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 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1862 OF 2013 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No.8291 of 2013]

Sudam Charan Dash ….    Appellant

Vs.  State of Orissa & Anr. …   Respondents

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1.  Leave granted.

2. The appellant’s son – Rajib Das was murdered on 5/1/2009  

in a hotel.  FIR was lodged in respect thereof on 6/1/2009.  

PS Case No. 4 of 2009 was registered.  It is the appellant’s  

case that the police did not investigate the case properly.  

The appellant ultimately filed a writ petition in the Orissa  

High  Court.   Thereafter,  the  investigation  gained

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momentum.   On  3/1/2013,  non-bailable  warrant  was  

issued against Mr. Sweekar Nayak, who is respondent 2,  

by  the  SDJM,  Rayagada.   Respondent  2  preferred  an  

application for anticipatory bail in the Orissa High Court.  

The High Court  disposed of  the said  application by the  

impugned order.  We notice that in the impugned order,  

the High Court has made a categorical observation that  

considering  the  nature  of  the  allegations  made against  

respondent 2, it did not think it to be a fit case for grant of  

anticipatory bail.   Surprisingly,  however,  the High Court  

gave a direction that in the event respondent 2 surrenders  

before the learned SDJM, Rayagada within four weeks and  

moves an application for bail, he shall be released on bail  

on such terms and conditions as the learned Magistrate  

deems  fit  and  proper.   Pursuant  to  this  direction,  

respondent 2 surrendered before the learned Magistrate  

and was released on bail on 11/06/2013.

3.  We are surprised at the direction issued by the High Court  

to the trial court to release respondent 2 on bail.  When  

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the  High  Court  rejected  the  application  for  anticipatory  

bail,  it  was  sufficient  indication  that  the  High  Court  

thought  it  fit  not  to  put  a  fetter  on  the  investigating  

agency’s  power  to  arrest  respondent  2.   In  such  a  

situation, the investigating agency, if it so desired and if it  

thought that the custodial interrogation of respondent 2  

was necessary, could have arrested him.  Therefore, after  

rejecting the prayer for anticipatory bail, the High Court  

should not have negated its own order by directing that  

respondent  2  should  be  released  on  bail.   This  is  

contradiction  in  terms.   It  dilutes  the  order  rejecting  

anticipatory  bail.  Such  order  is  not  legally  sound.   It  

overlooks the scope and purport of Sections 438 and 439  

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

4. In a similar situation in  Rashmi Rekha Thatoi & Anr.   

v.  State of Orissa & Ors  .  1, this Court took a strong view  

of  the  matter  and  observed  that  such  orders  have  no  

1 (2012) 5 SCC 690

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sanctity in law.  Relevant observations of this Court could  

be quoted:

“33. We  have  referred  to  the  aforesaid   pronouncements  to  highlight  how  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Gurbaksh  Singh  Sibbia v.  State of Punjab,2 had analysed  and  explained  the  intrinsic  underlying  concepts under Section 438 of the Code, the  nature of orders to be passed while conferring  the  said  privilege,  the  conditions  that  are  imposable and the discretions to be used by  the  courts.  On  a  reading  of  the  said   authoritative  pronouncement  and  the  principles that have been culled out in Savitri  Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra  3   there is  remotely  no  indication  that  the  Court  of   Session or the High Court can pass an order   that  on  surrendering  of  the  accused  before   the Magistrate he shall be released on bail on   such  terms  and  conditions  as  the  learned  Magistrate may deem fit  and proper or the   superior  court  would  impose  conditions  for   grant  of  bail  on such surrender.   When the   High Court in categorical terms has expressed   the  view  that  it  is  not  inclined  to  grant   anticipatory  bail  to  the petitioner-accused it   could not have issued such a direction which   would tantamount to conferment of benefit by  which the accused would be in a position to   avoid  arrest.   It  is  in  clear  violation  of  the   

2 (1980) 2 SCC 565 3 (2009) 8 SCC 325

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language employed in the statutory provision   and  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  dictum  laid   down  in  Gurbaksh  Singh  Sibbia  and  the  principles culled out in Savitri Agarwal”.

The operative portion of the order passed in that case  

reads as follows:

“Judging  on  the  foundation  of  aforesaid  well- settled principles, the irresistible conclusion is that   the impugned orders directing enlargement of bail   of  the  accused  persons,  namely,  Uttam  Das,   Abhimanyu  Das  and  Murlidhar  Patra  by  the  Magistrate  on  their  surrendering  are  wholly   unsustainable  and  bound  to  founder  and  accordingly  the  said  directions  are  set  aside.   Consequently,  the bail  bonds of the aforenamed  accused persons are cancelled and they shall be   taken into custody forthwith. It needs no special   emphasis to state that they are entitled to move   applications for grant of bail under Section 439 of   the Code which shall be considered on their own   merits.”

5.     We respectfully agree with these observations.  We also  

feel that such orders put restriction on the power of the trial  

court to consider the bail application on merits and grant or  

reject prayer for bail.  We are of the opinion that such orders  

should never be passed.

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6.     In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order.

7.     We  have  perused  the  order  passed  by  the  SDJM,  

Rayagada  granting  bail  to  respondent  2  pursuant  to  the  

impugned order.  Obviously, the SDJM released respondent 2  

on bail solely on the ground that the High Court had issued  

the above mentioned direction.  The SDJM had no alternative  

but  to  do  so.   Thus,  there  is  no  consideration  of  the  

application for  bail  filed by respondent  2  on merits.   We,  

therefore,  quash the consequential  order  dated 11/6/2013  

passed by the SDJM, Rayagada.  Ordinarily, we would have  

directed respondent 2 to surrender today.  But, we refrain  

from giving any such direction.    In  the circumstances,  if  

respondent  2  appears  and  surrenders  before  the  SDJM,  

Rayagada on 29/10/2013 and prefers an application for bail,  

we  direct  the  SDJM,  Rayagada  to  decide  respondent  2’s  

application  on  merits  and  in  accordance  with  law.   The  

appellant may remain present in the court and oppose the  

bail application if he so desires.  

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8.    We direct the Registry of this Court to forward a copy of  

this judgment to the Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court.  

We request the Chief Justice of Orissa High Court to circulate  

a copy of this order to the learned Judges of the Orissa High  

Court.  

9.    The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.  

      ……………….……………………..J ( RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

……..…………………………………J ( MADAN B. LOKUR )

NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 25, 2013             

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