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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 499 OF 2011

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                             …      Appellant(s)

Versus

SANJAY     …   Respondent(s)

with  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2105 OF 2013

JAYSUKH BAVANJI SHINGALIA      …      Appellant(s)

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER             …  Respondent(s)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2108-2112 of 2013

MALABHAI SHALABHAI RABARI AND OTHERS  …     Appellant(s)

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS      …    Respondent(s)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2107 of 2013

KALUBHAI DULABHAI KHACHAR               …     Appellant(s)

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER           …  Respondent(s)

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2106 of 2013

SONDABHAI HANUBHAI BHARWAD            …   Appellant(s)

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER           …  Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

M.Y.EQBAL, J.

1. The principal  question  which  arises  for  consideration  in  

these appeals is whether the provisions contained in Sections  

21, 22 and other sections of Mines and Minerals (Development  

and Regulation) Act, 1957 operate as bar against prosecution  

of  a  person  who  has  been  charged  with  allegation  which  

constitutes  offences  under  Section  379/114  and  other  

provisions of the Indian Penal Code.  In other words, whether  

the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act explicitly or impliedly  

excludes the provisions of Indian Penal Code when the act of an  

accused is  an offence both under the Indian Penal  Code (in  

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short,  ‘IPC’)  and under the provisions  of  Mines and Minerals  

(Development and Regulation) Act.

2. Criminal  Appeal  No.499  of  2011  arose  out  of  an  order  

passed by the Delhi High Court on an application under Section  

482 Cr.P.C.  seeking quashing of  the FIR registered at  Police  

Station  Alipur  under  Sections  379/114/120B/34  IPC  on  the  

allegation that appellant was involved in illegal mining of sand  

from the Yamuna basin.   An FIR was registered by the police  

suo  motu  having  come  to  know  that  some  persons  were  

removing and selling sand from the Yamuna basin for the last  

so  many  days.   On  receipt  of  such  information,  the  police  

officers committed raid and visited the site where they found  

one dumper filled with sand.  Because of non-production of any  

documents  and  valid  papers,  the  digging  equipments  were  

seized and taken into possession and persons were arrested.  

An FIR was registered on the charges of illegal mining under  

Section 379/114 IPC  besides being cognizable  offence under  

Section  21  (4)  of  the  Mines  and  Mineral  (Development  and  

Regulation) Act, 1957 (in short the MMDR Act).

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3. The appellant challenged the registration of the case on  

the  ground  inter  alia  that  offence  if  at  all  committed,  

cognizance  would  have  been  taken  under  the  provisions  of  

MMDR Act, that too on the basis of complaint to be filed under  

Section 22 of the Act by an authorized officer.

4. Criminal Appeal No.2105 of 2013

Similarly this case arose out of an order passed by the  

Gujarat  High  Court  on  an  application  filed  by  the  appellant  

seeking quashing of the FIR on various grounds inter alia that  

Section  22  of  the  MMDR  Act  put  a  complete  bar  on  the  

registration of FIR by the police.  The allegation inter alia in the  

FIR was on illegal mining in those areas where mining lease  

was already revoked.

5. Criminal Appeal Nos. 2108-2112 of 2013

In  these  cases,  appellants  are  the  owners  of  Murlidhar  

Stone Industries and were granted quarry lease in the seam of  

Village  Thoriwari  for  excavation  of  mines  and  minerals  on  

payment of royalty.  The appellants challenged the legality and  

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validity  of  mining  complaint  lodged  by  the  State  geologist  

against them for offences under Section 379/114 of IPC and  

under Section 21 of the MMDR Act.  The appellants sought an  

appropriate writ or direction to quash and set aside the criminal  

proceedings on the same ground that  Section 22 of the Act  

prohibits registration of FIR with respect to offences punishable  

under the said MMDR Act.

6. Criminal Appeal No.2107 of 2013

This appeal also arose out of the order passed by the High  

Court of Gujarat on the application challenging the legality and  

validity  of  criminal  complaint  filed before  Bhuj  Taluka Police  

Station for the alleged illegal mining and transporting a dumper  

loaded with black trap stone.  A complaint was made with the  

police for the commission of offence under Section 379 read  

with Section 114 of the IPC and under Section 21 of the MMDR  

Act.

7. Criminal Appeal No.2106 of 2013

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This  appeal  also  arose  out  of  a  complaint  filed  before  

Sayla Police Station by the Incharge Mines Supervisor, alleging  

offence punishable under Sections 4(1) and 21(1) of the MMDR  

Act.  No charge sheet has been filed in this complaint so far.

8. Criminal Appeal No.499 of 2011, as stated above, arose  

out of the order passed by the Delhi High Court.  The Delhi High  

Court formulated three issues for consideration:-  

(1) Whether the police could have registered an  FIR in the case;   

(2)  Whether  a  cognizance  can  be  taken by  the  concerned  Magistrate  on  the  basis  of  police  report; and  

(3)  Whether  a  case  of  theft  was  made  out  for  permitting  registration  of  an  FIR  under  Section  379/411 of the Indian Penal Code.   

The High Court after referring various provisions on the MMDR  

Act  vis-à-vis  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  disposed  of  the  

application directing the respondent to amend the FIR, which  

was registered,  by converting the offence mentioned therein  

under  Section  379/411/120B/34  of  IPC  to  Section  21  of  the  

MMDR Act.  The High Court in para 18 of the impugned order  

held as under:-

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“18.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid  and  taking  into  consideration  the  provisions  contained  under  Section 21 (6) of the said Act I hold that:

(i) The offence under the said Act being  cognizable  offence,  the  Police  could  have  registered an FIR in this case;

(ii) However, so far as taking cognizance of  offence under the said Act is concerned, it can be  taken by  the  Magistrate  only  on  the  basis  of  a  complaint  filed  by  an  authorized  officer,  which  may be filed along with the police report;  

(iii)  Since  the  offence  of  mining  of  sand  without permission is punishable under Section 21  of the said Act, the question of said offence being  an offence under Section 379 IPC does not arise  because the said Act makes illegal mining as an  offence only when there is no permit/licence for  such extraction and a complaint in this regard is  filed by an authorized officer.”

9. On the other hand the Gujarat High Court formulated the  

following question for consideration:-

Whether Section 22 of the Act would debar even  lodging an FIR before the police with respect to  the offences punishable under the said Act  and  Rules made thereunder?

In Case such FIR’s are not debarred and the police  are permitted to investigate,  can the concerned  Magistrate take cognizance of the offences on a  police report?  

What  would  be  the  effect  on  the  offences  punishable under the Indian Penal Code in view of  the provisions contained in the Act?

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10. The Gujarat High Court came to the following conclusion:- (i) The  offence  under  the  said  Act  being  cognizable  offence,  the  Police  could  have  registered an FIR in this case;  

(ii) However,  so  far  as  taking  cognizance  of  offence under the said Act is concerned, it can be  taken by  the  Magistrate  only  on  the  basis  of  a  complaint  filed  by  an  authorized  officer,  which  may be filed along with the Police report;  

(iii) Since the offence of mining of sand without  permission is punishable under Section 21 of the  said  Act,  the  question  of  said  offence  being  an  offence  under  Section  379  IPC  does  not  arise  because the said Act makes illegal mining as an  offence only when there is no permit/licence for  such extraction and a complaint in this regard is  filed by an authorized officer.  

The High Court, therefore, held that:- 1. Section  22  of  the  Act  does  not  prohibit  registering  an  FIR  by  the  police  on  information  being  given  with  respect  to  offences  punishable  under the said Act or the Rules made thereunder.  

2. It is however, not open for the Magistrate to  take cognizance of  the offence punishable under  the Act or the Rules made there under on a mere  charge-  sheet  filed  by  the  police.  It  would,  however, be open for the officer authorized by the  state or the Central Government in this behalf to  file  a  complaint  in  writing  before  the  Magistrate  relying upon the investigating carried out by the  police  and  the  complaint  may  also  include  the  papers of the police investigation.

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3. With respect  to offences punishable under  the Indian Penal Code, no such bar as indicated in  para (2) would apply.

xxxxxxx

22. In  so far  as  the  petitions  where only  FIRs  have been registered by the police and no charge  sheet is filed, they must fail. In so far as the cases  where police investigation has been concluded and  charge  sheets  have  been  filed,  it  would  not  be  open  for  the  Magistrate  concerned  to  take  cognizance of offences only on such police reports.

11. In the case of Sengol, Charles and K. Kannan, etc.etc.   

vs. State  Rep. by Inspector of Police, 2012 Cri LJ 1705,  

2012(2)  CTC  369,  a  similar  question  also  came  for  

consideration before the Madras High Court  where a batch of  

writ  petitions  were  heard  and  disposed  of.   The  allegation  

made  against  the  writ  petitioner  in  the  FIR  was  that  they  

committed theft of sand from rivers and river-bed belonging to  

the  Government,  which  act  also  constitutes  violation of  the  

provisions of MMDR Act.   Accordingly, they were prosecuted  

for the offence punishable under Section 21 of the MMDR Act  

and also under Section 379 IPC.  The question that came for  

consideration  before  the  Court  was  as  to  whether  the  

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provisions  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals  (Development  and  

Regulation) Act, 1957, will either explicitly or impliedly exclude  

the provisions of the Indian Penal  Code when the act of an  

accused is an offence both under the Indian Penal Code and  

under the Provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development  

and Regulation) Act, 1957?

12. After  considering  various  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  

Division Bench observed:-

“35. A cursory comparison of these two provisions  with Section 378 of IPC would go to show that the  ingredients are totally different. The contravention  of the terms and conditions of mining lease, etc.  constitutes  an offence punishable  under  Section  21  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals  Act,  whereas  dishonestly  taking  any  movable  property  out  of  the  possession  of  a  person  without  his  consent  constitutes theft. Thus, it is undoubtedly clear that  the ingredients of an offence of theft as defined in  Section 378 of IPC are totally different from the  ingredients  of  an  offence  punishable  under  Section  21(1)  r/w Section 4(1)  and 4(1A)  of  the  Mines and Minerals Act.”

13. The  Calcutta  High  Court  in  the  case  of  Smt.  Seema  

Sarkar vs. The State, (1995)1 CALLT 95(HC),  has taken a  

different  view.  In this case the Block Land Reforms Officer  

lodged a complaint with the Police Station alleging  inter alia  

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that the accused persons unauthorisedly excavated the land of  

ordinary  clay for  manufacturing brick  without  an authorized  

licence and thereby violated Section 21(2) of the MMDR Act  

and Section 379 IPC.   The Bhatar police station registered the  

complaint treating it as an FIR and GR case was started before  

the  sub-divisional  judicial  Magistrate,  Faridabad.   The  order  

taking cognizance and also the complaint was challenged by  

the accused persons on the ground inter alia  that no court is  

competent and empowered to take cognizance of an offence  

under  the  MMDR  Act,  1957  unless  the  complaint  is  being  

lodged by an authorized person.  Quashing the complaint, the  

Calcutta High Court held as under:-

“6. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance  of. the offence on the basis of the charge-sheet as  submitted by the Police under Section 21(2) of the  Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)  Act,  1957  and  Section  379  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code. Cognizance can be taken under section 190  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973.  Cognizance  is  one  and  it  cannot  be  divided.  Splitting  of  cognizance  is  not  permissible  under  the  law.  This  is  the  admitted  position  that  the  complainant who lodged the complaint is not an  authorized  person  to  make  such  complaint.  So  taking cognizance on the basis of the complaint  by  the  learned  Magistrate  for  violation  of  the  provision  under  Section  21(2)  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957  

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is  bad.  The  only  question  that  is  left  open  is  whether taking cognizance itself is bad or a partial  cognizance can be taken? In the peculiarity of the  facts and circumstances of the case if the offence  as  alleged  under  Section  379  I.P.C.  against  the  accused  is  dissociated  from  the  allegation  of  excavation of earth without license constituting an  offence  under  Section  21(2)  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957,  then there is no ingredient for an offence under  Section 379 I.P.C. against the accused. Even if it is  assumed that there is such an ingredient then the  order  of  taking  cognizance  is  bad  because  cognizance is one and it cannot be made a split. If  it is found that taking cognizance of an offence is  bad  the  other  part  of  the  offence  for  which  cognizance has been taken cannot be sustained in  law.”

14. Since conflicting views have been taken by Gujarat High  

Court,  Delhi  High  Court,  Kerala  High  Court,  Calcutta  High  

Court, Madras High Court and Jharkhand High Court, and they  

are in different  tones,  it  is  necessary to settle the question  

involved in these appeals.

15. Mr.  Nikhil  Goel  learned  counsel  appearing  in  Criminal  

Appeal  Nos.  2105,  2106  and  2107  of  2013  assailed  the  

impugned order of the High court on various grounds.  Learned  

counsel firstly contended that Section 22 of MMDR Act per se  

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puts a bar even on registration of the FIR and consequently on  

investigation unless a direction to that effect comes from the  

Magistrate and that too on a complaint in writing made by a  

person authorized in this behalf.  Learned counsel contended  

that Section 21(6) of the Act makes the offence under sub-

section  1  of  Section  21  to  be  cognizable  irrespective  of  

anything  contained to  the  contrary  in  the  Code of  Criminal  

Procedure.   Learned  counsel  contended  that  both  Section  

21(6)  and  Section  22  if  read  independently  on  each  other  

would make the other provision otiose.   As a result, the bar  

under Section 22 of the Act would not only prevail upon the  

provisions contained in Section 190, Cr.P.C. but would prevail  

over  the  chapter  of  the  investigation,  namely  Chapter  12  

Cr.P.C.    

16. Learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  in  case  the  

cognizability  of  the  offence  contained  in  sub-clause  6  of  

Section 21 is to be extended to include applicability of Chapter  

12 of the Criminal Procedure Code, without complying with the  

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provisions of Section 22, the same would present at least three  

difficulties.  Firstly, there are several provisions after the stage  

of  filing  of   charge-sheet  which  would  be  contrary  to  the  

provisions  and the rules contained in  the 1957 Act.   These  

provisions  in  the  act  and the  rules  framed under  the  1957  

legislation inescapably indicate that almost everything relating  

to an offence under the provisions of  Section 21 has to be  

done by the authorized officer.  Accordingly, if the provisions  

of Section 21(6) are to be extended to Chapter 12, while the  

police may register an FIR, the power to seize, the power to  

compound,  the  requirement  of  taking  directions  from  the  

jurisdictional  magistrate are examples of some things which  

the police cannot do in view of direct contrary to the provisions  

in the 1957 Act.   Learned counsel submitted that this power of the  

police is equivalent to the same power/duty which arises pursuant to an  

order of the Magistrate under Section 156 [3]. There would definitely be  

cases where offences punishable under Section 20 were brought to the  

notice of persons who were neither authorized person under the Act nor  

the police.  Therefore in such a situation,  if  the police fails  to act,  the  

other  option  available  to any person is  to make an application  under  

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Section 156 [3].  However, in this case, the learned Magistrate has no  

jurisdiction to pass an order under this provision in view of paragraph 11.  

Therefore,  it  will  be  a  completely  incongruous   situation  if  the  

provisions of sub-clause 6 of Section 21 are to be extended to  

Chapter  12  despite  which  several  provisions  in  Chapter  12  

cannot be invoked.

17. Learned counsel further submitted that the provisions of  

Chapter  12  to  14  leading  up  to  the  magistrate  taking  

cognizance of  an offence are a part  of  a  common statutory  

duty. The investigation under Section 156 of the Code has to  

necessarily result in a report either under Section 170 or 173 of  

the Code.  The appellant submits that the magistrate is  duty  

bound  to  act  on  such  report  in  one  of  the  three  manners  

suggested in para-6 of 1980 (4) SCC 631. It is submitted that  

there is no other option of preparation of final report and keep  

it in abeyance. For this reason as well, the provisions of sub-

section  (6)  cannot  be  read  into  Chapter  12  of  the  code.  

Learned counsel  further submitted that the manner in which  

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the various high courts have dealt  with these provisions are  

conflicting.  The  appellant  relies  upon  the  decision  of  Kerala  

High Court reported in 2008 Cr.L.J.  2388,  decision of Madras High  

Court in Sengol (supra), the judgments of this Court reported in (2009) 7  

SCC 526 and (2011) 1 SCC 534 on the interpretation of similar clauses  

under different enactments.  It was contended that if the intention of the  

Legislature was to make violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the  

MMDR Act as an offence of theft, there would have been an appropriate  

provision in the MMDR Act itself.   The counsel  submits that there is a  

specific  purpose  for  which  powers  have  been  given  to  the  authorized  

person to take care of breaches under the Act and as such breaches are  

to  be  tried  under  the  general  penal  law  as  it  would  take  away  the  

protection  which an accused/suspect has been given under the MMDR  

Act. The appellant submits that all penal statutes have to be construed  

strictly and wherever there are two views possible, benefit to an accused  

has to be given.

18. Before answering the question, we shall first refer in brief  

the  relevant  provisions  of  Mines  and Minerals  (Development  

and  Regulation)  Act,  1957  and  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  

Section 4 of the Act puts a restriction on mining operation or  

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prospecting mining operation by any person except under  a  

lease or licence.  Section 4 reads as under:-

“4.  Prospecting  or  mining  operations  to  be  under  licence  or  lease.   (1)  No  person  shall  undertake  any  reconnaissance,  prospecting  or  mining operations in any area, except under and in  accordance  with  the  terms  and  conditions  of  a  reconnaissance permit or of a prospecting licence or,  as the case may be, a mining lease, granted under  this Act and the rules made thereunder:  Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect  any prospecting or mining operations undertaken in  any  area  in  accordance  with  the  terms  and  conditions of  a prospecting licence or mining lease  granted before the commencement of this Act which  is in force at such commencement.   Provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall  apply to any prospecting operations undertaken by  the Geological Survey of India, the Indian Bureau of  Mines,  the  Atomic  Minerals  Directorate  for  Exploration  and  Research  of  the  Department  of  Atomic  Energy  of  the  Central  Government,  the  Directorates  of  Mining  and  Geology  of  any  State  Government  (by  whatever  name  called),  and  the  Mineral  Exploration  Corporation  Limited,  a  Government Company within the meaning of Section  617 of the Companies Act, 1956.   Provided also that nothing in  this  sub-section  shall  apply  to  any  mining  lease  (whether  called  mining  lease, mining concession or by any other name) in  force immediately before the commencement of this  Act in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.  (1A) No person shall transport or store or cause to be  transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in  accordance with the provisions  of  this  Act and the  rules made thereunder.   

(2) No reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or  mining  lease  shall  be  granted  otherwise  than  in  

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accordance with the provisions  of  this  Act and the  rules made thereunder.  (3)  Any  State  Government  may,  after  prior  consultation  with  the  Central  Government  and  in  accordance with the rules  made under Section 18,  undertake   reconnaissance,  prospecting  or  mining  operations with respect to any mineral specified in  the First Schedule in any area within that State which  is not already held under any reconnaissance permit,  prospecting licence or mining lease.”

19. From  a  bare  perusal  of  Section  4,  particularly  Section  

4(1A)  would  show  that  there  is  a  total  restriction  on  

transportation  or  search  of  minerals  otherwise  than  in  

accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made  

thereunder.  The next relevant provisions are Sections 21 and  

22 of the Act.  Section 21 reads as under :-

“Penalties  21. (1)  Whoever  contravenes  the  provisions  of  sub-section (1)  or  sub-section  (1A)  of  section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for a  term which may extend to  two years,  or  with  fine  which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees, or  with both.   (2) Any rule made under any provision of this Act  may provide that any contravention thereof shall be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which may  extend to one year or with fine which may extend to  five thousand rupees, or with both, and in the case of  a  continuing  contravention,  with  an  additional  fine  which may extend to five hundred rupees for every  day during which such contravention continues after  conviction for the first such contravention.  (3) Where any person trespasses into any land in  contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of  section  4,  such trespasser  may be served with  an  

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order  of  eviction  by  the  State  Government  or  any  authority  authorised  in  this  behalf  by  that  Government  and  the  State  Government  or  such  authorised  authority  may,  if  necessary,  obtain  the  help of  the police to evict  the trespasser from the  land.  

(4) Whenever  any  person  raises,  transports  or  causes  to  be  raised  or  transported,  without  any  lawful authority, any mineral from any land, and, for  that  purpose,  uses any tool,  equipment,  vehicle  or  any  other  thing,  such  mineral,  tool,  equipment,  vehicle or any other thing shall be liable to be seized  by an officer or authority specially empowered in this  behalf.  

(4A) Any  mineral,  tool,  equipment,  vehicle  or  any  other  thing  seized  under  sub-section  (4),  shall  be  liable  to  be  confiscated  by  an  order  of  the  court  competent to    take cognizance of the offence under  sub-section  (1)  and  shall  be  disposed  of  in  accordance with the directions of such court.  

(5) Whenever  any  person  raises,  without  any  lawful authority, any mineral from any land, the State  Government  may  recover  from  such  person  the  mineral so raised, or, where such mineral has already  been disposed of,  the price thereof,  and may also  recover from such person, rent, royalty or tax, as the  case may be, for the period during which the land  was  occupied  by  such  person  without  any  lawful  authority.  (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence under  sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.”

20. Section 21 is a penalty provision in case of contravention  

of Section 4(1A) of the Act and is punishable with imprisonment  

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for a term which may extend to two years.  Sub-section 3 of  

Section 21 would show that the State Government or any other  

authority authorized by the State Government may obtain the  

help of  police to  evict  the trespassers from the land who is  

doing mining activity in contravention of the provisions of the  

Act.   Sub-section  4  further  empowered  the  officer  or  an  

authority specially empowered in this behalf to seize any tool,  

equipment, vehicle or any other thing which are used by any  

person  who  illegally  or  without  any  lawful  authority  erases,  

transports any minerals from any land.  Those minerals, tools,  

equipment  or  vehicle  or  any  other  thing  so  seized  shall  be  

confiscated  by  the  order  of  the  court  competent  to  take  

cognizance and shall  be disposed of  in  accordance with the  

direction of such court as contemplated under sub-section 4(A)  

of Section 4 of the Act.  Sub-section (6) of Section 21 has been  

inserted by an Amendment Act of 1986 whereby an offence  

under  Sub-section  (1)  of  this  Section  has  been  made  

cognizable.  Section 22 which is very relevant for the instant  

case needs to be quoted hereinbelow :-

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“22. Cognizance of offences    No  court  shall  take  cognizance  of  any  offence  punishable  under  this  Act  or  any  rules  made  thereunder except  upon complaint in  writing  made  by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central  Government or the State Government.”

21. Reading  the  aforesaid  provision  would  show  that  

cognizance  of  any  offence  punishable  under  the  Act  or  the  

Rules  made  thereunder  shall  be  taken  only  upon  a  written  

complaint made by a person authorized in this behalf by the  

Central Government or the State Government.

22. Section 23(B) confers power to any gazetted officer of the  

Central or State Government authorized on that behalf to make  

search  of  minerals,  documents  or  things  in  case  there  is  a  

reason  to  believe  that  any  mineral  has  been  raised  in  

contravention of the Act or the Rules made thereunder.  While  

making search provisions of Section 100 of Code of Criminal  

Procedure has been made applicable to every search.

“23B. Power to search --. If any gazetted officer  of the Central or a State Government authorised by  the Central Government [or a State Government, as  the  case  may  be,  in  this  behalf  by  general  or  special order has reason to believe that any mineral  

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has been raised in contravention of the provisions  of  this  Act  or  rules  made  thereunder  or  any  document  or  thing  in  relation  to  such  mineral  is  secreted in any place [or vehicle,] he may search  for  such  mineral,  document  or  thing  and  the  provisions  of  section 100 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 shall apply to every such search.”

23. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 23(C)(1) of the  

MMDR  Act,  the  Government  of  Gujarat  made  rules  called  

Gujarat  Mineral  (Prevention  of  Illegal  Mining,  Transportation  

and Storage)  Rules,  2005.   The said  Rules,  inter  alia,  made  

provisions to search, seizure and confiscation of the property in  

the  manner  provided  under  the  Act  as  and  when  a  person  

violates  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the  Rules  made  

thereunder in doing mining activities.

24. Looking  into  the  provisions  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure,  1973 the relevant provisions need to be referred  

hereunder.   Section  2(c),  2(d)  and  2(h)  define  cognizable  

offence, complaint and investigation which reads as under :-

“2(c) “cognizable offence” means an offence for  which,  and  “cognizable  case”  means  a  case  in  which, a police officer may, in accordance with the  

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First Schedule or under any other law for the time  being in force, arrest without warrant;

2(d) “complaint”  means  any  allegation  made  orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to  his  taking  action  under  this  Code,  that  some  person,  whether  known  or  unknown,  has  committed  an  offence,  but  does  not  include  a  police report.

2(h) “investigation” includes all the proceedings  under  this  Code  for  the  collection  of  evidence  conducted  by  a  police  officer  or  by  any person  (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a  Magistrate in this behalf;”

25. Section 4 provides that all offences under the Indian Penal  

Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise  

dealt  with  according  to  the provisions  contained in  the  said  

Code.  Sub-section (2) of Section 4 provides that all offences  

under any other law shall be inquired into, tried and otherwise  

dealt with according to the same provisions but subject to any  

enactment  regulating  the  mining  or  place  of  investigation,  

inquiry or trial of such offences.  Coming to the provisions of  

Section 41 of the Code, it will show that a police officer without  

an order of Magistrate and warrant can arrest any person who  

commits a cognizable offence.  The Court may also arrest any  

person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made  

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or  credible  information  has  been  received  or  a  reasonable  

suspicion  exist  that  he  has  committed  a  cognizable  offence  

punishable with imprisonment for a term which made less than  

seven years.  The relevant part of Section 41, Cr.P.C. is quoted  

hereinbelow:-

“41.  When  police  may  arrest  without  warrant .-  (1)  Any  police  officer  may  without  an  order  from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest  any  person— (a) who commits, in the presence of  a police  officer, a cognizable offence; (b)  against  whom a reasonable complaint  has  been made, or credible information has been  received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that  he  has  committed  a  cognizable  offence  punishable with imprisonment for a term which  may be less  than seven years  or  which  may  extend to seven years whether with or without  fine,  if  the  following  conditions  are  satisfied,  namely:- (i)  the police  officer  has reason to  believe  on  the  basis  of  such  complaint,  information,  or  suspicion that such person has committed the  said offence; (ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest  is necessary-  (a)  to  prevent  such  person  from  committing  any further offence; or  (b) for proper investigation of the offence; or  (c)  to  prevent  such person  from causing  the  evidence  of  the  offence  to  disappear  or  tampering with such evidence in any manner;  or  (d)  to prevent  such person from making any  inducement,  threat  or  promise  to  any  person acquainted with the facts of the case so  

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as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts  to the Court or to the police officer; or  (e)  as  unless  such  person  is  arrested,  his  presence  in  the  Court  whenever  required  cannot be ensured,  and the police officer shall record while making  such arrest, his reasons in writing. ………………..”

26. Chapter 11 of the Code confers very important power and  

duty upon the police officer to take preventive action in certain  

cases.  Sections 149, 150, 151 and 152 of the Code are worth  

to be referred to and quoted hereinbelow :-

“149. Police  to  prevent  cognizable  offences – Every police officer may interpose for  the purpose of preventing, and shall, to the best  of  his  ability,  prevent,  the  commission  of  any  cognizable offence.

150.     Information  of  design  to  commit  cognizable  offences  –  Every  police  officer  receiving information of a design to commit any  cognizable  offence  shall  communicate  such  information  to  the  police  officer  to  whom he  is  subordinate, and to any other officer whose duty  it  is  to  prevent  or  take  cognizance  of  the  commission of any such offence.

151. Arrest  to  prevent  the  commission  of  cognizable offences – (1) A  police  officer,  knowing  of  a  design  to  commit  any  cognizable  offence  may  arrest,  without  orders  from  a  Magistrate and without a warrant, the person so  designing,  if  it  appears  to  such officer  that  the  commission  of  the  offence  cannot  be  otherwise  prevented.

(2) No person arrested under sub-section  (1)  shall  be  detained  in  custody  for  a  period  

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exceeding twenty-four hours from the time of his  arrest unless his further detention is required or  authorized under any other provisions of this Code  or any other law for the time being in force.

152. Prevention  of  injury  to  public  property.-  A  police  office  may  of  his  own  authority  interpose  to  prevent  any  injury  attempted  to  be  committed  in  his  view  to  any  public  property,  movable  or  immovable,  or  the  removal or injury of any public landmark or buoy  or other mark used for navigation.”

27.  Perusal of aforementioned provisions would show that a  

police officer of his own authority has the duty to prevent any  

injury attempted to be committed to any public property or  

national assets and to prosecute such person in accordance  

with law.

28. The policy and object of Mines and Minerals Act and Rules  

have  a  long  history  and  are  the  result  of  an  increasing  

awareness  of  the  compelling  need  to  restore  the  serious  

ecological imbalance and to stop the damages being caused to  

the nature.

29.  The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that adverse and  

destructive  environmental  impact  of  sand  mining  has  been  

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discussed  in  the  UNEP  Global  Environmental  Alert  Service  

report.   As  per  the  contents  of  the  report,  lack  of  proper  

scientific  methodology  for  river  sand  mining  has  led  to  

indiscriminate  sand  mining,  while  weak  governance  and  

corruption  have  led  to  widespread  illegal  mining.  While  

referring to the proposition in India,  it  was stated that Sand  

trading is a lucrative business, and there is evidence of illegal  

trading  such  as  the  case  of  the  influential  mafias  in  our  

Country.

30.    The  mining  of  aggregates  in  rivers  has  led  to  severe  

damage to river, including pollution and changes in levels of  

pH. Removing sediment from rivers causes the river to cut its  

channel through the bed of the valley floor, or channel incision,  

both  upstream  and  downstream  of  the  extraction  site.  This  

leads  to  coarsening  of  bed  material  and  lateral  channel  

instability.  It  can  change the  riverbed itself.  The removal  of  

more than 12 million tonnes of sand a year from the Vembanad  

Lake catchment in India has led to the lowering of the riverbed  

by  7  to  15  centimetres  a  year.  Incision  can  also  cause  the  

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alluvial aquifer to drain to a lower level, resulting in a loss of  

aquifer  storage.  It  can  also  increase  flood  frequency  and  

intensity  by  reducing  flood  regulation  capacity.  However,  

lowering the water table is most threatening to water supply  

exacerbating drought occurrence and severity as tributaries of  

major  rivers  dry  up  when  sand  mining  reaches  certain  

thresholds.

31.    Illegal  sand mining also causes erosion.  Damming and  

mining have reduced sediment delivery from rivers to  many  

coastal areas, leading to accelerated beach erosion.  

32.    The report also dealt with the astonishing impact of sand  

mining  on  the  economy.  It  states  that  the  tourism may  be  

affected through beach erosion.  Fishing,  both traditional  and  

commercial — can be affected through destruction of benthic  

fauna. Agriculture could be affected through loss of agricultural  

land from river erosion and the lowering of the water table. The  

insurance sector is affected through exacerbation of the impact  

of extreme events such as floods, droughts and storm surges  

through decreased protection of beach fronts. The erosion of  

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coastal areas and beaches affects houses and infrastructure. A  

decrease  in  bed  load  or  channel  shortening  can  cause  

downstream  erosion  including  bank  erosion  and  the  

undercutting or undermining of engineering structures such as  

bridges, side protection walls and structures for water supply.

33.   Sand is often removed from beaches to build hotels, roads  

and  other  tourism-related  infrastructure.  In  some  locations,  

continued  construction  is  likely  to  lead  to  an  unsustainable  

situation  and  destruction  of  the  main  natural  attraction  for  

visitors — beaches themselves.

34.    Mining from, within or near a riverbed has a direct impact  

on  the  stream’s  physical  characteristics,  such  as  channel  

geometry, bed elevation, substratum composition and stability,  

instream  roughness  of  the  bed,  flow  velocity,  discharge  

capacity,  sediment  transportation  capacity,  turbidity,  

temperature,  etc.  Alteration  or  modification  of  the  above  

attributes  may  cause  hazardous  impact  on  ecological  

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equilibrium of  riverine  regime.  This  may also  cause adverse  

impact  on  instream  biota  and  riparian  habitats.  This  

disturbance may also cause changes in channel configuration  

and flow-paths.  

35. In the case of  M. Palanisamy vs. The State of Tamil   

Nadu,  2012 (4) CTC 1, the amended provisions of the Tamil  

Nadu  Mines  and  Minerals  Concession  Rules,  1959  was  

challenged on the ground that the said Rules for the purpose of  

preventing  and  restricting  illegal  mining,  transportation  and  

storage of minerals are ultra vires constitutional provisions and  

the  provisions  of  the  Mine  and  Minerals  (Development  and  

Regulation) Act, 1957.  Upholding the vires of the Rules, the  

Division  Bench (one of  us,  Eqbal,  J.  as  he then was)  of  the  

Madras  High  Court,  elaborately  discussed  the  object  of  

restriction put in the illegal mining, transportation and storage  

of minerals including sand and after considering various reports  

observed thus:

“20.   In  order  to  appreciate  the  issue  involved  in  these  Writ  Petitions,  we  may  have  to  look  at  the  larger  picture  -  the  impact  of  indiscriminate,  

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uninterrupted sand quarrying on the already brittle  ecological set up of ours. According to expert reports,  for thousands of years, sand and gravel have been  used  in  the  construction  of  roads  and  buildings.  Today,  demand  for  sand  and  gravel  continues  to  increase.  Mining  operators,  instead  of  working  in  conjunction  with  cognizant  resource  agencies  to  ensure  that  sand  mining  is  conducted  in  a  responsible  manner,  are  engaged  in  full-time  profiteering.  Excessive  in-stream  sand-and-gravel  mining from river beds and like resources causes the  degradation  of  rivers.  In-stream mining  lowers  the  stream  bottom,  which  leads  to  bank  erosion.  Depletion  of  sand  in  the  stream-bed  and  along  coastal  areas  causes  the  deepening  of  rivers  and  estuaries  and  enlargement  of  river  mouths  and  coastal inlets. It also leads to saline-water intrusion  from  the  nearby  sea.  The  effect  of  mining  is  compounded  by  the  effect  of  sea  level  rise.  Any  volume  of  sand  exported  from  stream-beds  and  coastal areas is a loss to the system. Excessive in- stream  sand  mining  is  a  threat  to  bridges,  river  banks  and  nearby  structures.  Sand  mining  also  affects  the  adjoining  groundwater  system and  the  uses  that  local  people  make  of  the  river.  Further,  according  to  researches,  in-stream  sand  mining  results  in  the  destruction  of  aquatic  and  riparian  habitat  through  wholesale  changes  in  the  channel  morphology. The ill effects include bed degradation,  bed  coarsening,  lowered  water  tables  near  the  stream-bed, and channel instability.  These physical  impacts  cause  degradation  of  riparian  and  aquatic  biota  and may lead to  the undermining  of  bridges  and other  structures.  Continued  extraction  of  sand  from river beds may also cause the entire stream- bed to degrade to the depth of excavation.   22.  The  most  important  effects  of  in-stream sand  mining on aquatic habitats are bed degradation and  sedimentation, which can have substantial negative  effects on aquatic life. The stability of sand-bed and  gravel-bed streams depends  on a  delicate  balance  between stream flow,  the sediments supplied  from  the watershed and the channel form. Mining-induced  changes in sediment supply and channel form disrupt  the channel and the habitat development processes.  

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Furthermore,  movement  of  unstable  substrates  results in downstream sedimentation of habitats. The  affected distance depends on the intensity of mining,  particles  sizes,  stream  flows,  and  channel  morphology.  23.  Apart  from  threatening  bridges,  sand  mining  transforms the riverbeds into large and deep pits; as  a  result,  the  groundwater  table  drops  leaving  the  drinking water wells on the embankments of  these  rivers  dry.  Bed  degradation  from in-stream mining  lowers  the  elevation  of  stream  flow  and  the  floodplain water table, which in turn, can eliminate  water table-dependent woody vegetation in riparian  areas  and  decrease  wetted  periods  in  riparian  wetlands.  So far  as  locations  close  to  the  sea  are  concerned, saline water may intrude into the fresh  waterbody.”

36. In the case of   Centre for Public Interest Litigation  

vs.  Union  of  India,  (2012)  3  SCC  1,  this  Court,  while  

observing that the natural resources are the public property  

and national assets, held as under:-

“75. The State is  empowered to distribute natural  resources.  However,  as  they  constitute  public  property/national  asset,  while  distributing  natural  resources the State is bound to act in consonance  with the principles of equality and public trust and  ensure  that  no  action  is  taken  which  may  be  detrimental to public interest. Like any other State  action, constitutionalism must be reflected at every  stage  of  the  distribution  of  natural  resources.  In  Article 39(b) of the Constitution it has been provided  that  the  ownership  and  control  of  the  material  resources of the community should be so distributed  so as to best subserve the common good,  but no  comprehensive  legislation  has  been  enacted  to  generally define natural resources and a framework  

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for  their  protection.  Of  course,  environment  laws  enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures deal  with specific natural resources i.e. forest, air, water,  coastal zones, etc.”

37. In the case of M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath and others (1997)  

1 SCC 388, this Court while considering the doctrine of public trust which  

extend to natural resources observed as under:-

“24. The  ancient  Roman  Empire  developed  a  legal  theory known as the “Doctrine of the Public Trust”. It  was  founded  on  the  ideas  that  certain  common  properties such as rivers, seashore, forests and the air  were held by Government in  trusteeship for  the free  and  unimpeded  use  of  the  general  public.  Our  contemporary concern about “the environment” bear a  very close conceptual relationship to this legal doctrine.  Under  the  Roman  law  these  resources  were  either  owned  by  no  one  (res  nullious)  or  by  every  one  in  common (res communious). Under the English common  law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources  but  the  ownership  was  limited  in  nature,  the  Crown  could not  grant these properties  to private owners  if  the effect was to interfere with the public interests in  navigation or fishing. Resources that were suitable for  these uses  were  deemed to  be  held  in  trust  by  the  Crown  for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  Joseph  L.  Sax,  Professor of Law, University of Michigan — proponent of  the Modern Public Trust Doctrine — in an erudite article  “Public  Trust  Doctrine  in  Natural  Resource  Law :  Effective  Judicial  Intervention”,  Michigan Law Review,  Vol.  68,  Part  1  p.  473,  has  given  the  historical  background of the Public Trust Doctrine as under: “The source of modern public trust law is found in a  

concept  that  received  much  attention  in  Roman  and  English law — the nature of property rights in rivers, the  sea,  and  the  seashore.  That  history  has  been  given  considerable attention in the legal literature, need not  be  repeated in  detail  here.  But  two points  should  be  emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation  

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and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit  of  the  public;  accordingly,  property  used  for  those  purposes  was  distinguished  from  general  public  property  which the sovereign could routinely  grant to  private owners. Second, while it was understood that in  certain  common  properties  —  such  as  the  seashore,  highways,  and  running  water  —  ‘perpetual  use  was  dedicated  to  the  public’,  it  has  never  been  clear  whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent  infringement  of  those  interests.  Although  the  State  apparently  did  protect  public  uses,  no  evidence  is  available  that  public  rights  could  be  legally  asserted  against a recalcitrant government.”

25. The  Public  Trust  Doctrine  primarily  rests  on  the  principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and  the forests have such a great importance to the people  as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make  them a subject of private ownership. The said resources  being  a  gift  of  nature,  they  should  be  made  freely  available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.  The doctrine enjoins  upon the Government to protect  the resources for the enjoyment of the general public  rather than to permit their use for private ownership or  commercial  purposes.  According  to  Professor  Sax  the  Public Trust Doctrine imposes the following restrictions  on governmental authority:

“Three  types  of  restrictions  on  governmental  authority are often thought to be imposed by the public  trust:  first,  the property  subject  to  the  trust  must  not  only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held  available  for  use  by  the  general  public;  second,  the  property  may  not  be  sold,  even  for  a  fair  cash  equivalent; and third the property must be maintained  for particular types of uses.”

xxxxxxxxx 34. Our legal system — based on English common law  —  includes  the  public  trust  doctrine  as  part  of  its  jurisprudence.  The  State  is  the  trustee  of  all  natural  resources which are by nature meant for public use and  enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea- shore,  running  waters,  airs,  forests  and  ecologically  fragile  lands.  The State as a  trustee is  under  a  legal  

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duty to protect the natural resources. These resources  meant for public use cannot be converted into private  ownership.”

38. In the case of   Intellectuals Forum vs. State of A.P.,   

(2006) 3 SCC 549, this Court while balancing the conservation  

of natural resources vis-à-vis urban development observed as  

under:-

“67. The  responsibility  of  the  State  to  protect  the  environment  is  now  a  well-accepted  notion  in  all  countries.  It  is  this  notion  that,  in  international  law,  gave rise to the principle of “State responsibility” for  pollution emanating within one’s own territories (Corfu  Channel case). This responsibility is clearly enunciated  in  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Human  Environment, Stockholm 1972 (Stockholm Convention),  to which India was a party. The relevant clause of this  declaration  in  the  present  context  is  para  2,  which  states: “The natural resources of the earth, including the air,  water,  land,  flora  and  fauna  and  especially  representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be  safeguarded  for  the  benefit  of  present  and  future  generations through careful  planning or  management,  as appropriate.” Thus, there is no doubt about the fact that there is a  responsibility bestowed upon the Government to protect  and preserve the tanks, which are an important part of  the environment of the area.”

39. In  the  case  of  Manohar  Lal  Sharma  vs.  Principal   

Secretary,  (2014) 2 SCC 532,  this Court while  considering the  

power of the police officer observed as under:-

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“24. In the criminal justice system the investigation  of an offence is the domain of the police. The power  to  investigate  into  the  cognizable  offences  by  the  police  officer  is  ordinarily  not  impinged  by  any  fetters.  However,  such  power  has  to  be  exercised  consistent  with  the  statutory  provisions  and  for  legitimate  purpose.  The  courts  ordinarily  do  not  interfere  in  the  matters  of  investigation  by  police,  particularly,  when  the  facts  and  circumstances  do  not  indicate  that  the  investigating  officer  is  not  functioning  bona  fide.  In  very  exceptional  cases,  however, where the court finds that the police officer  has exercised his investigatory powers in breach of  the  statutory  provision  putting  the personal  liberty  and/or  the  property  of  the  citizen  in  jeopardy  by  illegal  and  improper  use  of  the  power  or  there  is  abuse of the investigatory power and process by the  police  officer  or  the  investigation  by  the  police  is  found  to  be  not  bona  fide  or  the  investigation  is  tainted with animosity,  the court  may intervene to  protect  the  personal  and/or  property  rights  of  the  citizens.”

40. In the case of  State of M.P.  vs. Ram Singh, (2000) 5  

SCC 88, this Court was considering an order by which the High  

Court quashed the investigation and consequent proceedings  

conducted and concluded by the police under Section 13(1)(e)  

and 13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988 on  the  

ground that the investigation had not been conducted by an  

authorized officer in terms of Section 17 of the Act.  The Court  

held that the Act was intended to make effective provision for  

the prevention of bribery  and  corruption  rampant  amongst  

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the public servants.  It is a social legislation intended to curb  

illegal  activities  of  the public  servant  and is  designed to  be  

liberally  construed  so  as  to  advance  its  object.   The  Court  

observed:-

“9. The  menace  of  corruption  was  found  to  have  enormously increased by the First and Second World War  conditions.  Corruption,  at  the  initial  stages,  was  considered confined to the bureaucracy which had the  opportunities to deal with a variety of State largesse in  the form of contracts, licences and grants. Even after the  war the opportunities for corruption continued as large  amounts of government surplus stores were required to  be disposed of by the public servants. As a consequence  of the wars the shortage of various goods necessitated  the  imposition  of  controls  and  extensive  schemes  of  post-war  reconstruction  involving  the  disbursement  of  huge  sums  of  money  which  lay  in  the  control  of  the  public  servants giving them a wide discretion with the  result of luring them to the glittering shine of wealth and  property.  In  order  to  consolidate  and amend the  laws  relating  to  prevention  of  corruption  and  matters  connected  thereto,  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1947  was  enacted  which  was  amended  from  time  to  time. In the year 1988 a new Act on the subject being  Act 49 of 1988 was enacted with the object of dealing  with the circumstances, contingencies and shortcomings  which were noticed in the working and implementation  of  the  1947  Act.  The  law  relating  to  prevention  of  corruption was essentially made to deal with the public  servants,  not  as  understood  in  common  parlance  but  specifically defined in the Act.

xxxxx 14. It may be noticed at this stage that a three-Judge  Bench of this Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR  1955  SC  196,  had  held  that  a  defect  or  illegality  in  investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on  the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance  or trial. Referring to the provisions of Sections 190, 193,  

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195 to 199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  (1898) in the context of an offence under the Prevention  of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held:

“A  defect  or  illegality  in  investigation,  however  serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the  procedure  relating  to  cognizance  or  trial.  No  doubt  a  police  report  which  results  from  an  investigation  is  provided in Section 190 Cr.PC as the material on which  cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a  valid  and  legal  police  report  is  the  foundation  of  the  jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. Section 190  Cr.PC is one out of a group of sections under the heading  ‘Conditions  requisite  for  initiation  of  proceedings’.  The  language of this section is in marked contrast with that  of  the  other  sections  of  the  group  under  the  same  heading, i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.

These latter sections regulate the competence of the  court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting  in  compliance  therewith.  But  Section  190  does  not.  While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of  Section  190(1)  are  conditions  requisite  for  taking  of  cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on  an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a  nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under  clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one  or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any  case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error  in  a  proceeding  antecedent  to  the  trial.  To  such  a  situation  Section  537  Cr.PC  which  is  in  the  following  terms is attracted:

‘Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no  finding,  sentence  or  order  passed  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  shall  be  reversed or  altered on  appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or  irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge,  proclamation,  order,  judgment  or  other  proceedings  before  or  during  trial  or  in  any  inquiry  or  other  proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission  or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.’ If,  therefore,  cognizance  is  in  fact  taken,  on  a  police  report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision  relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the  result  of  the trial  which follows it  cannot  be set aside  

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unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to  have  brought  about  a  miscarriage  of  justice.  That  an  illegality committed in the course of investigation does  not  affect  the  competence  and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in  —  ‘Parbhu v.  Emperor,  AIR  1944  PC  73,  and  —  ‘Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., AIR 1950 PC 26 ”  It further held:

“In  our  opinion,  therefore,  when  such  a  breach  is  brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the  trial,  the  court  will  have  to  consider  the  nature  and  extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for  such  reinvestigation  as  may  be  called  for,  wholly  or  partly,  and by such officer  as it  considers  appropriate  with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the  Act. It is in the light of the above considerations that the  validity or otherwise of the objection as to the violation  of  Section  5(4)  of  the Act  has  to  be decided and the  course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined.”

41. In the case of Directorate of Enforcement vs.  Deepak  

Mahajan,  (1994)  3  SCC  440,  the  question  came  up  for  

consideration before this Court was as to whether a Magistrate  

before whom a person arrested under Section 35 of the Foreign  

Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 is produced, has jurisdiction to  

authorize detention of that person under Section 167(2) of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure.  Answering that question the Court  

observed:-

“23. Keeping in view the cardinal principle of law that  every law is designed to further the ends of justice but  not to frustrate on the mere technicalities, we shall deal  

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with  all  those  challenges  in  the  background  of  the  principles of statutory interpretations and of the purpose  and the spirit  of the concerned Acts as gathered from  their intendment.

24. The  concerned  relevant  provisions  of  the  Acts  with  which  we  are  concerned,  no  doubt,  pose  some  difficulty  in  resolving  the  question  with  regard  to  the  jurisdiction of the Magistrate authorising detention and  subsequent extension of the same when the provisions  of  those  Acts  are  narrowly  and  literally  interpreted.  Though the function of the courts is only to expound the  law  and  not  to  legislate,  nonetheless  the  legislature  cannot be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties in the  implementation of its intention and the spirit of the law.  In  such  circumstances,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  mould or creatively interpret the legislation by liberally  interpreting the statute.

xxxxxxxxxxxx 134. There are a series of decisions of various High  

Courts, of course with some exception, taking the view  that a Magistrate before whom a person arrested by the  competent authority under the FERA or Customs Act is  produced,  can  authorise  detention  in  exercise  of  his  powers  under  Section  167.  Otherwise  the  mandatory  direction under the provision of Section 35(2) of FERA or  Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, to take every person  arrested  before  the  Magistrate  without  unnecessary  delay when the arrestee was not released on bail under  sub-section  (3)  of  those  special  Acts,  will  become  purposeless and meaningless and to say that the courts  even in the event of refusal of bail have no choice but to  set the person arrested at liberty by folding their hands  as a helpless spectator in the face of what is termed as  “legislative casus omissus” or legal flaw or lacuna, it will  become utterly illogical and absurd.”

42. In the case of Maqbool Hussain vs. State of Bombay,  

AIR 1953 SC 325, the question that fell for consideration before  

the Constitution Bench of this Court was whether by reason of  

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the  proceedings  taken  by  the  Sea  Customs  authorities  the  

appellant could be said to have been prosecuted and punished  

for the same offence with which he was charged in the court of  

the Chief  Presidency Magistrate,  Bombay.   In  the said  case,  

gold  had  been  brought  by  the  appellant  from  Jeddah  in  

contravention of the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation  

Act, 1947.  He was also liable to be prosecuted under the Sea  

Customs  Act.   The  prosecution  was  challenged  as  being  

violative of Article 20(2) of the Constitution.  The Constitution  

Bench answering the question held as under:

“…There is no doubt that the act which constitutes  an offence under  the Sea  Customs Act  as  also  an  offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act  was one and the same,  viz.,  importing the gold  in  contravention of the notification of the Government  of India dated the 25th August, 1948. The appellant  could be proceeded against under section 167(8) of  the Sea Customs Act as also under section 23 of the  Foreign  Exchange Regulation  Act  in  respect  of  the  said  act.  Proceedings  were  in  fact  taken  under  section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act which resulted  in the confiscation of the gold. Further proceedings  were taken under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange  Regulation  Act  by  way  of  filing  the  complaint  aforesaid  in  the  Court  of  the  Chief  Presidency  Magistrate, Bombay, and the plea which was taken  by the accused in bar of the prosecution in the Court  of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, was that he had  already been prosecuted and punished for the same  

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there is no substance in this argument, Section 53 of  the 1922 Act only requires that a person shall not be  proceeded against for an offence under Section 51 or  Section 52 of the 1922 Act "except at the instance of  the  Inspecting  Assistant  Commissioner".  It  is  not  disputed in the present case that the respondent has  filed  complaint  petitions  on  the  authority  of  the  Inspecting  Assistant  Commissioner.  There  is  no  statutory  requirement  that  the  complaint  petition  itself  must  be  filed  by  the  Inspecting  Assistant  Commissioner.  The  clause  "at  his  instance"  in  Section 53 of  the  1922  Act  only  means  "on  his  authority" and it is therefore sufficient compliance of  the statutory requirement if the complaint petition is  filed by the respondent on being authorised by the  Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.”

46. In  the  case  of  Collector  of  Customs  vs.  Vasantraj   

Bhagwanji Bhatia, 1988 (3) SCC 467, the question that arose  

for consideration before this Court was as to whether a person  

prosecuted under the Customs Act, 1962 was also liable to be  

prosecuted under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968.  In that case,  

person was acquitted from the charge of commission of offence  

under  the  Customs  Act.   Considering  the  question,  whether  

acquittal  of  that  person  will  create  a  bar  for  subsequent  

prosecution  under  the  Gold  (Control)  Act,  1968,  this  Court  

observed:

“It is therefore evident that the ingredients required  to be established in respect of the offence under the  

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Customs Act are altogether different from the ones  required to be established for an offence under the  Gold  (Control)  Act.  In  respect  of  the  former,  the  prosecution  has  to  establish  that  there  was  a  prohibition against the import into Indian sea waters  of goods which were found to be in the possession of  the  offender.  On the  other  hand in  respect  of  the  offence under the Gold (Control) Act, it is required to  be established that the offender was in possession of  primary gold meaning thereby gold of a purity of not  less than 9 carats in any unfinished or semi-finished  form.  In  regard  to  the  latter  offence  it  is  not  necessary to establish that there is any prohibition  against  the  import  of  gold  into  Indian  sea  waters.  Mere  possession  of  gold  of  purity  not  less  than  9  carats in any unfinished or semi-finished form would  be  an  offence  under  the  Gold  Control  Act.  It  is  therefore  stating  the  obvious  to  say  that  the  ingredients  of  the  two  offences  are  altogether  different.  Such  being  the  case  the  question  arises  whether  the  acquittal  for  the  offences  under  the  Customs  Act  which  requires  the  prosecution  to  establish altogether different ingredients operates as  a  bar  to  the  prosecution  of  the  same  person  in  connection with the charge of having committed the  offence under the Gold (Control) Act.”

47. In the case of Leo Roy Frey vs. Thomas Dana, AIR 1958  

SC 119, the question that arose for consideration before the  

Constitution Bench of this Court was as to whether conviction  

of  a  person  for  an  offence  under  Section  157(8)(c)  of  the  

Customs  Act  will  bar  a  subsequent  trial  for  conspiracy,  this  

Court observed that:

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Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and the matter was investigated by  

the Police.  At this stage, one of the accused persons moved  

the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the order of  

the Magistrate to take cognizance of the alleged offence.   The  

High Court took the view that Section 210, Cr.P.C. is attracted  

and that as an investigation by the Police was under progress  

in relation to the same offence, the learned Magistrate would  

be required to stay the proceedings on the complaint.   The  

High Court further held that learned Magistrate acted without  

jurisdiction in  taking cognizance of the offence.   The matter  

ultimately came to this Court at the instance of State of Bihar.  

Holding  that  Section  210 was  not  attracted,  Their  Lordships  

held:

“24. We are unable to accept the contention of Shri R.F.  Nariman that the specific allegation in the present case  concerns the specific act of killing of an elephant, and  that  such  an  offence,  at  all  events,  falls  within  the  overlapping areas between of Section 429 IPC on the  one hand and Section 9(1) read with Section 50(1) of  the Act on the other and therefore constitutes the same  offence. Apart from the fact that this argument does not  serve  to  support  the  order  of  the  High  Court  in  the  present case, this argument is, even on its theoretical  possibilities, more attractive than sound. The expression  “any  act  or  omission  which  constitutes  any  offence  under this Act” in Section 56 of the Act, merely imports  the idea that the same act or omission might constitute  

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an offence under another law and could be tried under  such other law or laws also.

xxxxxxxx

26. Broadly speaking, a protection against a second or  multiple  punishment  for  the  same  offence,  technical  complexities  aside,  includes  a  protection  against  re- prosecution  after  acquittal,  a  protection  against  re- prosecution  after  conviction  and  a  protection  against  double  or  multiple  punishment  for  the  same offence.  These  protections  have  since  received  constitutional  guarantee under Article  20(2).  But  difficulties  arise in  the application of the principle in the context of what is  meant by “same offence”. The principle in American law  is stated thus:

“The  proliferation  of  technically  different  offences  encompassed in a single instance of crime behaviour  has increased the importance of defining the scope  of  the  offence  that  controls  for  purposes  of  the  double jeopardy guarantee.

Distinct  statutory  provisions  will  be  treated  as  involving  separate  offences  for  double  jeopardy  purposes only if ‘each provision requires proof of an  additional  fact  which  the  other  does  not’  (Blockburger v.  United  States).  Where  the  same  evidence suffices to prove both crimes, they are the  same for double jeopardy purposes, and the clause  forbids successive trials and cumulative punishments  for the two crimes. The offences must be joined in  one  indictment  and  tried  together  unless  the  defendant  requests  that  they  be  tried  separately. (Jeffers v.United States,[1977]432 US 137)” 27. The  expression  “the  same  offence”,  

“substantially  the  same  offence”  “in  effect  the  same  offence” or “practically the same”, have not done much  to lessen the difficulty in applying the tests to identify  the  legal  common  denominators  of  “same  offence”.  Friedland in  Double Jeopardy (Oxford 1969) says at p.  108:

“The trouble with this approach is that it is vague  and hazy and conceals the thought processes of the  court.  Such an inexact test must depend upon the  individual  impressions  of  the  judges  and  can  give  

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little guidance for future decisions. A more serious   consequence is the fact that a decision in one case  that two offences are ‘substantially the same’ may  compel the same result in another case involving the  same two offences where the circumstances may be  such  that  a  second  prosecution  should  be  permissible....” 28. In  order  that  the  prohibition  is  attracted  the  

same act must constitute an offence under more than  one Act. If there are two distinct and separate offences  with  different  ingredients  under  two  different  enactments, a double punishment is not barred. In Leo  Roy  Frey v.  Superintendent,  District  Jail, the question  arose whether a crime and the offence of conspiracy to  commit it are different offences. This Court said:  

“The offence of  conspiracy to commit a crime is  a  different offence from the crime that is the object of  the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the  commission of the crime and is complete before the  crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime  attempted  or  completed  does  not  require  the  element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They  are, therefore, quite separate offences.”

50. It  is  well  known  principle  that  the  rule  against  double  

jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una  

et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy  

twice  for  one  and  the  same  offence.   Article  20  of  the  

Constitution  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  prosecuted  or  

punished for the offence more than once.  However, it is also  

settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment  

has no bar if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct.

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51. In the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh, (2003)  

2 SCC 152, a person was prosecuted for violation of prohibitory  

order issued by the Collector under Sections 5 and 6 of the  

Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Ordinance, 1987.  Against the said  

Ordinance, mass rally took place which led to the registration  

of FIRs against various persons for violation of prohibitory order  

under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act.  Persons, who were arrested,  

moved a petition challenging the vires of the Ordinance and  

the  Act.   The  High  Court  upholding  the  vires  of  the  

Ordinance/Act  held  that  the  provisions  of  Sections  5  and  6  

overlapped each other and that a person could be found guilty  

only of the offence of contravening a prohibitory order under  

either  Section  6(1)  or  Section  6(2)  of  the  Act.   This  Court  

discussing the doctrine of double jeopardy and Section 26 of  

the General Clauses Act held as under:

“We are,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that  in  a  given  case, same set of facts may give rise to an offence  punishable under  Section  5 and Section  6(3)  both.  There is nothing unconstitutional or illegal about it.  So  also  an  act  which  is  alleged  to  be  an  offence  under Section 6(3) of the Act and if for any reason  prosecution  under  Section  6(3)  does  not  end  in  

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conviction, if the ingredients of offence under Section  5 are made out, may still  be liable to be punished  under  Section  5  of  the  Act.  We,  therefore,  do  not  agree with the High Court to the extent to which it  has been held that once a prohibitory  order under  sub-section  (1)  or  (2)  has  been  issued,  then  a  criminal  act  done  after  the  promulgation  of  the  prohibitory order can be punished only under Section  6(3) and in spite of prosecution under Section 6(3)  failing,  on  the  same  set  of  facts  the  person  proceeded against cannot be held punishable under  Section  5  of  the  Act  although  the  ingredients  of  Section 5 are fully made out.

52. Learned counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  put  heavy  

reliance  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Avtar  

Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 666, in which the  

appellant was prosecuted and convicted for theft of electrical  

energy under  Section 39 of  the  Indian  Electricity  Act,  1910.  

The said conviction was challenged on the ground that as his  

prosecution  was  for  an  offence  against  the  Act  it  was  

incompetent as it had not been instituted at the instance of any  

person mentioned in Section 50 of the Act.  Section 39 of the  

Act provides that if a person  dishonestly abstracts, consumes  

or uses any energy shall be deemed to have committed theft  

within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. It is not in dispute  

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that  case,  the  respondent,  who  passed  the  Chartered  

Accountant  examination  but  was  not  a  member  of  the  

appellant’s  Institute  of  Chartered  Accounts,  allegedly  

represented  before  the  Income  Tax  Department  and  the  

authorities constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Trade Tax  

Act  on  the  basis  of  power  of  attorney  or  as  legal  

representative  and  submitted  documents  such  as  audit  

reports and certificates required to be issued by the Chartered  

Accountants  by  preparing  forged  seals  and  thereby  

impersonated  himself  as  Chartered  Accountant.   He  was  

accordingly prosecuted and charge was framed against him  

under Sections 419, 468, 471 and 472, IPC.  The respondent  

challenged  the  order  by  filing  revision  under  Section  397,  

Cr.P.C.  The Additional Sessions Judge set aside the order of  

the Magistrate and remanded the case to the trial court with a  

direction to decide whether there are sufficient grounds for  

framing charges under Sections 419, 468, 471 and 473, IPC  

read with Sections 24 and 26 of the C.A. Act.  After remand,  

the trial court passed an order holding that there was no basis  

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the court cannot interpret the provisions of the Act in  a  manner  which  will  deprive  the  victim  of  the  offences defined in Sections 416, 463, 464, 468 and  471 of his right to prosecute the wrongdoer by filing  the first  information  report  or  complaint  under  the  relevant provisions of CrPC.”

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42. The submission of Shri Gupta that the respondent  cannot be prosecuted for the offences defined under  IPC because no complaint had been filed against him  by  the  court  concerned  or  authority  as  per  the  requirement  of  Section  195(1)(b)(ii)  CrPC  sounds  attractive but lacks merit. The prohibition contained  in Section 195 CrPC against taking of cognizance by  the court except on a complaint in writing made by  the court  concerned before which the document is  produced or given in a proceeding is not attracted in  the case like the present one because the officers of  the  Income  Tax  Department  and  the  authorities  constituted  under  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Trade  Tax  Act, 1995 before whom the respondent is alleged to  have acted on the basis of power of attorney or as  legal representative or produced audit report do not  fall within the ambit of the term “court” as defined in  Section  195(3)  CrPC.  Such  officer/authorities  were  neither discharging the functions of a civil, revenue  or  criminal  court  nor  could  they  be  treated  as  tribunal constituted by or under the Central or State  Act, which is declared to be a court for the purpose  of Section 195.”

55. There cannot be any two opinions that natural resources  

are the assets of the nation and its citizens. It is the obligation  

of  all  concerned,  including  the  Central  and  the  State  

Governments,  to  conserve  and  not  waste  such  valuable  

resources.  Article  48-A  of  the  Constitution  requires  that  the  

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State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment  

and safeguard the forests and wild life of the country. Similarly,  

Article 51-A enjoins a duty upon every citizen to protect and  

improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers  

and  wild  life,  and  to  have  compassion  for  all  the  living  

creatures. In view of the Constitutional provisions, the Doctrine  

of  Public  Trust  has  become  the  law  of  the  land.  The  said  

doctrine rests on the principle that certain resources like air,  

sea, waters and forests are of such great importance to the  

people as a whole that it would be highly unjustifiable to make  

them a subject of private ownership.

56. Reading the provisions of the Act minutely and carefully,  

prima facie we are of the view that there is no complete and  

absolute  bar  in  prosecuting  persons  under  the  Indian  Penal  

Code where the offences committed by persons are penal and  

cognizable offence.

57.   Sub-section (1A) of Section 4 of the MMDR Act puts a  

restriction in  transporting and storing any mineral  otherwise  

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than in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules  

made thereunder.   In  other  words no person will  do  mining  

activity without a valid lease or license.  Section 21 is a penal  

provision  according  to  which  if  a  person  contravenes  the  

provisions of  Sub-section (1A) of Section 4 shall be prosecuted  

and punished in the manner and procedure provided in the Act.  

Sub-section (6) has been inserted in Section 4 by amendment  

making  the  offence  cognizable  notwithstanding  anything  

contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

58. Section 22 of the Act puts a restriction on the court to  

take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act or any  

rule  made  thereunder  except  upon  a  complaint  made  by  a  

person authorized in this behalf.

59. It is very important to note that Section 21 does not begin  

with  a  non-obstante  clause.  Instead  of  the  words  

“notwithstanding anything contained in any law for  the time  

being in force no court shall take cognizance…..”, the Section  

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begins with the words “no court shall take cognizance of any  

offence.”

60. It is well known that a non-obstante clause is a legislative  

device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to  

certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be  

found either in the same enactment or some other enactment,  

that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary  

provisions.

61. In  Liverpool  Borough   vs.   Turner  Lord  Campbell  

(1861), 30 L.J. Ch.379,  C.J. at page 380 said :-

“No  universal  rule  can  be  laid  down  for  the  construction  of  statutes,  as  to  whether  mandatory  enactments  shall  be  considered  directory  only  or  obligatory,  with  an  implied  nullification  for  disobedience.  It is the duty of courts to try to get at  the  real  intention  of  the  legislature  by  carefully  attending to  the  whole  scope of  the statute to  be  construed.”

62. In Pratap Singh  vs.  Shri Krishna Gupta, AIR 1956 SC  

140  at  page  141,  the  Supreme  Court  while  interpreting  the  

mandatory  and  directory  provisions  of  statute  observed  as  

under:-  

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“We do not think that is right and we deprecate  this  tendency  towards  technicality;  it  is  the  substance  that  counts  and  must  take  precedence  over  mere  form.    Some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter;  they cannot be broken; others are only directory and  a breach of them can be overlooked provided there is  substantial compliance with the rules read as whole  and  provided  no  prejudice  ensues;  and  when  the  legislature does not  itself  state which Judges must  determine  the  matter  and  exercising  a  nice  discrimination,  sort  out  one  class  from  the  other  along broad based, commonsense lines.”

63. The  question  is  whether  a  statute  is  mandatory  or  

directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not  

upon the language in which the intent is clothed.  The meaning  

and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to  

be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision,  

but  also  by  considering  its  nature,  its  design,  and  the  

consequences  which would  follow from construing  it  the  one  

way or the other.

64. In Maxell on the Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edn. at  

page 381, it is stated thus :-

“On the other hand, where the prescriptions of  a statute relate to the performance of a public duty  and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of  them would work serious  general  inconvenience or  injustice to persons who have no control over those  entrusted  with  the  duty  without  promoting  the  essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions  

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seem  to  be  generally  understood  as  mere  instructions  for  the  guidance  and  government  of  those  on  whom  the  duty  is  imposed,  or,  in  other  words, as directory only.  The neglect of them may  be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of  the act done in disregard of them.”

65. In the case of  State of U.P. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya,  

AIR  1961  SC  751,  while  interpreting  a  particular  statute  as  

mandatory or directory this Court observed :-

“When a statute uses the word ‘shall’,  ‘prima  facie’, it is mandatory, but the court may ascertain  the  real  intention  of  the  legislature  by  carefully  attending  to  the  whole  scope  of  the  statute.   For  ascertaining the real intention of the legislature the  court  may consider,  inter  alia,  the  nature  and the  design of the statute, and the consequences which  would follow from construing it the one way or the  other,  the  impact  of  other  provisions  whereby  the  necessity  of  complying  with  the  provisions  in  question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that  the statute provides  for  a contingency of  the non- compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non- compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by  some  penalty,  the  serious  or  trivial  consequences  that  flow  therefrom,  and,  above  all,  whether  the  object  of  the  legislation  will  be  defeated  or  furthered.”

66. Considering  the  principles  of  interpretation  and  the  

wordings  used  in  Section  22,  in  our  considered  opinion,  the  

provision is not a complete and absolute bar for taking action by  

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the  police  for  illegal  and  dishonestly  committing  theft  of  

minerals including sand from the river bed.

67. The Court shall take judicial notice of the fact that over the  

years rivers in India have been affected by the alarming rate of  

unrestricted sand mining which is damaging the eco-system of  

the rivers and safety of bridges.  It also weakens river beds, fish  

breeding and destroys the natural habitat of many organisms.  

If these illegal activities are not stopped by the State and the  

police  authorities  of  the  State,  it  will  cause  serious  

repercussions  as  mentioned  hereinabove.   It  will  not  only  

change  the  river  hydrology  but  also  will  deplete  the  ground  

water levels.

68. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions  

imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein.  In  

any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in  

contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections  

of the Act,  the officer empowered and authorized under the  

Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint  

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before the jurisdictional magistrate.  It is also not in dispute  

that the Magistrate shall in such cases take cognizance on the  

basis  of  the  complaint  filed  before  it  by  a  duly  authorized  

officer.  In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other  

provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist Magistrate  

for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record  

submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act.  

In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the  

Act  against  prosecution  of  a  person  except  on  a  complaint  

made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought  

to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and  

not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under  

Indian Penal Code.

69. However, there may be situation where a person without  

any  lease  or  licence  or  any  authority  enters  into  river  and  

extracts  sands,  gravels  and  other  minerals  and  remove  or  

transport  those  minerals in  a  clandestine  manner  with  an  

intent  to  remove  dishonestly  those  minerals  from  the  

possession   of  the  State,  is  laible  to  be   punished  for  

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committing such offence under Sections 378 and 379 of the  

Indian Penal Code.  

70. From a close reading of the provisions of MMDR Act and  

the  offence  defined  under  Section  378,  IPC,  it  is  manifest  

that the ingredients constituting the offence are different.  The  

contravention of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing  

mining activity in violation of Section 4 of the Act is an offence  

punishable  under  Section  21  of  the  MMDR  Act,  whereas  

dishonestly removing sand, gravels and other minerals from  

the river,  which is  the property of  the State,  out  of  State’s  

possession without the consent, constitute an offence of theft.  

71. Hence,  merely  because  initiation  of  proceeding  for  

commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of  

complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from taking  

action  against  persons  for  committing  theft  of  sand  and  

minerals in the manner mentioned above by exercising power  

under  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  submit  a  report  

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before  the  Magistrate  for  taking  cognizance  against  such  

person.  In other words, in a case where there is a theft of  

sand and gravels from the Government land, the police can  

register a case, investigate the same and submit a final report  

under  Section  173,  Cr.P.C.  before  a  Magistrate  having  

jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in  

Section 190 (1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

72. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in  

the light of relevant provisions of the Act vis-à-vis the Code of  

Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code, we are of the  

definite  opinion  that  the  ingredients  constituting  the  offence  

under  the  MMDR  Act  and  the  ingredients  of  dishonestly  

removing sand and gravel from the river beds without consent,  

which is the property of the State, is a distinct offence under the  

IPC.  Hence, for the commission of offence under Section 378  

Cr.P.C., on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having  

jurisdiction  can  take  cognizance  of  the  said  offence  without  

awaiting  the  receipt  of  complaint  that  may  be  filed  by  the  

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authorized officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of  

various provisions of the MMRD Act.  Consequently the contrary  

view taken by the different High Courts cannot be sustained in  

law  and,  therefore,  overruled.   Consequently,  these  criminal  

appeals  are  disposed  of  with  a  direction  to  the  concerned  

Magistrates to proceed accordingly.

…………………………….J. [ M.Y. Eqbal ]

…………………………….J. [Pinaki Chandra Ghose]

New Delhi September 04, 2014

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