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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2018 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9278 of 2012]

State of Rajasthan .. Appellant

Versus

Shambhu Kewat and Another .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Respondents  herein  were  charge-sheeted  for  the  

offences  punishable  under  Sections  307,  323,  325,  427  

read  with  Section  34  IPC.   They  were  tried  before  the  

Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track No. 1, Kota,  

Rajasthan.  From the side of the prosecution, PWs 1 to 5  

were examined and Exh. P1- P12 were produced.  From  

the  side  of  defence,  second  accused  was  examined  as

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DW1.   The Sessions Court, after hearing the parties and  

considering the oral and documentary evidence, found the  

accused persons guilty  of  the  offence punishable  under  

Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC, but acquitted them  

of the rest of the charges, vide its order dated 9.7.2009.  

Later, the accused persons were heard on sentence, and  

they   stated that they are not habitual criminals and are  

aged  26  and  28  years,  respectively.   Further,  it  was  

pointed out that they are poor labourers married and have  

children.  Further, it was also pointed out that the injuries  

were  caused  due  to  sudden  provocation,  and  were  not  

pre-meditated.     After  hearing  the  accused  and  the  

prosecution,  the  trial  Court,  on  sentence,  passed  the  

following order:

“Heard both the parties.  On the basis of the above  arguments,  perused  the  case  file.   Though  no  criminal  record  has  been  produced  by  the  Prosecution  against  the  accused,  nor  has  any  arguments  about  the  habitual  criminal,  however,  from the evidence came on file, this fact has been  established that accused Banwari and Shambhu had  been  taking  the  goods  on  credit  from  the  complainant  Abdul  Rashid,  also  on  the  day  of  incident, had come to take goods on credit and due  to  arrears  of  money,  he  had  refused  to  give  the  goods on credit.   Then they again came back at the  place of incident.  Thereafter about 10 minutes both  came with iron rod and a strip of iron like sword in a

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planned  manner,  and  both  together  made  a  murderous attack on Abdul Rashid.  By causing fatal  injury on the head after fracture of piece of bone of  head of  Abdul  Rashid,  went  inside the brain.   The  doctor  performed  the  surgery  and  taken  out.  Thereafter  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  accused  has  injured  in  ignorance,  suddenly  on  instigation  and  cause  the  said  injury  to  Abdul  Rashid  and  for  committing the act by them, they have no intention  or  purpose  for  committing  such  act.   Case  under  Section 307 IPC has been proved against the accused  beyond  doubt.   Therefore  in  this  situation  lenient  view cannot be adopted against the accused.  The  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  has  shown  this  intent  in  several  cases  that  if  the  leniency  is  given  to  the  accused, then the criminal people in the society will  be encouraged.  The accused had without any reason  has injured the complainant sitting in his shop.  This  has been witnessed by other people of the society  sitting  in  shop.   Adopting  lenient  view  with  the  accused, faith of the other people of the society will  go  from  justice.   In  such  situation,  as  per  the  direction given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,  the  accused are punished as under:

ORDER OF SENTENCE: Therefore  accused  Shambhu  son  of  Babu  Lal  and  accused Banwari lal son of Babu Lal Kevat, residents  of  Iqbal  Chowk,  Sakatpura,  Kota  are  declared  acquitted from the charge under Section 427 IPC and  both the accused are convicted and are sentenced  for 10-10 (Ten-Ten) years rigorous imprisonment and  fine of  Rs.5000-5000/-  (Rupees five thousand only)  for the charge under Section 307 read with Section  34 IPC.   In the event of committing default in the  payment  of  fine  will  face  additional  simple  imprisonment  of  3-3  months.   The  period  spent  in  police/judicial  custody  by  the  accused  will  be  adjusted in the period of original sentence under the  provision  of  Section  428  Cr.P.C.     Warrant  of  sentence  be prepared.   Recovered property  in  the  case,  iron  road  and  strip  of  iron  like  sword  be  destroyed after expiry of limitation of appeal as per

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directions.  Copy of the judgment be supplied to the  accused free of cost.”

3. Aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence, the  

accused  persons  approached  the  High  Court  by  filing  S.B.  

Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 2009.   When the appeal came up  

for hearing, on 16.11.2011, the complainant, Abdul Rashid who  

was present in the court,    stated that  he and the accused  

persons  had entered into  a  compromise and,  based on that  

compromise, he had received the compensation amount from  

the  accused  persons  for  the  injuries  caused  to  him.  

Consequently, it was pointed out that he did not wish to pursue  

the appeal.   Learned counsel  appearing  for  the complainant  

submitted  before  the  High  Court  that  since  the  parties  had  

buried  the  differences  and  since  offence  committed  was  

‘against  an  individual’,  rather  than  ‘against  the  State’,  no  

fruitful  purpose  would  be  served  by  keeping  the  accused  

persons behind the bars, and hence, it was requested that the  

case be compounded and the appeal be allowed.  

4. We have examined the reasons stated by the High Court  

for acceding to  that  request.   The High Court  examined the  

scope of Sections 482 and 320 CrPC and expressed the view  

that  there  are  certain  similarities  and  differences  between

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compounding and quashing a case on the basis of compromise  

and  hence,  quashing  of  a  criminal  proceeding  upon  a  

compromise is well within the discretionary power of the Court.  

It also opined that while the power under Section 320 CrPC is  

cribbed, cabined and confined, the power under Section 482  

CrPC is  vast,  unparallel  and paramount.    On facts the High  

Court opined that it was a case where the fight between the  

parties had occurred on the spur and heat of the moment and  

the assault  was  more a crime ‘against  an individual’,  rather  

than ‘against the society at large’.    The High Court held as  

follows:

“In the present case, the fight occurred at the spur  of  the  moment  in  the  heat  of  the  moment.  According to the prosecution,  both the sides were  verbally fighting when alleged, the appellants struck  Abdul Rashid (PW-3).  The assault was more a crime  against  an  individual  than  against  the  society  at  large.   Admittedly,  both  the  parties  have  entered  into  a  compromise.   They  have  resolved  their  differences.   Thus,  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  justice to allow the appeal.”

5. The High Court felt that since the parties had entered into  

a compromise and resolved their disputes and differences,  it  

would  be  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  allow  the  appeal.  

Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the accused persons  

were acquitted of the offence under Sections 307 read with 34  

IPC.  Aggrieved by the same, this appeal has been preferred.

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6. Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that  

the High Court has completely misread and misunderstood the  

various principles laid down by this  Court in  Gian Singh v.  

State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 SCC regarding the  

scope and ambit of Sections 482 and 320 CrPC as well as the  

powers  conferred  on  the  criminal  Court  to  quash  criminal  

proceedings involved in a non-compoundable offence, in view  

of the compromise arrived at between the parties.  The various  

guidelines  laid  down  by  this  Court  were  also  overlooked.  

Learned counsel also submitted that the High Court has also  

committed an error in holding that the offence which has been  

proved  was  merely  an  offence  against  an  individual,  rather  

than against the State.   Learned counsel submitted that the  

Sessions Court had correctly noticed the nature of injuries and  

rightly came to the conclusion that the accused had committed  

injuries  not  due  to  sudden  provocation,  but  it  was  a  

premeditated  incident  and  that  the  trial  Court  has  rightly  

awarded the sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for  

the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.  

7. Learned counsel  appearing  for  the respondents,  on the  

other  hand,  contended  that  the  parties  had  entered  into  a  

compromise and, on the basis of the compromise, the accused

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persons paid a substantial amount to the complainant for the  

injuries  caused  to  him and  taking  note  of  the  fact  that  the  

alleged  crime  was  committed  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  

without  pre-meditation,  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  

compounding the offence and acquitting the accused persons.  

8. We may point out that in Gian Singh (supra), this Court  

has held that quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on  

the ground of settlement between an offender and the victim is  

not the same thing as compounding of offences.  This Court  

also held that the power of compounding of offences conferred  

on a Court under Section 320 CrPC is materially different from  

the power conferred under Section 482 for quashing of criminal  

proceedings by the High Court.  In compounding of offences,  

power of  a  criminal  court  is  circumscribed by the provisions  

contained in Section 320 CrPC and the Court is guided solely  

and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation  

of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceeding  

or criminal complaint under Section 482 CrPC is guided by the  

material  on  record  as  to  whether  the  ends  of  justice  would  

justify  such  exercise  of  power,  although  the  ultimate  

consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.  

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9. The Court also opined that the power of the High Court in  

quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR  or complaint in exercise  

of  its  inherent  jurisdiction  is  distinct  and  different  from the  

power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences  

under  Section 320 CrPC.   This  Court  further  opined that  the  

inherent power is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation  

but it  has to be exercised in accordance with the guidelines  

engrafted  in  such  power,  namely,  (i)  to  secure  the  ends  of  

justice,  or (ii)  to prevent abuse of  the process of  any court.  

This Court also cautioned that while  exercising the power of  

compounding the offence, the court must have due regard to  

the nature and gravity of the crime.

10. We  notice,  in  this  case,  admittedly,  the  offence  

committed  under  Section  307  IPC  is  not  compoundable.   In  

Ishwar  Singh  v.  State  of  M.P. (2008)  15  SCC  667,  the  

accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable  

under Section 307 IPC and, with reference to Section 320 CrPC,  

it was held that Section 307 was not a compoundable offence  

and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall  

be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code.  In  

Gulab Das and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011)  

10  SCC 765,  a  different  note  was  struck  by  this  Court,  but

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certain reasons for compounding the offence under Section 307  

IPC  were  stated.    In  that  case,  this  Court  noticed  that  the  

incident had taken place in the year 1994 and the parties were  

related to each other.   Both the accused persons, at the time  

of the incident, were in their 20’s.  Further, it was also noticed  

that a cross case was registered against the complainant also  

in which he was convicted and sentenced.  Further, it was also  

noticed that the accused persons had also undergone certain  

period of sentence.  The case which was settled between the  

parties, involved offences punishable under Section 325 read  

with Section 34 and also under Section 323 IPC.   It was in such  

circumstances that the Court felt that the settlement arrived at  

between the parties was a sensible once so as to give quietus  

to the controversy.  The Court while upholding the conviction,  

reduced the sentence awarded to the accused to the period  

they had already undergone.

11. In  Rajendra  Harakchand  Bhandari  and  others  v.   

State of Maharashtra and another (2011) 13 SCC 311, this  

Court  had  an occasion  to  consider  the  question  whether  an  

offence under Section 307 IPC could be compounded in terms  

of the compromise reached at between the parties.   It  was  

categorically held that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not

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compoundable  in  terms  of  Section  320(9)  CrPC  and  that  

compounding of such an offence was out of question.   Further,  

taking note of the fact that the incident had occurred in the  

year 1991 and it was almost 20 years since then, and that the  

accused persons were agriculturists by occupation and had no  

previous criminal background and there had been reconciliation  

among  the  parties,  the  Court  held  that  the  ends  of  justice  

would  be  met  if  the  substantive  sentence  awarded  to  the  

accused be reduced to the period already undergone.

12. We find, in this case, such a situation does not arise.   In  

the instant case, the incident had occurred on 30.10.2008.  The  

trial  Court  held  that  the  accused  persons,  with  common  

intention, went to the shop of the injured Abdul Rashid on that  

day armed with iron rod and a strip of iron and, in furtherance  

of their common intention, had caused serious injuries on the  

body of  Abdul  Rashid,  of  which  injury  number 4 was on his  

head, which was of a serious nature.

13. Dr.  Rakesh  Sharma,  PW5,  had  stated  that  out  of  the  

injuries caused to Abdul Rashid, injury no. 4 was an injury on  

the  head  and  that  injury  was  “grievous  and  fatal  for  life”.  

PW8, Dr. Uday Bhomik, also opined that a grievous injury was  

caused on the head of Abdul Rashid.  Dr. Uday conducted the

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operation on injuries of Abdul Rashid as a Neuro Surgeon and  

fully  supported  the  opinion  expressed  by  PW  5  Dr.  Rakesh  

Sharma that injury no. 4 was “grievous and fatal for life”.   

14. We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note  

of by the Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10  

years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under  

Section 307 IPC, but not by the High Court.   The High Court  

has completely overlooked the various principles laid down by  

this Court in Gian Singh (supra), and has committed a mistake  

in taking the view that, the injuries were caused on the body of  

Abdul Rashid in a fight occurred at the spur and the heat of the  

moment. It has been categorically held by this Court in  Gian  

Singh (supra) that the Court, while exercising the power under  

Section 482, must have “due regard to the nature and gravity  

of the crime” and “the societal impact”.  Both these aspects  

were completely overlooked by the High Court. The High Court  

in  a  cursory  manner,  without  application  of  mind,  blindly  

accepted the statement  of  the parties  that  they had settled  

their disputes and differences and took the view that it was a  

crime against “an individual”, rather than against “the society  

at large”.

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15. We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have  

been committed by the accused persons was a crime against  

an individual,  on the other  hand it  was  a crime against  the  

society at large.   Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for  

achieving  social  control  and  its  purpose  is  the  regulation  of  

conduct and activities within the society.  Why Section 307 IPC  

is  held  to  be  non-compoundable,  because  the  Code  has  

identified which conduct should be brought within the ambit of  

non-compoundable offences.  Such provisions are not meant,  

just to protect the individual, but the society as a whole.  High  

Court was not right in thinking that it was only an injury to the  

person  and  since  the  accused  persons  had  received  the  

monetary compensation and settled the matter, the crime as  

against  them was wiped off.   Criminal  justice  system has  a  

larger objective to achieve, that is safety and protection of the  

people  at  large  and  it  would  be  a  lesson  not  only  to  the  

offender,  but to the individuals at  large so that such crimes  

would not be committed by any one and money would not be a  

substitute for the crime committed against the society.  Taking  

a lenient view on a serious offence like the present, will leave a  

wrong impression about  the criminal  justice  system and will

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encourage  further  criminal  acts,  which  will  endanger  the  

peaceful co-existence and welfare of the society at large.

16. We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set  

aside the judgment of  the High Court.   The High Court  was  

carried  away  by  the  settlement  and  has  not  examined  the  

matter  on merits,  hence,  we are  inclined  to  direct  the High  

Court to take back the appeal to its file and decide the appeal  

on merits.  Let the High Court dispose of the appeal within six  

months.  Ordered accordingly.

………………………………J. (K. S. Radhakrishnan)

………………………………J. (A. K. Sikri)

New Delhi, November 28, 2013.