REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 632 OF 2008

State of Punjab & Ors.     .... Appellant(s)

Versus

The Senior Vocational Staff Masters Association & Ors.      .... Respondent(s)

                  J U D G M E N T

R.K. Agrawal, J.

1) The  above  appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  impugned

common judgment and order  dated 23.05.2006 passed by the

High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in L.P.A. No. 66

of 2006 in CWP No. 10928 of 2003 and L.P.A. No. 67 of 2006 in

CWP  No.  7527  of  1995  whereby  the  Division  Bench  while

dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants herein upheld the

order dated 27.04.2005 passed by learned single Judge of  the

High Court in CWP Nos. 10928 of 2003 and 7527 of 1995.

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2) Brief facts:

(a) The  Senior  Vocational  Staff  Masters  Association-the

respondent Association represents the Vocational Masters in the

State  of  Punjab appointed during the years 1975, 1982, 1983

and  thereafter.   The  respondents  were  appointed  on  their

respective  posts  by  the  State  of  Punjab  in  the  year  1975  on

ad-hoc basis.   In  the  year  1978,  the  Punjab  Public  Service

Commission advertised  132 posts  of  Vocational  Masters  to  be

filled up by way of regular appointment.  These posts were to be

filled  up  under  the  Punjab  School  Education  (PSE)  Class  III

(School Cadre) Rules.  The minimum educational qualification for

the posts of Vocational Masters was degree or post graduation

except very few courses where the educational qualification was

Diploma under the advertisement.   

(b) In the year 1992-93, the State Government decided to revise

the  minimum  qualification  for  being  appointed  as  vocational

masters and Diploma was provided as the minimum educational

qualification  in  place  of  Degree  for  some  courses.   Due  to

revision,  there  were  two  classes  of  Vocational  Masters  in  the

State, viz., Diploma holder vocational masters and degree holder

vocational  masters  or  post-graduate  vocational  masters.   The

State Government, taking note of the fact that the unequals are

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being treated as equals due to the revision in qualification, vide

Notification  dated  31.03.1995,  re-designated  degree  holder

vocational  masters  and  post-graduate  vocational  masters  as

vocational  lecturers  with  the  rider  that  their  present

responsibilities and financial matters will have no change.  It is

also  pertinent  to mention here that  Diploma holder  vocational

masters  were  also  provided  an  opportunity  to  re-designate  as

vocational  lecturers  as  and  when  they  acquire  the  degree  or

post-graduate qualification.   

(c) The  said  notification  dated  31.03.1995  was  challenged

before the High Court in CWP No. 7527 of 1995 by the remaining

Vocational Masters for a direction to the appellants to grant the

designation of Vocational Lecturers to all the Vocational Masters

in the State of  Punjab.   During the pendency of  the said writ

petition, the State Government made rules to amend the Punjab

State  Education  Class  III  (School  Cadre)  Service  Rules,  1978

prescribing  separate  qualification  for  vocational  masters  and

vocational lecturers.

(d) On  the  onset  of  4th Punjab  Pay  Commission,  the

Commission had not  treated Vocational  Masters separate from

Masters of General Studies and the Vocational Lecturers from the

Lecturers of General Studies and merged the Vocational Masters

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with that of the School Masters and Vocational Lecturers with

School  Lecturers  by  amendment,  viz.,  Punjab  Civil  Services

(revised  pay)(first  amendment)  Rules,  1998  wherein  School

Lecturers were granted the pay scale of Rs. 6,400-10,640/- and

School Masters were given the pay scale of Rs. 5,800-9,200/-.  It

is pertinent to mention here that earlier the Vocational Masters

and Vocational Lecturers were given the same pay scales.   

(e) The respondents herein, being aggrieved by the disparity in

pay scales granted by the 4th Pay Commission, approached the

State  Government  claiming  that  they  should  be  granted  pay

scales  at  par  with  the  Lecturers.   Vide  Notification  dated

07.11.2002, the Government of Punjab, Department of Education

clarified  that  “the  Vocational  Masters  appointed  on  or  after

08.07.1995 neither  can be  designated  as  Vocational  Lecturers

based upon the educational qualification nor the revised scale of

Rs. 6,400-10,640/- in place of Rs. 5,800-9,200/- be granted to

them with effect from 01.01.1996.  In other words, the benefit of

higher scale will be admissible to those who were in service prior

to  08.07.1995”.   Vide  a  subsequent  notification  dated

16.05.2003, the State Government reiterated the stand taken in

the  Notification  dated  07.11.2002  and  also  sought  for  strict

compliance of the same.

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(f) The Government of Punjab, Department of Education, vide

Notification dated 16.07.2003, cancelled the Notifications dated

07.11.2002  and  16.05.2003  clarifying  the  position  that  only

those  Vocational  Masters  who  were  appointed  prior  to

08.07.1995  and  those  who  acquired  the  qualification  of

post-graduate or degree in engineering by 08.07.1995 would be

eligible for scale of  pay of  Rs. 6,400-10,640/- with effect from

01.01.1996  and  also  issued  a  direction  to  recover  the  excess

amount  being  paid  to  any  ineligible  vocational  master  on  the

basis of the earlier Notifications.

(g) Being aggrieved by the Notification dated 16.07.2003, the

respondents herein preferred CWP No. 10928 of 2003 before the

High  Court.   Learned  single  Judge  of  the  High  Court,  vide  a

common  judgment  and  order  dated  27.04.2005  in  CWP  Nos.

10928 of 2003 and 7527 of 1995, quashed the Notification dated

16.07.2003 and directed the State Government to give the benefit

of  Notification dated 31.03.1995 to  all  the  Vocational  Masters

recruited prior to 08.07.1995.

(h) Aggrieved  by  the  order  dated  27.04.2005,  the  State

Government preferred L.P.A. No. 66 of 2006 in CWP No. 10928 of

2003 and L.P.A. No. 67 of 2006 in CWP No. 7527 of 1995 before

the  High Court.   The  Division Bench of  the  High Court,  vide

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common judgment and order  dated 23.05.2006, dismissed the

appeals filed by the appellants herein.        

(i) Aggrieved  by  the  order  dated  23.05.2006,  the  appellants

have preferred this appeal by way of special leave.

3)  Heard the  arguments  advanced by  Mr.  Karan Bharihoke,

learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Neeraj Kumar Jain

and Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respective

respondents and perused the records.  

Point(s) for consideration:-

4) The only point for consideration before this Court is whether

in  the  present  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  the

Notification dated 16.07.2003 is valid in the eyes of law or not?

Rival submissions:   

5) Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  contended before  this

Court that the respondents do not fulfill the basic qualification of

Lecturer.  It was further contended that the High Court has not

considered  the  fact  that  the  respondents  could  not  have

challenged  the  Notification  dated  31.03.1995  as  the  said

Notification has  been superseded by  the  Statutory  Rule  dated

08.07.1995.  He  further  contended  that  the  High  Court  has

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recorded an erroneous finding of fact that the Notification dated

16.07.2003 is violative of principles of natural justice and there is

no question of recovering the excess amount paid as salaries and

allowances  to  the  respondents.   Learned  counsel  further

contended that it is a well settled proposition of law that the pay

scales  of  a  class  of  employees  are  determined  by  the  State

Government keeping in view the qualifications, responsibilities,

nature of work and resources of the State and the High Court

ought not have granted the pay scale of Rs. 6,400-10,640/- to

the  respondents  herein-Vocational  Staff  Masters.   Learned

counsel  further  contended  that  in  order  to  rectify  the  error

committed earlier, the Notification dated 16.07.2003 was issued

by  the  State  Government  withdrawing  the  pay  scale  of  Rs.

6,400-10,640/-  to  the  vocational  masters  w.e.f.  01.01.1996

which was inadvertently given vide Notification dated 07.11.2002,

and there is no foul play on the part of the State to hamper any

legitimate right of the respondents as it is the prerogative of the

State.  Learned counsel finally contended that the orders passed

by the High Court are erroneous and are in flagrant violation of

the statutory rules and be set aside by this Court.  In support of

his submissions, learned counsel has relied upon the following

decisions of this Court which are as under:-

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(i) In  V.  Markendeya  and  Others vs.  State  of  Andhra

Pradesh and Others (1989) 3 SCC 191, it was held as under:-

“10. In Randhir Singh case and later in Dhirendra Chamoli case, Surinder Singh case, Bhagwan Dass case, Jaipal case and P. Savita case, this Court implemented the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. The court granted relief on the principle of equal pay on the basis  of  same  or  similar  work  performed  by  two  classes  of employees under the same employer even though the two classes of employees  did  not  constitute  the  same  service.  But  in  all  the aforesaid  cases  relief  was  granted  only  after  it  was  found  that discrimination was practised in  giving different  scales  of  pay in violation of the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The principle of  equal pay for  equal work was enforced on the premise that discrimination was practised between the  two  sets  of  employees  performing  the  same  duties  and functions,  without  there  being  any  rational  classification.  The principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not an abstract one, it is open to the State to prescribe different scales of pay for different cadres  having  regard  to  nature,  duties,  responsibilities  and educational qualifications. Different grades ace laid down in service with varying qualifications for entry into particular grade. Higher qualification and experience based on length of service are valid considerations  for  prescribing  different  pay  scales  for  different cadres.  The  application  of  doctrine  arises  where  employees  are equal  in  every  respect,  in  educational  qualifications,  duties, functions and measure of responsibilities and yet they are denied equality in pay. If the classification for prescribing different scales of pay is founded on reasonable nexus the principle will not apply. But  if  the classification is  founded on unreal  and unreasonable basis it would violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the principle of equal pay for equal work, must have its way. In the decisions  reference  to  which  have  been  made  by  the  learned counsel for the appellants, this Court granted relief, after recording findings  that  the  aggrieved  employees  were  discriminated  in violation of  the equality  clause under Articles  14 and 16 of  the Constitution,  without  there  being  any  rationale  for  the classification.

11. In a number of decisions of this Court the claim for equal pay  for  equal  work has been negatived on the  ground that  the different pay scales prescribed for persons doing similar or same work is permissible on the basis of classification founded on the measure of responsibilities, educational qualifications, experience and other allied matters. In  Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) v. Union of India, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji said:  

“...  there  may  be  qualitative  differences  as  regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but  the  responsibilities  make  a  difference.  One  cannot

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deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational  nexus with the object  of differentiation,  such  differentiation  will  not  amount  to discrimination.  It  is  important  to  emphasise that  equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it  follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right.”

The learned Judge further observed: “The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact,  some less — it  varies  from nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always be  translated  into  a  mathematical  formula.  If  it  has  a rational  nexus with the object  sought for,  as reiterated before  a  certain  amount  of  value  judgment  of  the administrative authorities who are charged with fixing the pay  scale  has  to  be  left  with  them  and  it  cannot  be interfered with by the court unless it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived mala fide either in law or in fact.”

12. In State of U.P. v.  J.P. Chaurasia, this Court negatived the claim of  Bench Secretaries  for  equal  pay for  equal  work on the basis of reasonable classification based on merit, experience and seniority  though  both  sets  of  employees  were  performing  the similar duties and having similar responsibilities.  In  Mewa Ram Kanojia v. AIIMS this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner for parity in pay on the application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” on the ground of reasonable classification on the basis of educational qualifications.

13. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that where two classes of employees perform identical or similar duties and carrying out the same functions with the same measure of responsibility having same academic qualifications, they would be entitled to equal pay. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and the court will strike down the discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees. But before such relief is granted the court must consider and analyse the rationale behind the State action in prescribing two different  scales of  pay.  If  on an analysis  of  the relevant  rules,  orders,  nature  of  duties,  functions,  measure  of responsibility,  and  educational  qualifications  required  for  the relevant posts, the court finds that the classification made by the State in giving different treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the classification must be upheld. Principle of equal pay for equal work is applicable among equals, it cannot be applied

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to unequals. Relief to an aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for equal work can be granted only after it is demonstrated  before  the  court  that  invidious  discrimination  is practised by the State in prescribing two different scales for the two classes  of  employees  without  there  being  any  reasonable classification  for  the  same.  If  the  aggrieved  employees  fail  to demonstrate  discrimination,  the principle  of  equal  pay for  equal work cannot be enforced by court in abstract. The question what scale should be provided to a particular class of service must be left  to  the  executive  and  only  when  discrimination  is  practised amongst the equals, the court should intervene to undo the wrong, and to ensure equality among the similarly placed employees. The court  however cannot prescribe equal  scales of  pay for  different class of employees.”

(ii) In  State  of  U.P.  and  Others vs.  J.P.  Chaurasia  and

Others (1989) 1 SCC 121, it was held as under:-   

“20. The  second  question  formulated  earlier  needs  careful examination. The question is not particular to the present case. It is  pertinent  to  all  such  cases.  It  is  a  matter  affecting  the  civil services in general.  The question is whether there could be two scales of pay in the same cadre of persons performing the same or similar work or duties. All Bench Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad  are undisputedly  having  same  duties.  But  they  have been  bifurcated  into  two  grades  with  different  pay  scales.  The Bench Secretaries Grade I are in a higher pay scale than Bench Secretaries Grade II. The entitlement to higher pay scale depends upon selection based on merit-cum-seniority. Can it be said that it would be violative of  the right to equality  guaranteed under the Constitution?

31. In the present case, all Bench Secretaries may do the same work, but their quality of work may differ. Under the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bench Secretaries Grade I are selected by a Selection Committee. The selection is based on merit with due regards to seniority. They are selected among the lot of Bench Secretaries Grade II. When Bench Secretaries Grade II acquire experience and also display more merit, they are appointed as  Bench  Secretaries  Grade  I.  The  rules  thus  make  a  proper classification for the purpose of  entitlement to higher pay scale. The High Court has completely overlooked the criterion provided under the Rules. The merit governs the grant of higher pay scale and that  merit  will  be evaluated by a competent  authority.  The classification made under the Rules, therefore, cannot be said to be violative of the right to have equal pay for equal work.”

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6) Per  contra,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

respondents-Vocational Staff Masters Association submitted that

since beginning the educational qualification for appointment as

Vocational Masters had been a degree or a diploma with three

years’ experience as both the qualifications were placed at par.

The process  of  selection as  well  as  the nature  of  the  job  was

same.  There was no such difference or distinction brought about

between  the  persons  so  appointed.   Learned  senior  counsel

further  submitted  that  the  State  Government  sought  to  bring

about  an  arbitrary  distinction  amongst  people  who  had  been

appointed to teach the same classes of 10+1 and 10+2 and such

arbitrary action is contrary to law and has rightly been directed

to be rectified by the High Court.  Learned senior counsel further

submitted  that  there  cannot  be  any  discrimination  between

similarly  situated  persons  whether  by  way  of  a  government

notification or by any amendment in the Rules.  The plea that

there was an inadvertent mistake is contrary to the record and it

is a deliberate distinction in law sought to be brought about by

the appellants.  Learned senior counsel finally contended that the

High  Court  was  right  in  upholding  the  order  passed  by  the

learned  single  Judge  and  the  present  appeal  is  liable  to  be

dismissed.   

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7) Learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  vocational

lecturers  (Respondent  Nos.  5  and 7)  submitted that  the  State

Government, while exercising powers under Section 309 of the

Constitution,  framed Punjab  Civil  Services  (Revised Pay)  (First

Amendment) Rules, 1998.  As per the said Rules, different scales

of  pay  have  been  prescribed  for  Vocational  Lecturers  and

Vocational  Masters.   The government,  after  examining  various

factors  including  different  qualifications  required  for  both  the

posts, has prescribed higher pay scale for Vocational Lecturers

than the Vocational  Masters.   The said differentiation is made

bona fide,  reasonably  on an intelligible  criterion,  which has a

rational nexus with the object of differentiation.  Notably, the said

Rules  were  not  assailed  by  the  Vocational  Masters  before  the

High Court.  Thus, there are statutory rules which hold the field

and different pay scales for both the posts have been prescribed

on the basis of the said Rules.  However, the High Court without

even noticing the said rules, by way of order, erroneously struck

down the action of the government in not granting the pay scales

of Vocational Lecturers to Vocational Masters.   

8) Learned senior counsel further submitted that it has been

held in a catena of cases of this Court that the doctrine of ‘equal

pay for equal work’ has no mechanical application in every case

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and Article 14 permits reasonable qualification based on qualities

or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as

against those who are left out.  For claiming the benefit of the

doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’, the concerned employee

has  to  establish  that  the  qualification,  eligibility,  mode  of

selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work and duties and

effort,  reliability,  confidentiality,  dexterity,  functional  need and

responsibilities  and status of  both the posts  are  identical.   In

support  of  this  claim,  learned  senior  counsel  pointed  out  the

judgments of this Court in Shyam Babu Verma and Others vs.

Union of India and Others (1994) 2 SCC 521 and Government

of W.B. vs. Tarun K. Roy and Others (2004) 1 SCC 347.

9) Learned senior counsel further stressed upon the point that

the matters concerning pay fixation etc. exclusively falls within

the domain of Expert Committees constituted by the government

and  court  should  refrain  from  interfering  with  the  decisions

regarding fixation of pay arrived at by such Committees.  So long

as the decision of those who are charged with the administration

in fixing the scales of  pay and other service conditions etc.  is

made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion, which has

a  rational  nexus  with  the  object  of  differentiation,  such

differentiation  will  not  amount  to  discrimination.   The

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determination as to whether two posts are equal or not is the job

of Expert Committee and the Court should not interfere with the

same.   In  support  of  this  submission,  learned  senior  counsel

point  out  the  following  judgment  of  this  Court,  viz.,  Indian

Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Workmen, Indian Drugs &

Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 408 and  State Bank of

India and Others vs. K.P. Subbaiah and Others (2003) 11 SCC

646.    

10) Learned senior counsel finally submitted that in the absence

of wholesome identity between the Vocational  Masters and the

Vocational Lecturers, the High Court erred in quashing the order

dated 16.07.2003 passed by the  State  Government whereby it

has  decided not  to  extend the  benefit  of  higher  pay  scales  to

those Vocational Masters who did not acquire the qualification of

post graduate or degree in engineering by 08.07.1995.  The said

decision of the Government was in consonance with the statutory

rules and had been made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible

criterion  which  has  a  rational  nexus  with  the  object  of

differentiation.   Hence,  the  High  Court  erred  in  quashing  the

same and that too without even noticing much less adverting to

the statutory rules which govern the field.   

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Discussion:

11) The respondents herein are claiming the pay scale of  Rs.

6,400-10,640/- with effect from 01.01.1996 which would be at

par with the scale granted to the lecturers.  It is their claim that

when  they  were  initially  appointed  as  Vocational  Masters  on

ad-hoc basis and were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 300-600/- a

degree  in  Engineering  was  the  necessary  qualification  for

teaching  students  in  the  Engineering  trade  and  for

non-engineering  trade,  a  candidate  was  required  to  have  the

qualification of B.A. with ITI Diploma.  These qualifications were

at par with Lecturers under the PES Class III Rules.  It is also on

record that at the relevant time, the posts of Lecturers were in

the lower scale of Rs. 250-550/-.  The scale which had been given

to Vocational Masters was equivalent to the scale which had been

enjoyed  by  the  Head  Masters.   In  the  year  1978,  the  Pay

Commission recommended the pay scale of Rs. 700-1300/- both

for  lecturers  as  well  as  for  vocational  masters.   Thus,  the

vocational masters and lecturers were placed in the same scale.

The parity in pay continued even in the subsequent pay revision

and  both  the  categories  were  placed  in  the  pay  scale  of  Rs.

1,800-3,200/-.  In this view of the matter, the nature of duties of

the  Lecturers  and  Vocational  Masters  has  not  undergone  any

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change.   

12) However, when the pay scales were revised in the year 1998

with effect from 01.01.1996, a disparity was created between the

pay  scales  of  Lecturers  and  Vocational  Masters.   Whilst  the

Lecturers were granted the pay scale of Rs. 6,400-10,640/-, the

respondents  herein-Vocational  Masters  were  fixed  in  the

converted pay scale of Rs. 5,800-9,200/-.  It is also on record

that  the  Vocational  Masters,  who  were  appointed  earlier  to

08.07.1995  claimed  that  they  cannot  be  granted  a  pay  scale

lesser than the Lecturers.  Vide Notification dated 07.11.2002,

the State Government issued a clarification that the Vocational

Masters  appointed  on  or  after  08.07.1995  neither  can  be

designated as Vocational Lecturers based upon the educational

qualification  nor  can  be  granted  the  revised  scale  of  Rs.

6,400-10,640/- to them with effect from 01.01.1996 stating that

the higher scale will be admissible to those who were in service

prior to 08.07.1995.  In view of the Notification dated 07.11.2002,

the  higher  scale  was  given  to  the  Vocational  Masters.   On

21.05.2003, the State Government granted a quota of 15% to the

Vocational  Masters  for  being  considered  for  promotion to  PES

Class II.  In the meantime, on 16.07.2003, the State Government,

by  way  of  subsequent  Notification,  superseding  earlier

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Notifications dated 07.11.2002 and 16.05.2003, directed that the

designations and pay scale of Rs. 6,400-10,640/- with effect from

01.01.1996 will be admissible to only those Vocational Masters

who  have  been  appointed  prior  to  08.07.1995  and  had  the

qualification  of  post-graduate  or  degree  in  engineering  by

08.07.1995.   On  the  basis  of  the  said  Notification,  the  State

Government passed orders to recover the excess amount paid to

Vocational Masters after following the due procedure under the

Rules.  However,  the  claim  of  the  respondents  herein  to

re-designate all the Vocational Masters as Vocational Lecturers

was still pending.        

13)  As the name suggests, vocational courses are those courses

in which teaching is not on regular basis. Vocational courses play

a very important role  in the  grooming of  students  in different

fields.  It  trains  young people  for  various jobs  and helps  them

acquire  specialized  skills.  Vocational  education  can  also  be

termed as job-oriented education. It helps a person in becoming

skilled in a particular filed at a comparatively lower age. In the

present case, the State Government, in the year 1975, felt the

need of  Vocational  courses and accordingly  made the  suitable

provisions  for  the  regulation  of  these  courses.  As  per  the

government  orders,  initially,  except  very  few  subjects,  the

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minimum educational  qualification for  the  appointment  to  the

post of “Vocational Masters” was Degree or Post Graduation.

14) It is a cardinal principle of law that government has to abide

by  rule  of  law  and  uphold  the  values  and  principles  of  the

Constitution.  Respondents  herein  alleged  that  creating  an

artificial distinction between the persons in the same cadre would

amount  to  violation  of  Article  14  i.e.  equality  before  law  and

hence, such an act cannot be sustained.  The doctrine of equality

is  a  dynamic  and  evolving  concept  having  many  dimensions.

Articles  14-18  of  the  Constitution,  besides  assuring  equality

before  the  law and equal  protection of  the laws,  also  disallow

discrimination which lacks the object  of  achieving  equality,  in

matters of employment. It is well settled that though Article 14

forbids  class  legislation  but  it  does  not  forbid  reasonable

classification.  When  any  rule  of  statutory  provision  providing

classification  is  assailed  on  the  ground  that  it  is  contrary  to

Article 14, its validity can be sustained if it satisfies two tests,

namely, that the classification was to be based on an intelligible

differentia  which  distinguishes  persons  or  things  grouped

together from the others left out of the group, and the differentia

in question must have a reasonable nexus to object sought to be

achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other

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words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of

classification  and  the  object  intended  to  be  achieved  by  the

Statute or the Rule.

15) It is evident that at the time of initial appointment, both the

degree  holders  and  the  Diploma holders  were  appointed  by  a

common process of selection where for the engineering trade a

degree was required and for the non-engineering trade a diploma

was  considered  as  the  appropriate  qualification.   A  common

advertisement was issued and a common process of selection led

to  the  appointment  of  all  persons  who  were  designated  as

Vocational Masters.  They were appointed on a pay scale higher

than the  general  lecturers.   They  continued to  draw a higher

scale  till  the  year  1978  when  the  pay  scale  of  the  general

lecturers was brought at par with the pay scale of the Vocational

Masters.  It is only in the year 1995 that an effort was made by

the State Government to create a distinction between the degree

holders as vocational lecturers and diploma holders as vocational

masters.   

16) Further,  since  the  very  inception,  the  educational

qualification for appointment as Vocational Masters had been a

degree  or  a  diploma with  three  years’  experience  as  both  the

qualifications were placed at par.  All persons were appointed by

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a common process of selection and they teach the same classes,

performing the same work.  No distinction can be brought about

between the persons so appointed.  It is only subsequently that

the  appellants  designated  some  of  the  Vocational  Masters  as

Vocational Lecturers and brought about an artificial distinction

between the two.  Even on account of re-designation of the degree

holders and post graduates as vocational lecturers, there was no

change  in  the  responsibilities  and  the  financial  matters  as

between  the  degree  holders  and  diploma  holders  before  the

alleged  Notification  which  fact  is  duly  admitted  by  the  State.

There  is  no  distinction  between  the  vocational  lecturers  and

vocational masters and they form one unified cadre and class.

There cannot be any discrimination between similarly situated

persons,  whether  by  way  of  a  government  notification  or  any

amendment in the Rules.  As far as nature of work is concerned,

it is stated that the vocational masters are discharging their duty

in  the  Senior  Secondary  Schools  in  the

Engineering/non-Engineering  trades  and  have  the  technical

qualifications while the vocational lecturers are also discharging

the same duties in the same schools.  Both vocational masters

and lecturers are teaching the same classes, i.e., 10+1 and 10+2

and hence the nature of work, responsibilities and duties being

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identical and the pay scales were also kept identical since 1978

onwards.   

17) The principle of equality, is also fundamental in formulation

of  any policy by the State and the glimpse of the same can be

found in Articles 38, 39, 39A, 43 and 46 embodied in Part IV of

the Constitution of  India.  These Articles of  the Constitution of

India mandate that the State is under a constitutional obligation

to assure a social order providing justice- social, economic and

political, by  inter alia, minimizing monetary inequalities, and by

securing  the  right  to  adequate  means  of  livelihood  and  by

providing  for  adequate  wages  so  as  to  ensure,  an appropriate

standard  of  life,  and  by  promoting  economic  interests  of  the

weaker  sections.  Meaning  thereby,  if  the  State  is  giving  some

economic benefits to one class while denying the same to other

then the onus of justifying the same lies on the State specially in

the  circumstances when both the classes or  group of  persons

were treated as same in the past by the State. Since Vocational

Masters had been drawing same salary as Vocational Lecturers

were drawing before the application of 4th pay commission, any

attempt to curtail their salary and allowances would amount to

arbitrariness which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law if no

reasonable justification is offered for the same.

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18) We are conscious of the fact that a differential scale on the

basis  of  educational  qualifications and the nature of  duties  is

permissible.   However,  it  is  equally  clear  to  us  that  if  two

categories of employees are treated as equal initially, they should

continue to be so treated unless a different treatment is justified

by some cogent reasons. In a case where the nature of duties is

drastically  altered,  a  differential  scale  of  pay may be justified.

Similarly, if a higher qualification is prescribed for a particular

post, a higher scale of pay may be granted.  However, if the basic

qualifications and the job requirements continued to be identical

as they were initially laid down, then the Court shall be reluctant

to accept the action of the authority in according a differential

treatment unless some good reasons are disclosed.  Thus,  the

decisions  relied  upon  by  learned  senior  counsel  are  clearly

distinguishable and are not applicable to the facts of the present

case.  

Conclusion:

19) In view of the forgoing discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that the High Court was fully justified in declaring that

the  vocational  masters  are  entitled  to  pay  scale  of  Rs.

6,400-10,640/- on the ground that  the nature of  duties being

discharged by the vocational masters are the same as vocational

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lecturers  and  that  there  was  no  rationale  behind  making  a

classification between the two especially when both the categories

were  treated  as  one  and  the  same  in  all  the  previous  pay

revisions  since  1978  onwards.   Vide  notification  dated

31.03.1995,  only  the  nomenclature  of  vocational  masters  was

changed without changing their nature of duties and pay scales.

Further,  the impugned order  dated 16.07.2003 deserves to be

quashed on the short ground that it  has been passed without

complying the rules of natural justice.  The same could not have

been  passed  without  giving  an  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the

concerned employees.   

20) It  is  by  now  well  settled  that  no  orders  causing  civil

consequences can be passed, without observing rules of natural

justice as it was held in Bhagwan Shukla vs. Union of India &

Ors. AIR 1994 SC 2480 wherein it was held as under:

“3.  We  have  heard  learned counsel  for  the  parties.  That  the petitioner's basic pay had been fixed since 1970 at Rs, 190 p.m. is not disputed. There is also no dispute that the basic pay of the appellant was reduced to Rs. 181 p.m. from Rs. 190 pan. in 1991  retrospectively  w.e.f.  1812.1970.  The  appellant  has obviously been visited with civil consequences but he had been granted no opportunity to show cause against the reduction of his basic pay. He was not, even put on notice before his pay was reduced  by  the  department  and the  order  came to  be  made behind his back without following any procedure known to law. There, has, thus, been a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the appellant has been made to suffer huge financial loss without being heard. Fair play in action warrants that no such order which has the effect of an employee suffering civil  consequences  should  be  passed  without  putting  the concerned to  notice  and giving  him a hearing in the matter.

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Since,  that  was  not  done,  the  order  (memorandum)  dated 25.7.1991. which was impugned before the Tribunal could not certainly be sustained and the Central Administrative Tribunal fell in error in dismissing the petition of the appellant. The order of the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. We, accordingly, accept this appeal and set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 17.9,1993 as well as the order (memorandum) impugned  before  the  Tribunal  dated  25.7.1991  reducing  the basic  pay  of  the  appellant  From  Rs.  190  to  Rs.  181  w.e.f. 18.12,1970.”

21) The order dated 16.07.2003 came to be made behind the

back  of  vocational  masters  without  following  any  procedure

known to law.  Thus, there has been a flagrant violation of the

principles of natural justice and the respondents had been made

to suffer huge financial loss without being heard.  Fair play in

action warrants that no such order which has the effect of  an

employee suffering civil consequences should be passed without

putting the concerned to notice and giving him a hearing in the

matter.

22) In our considered view, the High court while dealing with the

matter  on  merits,  has  rightly  quashed  the  letter  dated

16.07.2003 and directed the State government to give benefits of

the Notification dated 31.03.1995 to all the Vocational Masters.

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23)  In view of above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere

in  the  decision  passed  by  the  High  Court.   Accordingly,  the

appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

  ...…………………………………J.               (DIPAK MISRA)

 …………….………………………J.              (R.K. AGRAWAL)

   .…....………………………………J.              (PRAFULLA C. PANT)                       

NEW DELHI; AUGUST 18, 2017.  

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ITEM NO.1501               COURT NO.9               SECTION IV                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  632/2008 STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.                          Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS SENIOR VOCATIONAL STAFF MASTERS  ASSOCIATION & ORS.     Respondent(s)

Date : 18-08-2017 This appeal was called on for pronouncement     of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Ajay Pal, AOR Mr. Karan Bharihoke, AOR

                   For Respondent(s)

Mr. Tarun Gupta, AOR Ms. Parul Sharma,Adv. Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, AOR Mr. Aditya Kumar Choudhary,Adv. Mr. Ajit Pathak,Adv. Mr. Akhil Anand, AOR Mr. Ashok K. Mahajan, AOR                  

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  R.K.Agrawal  pronounced  the Reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Prafulla C.Pant.

The  appeal  is  dismissed  in  terms  of  the  signed Reportable judgment.  

Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.  

(ANITA MALHOTRA)                           (CHANDER BALA)   COURT MASTER                             COURT MASTER (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file.)

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