26 November 2015
Supreme Court
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STATE OF U.P. Vs UNITED BANK OF INDIA

Bench: M.Y. EQBAL,C. NAGAPPAN
Case number: C.A. No.-005254-005254 / 2010
Diary number: 2483 / 2010
Advocates: ABHISTH KUMAR Vs MITTER & MITTER CO.


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REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5254 OF 2010

State of Uttar Pradesh and others Appellant(s)

versus

United Bank of India and others                   Respondent(s) WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4688 OF 2010

M/s. Amrita Bazar Patrika Pvt. Ltd. Appellant(s)

versus

M/s. Jvine Development Pvt. Ltd.  and others          Respondent(s)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2462 OF 2010

United Bank of India Appellant(s)

versus

M/s. Jvine Development Pvt. Ltd.  and others          Respondent(s)

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1969-1970 OF 2010

Northern India Patrika A.P.K.S. Morcha Appellant(s)

versus

United Bank of India and others                   Respondent(s)

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J U D G M E N T

M.Y. Eqbal, J.:

Since all these appeals arise out of a common judgment  

and order dated 3.11.2009, they have been heard together and  

disposed of by this common judgment.

2. By the impugned judgment dated 3.11.2009 passed by a  

Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, the writ petition  

filed by the writ petitioner United Bank of India was allowed  

and  necessary  directions  were  issued.   Aggrieved  by  those  

directions, the appellants have come to this Court.

3. In the writ petition No.775 of  1999, the writ petitioner  

namely United Bank of India sought the following reliefs:

“a) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature  of certiorari quashing the impugned show cause  notice dated 19.12.1998 contained in Annexure  ‘6’ to this writ petition.

b) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature  of prohibition restraining the respondents from  canceling  the  lease  with  regard  to  property  no.19, Clive Road, Allahabad.

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c) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of  prohibition  restraining  the  respondents  from  converting  the  lease  of  property  no.19,  Clive  Road, Allahabad, into free hold in favour of any  other person.

d) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature  of mandamus directing the respondents nos.1 to  4  to  accept  the  application  and  money  for  conversion  of  lease  hold  rights  with  regard  to  property no.19, Clive Road, Allahabad, into free  hold, as per Government order dated 4.12.1998,  contained in Annexure ‘7’ to this writ petition in  favour of the petitioner bank.

e) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of  mandamus directing respondents nos.1 to 4 to  renew the lease in respect of the premises No.19,  Clive  Road,  Allahabad,  and  to  execute  the  necessary  lease  deed  with  reference  to  the  decretal rights of the petitioner bank.

f)  Issue  any  other  suitable  writ,  order  or  direction  which  this  Hon’ble  Court  may  deem  just  and  proper  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case.”

4. The  facts  of  the  case  in  brief  as  narrated  in  the  writ  

petition are that the property in question i.e. Bungalow no.19,  

Clive  Road,  Allahabad  was  initially  leased  out  to  one  Ms.  

Mortha Anthony on 11.8.1887 for 50 years and the said period  

expired on 11.8.1937.  On 7.4.1945, the lease was renewed in  

favour of  Miss Verna Anthony and Miss Leena Anthony for  

another 50 years by the Collector Allahabad, for the Governor  

of United Provinces, which was made effective from 1.9.1937,  

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and  as  such,  the  said  lease  was  valid  up  to  31.8.1987.  

Subsequently,  on  22.10.1945,  the  lease  was  transferred  in  

favour of M/s. Amrita Bazar Patrika Pvt. Ltd. (in short, “the  

ABP Company”) by means of a registered deed.  On the basis  

of  the  said  transfer  deed,  a  lease  deed  was  executed  on  

25.07.1949 by the State of Uttar Pradesh in favour of the ABP  

Company for 50 years from the first day of September 1937 in  

pursuance  of  G.O.  No.1286/XI-780/45  dated  22.03.1947.  

Consequent  thereupon,  the  name  of  the  Company  was  

mutated as lessee in respect of the property situated at 19,  

Clive Road, Allahabad in the Nazul property register.  The ABP  

Company, having its registered office in Calcutta, its Managing  

Director has been carrying  on two businesses of publishing  

newspapers from Calcutta as well as from Allahabad and other  

regional offices all over the country. The Company owns two  

properties  at  Allahabad  being  premises  no.19,  Clive  Road,  

Allahabad and premises no.10, Edmonston Road, Allahabad.  

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5. Further the case of the appellant is that the United Bank  

of India (in short, “the Bank”) had advanced credit facilities to  

the Company M/s ABP Pvt. Ltd. and the said Company had  

taken loan for the purposes of giving salaries to their staff as  

well  as  to  modernize  its  printing  technology  for  which  the  

company  alleged  to  have  mortgaged  their  immovable  

properties  at  Calcutta  and  Allahabad,  including  leasehold  

property situated at 19, Clive Road, Allahabad by means of  

deposit of title deeds.  Since the Company became irregular in  

paying the loan instalments, the Bank issued a demand notice  

calling upon the Company and others to pay the outstanding  

dues.  Thereafter, for recovery of its dues, the Bank had filed a  

Suit No. 510 of 1990 at Calcutta High Court in the capacity of  

mortgagee  of  the  various  properties  of  the  said  Company  

including 19, Clive Road, (25 and 25-A Chikatpur Nasibpur  

Bakhtiyara), Allahabad, which was held by the said Company  

as  lessee.  The  said  suit  was  decreed  on 09.10.1991 and  a  

mortgage decree was passed in favour of Bank.  It would be  

relevant  to  mention  here  that  the  paramount  title  holder  

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namely the State of Uttar Pradesh was not made party in the  

suit  and  the  mortgage  decree  was  passed  on  the  basis  of  

settlement arrived at between the parties.  

6. Some  of  the  important  terms  of  the  settlement  upon  

which the Bank's suit was decreed, inter alia, are as follows:-  

“(a)  There  will  be  a  decree  for  Rs.10,84,34,870.37 in favour of the plaintiff and  against the defendant nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7.  

(b)  There  will  be  a  decree  for  interest  on  the  decretal  due  of  Rs.10,84,34,870.37  at  6% per  annum  simple  from  August  21,  1991  till  realisation of the decretal dues and in terms of  clause 17 herein below.  

(c) There will be a decree for costs assessed at  Rs.2,31,442.08. Such costs shall be paid on or  before December 31, 1991.  

(d) There will be a decree for Rs.33,30,000/- of  the plaintiff against defendant no.8 with interest  at 6% per annum simple from August 21, 1991,  till realisation of the decretal dues and in terms  of  Clause 17 herein.  This amount,  however,  is  included in the amount stated in paragraph (a)  hereinabove.

(e)  There  will  be  a  declaration  that  the  suit  properties  mentioned  in  Annexure  K  to  the  plaint, a copy whereof is annexed hereto, remain  hypothecated  and  the  immovable  properties  mentioned in Annexure L to the plaint, a copy  whereof is annexed hereto, remain mortgaged to  the plaintiff as securities for the payment of the  decretal  dues  with  interest  and  costs,  as  provided hereinabove.  

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(f)  There  will  be  a  decree  for  sale  of  the  hypothecated assets  mentioned in Annexure K  to the plaint for payment of the decretal dues.  Such sale, however, shall not be effected except  as provided hereinafter or unless and until there  is a default in payment of the decretal dues in  the manner, as provided hereinafter.  

(g) There will be a preliminary-cum-final decree  for sale of the mortgaged properties mentioned  in  Annexure  L  for  payment  of  the  decretal  amount  with  interest  and  costs,  as  provided  hereinafter, but such sale shall not be effected  except as provided hereinafter or in the event of  default in payment of the decretal dues in the  manner, as provided hereinafter.  

(h)  The  Joint  Receivers  will  take  symbolical  possession of  the suit  properties  and they will  not  disturb  the  possession  of  the  said  defendants with the carrying on the business of  the  said  defendants-judgment  debtors  unless  requested by the plaintiff.”  

7. The  Bank  alleged  that  it  had  further  granted  credit  

facilities to the ABP Company on the request made by it along  

with four other banks in order to rehabilitate the Company.  

In the meanwhile, the Additional District Magistrate (F & R)  

Allahabad issued a show cause notice dated 19.12.1998 to the  

Company M/s. ABP Pvt. Ltd. as to why their lease right over  

19, Clive Road, may not  be terminated.   The lessee namely  

M/s ABP Pvt. Ltd. did not challenge the notice.  The appellant  

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on the basis of the mortgage decree challenged the notice by  

filing Writ  Petition No.  775 of  1999 for  quashing the above  

show cause notice.  The Bank further requested that as per  

the G.O. dated 01.12.1998 issued by the State Government,  

which  lays  down  a  detailed  policy  along  with  various  

provisions  about  entitlement  for  getting  conversion  of  lease  

land into free hold status, the property situated at 19, Clive  

Road  may  be  converted  into  free  hold.   The  Bank  as  a  

mortgagee  decree  holder  and  as  a  nominee  of  the  lessee  

Company subsequently submitted an application along with  

relevant  challans  in  respect  of  part-payment  of  free  hold  

charges depositing a sum of Rs.21,85,200.00 on 15.06.1999 in  

the State Bank of India, Allahabad Main Branch. Moreover, in  

paragraphs 14, 16 and 22 of the counter affidavit filed by the  

Company in  Writ  Petition  No.775/99,  it  has  been admitted  

that the appellant Bank is their nominee.

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8. Curiously  enough,  when  the  terms  of  the  mortgage  

decree  was  not  complied  with  inasmuch  as  the  decretal  

amount  was  not  paid  to  the  Bank  by  the  mortgagor-ABP  

Company, the Bank filed an application in the Calcutta High  

Court  for  transfer  of  execution  applications  to  the  Debt  

Recovery Tribunal for issuance of recovery certificates.  Upon  

such  transfer  the  cases  were  registered  before  the  Debt  

Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta.

9. Surprisingly  enough,  before  the  DRT,  Calcutta,  a  

settlement was entered into between the parties.  Before the  

DRT, five banks viz., United Bank of India, Allahabad Bank,  

Bank of Baroda,  Canara Bank, Punjab National  Bank, were  

the applicants and ABP Company (mortgagor) and guarantors  

were the respondents.  Here also, the State of U.P. was not a  

party to the debt recovery proceeding.  On the basis of consent  

of the parties the Debt Recovery Tribunal passed an order on  

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11.02.2004.   The  relevant  portion  of  the  order  dated  

11.02.2004 passed by the DRT is quoted hereinbelow :-

“Heard the parties and examined the contents of  the  joint  petition  and  the  records  filed.   The  aforesaid cases are disposed of on the basis of the  settlement in the following way:-

1) By  consent  of  the  parties  application  being O.A. No.192 of 1997 is disposed of  by  the  issuing  certificate  and  directing  the  defendants  jointly  and severally,  to  pay:

a) Rs.6,54,221.00 to applicant no.1 b) Rs.2,13,62,183.04 to applicant no.2 c) Rs.2,02,31,071.21 to applicant no.3 d) Rs.2,07,70,640.81 to applicant no.4 e) Rs.1,98,25,365.55 to applicant no.5 f) The defendants are directed to pay to  

each of the applicants interest at the  agreed rate from August 27, 1997 till  realization.

g) In default of payment Recovery officer  is directed to sell by public auction or  private  treaty  the  hypothecated  assets,  mortgaged  properties  and  charged  assets  of  the  respondents  including  those  mentioned  in  Annexure  ‘G’  and  ‘H’  by  public  auction or by private treaty.

h) Defendants  are  also  directed  to  pay  the cost of the proceedings jointly and  severally to each of the applicants.

2) By consent of the parties application being  OA  No.193  is  disposed  of  by  issuing  certificate  and directed the defendants jointly and severally  pay

a) Rs.13,58,804.27 to applicant no.1 b) Rs.1,42,52,371.48 to applicant no.2

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c) Rs.1,71,03,802.70 to applicant no.3 d) Rs.1,64,10,410.96 to applicant no.4 e) Rs.1,61,79,866.01 to applicant no.5 f) Interest  at  the  agreed  rate  from  

27.8.1997 till realization g) In default of payment the Recovery  

officer  is  directed  to  take  proceedings  for  recovery  of  the  certificate debt including the sale of  the  mortgaged  and  charged  assets  described  in  scheduled  ‘G’  and  ‘H’  by public auction for private treaty.

h) Defendants are also directed to pay  the  cost  of  the  proceedings  jointly  and  severally  to  each  of  the  applicants.

3) By consent of the parties application being  275 of 1997 is disposed of by issuing certificate  directing the defendants jointly and severally to  pay :-

a) Certified  sum  Rs.2,57,61,088.94  against the defendants.

b) Defendants  are  directed  to  pay  to  the applicant interest at the agreed  rate  from  11.12.1997  till  the  amount is repaid.

c) In default of payment, the Recovery  Officer  is directed to sell  by public  auction  or  private  treaty  the  hypothecated  assets  of  the  respondents  including  in  those  mentioned in Annexure X by public  auction or private treaty.

d) Defendants are directed to pay the  cost  of  the  proceedings  jointly  and  severally to the applicant.

4) In TA/18/97 and TA/19/97 this Tribunal  has already issued the certificate for recovery in  favour of  the applicant  bank.   The defendants  have admitted these certified claims.

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5) The  parties  have  agreed  to  settle  the  decretal  amounts  of  United  Bank  of  India  (T.A.No.18 of 1997, T.A. No.19 of 1997), and the  claims of the applicant banks in OA No.192 of  1997,  OA  No.193  of  1997  and  OA  No.275  of  1997 in the following manner:

a) The consortium banks have agreed  to settle their respective claims against the  defendants  by  accepting  the  following  amounts by 30th June, 2004.

i) Rs.  2439.65  lakhs  by  United Bank of India ii) Rs.304.35  lakhs  by  Canara Bank. (iii) Rs.303.13  lakhs  by  Bank of Baroda (iv) Rs.228.16 by Allahabad  Bank (v) Rs.230.67  lakhs  by  Punjab National Bank vi) Rs.57  lakhs  towards  legal expenses incurred by the  consortium banks.”

10. Not only that, by the said order a committee consisting of  

receiver was appointed with a direction to take possession of  

all hypothecated assets and mortgaged properties and dispose  

of the same in the following manner:-

“xxxxxx

(c) Out of the sale proceeds of hypothecated  assests and mortgaged properties as contained  in Annexure I & II of today’s joint petition the  committee pay:

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i) 40%  to  the  Applicant  banks  (consortium banks) (ii) 40%  of  the  sale  proceeds  of  the  assets  will  be  paid  to  the  workers/employees  towards  their  dues  to  the  maximum  extent  of  Rs.15 crore. (iii) 20% of the sale proceeds will  be  utilized  by  the  said  three  companies for meeting various dues  of other creditor.”

11. It appears that pursuant to the order dated 11.02.2004  

an  auction  sale  notice  was  published  on  17/18.5.2004  in  

respect  of  the  immovable  property  situated  at  Clive  Road,  

Allahabad,  inviting  prospective  purchasers  to  participate  in  

the  auction  sale  of  the  property  allegedly  mortgaged to  the  

appellant United Bank of India.

12. In pursuance to the aforesaid sale notice, one M/s. Jvine  

Development Pvt. Ltd. and several other persons deposited the  

earnest money and the offer of  Jvine Development Pvt.  Ltd.  

was finally accepted and they were asked to deposit 25 % of  

the bid amount within 15 days and remaining 75% within 3  

months.  Although  the  said  Jvine  Development  Pvt.  Ltd.  

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deposited the 25 % amount, it did not deposit the remaining  

amount.  The Jvine Co. then asked the Bank to first get the  

said property converted into freehold or have a transferable  

right in respect of the said property. Thereafter, a show cause  

notice was issued by the Bank upon the Jvine Development  

Pvt. Ltd. on 30.09.2004.   In this connection, a writ petition  

was filed by the Company before the High Court and the High  

Court stayed the show cause notice.

13. The  District  Magistrate,  Allahabad  rejected  the  

application of the Bank for grant of free hold right in respect of  

the  land  in  question  i.e.  19,  Clive  Road,  Allahabad  on  the  

ground that Bank does not come within the eligibility criteria  

under G.O. dated 01.12.1998. Pursuant to the order passed  

by  the  District  Magistrate,  Allahabad,  the  Bank  made  a  

representation to the State Government on 30.08.2005 under  

Paragraph 7 of G.O. dated 17.02.1996 merged in G.O. dated  

01.12.1998 for passing orders for grant of free hold rights. It  

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was argued by the writ-petitioner before the High Court that  

the legal opinion sought by the State Government from its Law  

Department  in  the  aforesaid  matter  has  also  recommended  

that the said property may be converted into freehold but the  

District  Magistrate,  Allahabad  did  not  pay  any  heed  to  the  

aforesaid opinion as well as on the recommendation given by  

the State Government. Before the High Court, it was pleaded  

by  learned  counsel  for  prospective  auction  purchaser  Jvine  

Development Ltd. that after the decree of Calcutta High Court  

and subsequent order of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Kolkata all  

the rights, title and interest of M/s. Amrit Bazar Patrika Pvt.  

Ltd. ceased and it  vested with the Bank and the Bank had  

acquired first charge over the aforesaid property.   As per the  

order  of  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal,  Kolkata,  a  sale  committee  

was formed, which started its function by calling bids for the  

aforesaid property. Accordingly, a sale notice was published on  

18.5.2004 in ‘The Times of India’ in respect of the immovable  

properties situated at 19, Clive Road, Allahabad.  In reply to  

this  auction  sale  notice,  the  writ-petitioner  deposited  the  

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earnest money by way of bank draft and also submitted the  

tender.  

14. The State of U.P. for the first time after having come to  

know about all the aforementioned developments when it was  

made  party  in  the  writ  petition,  filed  a  detailed  counter  

affidavit.  According to the State of U.P. the suit property is a  

Nazul Land No. 25 and 25A which was given on lease to ABP  

and the period of lease expired on 31.08.1987 and on account  

of expiry of the lease and for violation of the terms of lease a  

show cause notice was issued on 14.05.1999 for resumption of  

the property.  The case of the State of U.P. is that the proposed  

decision for renewal of lease was not given effect to and the  

same was finally rejected by order dated 09.05.2005.

15. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ  

petitions preferred by the Bank and  M/s. Jvine Development  

Pvt. Ltd.  The operative portion of the order passed by the High  

Court is quoted hereinbelow :-

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“….An important aspect of the case is that the  judgements of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court and  Debt Recovery Tribunal, Kolkata also deal with  welfare of the workers of the Company and 40%  of the auction amount is directed to be released  in  favour  of  workers.  The  abovementioned  judgements of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court and  the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta were never  challenged by the State Govt., though it was well  within the knowledge of its authorities. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the  maxim of equity, namely,  actus curiae neminem  gravabit  -  an  act  of  court  shall  prejudice  no  man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded  upon justice and good sense which serves a safe  and certain guide for the administration of law.  The  law  itself  and  its  administration  is  understood to disclaim as it does in its general  aphorisms,  all  intention  of  compelling  impossibilities,  and  the  administration  of  law  must  adopt  that  general  exception  in  the  consideration of particular cases.   

xxxxxxx xxxxxxx

From  the  ongoing  discussion  and  submission  advanced before us and also taking into account  the equity, the legal opinion of the law Secretary  and  undue  delay  in  disposal  of  the  free  hold  application by the State, we are of the view that  writ of mandamus be issued to the respondents  to convert the land in question as free hold in  favour of the Petitioner- Bank.  In the result, the writ petition is hereby allowed  and the show cause notice dated 19.12.1998 is  hereby  quashed.  The  respondents  are  hereby  directed  by  the  writ  of  mandamus  to  issue  a  demand notice forthwith and convert the land in  question into free hold after taking the necessary  75 % balance amount from the petitioner-bank  as per the G.O. dated 1.12.1998. Furthermore,  the  connected  writ  petition  No.46115 of 2004 is allowed and the impugned  notice dated 30.9.2004 is hereby quashed and  

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the respondents are directed to transfer the land  to  the  petitioner  company  after  receipt  of  remaining balance amount of 75 % as per the  terms of the auction. The Land is transferred in  the  name  of  the  Bank,  it  is  made  clear  that  respondents shall raise the demand of remaining  75 % as soon as the land is transferred in the  name of the bank.”

16. Before we proceed to decide the issue involved, it would  

be appropriate to narrate the following facts which are not in  

dispute:-

“i) The  property  in  question  i.e.,  Bungalow No.19,  Clive  Road,  Allahabad in the  State of U.P. was initially given on lease dated  11.08.1887 to Ms. Mortha Anthony for a period  of 50 years commencing from 11.08.1887 ending  on 11.08.1937.  The said lease was renewed for  another  term  of  50  years  on  7.4.1945  by  the  Government  of  United  Province  of  Allahabad.  The  said  lease  was  scheduled  to  expire  on  31.8.1987;

ii) Before the expiry of lease the lessee  viz.,  Ms.  Mortha  Anthony,  transferred  the  leasehold  property  on  22.10.1945 in  favour  of  appellant-Amrit  Bazar  Patrika  Private  Limited  (for short ABP).  Consequent upon the transfer  the lease deed was executed by the Secretary,  Government  of  U.P.  in  favour  of  ABP  on  25.7.1943 for the remaining period of lease;

iii) Although  the  lease  granted  to  the  ABP  expired  on  11.8.1987,  the  lessee  ABP  moved  an application  in  the  year  1996 before  the State Government for renewal of the lease in  their  favour.   The  said  application  was  

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considered  and an order  of  proposed  sanction  for renewal of lease was take subject to proof of  payment  of  dues  and  execution  of  a  renewed  lease deed on fulfillment of conditions.  However,  no such renewed lease deed was executed by the  State of U.P. after the expiry of period of lease  i.e., 11.8.1987;

iv) A  show  cause  notice  dated  19.12.1998 was issued by the State government  calling  upon  the  lessee  namely  ABP  to  show  cause  as  to  why  possession  of  the  leased  property be not taken by the Government as per  the Government Grants Act, 1895.”

17. Curiously enough, lease was granted by the State of U.P.  

in respect of  the said property situated in Allahabad in the  

State  of  U.P.  but  the  appellant-ABP  moved  an  application  

before  the  Special  Secretary,  Land  Reforms  Department,  

Urban Land Ceiling Branch, Government of West Bengal, in  

the year 1997 seeking exemption under Section 20 and 21 of  

the  Land  Ceiling  Act,  1976  and  submitted  a  proposal  for  

construction of residential unit on the portion of the land for  

the  use  of  financially  backward  class  and  also  sought  

permission for using the land.  The concerned Land Reforms  

Department without appreciating the fact that the land and  

building was owned by the State of U.P., issued a conditional  

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order  granting exemption from Urban Land Ceiling Act  and  

also granted permission for construction of the building.  This  

fact was never brought to the notice of the government of U.P.  

either by the lessee ABP or by the concerned Land Reforms  

Department of State of West Bengal.

18.    Mr. Irshad Ahmad, learned AAG for the State of U.P., Mr.  

Rajesh  Kumar,  learned  counsel  for  the  Bank,  Mr.  Rakesh  

Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel,  Mr.  V.  Shekhar,  learned  

senior counsel, Mr. Awanish Sinha, Mr. Rishi Kesh, learned  

counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  and  the  respondents,  

advanced their arguments.

19. We  have  gone  through  the  facts  of  the  case  and  the  

documents which reveal that in Case No.510 of 1990 filed by  

the appellant-Bank before the Calcutta High Court, the State  

of U.P. and the Collector were not made parties although the  

property  in  question  being  the  Nazul  property  under  the  

ownership of the State of U.P.  Hence, the appellant had filed a  

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case before the High Court of Calcutta by concealing the facts  

and as such the order dated 09.10.1991 is not binding upon  

respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3.  It has been specifically mentioned  

in the mortgage decree that the decree will not be binding to  

persons  who  are  not  parties.  Extract  of  the  order  dated  

09.10.91 passed by the Calcutta High Court by which the suit  

was  decreed  in  terms  of  the  settlement  is  reproduced  

hereinbelow :-

“xxxx

The  court:  the  defendants  Nos.  1,2,3,7  and 8 have entered into an agreement with the  United ‘Bank of India in terms of the settlement  which have  been  signed  by  the  defendants  as  also on behalf of the plaintiff and their respective  advocates on record.

These defendants submitted to a decree in  favour of the plaintiff.

Under those circumstances this Court as  per the terms of settlement agreed upon by and  between the parties passes a decree in terms of  the settlement filed.   However,  this decree will  not affect the interest of any of the parties other  than the parties to the settlement.

This  court appoints as per  suggestion of  the  plaintiff  Bank  Mr.  Abhijit  Roy,  Deputy  General Manager, Reconstruction (Counselling),  United  Bank  of  India,  16,  Old  Court  House  Street, Calcutta together with a senior member  

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of  the  bar,  Dr.  Debi  Prasad  Pal  as  joint  Receivers.

In view of the order passed by this Court  in  the  suit  there  will  be  no  order  on  this  application  taken  out  by  Mr.  B.K.  Chatterji’s  client  for being added as a party defendant to  the suit.

All  parties  including  the  Joint  Receivers  are to in a signed copy of  the minutes of this  order on undertaking.

xxxxx”

20. It  is  submitted  by  the  State  that  respondent-ABP has  

mortgaged the property in question in favour of the appellant,  

by way of equitable mortgage but in support of its case, the  

appellant-Bank  has  not  filed  any  document.  It  is  also  

important  to  mention  here  that  the  Nazul  Land  No.25  and  

25A,  Chikatpur  Nasibpur  Bakhtiara  (situated  at  19,  Clive  

Road), and the Nazul Land No.120-1/2 Civil Station which is  

situated at 10, Edmoston Road, being the Nazul properties,  

are the properties of the Government of Uttar Pradesh.  Hence,  

the respondent-ABP was not having any authority to mortgage  

the same in favour of appellant without prior sanction of the  

Government of U.P. or the lessor.  It is important to note here  

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that the appellant has intentionally did not make respondent  

nos. 1,2,3 as party in Case No.510/1990, hence orders passed  

in that case are not binding upon the said respondents.

21. It is pertinent to mention here that the land in dispute  

being a Government property, the appellant-Bank cannot get  

any right over it.  Moreover, neither the appellant-Bank is a  

lessee of  the  land in question nor  any lease has ever  been  

sanctioned  by  the  Govt,  of  U.P.  in  its  favour.   Hence,  the  

appellant is not entitled to get any right or to keep possession  

of the properties in question situated at 19, Clive Road and 10,  

Edmoston Road.

22. The contention of the appellant-Bank is that only on the  

basis of the notice issued on 9.12.1998, the appellant cannot  

be deprived of its rights.  It is pertinent to mention here that  

the above notice was not issued to the appellant Bank, but  

was issued to the Secretary/Director of M/s ABP Pvt. Ltd. vide  

letter  No.  56/Nazul-(CL)-XXI-8/11(96-97)  dated  19th  

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December, 1998 in relation to the Nazul land No.25 and 25A,  

Chikatpur, Nasibpur Bakhtiara.  Hence, the appellant is not  

competent to file any petition and challenge the above notice.  

It is worthwhile to mention that the above show cause notice  

was issued on the ground of violation of the terms of lease for  

which a reply was filed by Shri B.P. Tiwari, Secretary of M/s  

ABP Co. Ltd. dated 13.01.1999.  This Court vide order dated  

8.1.1999 in the writ petition has stayed further proceedings of  

the above show cause notice issued on 19.12.1998.  It is also  

worthwhile  to mention here that  in the case of  Nazul  Land  

No.120-1/2 Civil Station (which is situated at 10, Edmoston  

Road),  on  violating  the  terms  of  lease  by  raising  illegal  

construction  without  prior  sanction  and  for  other  

irregularities, a show cause notice vide letter No.448/Nazul-

(CL)-XXI-8/51(80-81)  dated 14th May,  1999 was sent  to  the  

Director/Secretary of M/s ABP Pvt.Ltd through registered post  

and its reply was given by Shri B.P. Tiwari, Secretary, ABP Pvt.  

Ltd. on 27.5.1999 and in that reply no justified reasons have  

been given  by  the  Secretary  of  the  above  Company  for  the  

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violation of the terms of the lease by unauthorisedly raising  

construction and for unauthorisedly running a workshop for  

repairing  LML  Vespa  Scooter.   Hence,  after  thorough  

consideration  when  it  was  found  that  the  issuance  of  new  

lease in favour of M/s ABP was not in accordance with rules,  

the name of M/s ABP was cancelled from the above land vide  

order No. 47/Nazul-CL-XXI-8/51(80-81), dated 9th May, 2005  

and the entire area of Nazul Land No.120-1/2 Civil Station has  

been  vested  with  the  Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh.  

Admittedly, no notice was issued to the appellant Bank by the  

State.  Hence, the appellant was not aggrieved by these notices  

in  any  manner.   Neither  the  appellant-Bank  is  having  any  

relation with both the lands in question nor any lease of the  

above land has ever been sanctioned in its favour.

23. In Civil Appeal Nos.1969-1970 of 2010, filed by Northern  

India  Patrika  Amrit  Prabhat  Karamchari  Sanyukt  Morcha  

against the same impugned order of the High Court mainly on  

the  ground  that  they  were  employees  of  M/s.  Amrit  Bazar  

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Patrika Ltd. and have their legitimate dues against the ABP  

Company, the appellants have raised objection with regard to  

the  order  passed by  the  High Court  giving  direction to  the  

State Government to convert the Nazul land as free hold land  

in favour of the Bank.  According to this appellant, the Bank is  

not entitled to get the land converted into free hold land.

24.  In  Civil  Appeal  No.  4688 of  2010,  the  lessee,  namely  

ABP, is also aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by  

the  High  Court  mainly  on  the  ground  inter  alia  that  the  

auction of the property in question is absolutely on a very less  

price and is erroneous.  According to the appellant, the High  

Court erred in law in not permitting respondent nos.2 & 3 to  

forfeit the earnest money of respondent no.1 Company on the  

ground  that  the  said  Company  has  breached  terms  of  the  

auction without any valid justification.

25. In Civil Appeal No.2462 of 2010, the appellant Bank is  

aggrieved  by  that  part  of  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  

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whereby  the  High  Court  failed  to  appreciate  that  after  

conversion of the properties from the leasehold to freehold, the  

land in question will fetch more price which will benefit the  

interest of the Bank and the workers.  So many other grounds  

have also been taken by the appellant.  

26. There  is  no  dispute  that  the  land  and  building  in  

question is Nazul property being the property of Government  

maintained  by the  State  authorities  in  accordance with the  

Nazul  Rules.   Chapter  1  of  the  Nazul  Rules  lays  down the  

provision  for  maintenance  of  Nazul  register,  procedure  for  

entering names of  persons in possession of  Nazul land and  

building.

27. Rule 13 provides the procedure for sale or lease of Nazul  

land, whereas Rule 16 makes it mandatory for obtaining prior  

approval  of  the  State  Government  before  sale  or  lease  or  

renewal  of  leases  of  nazul  lands.   Rule  13,  14 and 16 are  

quoted herein below:-

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“13. Sale  or  lease  of  nazul  lands-  The  sale  lease of nazul shall in all  cases be carried out  under  the  Collector’s  orders  and  when  it  is  proposed  to  lease  or  sale  nazul,  in  the  occupation  of  any  department,  other  than the  Revenue  Department,  the  nazul  shall  be  transferred to  the Collector  for  the  purpose  of  lease or sale:

Provided  that  before  the  nazul  in  the  occupation of a department is transferred to the  Collector for disposal it shall be the duty of the  department concerned to ascertain whether the  nazul  in  question  is  required  by  any  other  department of Government.  

14. Sale  or  lease  of  a  plot  for  building  purposes shall, subject to provisions of Rule 16,  be sanctioned by-

(1) the Collector, if the estimated value  does not exceed Rs. 2,500;

(2) the Commissioner,  if  the estimated  value  exceeds  Rs.  2,500  but  does  not exceed Rs. 10,00.;

(3) the  State  Government  in  other  cases.

In such cases, the terms of sale or lease as  finally  arranged,  shall  be  subject  also  to  confirmation by the Commissioner or the State  Government  as  the  case  may  be,  unless  the  terms  have  already  been  set  forth  in  the  proposal  for  sale  or  lease  and  have  been  approved.  Copies  of  orders  sanctioning  sale  of  nazul  property  shall  be  forwarded  to  the  Accountant General, Uttar Pradesh.

16. In  all  cases,  whether  of  sale  or  of  new  leases or of renewal of leases which have expired  without  option  of  renewal,  which  involve  a  concession in favour of the vendee or the lessee  e.g. in which it is proposed to fix the sale price  or the rent at a rate lower than the prevailing  

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market rate or in which it is propsed to sell or  lease the land without holding a public auction  or inviting public tenders, prior approval of the  State  Government  shall  be  obtained  before  sanction even though such cases, owing to the  value  of  the  land  being  within  the  limits  laid  down in the rules, could otherwise be sanctioned  without reference to the State Government.”

28. Indisputably the lease of Nazul land is governed by the  

Government  Grants  Act,  1895.   Sections  2  and  3  of  the  

Government Grants Act, 1895 very specifically provide that the  

provisions  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  do  not  apply  to  

Government lands.  Sections 2 and 3 read as under:

“2.  Transfer  of  Property  Act  1882,  not  to  apply to Government grants - Nothing in the  Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained shall  apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any  grant or other transfer of land or of any interest  therein  heretofore  made  or  hereafter  to  be  made by or on behalf of the Government to, or in  favor of, any person whomsoever; but every such  grant and transfer  shall be construed and take  effect as if the said Act had not been passed.

3.   Government  Grants  to  take  effect  according  to  their  tenor -  All  provisions,  restrictions  conditions  and  limitations  ever  contained  in  any  such  grant  or  transfer  as  aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according  to  their  tenor,  any  rule  of  law  stature  or  enactment  of  the  Legislature  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. “  

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29. The  aforesaid  legal  position  was  known  to  the  ABP  

Company and also the Bank.  In reply to the application filed  

by the Bank with the authorities of the State of Uttar Pradesh  

for conversion of the land into free hold land in favour of the  

Bank,  the  Authority  made  it  clear  that  conversion  of  land  

cannot be allowed in favour of the Bank.  The relevant portion  

of the Collector’s order is extracted hereinbelow:

“It  is  also  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  the  lease  of  Nazul  land  is  sanctioned  under  the  provisions of Government Grants Act, 1895 on  which the provisions of Transfer of Property Act,  1882 are not made applicable, as such the act of  mortgaging  the  above  property  by  the  management of the M/s. Amrit Bazar Patrika is  without any authority and is illegal.  Nazul land  is a government property, which is fully vested  in  the  Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh.   Hence  even  on  mortgaging  the  said  property  in  question  by  M/s  Amrit  Bazar  Patrika  without  getting  prior  sanction  of  its  Lessor/Collector,  Allahabad,  the  United  Bank  of  India  has  no  authority  to  get  it  converted  into  free  hold  in  their favour.”   

30. The  lease  of  Nazul  land  for  building  purposes  was  

sanctioned under G.O. No. 2035/IX-150 dated 27th November,  

1940  as  amended  by  G.O.  No.  1119-IX/54-1952  dated  

25th June, 1952.  The form of lease is provided in Form 2 in  

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the  Appendix  to  the  said  rule  according  to  the  terms  and  

conditions of the lease.  The lessee will not in any way transfer  

or  sublet  the  demised premises or  building  erected thereon  

without the previous sanction in writing of the lessor.

31. In the instant case, the renewal of lease dated 25th July,  

1940 was prepared as per Form 4 of the Nazul rule.  The said  

lease was renewed in accordance with the terms, conditions  

and covenants contained in the prescribed forms appended to  

the said rules.

32. The primary question which needs consideration is as to  

whether there is a valid mortgage created by the ABP Pvt. Ltd  

in favour of the Union Bank of India?

33. As stated above the disputed property, which is a Nazul  

Land and governed by the Government grant,  was given by  

way of Renewal of Lease to the ABP Co. for 50 years w.e.f.   1st  

September  1937,  which  expired  on  31st  August  1987.  

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Admittedly, ABP Co. mortgaged the said Nazul land in favour  

of  the  Bank,  in  which  the  ABP  Co.  had  only  a  leasehold  

interest  in  the  property.  There  is  nothing  on  record  which  

shows as to when the alleged mortgage was created by the  

ABP Co. in favour of the Bank. If we assume that the mortgage  

was  created  before  the  expiry  of  the  lease  i.e.  before  31st  

August 1987 then as per the Form 2 read with Form 3 which  

governs conditions for renewal of lease of the Nazul Rules any  

transfer or sub-lease by the ABP Co. had to be done with the  

previous sanction of the State, but in the present case not a  

single document is produced to show that any such sanction  

was obtained by the ABP from the State.  

34. It  is  admitted  fact  that  the  suit  property  is  the  Nazul  

Land, and as per the definition of Nazul, as provided in the  

Rule  1  of  the  Nazul  Rules,  it  means  any  land  or  building  

which, being the property of Government is not administered  

as a State Property.

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35. Admittedly, lease was renewed in favour of M/s. ABP Co.  

as  per  the  Government  order  in  accordance  with  the  rules  

mentioned in the Rules 13 to 16 of the Nazul Rules read with  

Form 3 of the Nazul Manual which talks about Renewal of a  

Lease.  

36. In Form 3 of the Nazul Manual it  is  mentioned in the  

renewal  lease  deed  that  “In  pursuance  of  the  premises  the  

lessor  hereby demises  upto the  Lessee all  and singular  the  

hereditaments and premises comprised in and demised by the  

within the written lease, now standing thereon with the same  

exceptions and reservations as are therein expressed to hold  

unto the Lease…… and subject to and with the benefit of such   

and the like lessee’s and Lessor’s convenants respectively and   

the like provisions and conditions in all respects (including the   

proviso  for  re-entry)  as  are  contained  in  the   within  written   

lease.

37. This “within written lease” is the original lease deed as  

mentioned in the Form 2 of the Nazul Manual.  Form 2 of lease  

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of Nazul land for building purposes it is one of the condition  

between the lessor and the lessee that “ the lessee will not in  

any way transfer or sublet the demised premises or buildings  

erected thereon without the previous sanction in writing of the  

lessor”.

38. In the present case there was nothing on the record to  

show  that  the  lessee  i.e.  (ABP)  has  obtained  any  written  

sanction from the lessor i.e. Government before mortgaging his  

leasehold  interest  in  the  Nazul  Land.  Meaning  thereby  the  

mortgage done by the lessee in favour of the Bank itself is bad  

in law, which was done in clear violation of the terms of the  

lease deed i.e.  mortgage of  the Nazul land without previous  

sanction in writing of the State.  

39. In  the  present  case  the  appellant-Bank,  which  is  a  

nationalized bank before lending public money by way of loan  

as  against  the  security  of  disputed  property  by  way  of  

depositing title deed, was supposed to verify the title of  the  

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mortgagor in respect of the disputed property. But neither any  

evidence nor a single sheet of paper has been produced by the  

Bank to show that the title of the mortgagor was verified and  

non-encumbrance certificate  in respect  of  disputed property  

was obtained or no objection from the State Government was  

taken by the Bank. Further, even if we hold that the mortgage  

was valid, in the cases of government grant, the government is  

very  much a  necessary  party  and  the  Calcutta  High  Court  

should not have passed the so called compromise mortgage  

decree without issuing notice to the Government. This is an  

infirmity done by the High Court and accordingly the mortgage  

decree is bad in law.  Moreover, the High Court should have  

taken into account the fact that the ABP Co. is only have the  

leasehold  interest  and the Bank could not  have been given  

right to auction the property as the ABP had only limited right  

which had expired in the year 1987.

 

40. The  High  Court  of  Allahabad  also  erred  in  giving  the  

direction to convert leasehold interest as freehold interest in  

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favour  of  the  Bank  by  applying  the  doctrine  of  legitimate  

expectation  for  issuing  the  writ  of  mandamus  against  the  

State,  which in our view is not the correct approach of the  

High Court.  The High Court  relied on two decisions of  this  

Court, one of which is the case of  Ram Parvesh Singh vs.  

State of Bihar,  (2006) 8 SCC 381, wherein the Court held  

that:-

“15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously,  it is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a  benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow  from a promise or established practice. The term  'established  practice'  refers  to  a  regular,  consistent  predictable  and  certain  conduct,  process  or  activity  of  the  decision-making  authority. The expectation should be legitimate,  that  is,  reasonable,  logical  and  valid.  Any  expectation  which  is  based  on  sporadic  or  casual  or  random  acts,  or  which  is  unreasonable,  illogical  or  invalid  cannot  be  a  legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not  enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by  courts,  for  judicial  review  of  administrative  action. It is procedural in character based on the  requirement  of  a  higher  degree  of  fairness  in  administrative action, as a consequence of  the  promise made, or practice established. In short,  a  person  can  be  said  to  have  a  'legitimate  expectation'  of  a  particular  treatment,  if  any  representation  or  promise  is  made  by  an  authority, either expressly or impliedly, or if the  regular  and  consistent  past  practice  of  the  authority gives room for such expectation in the  normal  course.  As  a  ground  for  relief,  the  

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efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as its slot  is  just  above 'fairness in action'  but far  below  'promissory  estoppel'.  It  may  only  entitle  an  expectant : (a) to an opportunity to show cause  before  the  expectation  is  dashed;  or  (b)  to  an  explanation  as  to  the  cause  for  denial.  In  appropriate cases, courts may grant a direction  requiring  the  Authority  to  follow the  promised  procedure  or  established  practice.  A  legitimate  expectation,  even  when  made  out,  does  not  always  entitle  the  expectant  to  a  relief.  Public  interest,  change  in  policy,  conduct  of  the  expectant or any other valid or bonafide reason  given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to  negative the 'legitimate expectation'.

The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on  established  practice  (as  contrasted  from  legitimate expectation based on a promise), can  be invoked only by someone who has dealings or  transactions or negotiations with an authority,  on  which  such  established  practice  has  a  bearing,  or  by  someone  who has a  recognized  legal  relationship  with  the  authority.  A  total  stranger  unconnected  with  the  authority  or  a  person who had no previous dealings with the  authority  and  who  has  not  entered  into  any  transaction  or  negotiations  with  the  authority,  cannot  invoke  the  doctrine  of  legitimate  expectation,  merely  on  the  ground  that  the  authority has a general obligation to act fairly.”

41. The aforesaid decision makes it clear that this doctrine  

cannot be applied in cases of invalid expectation, and as in the  

present case, the mortgage done by the ABP itself is bad in  

law.   We are of the clear view that this expectation is not valid  

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at  all  in the eye of  law. Moreover,  this  Court  in number of  

decisions  has  held  clearly  that  doctrine  of  legitimate  

expectation cannot be invoked by someone who has no dealing  

or transaction or negotiations with an authority or by someone  

who  has  a  recognized  legal  relationship  with  the  authority.  

Therefore,  as  the  Bank  is  not  having  any  recognized  legal  

relationship  with  the  State  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  

mortgage by the ABP in favour of the Bank itself is bad in law,  

there  is  no  question  of  invoking  doctrine  of  legitimate  

expectation  in  the  present  case  as  it  applies  to  a  regular,  

consistent predictable and certain conduct, process or activity  

of the decision-making authority.  The expectation should be  

legitimate,  that  is,  reasonable,  logical  and  valid.  Any  

expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random  

acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid, cannot be a  

legitimate expectation.

42. The  doctrine  of  legitimate  expectation  ordinarily  would  

not have any application when the legislature has enacted a  

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statute.   The  legitimate  expectation  should  be  legitimate,  

reasonable  and  valid.   For  the  application  of  doctrine  of  

legitimate expectation, any representation or promise should  

be  made  by  an  authority.  A  person  unconnected  with  the  

authority,  who  had  no  previous  dealing  and  who  has  not  

entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority  

cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation. A person,  

who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation  

has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and  

the denial  of  that  expectation has worked to his  detriment.  

This Court in the case of  Sethi Auto Service Station and  

another  vs.  Delhi  Development  Authority  and  others,   

(2009) 1 SCC 180, while considering the doctrine observed:-

“33. It  is  well  settled  that  the  concept  of  legitimate expectation has no role to play where  the State action is as a public policy or in the  public interest unless the action taken amounts  to an abuse of power. The court must not usurp  the discretion of  the public authority which is  empowered to take the decisions under law and  the  court  is  expected  to  apply  an  objective  standard which leaves to the deciding authority  the full range of choice which the legislature is  presumed  to  have  intended.  Even  in  a  case  where  the  decision  is  left  entirely  to  the  

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discretion of the deciding authority without any  such legal bounds and if the decision is taken  fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere  on the ground of procedural fairness to a person  whose interest  based on legitimate expectation  might  be  affected.  Therefore,  a  legitimate  expectation  can  at  the  most  be  one  of  the  grounds which may give rise to judicial  review  but the granting of relief is very much limited.  (Vide  Hindustan  Development  Corpn.  (1993)  3  SCC 499.”

43. The High Court after having recorded a finding that the  

Bank being the nominee of the mortgagee has a right to make  

an  application  for  conversion  of  Nazul  land  into  a  freehold  

land,   without  appreciating the  fact  that  the  Bank has not  

having  any  subsistence  interest  in  the  leasehold  property  

obtained a mortgage decree behind the back of the State being  

the paramount title holder applied the doctrine of legitimate  

expectation.

44. In  the  instant  case,  admittedly,  the  State  never  

recognized the appellant Bank as a mortgagee.  Further the  

State was not aware about the alleged mortgage said to have  

been  created  by  the  lessee  ABP  Co.  by  deposit  of  Lease  

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document.  Moreover, the State never represented or promised  

either to the lessee or to the Bank to give any benefit under  

the  lease.   In  such  circumstances,  we  are  of  the  definite  

opinion  that  the  High  Court  has  committed  grave  error  in  

applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation in favour of the  

bank.  

45. After  considering  the  entire  facts  of  the  case  and  the  

submissions  made  by  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

parties, we come to the following conclusion:-

(i)   Indisputably,  the  property  in  question  i.e. Premises No.19, Clive Road, Allahabad is a  Nazul land governed by the Government Grants  Act, 1895 and Nazul Rules.

(ii)    The property was given on lease by the  State of U.P.to Mrs. Mortha Anthony and second  time  the  lease  was  renewed  in  favour  of  Ms.  Verna  Anthony  and  Ms.  Leena  Anthony  for  a  further period of 50 years which was valid   up  to 31.8.1987.

(iii)  During  the  subsistence  of  lease,  the  leasehold  interest  was  transferred  in  1945  in  favour of ABP Co. and on the basis of the said  transfer  a  lease  was executed  in  1949  by  the  State  of  U.P.  in  favour  of  ABP  Co.  for  the  remaining period of lease which expired in 1987.  

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(iv) As against the loan taken by the Company  from  the  Bank,  a  mortgage  was  created  in  respect  of  the  property  by  the  Company  in  favour  of  Bank.   The  lease  in  respect  of  the  leasehold  interest  in  the  property  admittedly  expired in 1987.

(v)  The mortgage so created by the Company  in favour of the Bank in respect of Nazul land  without  the  sanction  of  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh in terms of the lease, is  ab initio void,   hence no right was created in favour of the Bank  by reason of the said mortgage.

(vi) Consequently, a mortgage decree obtained  by  the  Bank  on  the  basis  of  settlement,  in  absence of and behind the back of the State of  U.P.  could not have been enforced against the  State.  The  subsequent  proceedings  of  transferring  the  decree  to  the  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal and again passing an order for auction  sale of the property on the basis of settlement is  wholly illegal and without jurisdiction.

(vii) The appellant Bank has no right, title or  interest in the property so as to claim a right of  conversion  of  the  property  into  a  freehold  property.

(viii) The impugned notice issued by the State  of  U.P.  directing resumption of the property is  legal  and valid and cannot be quashed at  the  instance of the Bank.

46. For the reasons aforesaid, Civil Appeal No. 5254 of 2010  

is bound to be allowed and the judgment and order passed by  

the High Court is liable to be set aside.

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47. In the result,  other  appeals filed by the appellants i.e.  

Civil Appeal Nos. 1969-1970 of 2010, Civil Appeal No. 4688 of  

2010 and Civil Appeal No.2462 of 2010 are dismissed.

…………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

…..……………………….J. (C. Nagappan)

New Delhi November 26, 2015

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