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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.22-23  OF 2014    (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.)NOs.3810-3811 of 2012)

STATE OF TAMILNADU BY INS.OF POLICE VIGILANCE AND ANTI CORRUPTION … APPELLANT

VERSUS

N.SURESH RAJAN & ORS.    …RESPONDENTS

With  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.26-38 OF 2014

  (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.)NOs. 134-146 of 2013) STATE REP. BY DEPUTY SUPDT. OF POLICE VIGILANCE AND ANTI CORRUPTION … APPELLANT

VERSUS K.PONMUDI & ORS.     …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T  

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.22-23   OF 2014 (@SPECIAL  LEAVE PETITION(CRL.)Nos.3810-3811 of 2012)

The  State  of  Tamil  Nadu  aggrieved  by  the  

order dated 10th of December, 2010 passed by the

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Madras High Court in Criminal R.C.No.528 of 2009  

and Criminal M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2009, setting aside  

the order dated 25th of September, 2009 passed by  

the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Special  

Judge, Nagercoil (hereinafter referred to as ‘the  

Special Judge’), whereby he refused to discharge  

the  respondents,  has  preferred  these  special  

leave petitions.

Leave granted.

Short  facts  giving  rise  to  the  present  

appeals  are  that  Respondent  No.  1,  N.  Suresh  

Rajan,  during  the  period  from  13.05.1996  to  

14.05.2001,  was  a  Member  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  

Legislative Assembly as also a State Minister of  

Tourism.  Respondent No. 2, K. Neelkanda Pillai  

is his father and Respondent No. 3, R.Rajam, his  

mother.  On the basis of an information that N.  

Suresh Rajan, during his tenure as the Minister  

of Tourism, had acquired and was in possession of  

pecuniary  resources  and  properties  in  his  name  

and  in  the  names  of  his  father  and  mother,  

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disproportionate to his known sources of income,  

Crime No. 7 of 2002 was registered at Kanyakumari  

Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department on 14th  

of  March,  2002  against  the  Minister  N.  Suresh  

Rajan, his father, mother, elder sister and his  

bother-in-law.  During  the  course  of  the  

investigation,  the  investigating  officer  

collected and gathered informations with regard  

to  the  property  and  pecuniary  resources  in  

possession of N. Suresh Rajan during his tenure  

as the Minister, in his name and in the name of  

others.   On  computation  of  the  income  of  the  

Minister  from  his  known  sources  and  also  

expenditure incurred by him, it was found that  

the  properties  owned  and  possessed  by  him  are  

disproportionate to his known sources of income  

to  the  tune  of  Rs.  23,77,950.94.   The  

investigating  officer  not  only  examined  the  

accused Minister but also his father and mother  

as  also  his  sister  and  the  brother-in-law.  

Ultimately, the investigating agency came to the  

conclusion  that  during  the  check  period,  

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Respondent No.1, N. Suresh Rajan has acquired and  

was  in  possession  of  pecuniary  resources  and  

properties in his name and in the names of his  

father, K. Neelakanda Pillai (Respondent No. 2)  

and mother R. Rajam (Respondent No. 3) and his  

wife  D.S.  Bharathi  for  total  value  of  Rs.  

17,58,412.47. The investigating officer also came  

to  the  conclusion  that  Minister’s  father  and  

mother never had any independent source of income  

commensurate  with  the  property  and  pecuniary  

resources  found  acquired  in  their  names.  

Accordingly, the investigating officer submitted  

the charge-sheet dated 4th of July, 2003 against  

Respondent  No.1,  the  Minister  and  his  father  

(Respondent  No.2)  and  mother  (Respondent  No.3)  

respectively, alleging commission of an offence  

under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and  

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the  

Prevention of Corruption Act.  Respondents filed  

application  dated  5th of  December,  2003  under  

Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1973  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Code’),  

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seeking their discharge.  The Special Judge, by  

its order dated 25th of September, 2009 rejected  

their prayer.  While doing so, the Special Judge  

observed as follows:

“At  this  stage  it  will  be  premature to say that there are  no  sufficient  materials  on  the  side of the state to frame any  charge against them and the same  would not be according to law in  the opinion of this court and at  the same time this court has come  to  know  that  there  are  basic  materials  for  the  purpose  of  framing  charges  against  the  3  petitioners,  the  petition  filed  by  the  petitioners  is  dismissed  and  orders  passed  to  that  effect.”

Aggrieved  by  the  same,  respondents  filed  

criminal  revision  before  the  High  Court.   The  

High Court by the impugned judgment had set aside  

the order of the Special Judge and discharged the  

respondents on its finding that in the absence of  

any  material  to  show  that  money  passed  from  

respondent No. 1 to his mother and father, latter  

cannot  be said  to be  holding the  property and  

resources in their names on behalf of their son.  

The High Court while passing the impugned order  

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heavily  relied  on  its  earlier  judgment  in  the  

case of State by Deputy Superintendent of Police,  Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  Cuddalore  Detachment v. K. Ponumudi & Ors. (2007-1MLJ-CRL.- 100),  the  validity  whereof  is  also  under  consideration in the connected appeals.  The High  

Court  while  allowing  the  criminal  revision  

observed as follows:

“12.In  the  instant  case,  the  properties  standing  in  the  name  of  the  petitioners  2  and  3  namely, A2 and A3 could not be  held  to  be  the  properties  or  resources  belonging  to  the  1st  accused  in  the  absence  of  any  investigation into the individual  income  resources  of  A2  and  A3.  Moreover, it is not disputed that  A2  was  a  retired  Head  Master  receiving  pension  and  A3  is  running  a  Financial  Institution  and an Income Tax assessee.  In  the  absence  of  any  material  to  show  that  A1’s  money  flow  into  the  hands  of  A2  and  A3,  they  cannot be said to be holding the  properties and resources in their  name  on  behalf  of  the  first  accused.   There  is  also  no  material to show that A2 and A3  instigated  A1  to  acquire  properties  and  resources  disproportionate  to  his  known  source of income.”

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It  is  in  these  circumstances  that  the  

appellant is before us.   

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.26-38   OF 2014      (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.)Nos. 134-146 of 2013)

These special leave petitions are barred by  

limitation.   There  is  delay  of  1954  days  in  

filing the petitions and 217 days in refiling the  

same.  Applications have been filed for condoning  

the  delay  in  filing  and  refiling  the  special  

leave petitions.

Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for  

the petitioner submits that the delay in filing  

the special leave petitions has occurred as the  

Public Prosecutor earlier gave an opinion that it  

is  not  a  fit  case  in  which  special  leave  

petitions deserve to be filed.  The Government  

accepted the opinion and decided not to file the  

special leave petitions.  It is pointed out that  

the very Government in which one of the accused  

was a Minister had taken the aforesaid decision  

not to file special leave petitions.   However,  

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after the change of the Government, opinion was  

sought from the Advocate General, who opined that  

it  is  fit  case  in  which  the  order  impugned  

deserves to be challenged.  Accordingly, it is  

submitted that the cause shown is sufficient to  

condone the delay.  

Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel  

appearing for the respondents, however, submits  

that  mere  change  of  Government  would  not  be  

sufficient to condone the inordinate delay.  He  

submits that with the change of the Government,  

many issues which have attained finality would be  

reopened after long delay, which should not be  

allowed.  According to him, condonation of huge  

delay  on  the  ground  that  the  successor  

Government,  which  belongs  to  a  different  

political party, had taken the decision to file  

the special leave petitions would be setting a  

very  dangerous  precedent  and  it  would  lead  to  

miscarriage of justice.  He emphasizes that there  

is  a  life  span  for  every  legal  remedy  and  

condonation of delay is an exception.  Reliance  

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has been placed on a decision of this Court in  

the case of  Postmaster General v. Living Media  

India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563,  and our attention  has been drawn to Paragraph 29 of the judgment,  

which reads as follows:

“29. In our view, it is the right  time to inform all the government  bodies,  their  agencies  and  instrumentalities that unless they  have  reasonable  and  acceptable  explanation  for  the  delay  and  there was bona fide effort, there  is  no  need  to  accept  the  usual  explanation that the file was kept  pending  for  several  months/years  due  to  considerable  degree  of  procedural  red  tape  in  the  process.  The  government  departments  are  under  a  special  obligation  to  ensure  that  they  perform  their  duties  with  diligence  and  commitment.  Condonation  of  delay  is  an  exception and should not be used  as an anticipated benefit for the  government  departments.  The  law  shelters everyone under the same  light  and  should  not  be  swirled  for the benefit of a few.”

Mr.  Sorabjee  further  submits  that  the  

Limitation  Act  does  not  provide  for  different  

period  of  limitation  for  the  Government  in  

resorting to the remedy provided under the law  

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and the case in hand being not a case of fraud or  

collusion  by  its  officers  or  agents,  the  huge  

delay is not fit to be condoned.  Reliance has  

also been placed on a decision of this Court in  

the  case  of  Pundlik  Jalam  Patil  v.  Executive  

Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC  

448  and reference has been made to Paragraph 31  

of the judgment, which reads as follows:

“31. It  is  true  that  when  the  State  and  its  instrumentalities  are  the  applicants  seeking  condonation of delay they may be  entitled  to  certain  amount  of  latitude but the law of limitation  is  same  for  citizen  and  for  governmental  authorities.  The  Limitation  Act  does  not  provide  for  a  different  period  to  the  Government  in  filing  appeals  or  applications as such. It would be  a  different  matter  where  the  Government makes out a case where  public interest was shown to have  suffered owing to acts of fraud or  collusion  on  the  part  of  its  officers or agents and where the  officers  were  clearly  at  cross  purposes with it. In a given case  if any such facts are pleaded or  proved  they  cannot  be  excluded  from  consideration  and  those  factors may go into the judicial  verdict. In the present case, no  such facts are pleaded and proved  though  a  feeble  attempt  by  the  learned counsel for the respondent  

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was made to suggest collusion and  fraud  but  without  any  basis.  We  cannot  entertain  the  submission  made across the Bar without there  being any proper foundation in the  pleadings.”

The contentions put forth by Mr. Sorabjee are  

weighty,  deserving  thoughtful  consideration  and  

at one point of time we were inclined to reject  

the applications filed for condonation of delay  

and  dismiss  the  special  leave  petitions.  

However,  on a  second thought  we find  that the  

validity of the order impugned in these special  

leave petitions has to be gone into in criminal  

appeals  arising  out  of  Special  Leave  Petitions  

(Criminal) Nos. 3810-3811 of 2012 and in the face  

of  it,  it  shall  be  unwise  to  dismiss  these  

special  leave  petitions  on  the  ground  of  

limitation.  It is worth mentioning here that the  

order  impugned  in  the  criminal  appeals  arising  

out  of  Special  Leave  Petition  (Criminal)  Nos.  

3810-3811 of 2012, State of Tamil Nadu by Ins. of  Police,  Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  v.  N.  Suresh Rajan & Ors., has been mainly rendered,  

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relying  on  the  decision  in  State  by  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,  Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  Cuddalore  Detachment  vs.  K.  Ponmudi  and  Ors.(2007-1MLJ-CRL.-100),  which  is  impugned  in the present special leave petitions.  In fact,  

by  order  dated  3rd of  January,  2013,  these  

petitions were directed to be heard along with  

the aforesaid special leave petitions.  In such  

circumstances, we condone the delay in filing and  

refiling the special leave petitions.

In these petitions the State of Tamil Nadu  

impugns  the  order  dated  11th of  August,  2006  

passed  by  the  Madras  High  Court  whereby  the  

revision  petitions  filed  against  the  order  of  

discharge dated 21st of July, 2004 passed by the  

Special  Judge/Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  

Villupuram  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  

Special  Judge’), in  the Special  Case No.  7 of  

2003, have been dismissed.

Leave granted.

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Shorn  of  unnecessary  details,  facts  giving  

rise to the present appeals are that K. Ponumudi,  

respondent No. 1 herein, happened to be a Member  

of  the  State  Legislative  Assembly  and  a  State  

Minister in the Tamil Nadu Government during the  

check period. P. Visalakshi Ponmudi (Respondent  

No.2)  is  his  wife,  whereas  P.Saraswathi  

(Respondent  No.3)  (since  deceased)  was  his  

mother-in-law.   A.Manivannan  (Respondent  No.4)  

and  A.Nandagopal  (Respondent  No.5)  (since  

deceased)  are  the  friends  of  the  Minister  

(Respondent No.1).  Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 during  

their  lifetime  were  trustees  of  one  Siga  

Educational Trust, Villupuram.

In the present appeals, we have to examine  

the validity of the order of discharge passed by  

the Special Judge as affirmed by the High Court.  

Hence, we consider it unnecessary to go into the  

details  of the  case of  the prosecution  or the  

defence of the respondent at this stage.  Suffice  

it to say that, according to the prosecution, K.  

Ponmudi  (Respondent  No.1),  as  a  Minister  of  

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Transport  and  a  Member  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  

Legislative  Assembly  during  the  period  from  

13.05.1996 to 30.09.2001, had acquired and was in  

possession of pecuniary resources and properties  

in his name and in the names of his wife and  

sons,  which  were  disproportionate  to  his  known  

sources of income.  Accordingly, Crime No. 4 of  

2002 was registered at Cuddalore Village, Anti- Corruption Department on 14th of March, 2002 under  

Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code read with  

Section  13(2)  and  Section  13(1)(e)  of  the  

Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  hereinafter  

referred to as ‘the Act’.  During the course of  

investigation  it  transpired  that  between  the  

period  from  13.05.1996  to  31.03.2002,  the  

Minister had acquired and possessed properties at  

Mathirimangalam,  Kaspakaranai,  Kappiampuliyur  

villages and other places in Villupuram Taluk, at  

Vittalapuram  village  and  other  places  in  

Thindivanam Taluk, at Cuddalore and Pondicherry  

Towns, at Chennai and Trichy cities and at other  

places.   It  is  alleged  that  respondent  No.1-

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Minister  being  a  public  servant  committed  the  

offence of criminal misconduct by acquiring and  

being  in  possession  of  pecuniary  resources  and  

properties in his name and in the names of his  

wife, mother-in-law and also in the name of Siga  

Educational Trust, held by the other respondents  

on  behalf  of  Respondent  No.  1,  the  Minister,  

which were disproportionate to his known sources  

of  income  to  the  extent  of  Rs.3,08,35,066.97.  

According  to  the  prosecution,  he  could  not  

satisfactorily account for the assets and in this  

way,  the  Minister  had  committed  the  offence  

punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section  

13(1)(e) of the Act.

In  the  course  of  investigation,  it  further  

transpired that during the check period and in  

the  places  stated  above,  other  accused  abetted  

the Minister in the commission of the offence by  

him.  Respondent No. 2, the wife of the Minister,  

aided in commission of the offence by holding on  

his  behalf  a  substantial  portion  of  properties  

and pecuniary resources in her name as well as in  

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the name of M/s. Visal Expo, of which she was the  

sole  Proprietor.   Similarly,  Respondent  No.  3,  

the mother-in-law, aided the Minister by holding  

on his behalf a substantial portion of properties  

and pecuniary resources in her name as well as in  

the name of Siga Educational Trust by purporting  

to be one of its Trustees.  Similarly, Respondent  

No. 4 and Respondent No. 5 aided the Minister and  

held on his behalf a substantial portion of the  

properties and pecuniary resources in the name of  

Siga Educational Trust by purporting to be its  

Trustees.  It is relevant here to mention that  

during the course of investigation, the statement  

of  all  other  accused  were  taken  and  in  the  

opinion  of  the  investigating  agency,  after  due  

scrutiny  of  their  statements  and  further  

verification,  the  Minister  was  not  able  to  

satisfactorily  account  for  the  quantum  of  

disproportionate  assets.   Accordingly,  the  

Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department of the  

State  Government  submitted  charge-sheet  against  

the respondents under Section 109 of the Indian  

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Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section  

13(1)(e) of the Act.

It  is  relevant  here  to  state  that  the  

offences punishable under the scheme of the Act  

have to be tried by a Special Judge and he may  

take cognizance of the offence without commitment  

of the accused and the Judge trying the accused  

is required to follow the procedure prescribed by  

the Code for the trial of warrant cases by the  

Magistrate.  The Special Judge holding the trial  

is  deemed  to  be  a  Court  of  Sessions.   The  

respondents  filed  petition  for  discharge  under  

Section  239  of  the  Code  inter  alia  contending  

that  the  system  which  the  prosecution  had  

followed to ascertain the income of the accused  

is wrong.  Initially, the check period was from  

10.05.1996  to  13.09.2001  which,  during  the  

investigation,  was  enlarged  from  13.05.1996  to  

31.03.2002.   Not  only  this,  according  to  the  

accused,  the  income  was  undervalued  and  the  

expenditures  exaggerated.   According  to  

Respondent  No.  1,  the  Minister,  income  of  the  

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individual property of his wife and that of his  

mother-in-law and their expenditure ought not to  

have been shown as his property.  According to  

him, the allegation that the properties in their  

names are his benami properties is wrong.  It was  

also  contended  that  the  valuation  of  the  

properties  has  been  arrived  at  without  taking  

into  consideration  the  entire  income  and  

expenditure  of  Respondent  No.  1.   Respondents  

have also alleged that the investigating officer,  

who  is  the  informant  of  the  case,  had  acted  

autocratically  and  his  action  is  vitiated  by  

bias.   The  Special  Judge  examined  all  these  

contentions and by order dated 21st of July, 2004  

discharged  Respondents  on  its  finding  that  the  

investigation  was  not  conducted  properly.   The  

Special Judge further held that the value of the  

property of Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 ought not to  

have  been  clubbed  with  that  of  the  individual  

properties and income of Respondent No. 1 and by  

doing so, the assets of Respondent No. 1 cannot  

be  said  to  be  disproportionate  to  his  known  

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sources of income.  On the aforesaid finding the  

Special  Judge  discharged  all  the  accused.  

Aggrieved by the same, the State of Tamil Nadu  

filed  separate  revision  petitions  and  the  High  

Court, by the impugned order, has dismissed all  

the revision petitions.  The High Court, while  

affirming the order of discharge, held that the  

prosecution  committed  an  error  by  adding  the  

income  of  other  respondents,  who  were  assessed  

under  the  Income  Tax  Act,  in  the  income  of  

Respondent  No.1.   In  the  opinion  of  the  High  

Court,  an  independent  and  unbiased  scrutiny  of  

the  entire  documents  furnished  along  with  the  

final  report would  not make  out any  ground of  

framing  of  charges  against  any  of  the  accused  

persons.   While  doing  so,  the  High  Court  has  

observed as follows:

“18. The assets which admittedly,  do not belong to Accused 1 and  owned  by  individuals  having  independent  source  of  income  which  are  assessed  under  the  Income Tax Act, were added as the  assets  of  Accused  -1.   Such  a  procedure  adopted  by  the  prosecution  is  not  only  unsustainable  but  also  illegal.  

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An  independent  and  unbiased  scrutiny of the entire documents  furnished  along  with  the  final  report  would  not  make  out  any  ground for framing of charge as  against  any  of  the  accused  persons.  The methodology adopted  by  the  prosecution  to  establish  the disproportionate assets with  reference to the known source of  income is absolutely erroneous.

xxx xxx xxx The theory of Benami is totally  alien to the concept of trust and  it is not legally sustainable to  array  the  accused  3  to  5  as  holders of the properties or that  they  are  the  benamies  of  the  accused.  The  benami  transaction  has  to  be  proved  by  the  prosecution by producing legally  permissible  materials  of  a  bona  fide  character  which  would  directly prove the fact of benami  and  there  is  a  total  lack  of  materials  on  this  account  and  hence  the  theory  of  benami  has  not  been  established  even  remotely  by  any  evidence.  On  a  prima-facie  evidence  it  is  evident  that  the  other  accused  are possessed of sufficient funds  for  acquiring  their  properties  and  that  A1  has  nothing  to  do  with those properties and that he  cannot be called upon to explain  the  source  of  income  of  the  acquisition  made  by  other  persons.  19……… Admittedly the accused are  not  possessed  of  the  properties  standing in the name of Trust and  

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controlled by the Accused A3 to  A5. The trust is an independent  legal  entity  assessed  to  income  tax  and  owning  the  properties.  Only to boost the value of the  assets the prosecution belatedly  arrayed the Trustees of the Trust  as  accused  3  to  5  in  order  to  foist a false case as against A1.

xxx xxx xxx 21………All the properties acquired  by A2 and A3 in their individual  capacity  acquired  out  of  their  own income have been shown in the  Income  Tax  Returns,  which  fact  the  prosecution  also  knows  and  also available in the records of  the prosecution. The prosecution  has no justification or reason to  disregard  those  income  tax  returns  to  disallow  such  income  while  filing  the  final  report.  The  documents  now  available  on  record  also  would  clearly  disprove  the  claim  of  benami  transaction.”

The  High  court  ultimately  concluded  as  

follows:

“24…………Therefore, the trial court  analyzing  the  materials  and  documents  that  were  made  available at the stage of framing  charges and on their face value  arrived  at  the  right  conclusion  that charges could not be framed  against the respondents/accused.”

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Now we proceed to consider the legal position  

concerning the issue of discharge and validity of  

the  orders  impugned  in  these  appeals  in  the  

background  thereof.   Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar  submits  

that  the  order  impugned  suffers  from  patent  

illegality.  He points out that at the time of  

framing of the charge the scope is limited and  

what is to be seen at this stage is as to whether  

on examination of the materials and the documents  

collected,  the  charge  can  be  said  to  be  

groundless  or  not.   He  submits  that  at  this  

stage, the court cannot appraise the evidence as  

is done at the time of trial.  He points out that  

while passing the impugned orders, the evidence  

has  been  appraised  and  the  case  of  the  

prosecution has been rejected, as is done after  

the trial while acquitting the accused.   

Mr.  Sorabjee  as  also  Mr.  N.V.  Ganesh  

appearing on behalf of the respondents-accused,  

however, submit that when the court considers the  

applications for discharge, it has to examine the  

materials for the purpose of finding out as to  

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whether the allegation made is groundless or not.  

They submit that at the time of consideration of  

an  application  for  discharge,  nothing  prevents  

the court to sift and weigh the evidence for the  

purpose  of  ascertaining  as  to  whether  the  

allegations made on the basis of the materials  

and  the  documents  collected  are  groundless  or  

not.   They  also  contend  that  the  court  while  

considering such an application cannot act merely  

as  a  post-office  or  a  mouthpiece  of  the  

prosecution.   In  support  of  the  submission,  

reliance has been placed on a decision of this  

Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010)  

9 SCC 368  and our attention has been drawn to  

Paragraph 17(4) of the judgment, which reads as  

follows:

“17. In  Union  of  India  v.  Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., 1979  (3) SCC 4,  the scope of Section  227  CrPC  was  considered.  After  adverting  to  various  decisions,  this  Court  has  enumerated  the  following principles:  

xxx xxx xxx

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(4)  That  in  exercising  his  jurisdiction under Section 227 of  the  Code  the  Judge  which  under  the present Code is a senior and  experienced  court  cannot  act  merely  as  a  post  office  or  a  mouthpiece  of  the  prosecution,  but  has  to  consider  the  broad  probabilities  of  the  case,  the  total effect of the evidence and  the documents produced before the  court,  any  basic  infirmities  appearing in the case and so on.  This however does not mean that  the  Judge  should  make  a  roving  enquiry into the pros and cons of  the matter and weigh the evidence  as if he was conducting a trial.”

Yet  another  decision  on  which  reliance  has  

been placed is the decision of this Court in the  

case  of  Dilawar  Balu  Kurane  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra,  (2002)  2  SCC  135,  reference  has  been made to the following paragraph of the said  

judgment:

“12. Now  the  next  question  is  whether  a  prima  facie  case  has  been  made  out  against  the  appellant.  In  exercising  powers  under Section 227 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  the  settled  position of law is that the Judge  while considering the question of  framing  the  charges  under  the  said  section  has  the  undoubted  power  to  sift  and  weigh  the  

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evidence for the limited purpose  of finding out whether or not a  prima  facie  case  against  the  accused has been made out; where  the  materials  placed  before  the  court  disclose  grave  suspicion  against the accused which has not  been properly explained the court  will  be  fully  justified  in  framing  a  charge  and  proceeding  with the trial; by and large if  two  views  are  equally  possible  and the Judge is satisfied that  the evidence produced before him  while  giving  rise  to  some  suspicion but not grave suspicion  against the accused, he will be  fully justified to discharge the  accused,  and  in  exercising  jurisdiction under Section 227 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  the Judge cannot act merely as a  post  office  or  a  mouthpiece  of  the  prosecution,  but  has  to  consider the broad probabilities  of the case, the total effect of  the  evidence  and  the  documents  produced  before  the  court  but  should not make a roving enquiry  into  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  matter and weigh the evidence as  if he was conducting a trial.”

We  have  bestowed  our  consideration  to  the  

rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr.  

Ranjit Kumar commend us.  True it is that at the  

time  of  consideration  of  the  applications  for  

discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece  

of the prosecution or act as a post-office and  

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may sift evidence in order to find out whether or  

not the allegations made are groundless so as to  

pass an order of discharge.  It is trite that at  

the stage of consideration of an application for  

discharge,  the  court  has  to  proceed  with  an  

assumption that the materials brought on record  

by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said  

materials and documents with a view to find out  

whether  the  facts  emerging  therefrom  taken  at  

their face value disclose the existence of all  

the ingredients constituting the alleged offence.  

At this stage, probative value of the materials  

has to be gone into and the court is not expected  

to  go  deep  into  the  matter  and  hold  that  the  

materials would not warrant a conviction.  In our  

opinion, what needs to be considered is whether  

there is a ground for presuming that the offence  

has been committed and not whether a ground for  

convicting the accused has been made out.  To put  

it  differently,  if  the  court  thinks  that  the  

accused might have committed the offence on the  

basis of the materials on record on its probative  

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value,  it  can  frame  the  charge;  though  for  

conviction,  the  court  has  to  come  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  accused  has  committed  the  

offence.  The law does not permit a mini trial at  

this stage.  Reference in this connection can be  

made to a recent decision of this Court in the  

case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors. vs. State of  Uttar Pradesh & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 52, in which,  after analyzing various decisions on the point,  

this Court endorsed the following view taken in  

Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008)  2 SCC 561:

“11.  It  is  trite  that  at  the  stage  of  framing  of  charge  the  court is required to evaluate the  material and documents on record  with a view to finding out if the  facts emerging there from, taken  at  their  face  value,  disclosed  the  existence  of  all  the  ingredients  constituting  the  alleged offence.  At that stage,  the court is not expected to go  deep into the probative value of  the  material  on  record.  What  needs to be considered is whether  there is a ground for presuming  that  the  offence  has  been  committed  and  not  a  ground  for  convicting  the  accused  has  been  made  out.  At  that  stage,  even  strong  suspicion  founded  on  

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material which leads the court to  form a presumptive opinion as to  the  existence  of  the  factual  ingredients  constituting  the  offence alleged would justify the  framing  of  charge  against  the  accused  in  respect  of  the  commission of that offence."

Now reverting to the decisions of this Court  

in the case Sajjan Kumar (supra) and Dilawar Balu  

Kurane (supra), relied on by the respondents, we  

are of the opinion that they do not advance their  

case.   The  aforesaid  decisions  consider  the  

provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it  

clear that at the stage of discharge the Court  

can not make a roving enquiry into the pros and  

cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if  

it  was  conducting  a  trial.   It  is  worth  

mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge  

of  the accused  by the  Court of  Sessions under  

Section  227  in  a  case  triable  by  it;  cases  

instituted upon a police report are covered by  

Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than  

on a police report are dealt with in Section 245.  

From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is  

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evident  that  they  contain  somewhat  different  

provisions  with  regard  to  discharge  of  an  

accused.   Under  Section  227  of  the  Code,  the  

trial court is required to discharge the accused  

if  it  “considers  that  there  is  not  sufficient  

ground  for  proceeding  against  the  accused”.  

However,  discharge  under  Section  239  can  be  

ordered when “the Magistrate considers the charge  

against the accused to be groundless”.  The power  

to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1)  

when, “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to  

be recorded that no case against the accused has  

been  made  out  which,  if  not  repudiated,  would  

warrant  his  conviction”.   Section  227  and  239  

provide  for  discharge  before  the  recording  of  

evidence on the basis of the police report, the  

documents sent along with it and examination of  

the accused after giving an opportunity to the  

parties  to  be  heard.   However,  the  stage  of  

discharge under Section 245, on the other hand,  

is reached only after the evidence referred in  

Section  244  has  been  taken.   Thus,  there  is  

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difference  in  the  language  employed  in  these  

provisions.  But, in our opinion, notwithstanding  

these differences, and whichever provision may be  

applicable, the court is required at this stage  

to  see  that  there  is  a  prima  facie  case  for  

proceeding  against  the  accused.   Reference  in  

this connection can be made to a judgment of this  

Court in the case of R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay,  

(1986) 2 SCC 716.  The same reads as follows:

“43………………Notwithstanding  this  difference in the position there  is no scope for doubt that the  stage at which the magistrate is  required to consider the question  of  framing  of  charge  under  Section  245(1)  is  a  preliminary  one and the test of “prima facie”  case has to be applied. In spite  of the difference in the language  of the three sections, the legal  position  is  that  if  the  Trial  court is satisfied that a prima  facie  case  is  made  out,  charge  has to be framed.”

Bearing in mind the principles aforesaid, we  

proceed  to  consider  the  facts  of  the  present  

case.  Here the allegation against the accused  

Minister  (Respondent  No.1),  K.  Ponmudi  is  that  

while  he  was  a  Member  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  

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Legislative Assembly and a State Minister, he had  

acquired and was in possession of the properties  

in the name of his wife as also his mother-in-

law, who along with his other friends, were of  

Siga Educational Trust, Villupuram.  According to  

the  prosecution,  the  properties  of  Siga  

Educational Trust, Villupuram were held by other  

accused on behalf of the accused Minister.  These  

properties,  according  to  the  prosecution,  in  

fact,  were  the  properties  of  K.Ponumudi.  

Similarly, accused N. Suresh Rajan has acquired  

properties disproportionate to his known sources  

of income in the names of his father and mother.  

While passing the order of discharge, the fact  

that  the  accused  other  than  the  two  Ministers  

have been assessed to income tax and paid income  

tax  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  discharge  the  

accused  persons  particularly  in  view  of  the  

allegation made by the prosecution that there was  

no separate income to amass such huge properties.  

The  property  in  the  name  of  an  income  tax  

assessee itself cannot be a ground to hold that  

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it actually belongs to such an assessee. In case  

this proposition is accepted, in our opinion, it  

will  lead  to  disastrous  consequences.  It  will  

give opportunity to the corrupt public servants  

to amass property in the name of known persons,  

pay income tax on their behalf and then be out  

from  the  mischief  of  law.   While  passing  the  

impugned  orders,  the  court  has  not  sifted  the  

materials for the purpose of finding out whether  

or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding  

against  the  accused  but  whether  that  would  

warrant a conviction.  We are of the opinion that  

this  was not  the stage  where the  court should  

have  appraised  the  evidence  and  discharged  the  

accused  as  if  it  was  passing  an  order  of  

acquittal.   Further,  defect  in  investigation  

itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our  

opinion,  the  order  impugned  suffers  from  grave  

error and calls for rectification.  

 Any observation made by us in this judgment  

is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals  

and  shall  have  no  bearing  on  the  trial.  The  

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surviving  respondents  are  directed  to  appear  

before the respective courts on 3rd of February,  

2014.   The  Court shall  proceed with  the trial  

from the stage of charge in accordance with law  

and  make  endeavour  to  dispose  of  the  same  

expeditiously.

In the result, we allow these appeals and set  

aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid  

observation.  

    ………………..……………………………….J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

               ………………….……………………………………… J.

(M.Y. EQBAL) NEW DELHI, JANUARY 06, 2014.

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