STATE OF U.P. Vs MADHAV PRASAD SHARMA
Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,B.S. CHAUHAN, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-000242-000242 / 2011
Diary number: 32532 / 2009
Advocates: GUNNAM VENKATESWARA RAO Vs
M. A. CHINNASAMY
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 31461 of 2009)
State of U.P. & Ors. .... Appellant (s)
Versus
Madhav Prasad Sharma .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and
order dated 29.06.2009 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 614 of 2009
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
the special appeal preferred by the appellants herein.
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3) Brief facts:
(a) The respondent was appointed as Police Constable at
Police Lines, Aligarh vide order dated 01.02.1978. On
19.10.2001, the respondent had gone for some official
work and left the Police Station, Sikandarpur Vaishya and
thereafter came back on his duty on 28.01.2002 after 101
days. After initiation of departmental proceedings, the
Disciplinary Authority issued notices to the respondent on
various dates for seeking explanation for his unauthorized
absence from duty. On 23.03.2002, the Deputy
Superintendent of Police (in short “the DSP”) issued
charge sheet against the respondent by leveling charges
and directed him to submit the reply by 01.04.2002. As
the respondent did not reply to the notice, the DSP issued
another notice to the respondent on 04.04.2002. After
giving several opportunities to the respondent, the
Disciplinary Authority fixed the date as 01.07.2002 for
recording of evidence but the respondent did not appear
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before the Presiding Officer. Finally, the respondent
appeared before the Presiding Officer on 16.09.2002 and
informed that he has no defence witness. After completion
of the enquiry, the Presiding Officer, vide his order dated
09.10.2002, submitted his report to the Disciplinary
Authority. Agreeing with the enquiry report, the
Disciplinary Authority issued show cause notice dated
25.10.2002 to the respondent along with the copy of the
enquiry report for his comments/reply on the findings
recorded therein. On 06.11.2002, the respondent
submitted his reply stating that he had accepted the
findings on the charge of unauthorized absence from duty
on the ground of illness.
(b) The Sr. Superintendent of Police (in short “the SSP”),
Etah, vide order dated 23.11.2002, terminated the service
of the respondent. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the
respondent preferred Departmental Appeal before the
Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short “the DIG”),
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Agra Zone, Agra. Vide order dated 27.02.2003, the DIG
rejected the appeal filed by the respondent herein.
(c) Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred
writ petition being C.M.W.P. No. 53909 of 2003 before the
High Court which was allowed by the learned single Judge
vide his order dated 17.09.2008. Against the said order,
the appellants herein preferred special appeal being S.A.
No. 614 of 2009 before the High Court. The Division
Bench of the High Court, vide its order 29.06.2009,
dismissed the special appeal on the ground of
maintainability. Aggrieved by the said order, the
appellants have preferred this appeal by way of special
leave before this Court.
4) Heard Mr. Shail Kr. Dwivedi, learned Additional
Advocate General for the State of U.P. and Mr. V. Shekhar,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
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5) Without going into the merits of the charges leveled
against the respondent, let us consider the following two
questions:-
(i) Whether the Special Appeal No. 614 of 2009 preferred
by the State before a Division Bench against the order of
the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by
the petitioner therein is maintainable?
(ii) Even if we answer the first question in the negative,
whether the order of the learned single Judge quashing
the order of termination dated 23.11.2002 of the petitioner
therein is sustainable.
6) In view of the limited issues, there is no need to
traverse all the factual details. However, it is relevant to
refer the charge leveled against the respondent herein
which reads as under:-
“You left Police Station Sikandarpur Vaishya on 19.10.2001 for the Office of Circle Officer in connection with some departmental work and thereafter you came back on 28.01.2002 and thus remained unauthorizedly absent for 101 days from your service without any sanctioned leave/permission in this regard.”
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Pursuant to the Charge Memo, the delinquent was asked
to show cause and ultimately enquiry was conducted and
the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. The Disciplinary
Authority, namely, the SSP, by order dated 23.11.2002
terminated the service of the respondent with immediate
effect. By order dated 27.02.2003, the Appellate
Authority, i.e., the DIG, Agra also dismissed the appeal
filed by the respondent herein. Against the said order,
the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 53909 of 2003
before the High Court. By order dated 17.09.2008, the
learned single Judge, after finding that the respondent
herein had been sanctioned leave without pay and
subsequently his service was terminated on the same
ground and as such two punishments were inflicted for
one charge which is not permissible in law, quashed the
order of termination dated 23.11.2002. We will consider
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the merits of the order of the learned single Judge while
considering the second issue.
About the First Issue:-
7) Against the order of the learned single Judge, the State
Government filed Special Appeal No. 614 of 2009 before
the Division Bench of the High Court. Rule 5 of Chapter
VIII of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 speaks about
Special Appeal which reads as under:-
“Special Appeal.—An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of Superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a tribunal Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.”
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8) It is fairly admitted that in view of the fact that
against the order of termination the delinquent availed
departmental appeal to the DIG, after the order of the
learned single Judge no further appeal by way of special
appeal before the Division Bench would lie. The materials
placed and in view of the fact that the order of the SSP
was considered and disposed of by the Appellate
Authority, i.e., DIG and also of the fact that the order
impugned in the writ petition was passed in exercise of
appellate jurisdiction in terms of The Uttar Pradesh
Subordinate Police Officers/Employees (Punishment and
Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Rules”), we concur with the conclusion arrived at by the
Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned order.
However, in view of the fact that this Court issued notice
in the special leave petition as early as on 20.11.2009,
after hearing the arguments of either side, we intend to
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consider the merits of the order of the learned single
Judge dated 17.09.2008.
About the Second Issue:-
The learned single Judge, without going into the merits of
the claim made by both the parties with reference to the
charge leveled against the delinquent, enquiry
proceedings, order of the SSP and DIG, quashed the order
of termination on the simple ground that the delinquent
was inflicted with two punishments which is not
permissible in law. In the second paragraph, the learned
single Judge after pointing out that due to illness of the
delinquent the Department has sanctioned his leave
without pay and thereafter his service has been
terminated for his absence which amounts to two
punishments for one charge and quashed the order of
termination. On going through the relevant rules, we are
of the view that the learned single Judge committed an
error in arriving at such a conclusion.
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9) Rule 4 of the Rules prescribes the mode of punishment
which reads as under:
“4. Punishment.—(a) The following punishments may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon a Police Officer, namely:--
(a) Major Penalties:-- (i) Dismissal from service (ii) Removal from service (iii) Reduction in rank including reduction to a lower-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale.
(b) Minor Penalties:-- (i) With-holding of promotion (ii) Fine not exceeding one month’s pay (iii) With-holding of increment, including stoppage at an efficiency bar. (iv) Censure
(2) In addition to the punishments mentioned in sub- rule (1) Head Constables and Constables may also be inflicted with the following punishments:--
(i) Confinement to quarters (this term includes confinement to Quarter Guard for a term not exceeding fifteen days extra guard or other duty). (ii) Punishment Drill not exceeding fifteen days. (iii) Extra guard duty not exceeding seven days. (iv) Deprivation of good conduct pay.
(3) In addition to the punishments mentioned in sub- rules (1) and (2) Constables may also be punished with Fatique duty, which shall be restricted to the following tasks:-
(i) Tent pitching; (ii) Drain digging; (iii) Cutting grass, cleaning jungle and picking stones from parade grounds;
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(iv) Repairing huts and butts and similar work in the lines; (v) Cleaning Arms.”
We are not concerned about other rules. The perusal of
major and minor penalties prescribed in the above Rule
makes it clear that “sanctioning leave without pay” is not
one of the punishments prescribed, though, and under
what circumstances leave has been sanctioned without
pay is a different aspect with which we are not concerned
for the present. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that
sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishment
prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose
appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the
Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor
penalties. Denial of salary on the ground of ‘no work no
pay’ cannot be treated as a penalty in view of statutory
provisions contained in Rule 4 defining the penalties in
clear terms. Rule 7 empowers the Government or any
Officer of the Police to award the punishment mentioned
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in Rule 4. Rule 8 provides for punishment of dismissal
and removal. Thus the punishment of dismissal from the
service is the punishment which has been awarded to the
Respondent in accordance with Rules 4 and 8 of the
Rules. There is no question of awarding two punishments
in respect of one charge.
10) Doctrine of double jeopardy enshrined in Article 20(2)
of the Constitution of India has no application in the event
of there being only one punishment awarded to the
respondent under the Rules on charges being proved
during the course of disciplinary enquiry. The law laid
down by this Court in the case of Union of India vs.
Datta Linga Toshatwad (2005) 13 SCC 709 and Maan
Singh vs. Union of India, (2003) 3 SCC 464 fully apply in
the facts and circumstances of the present case.
11) In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bakshish Singh, AIR
1999 SC 2626 = (1998) 8 SCC 222, this Court has dealt
with a case wherein the Trial Court as well as the First
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Appellate Court and the High Court had taken the view
that in case unauthorized absence from duty had been
regularized by treating the period of absence as leave
without pay, the charge of misconduct did not survive.
However, without examining the correctness of the said
legal proposition, this court allowed the appeal on other
issues. As the said judgment gave an impression that this
Court had laid down the law that once unauthorized
absence has been regularized, the misconduct would not
survive. The matter was referred to the larger bench in
Mann Singh’s case (supra) wherein this Court clarified
that the earlier judgment in Bakshish Singh (supra) did
not affirm the said legal proposition and after following the
judgment of this court in State of M.P. v. Hari Har
Gopal & Ors., (1969) 3 SLR 274 (SC) disposed of the case
clarifying that this court in Bakshish Singh (supra)
dealt with only on the issue of remand by the High Court
as well as by the Ist Appellate Court to the punishing
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authority for imposing the fresh punishment. This Court
held as under:
“Bakshish Singh’s case is not an authority for the proposition that the order terminating the employment cannot be sustained inasmuch as in the later part of the same order the Disciplinary Authority also regularized unauthorized absence from duty by granting an employee leave without pay.”
This Court further held that the law laid down by this
court in Hari Har Gopal (supra) wherein it had been held
that in absence of regularization of unauthorized absence
it may not be possible for the employer to continue with
the disciplinary proceedings as there would be break in
service and thus, regularization of such absence even
without pay is justified. It is so necessary to continue with
the disciplinary proceedings.
12) In such circumstances, the conclusion of the learned
single Judge that the delinquent had suffered two
punishments cannot be sustained. At present, we are not
inclined to go into the validity or otherwise of the order of
termination in this proceeding. Inasmuch as learned
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single Judge quashed the order of termination only on the
ground that it is impermissible to impose two
punishments, we set aside the order of the learned single
Judge dated 17.09.2008 and remit the matter to the
learned single Judge for fresh disposal. Both parties are
permitted to put forth their claim with regard to the
outcome of the charge, order of the original and appellate
authority for which we express no opinion and it is for the
learned single Judge to consider and dispose of the same
as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of
six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this
judgment. Civil Appeal is allowed to this extent with no
order as to costs.
...…………………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)
...…………………………………J. (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)
NEW DELHI; JANUARY 10, 2011.
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