly correct and runs counter to the observations  

made by learned Magistrate and Sessions Court in this case.  

Pertinently, the Sessions Court order in which the conduct of  

the accused has been severely criticized has been confirmed  

by the High Court.  Besides, in this case, we are concerned  

with the Trust property.  Prima facie we find that whenever the  

case was about to be heard, the appellant tried to put a spoke  

by filing an application for discharge.  The Sessions Court and  

the High Court had directed that the case should proceed  

expeditiously or on day-to-day basis.  Even by the impugned  

order, the High Court has directed that the case shall  

commence on day-to-day basis.  The appellant has challenged  

the said order.  Had the appellant not raised repeated  

challenges, the case would have proceeded and perhaps got  

over by now.  Prima facie conduct of the appellant appears to  

us to be bad.  In the facts of this case, we are unable to come  

to a conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue  

would be an abuse of the process of the court. We are,  

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therefore, not inclined to give any relief to the appellant.  Mr.  

Sanyal has raised two other legal points, one is regarding  

limitation and the other is regarding the proceedings having  

already been vitiated on account of death of Smt. Hulasmani  

Devi, who had executed power of attorney in favour of the  

appellant.  We do not want to express any opinion on these  

questions. They involve questions of facts.  We would leave  

them open so that the trial court can decide them in  

accordance with law.  It is, therefore, not necessary for us to  

discuss the other decisions of this court cited by Mr. Sanyal.  

We must also caution the complainant.  It is not possible for  

us to say that the complainant has also been extremely  

prompt in prosecuting the case.  Since Trust property is  

involved in this case, the complainant is expected to be alert  

and vigilant.  We deem it appropriate to give him a final  

chance to prosecute this case.  We direct the trial court to  

take-up the case for final disposal, after receipt of this order  

by it and dispose it of within a period of four months from that  

date.  We expect the appellant to cooperate with the trial court  

and not file frivolous applications leading to procrastination.  

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We make it clear that nothing said by us in this order should  

be treated as our final expression on the merits of the case of  

the complainant or the appellant.  All questions of facts and  

law are expressly kept open.  The appeal is dismissed with the  

above directions.  

……………………………………………..J. (AFTAB ALAM)

……………………………………………..J. (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 4, 2012.  

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