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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 10613  OF 2014 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.36237 of 2012)

STATE OF M.P. & ORS.        …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

PARVEZ KHAN                  …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment  

and Order dated 20th March, 2012 of the High Court of Madhya  

Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No.262 of 2010.

3. The  question  raised for  our  consideration  is  whether  the  

refusal  by  the  competent  authority  to  give  compassionate  

appointment  in  police  service  on  the  ground  of  criminal

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antecedents of a candidate who is acquitted for want of evidence  

or  who  is  discharged  from  the  criminal  case  on  account  of  

compounding can be justified.

4. Sultan Khan was serving with the Madhya Pradesh Police.  

He died in harness on 21st June, 2005.  His son, the respondent  

Parvez  Khan,  applied  for  compassionate  appointment.   The  

competent authority sent his record for police verification.  It was  

found that he was involved in two criminal cases.  In one case,  

he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 325,  

294 and  506-B/34  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code and  in  the  other  

under Sections 452, 394 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code.  The  

Superintendent  of  Police  held  that  he  was  not  eligible  for  

appointment in Government service and closed his case.   

5. The respondent challenged the said order by way of Writ  

Petition No.15052 of 2008 on the ground that in the first case he  

was acquitted on 31st January, 2007 and in the second he was  

discharged on account of compounding of offence.    

6. Learned  Single  Judge  did  not  find  any  merit  in  his  

contention in the writ petition and dismissed the petition.   On  

appeal, the Division Bench took a different view.  It was held that  

the object of verification was to verify suitability of a candidate  

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for employment.  Since the respondent was acquitted in both the  

criminal  cases  he  could  not  be  considered  unsuitable.    No  

reason had been given as to why after acquittal in the criminal  

case,  the  respondent  was  considered  to  be  unsuitable.  

Accordingly, the Division Bench directed consideration of case of  

the respondent afresh in the light of observations in the order  

within three months.  Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has  

preferred this appeal.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

8. Learned  counsel  for  the  State  submitted  that  since  on  

police verification, it was found that the respondent was involved  

in criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he could not be given  

appointment.  Mere acquittal for want of evidence or discharge  

on account of compromise could not be taken to be conclusive  

for suitability of a candidate. The result of criminal proceedings  

was not conclusive of suitability of a candidate for recruitment to  

police service.

9. It is submitted that in a criminal case, a person cannot be  

punished in absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt but the  

standard  of  proof  required  for  consideration  of  suitability  or  

otherwise  of  a  candidate  was  not  the  same.   Discharge  on  

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account of compounding of the offence by the victim depended  

upon the attitude of the parties.  The victim may be prepared to  

settle the matter for any consideration other than innocence of  

the accused, but it did not wash off the criminal antecedents of  

an accused.  Entering into police service required a candidate to  

be of character, integrity and clean antecedents.  If a person is  

acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was  

falsely involved and he had no criminal antecedents.   All that  

may be inferred is  that he has not  been proved to  be guilty.  

Reliance  has  been  placed  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh1.

10. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  supported  the  

impugned order and submitted that some other similarly placed  

candidates had been given compassionate appointment.   Two  

such instances have been pointed out by the respondent in the  

counter  affidavit.    He  has  also  submitted  that  the  State  of  

Madhya Pradesh has issued Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003 for  

character  verification  of  candidates  for  recruitment  to  

Government service and such guidelines do no justify rejection  

of candidature of the respondent.  One of the instances given is  

of  Dilip  Kumar  Samadhiya  son  of  Shri  Jagdish  Prasad   1 2013 (7) SCC 685

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Samadhiya against whom three criminal cases were registered  

prior  to  the  recruitment  in  Government  service  but  he  was  

acquitted  either  on  account  of  compromise  or  on  account  of  

benefit  of  doubt.  Still,  he was given appointment.    Similarly,  

Jitender Sharma was recruited to Police service though he was  

tried  for  a  criminal  case,  but  acquitted  on  account  of  

compounding  or  on  the  basis  of  benefit  of  doubt.   As  per  

Guidelines  dated 5th June,  2003,  an independent  view can be  

taken only where candidate has concealed the information about  

pendency of trial and not where there is no such concealment,  

as in the present case.

11. After  due  consideration,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  

impugned order cannot be sustained.  Refusal by the competent  

authority  to  recruit  the  respondent  on the  ground  of  criminal  

antecedents is not liable to be interfered with.  The applicable  

Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003 inter alia provide :

“On the basis  of  merits  and demerits  by the Hon’ble   Court  the  acquitted candidate  will  be eligible  for  the  Government Service.”

The above guidelines show that acquittal is not conclusive.  

Even after acquittal, basis of order of the Court has to be gone  

into by the competent authority.    Even after order based on  

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compromise  or  lack  of  evidence  may  render  a  candidate  

ineligible.   In the present case, the relevant part of the order of  

the Superintendent of Police is as follows:

“Action was taken in regard to the proceedings of   compassionate appointment, character verification  was  got  done,  wherein  vide  Letter  No.V.S./21/VHR/2007/17(F)283/07  dated 17.9.2007  of the Police Headquarters it was informed that a  case under Section 294, 323, 506, 324, 34 of IPC   had been registered against the applicant in Police   Station  Kotwali  as  Crime  No.185/06  and  the  applicant  was  acquitted  on  the  basis  of  a  compromise  by  the  Court  on  23.2.2007.   In  the   same  manner  in  Crime  No.494/06  under  Section   394, 364, 451 of IPC a case was registered and vide   judgment  dated  31.1.2007  of  the  Court  he  was  acquitted.

Two separate crimes had been registered against   the  applicant,  wherein  in  one  case  Section  394,   451, 365 of IPC are there and which come in the   category of moral turpitude.  In the judgment of the  Court benefit of doubt has been given, therefore, as   per  the  new  guidelines  of  2003  issued  by  the   Government  of  Madhya  Pradesh  in  respect  of   character  verification  the  applicant  Parvez  Khan  alias Sonu alias Raja has been found to be ineligible   for Government service.”

12. In Mehar Singh (supra), the question considered by this Court  

was as follows :

“18. The question before this Court is whether the   candidature of the respondents who had made a  clean breast of their involvement in a criminal case  by  mentioning  this  fact  in  their   application/attestation  form  while  applying  for  a   post  of  Constable  in  Delhi  Police,  who  were   

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provisionally  selected  subject  to  verification  of   their  antecedents  and  who  were  subsequently   acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be   cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi   Police  on  the  ground  that  they  are  not  found  suitable for appointment to the post of Constable.”

After considering the rival contentions, the Court held :

“23. A  careful  perusal  of  the  policy  leads  us  to   conclude  that  the  Screening  Committee  would  be  entitled  to  keep  persons  involved  in  grave  cases  of   moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are   acquitted or  discharged if it feels that the acquittal or   discharge is  on  technical  grounds  or  not  honourable.   The  Screening  Committee  will  be  within  its  rights  to   cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the   acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct   of  the  prosecution  case  or  is  the  result  of  material   witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers   of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge   whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely   to  revert  to  similar  activities  in  future  with  more  strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police   force. The Screening Committee will  have to consider   the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in   the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for   worsening  the  law  and  order  situation  rather  than  maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the  Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this   Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only   persons  with  impeccable  character  enter  the  police  force.

24. We find  no  substance in  the  contention  that  by  cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening   Committee  has  overreached  the  judgments  of  the  criminal court. We are aware that the question of co- relation between a criminal  case and a departmental   enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can   be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in   connection  with  it  because  the  issue  involved  is   somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person  with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While   

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the standard of  proof  in a criminal  case is  the proof   beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  the  proof  in  a   departmental  proceeding  is  preponderance  of   probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal   because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not   acquittals  on merit.  An acquittal  based on benefit  of   doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal   on  merit  after  a  full-fledged  trial,  where  there  is  no   indication  of  the  witnesses  being  won  over.  In  R.P.  Kapur v.  Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 787] this Court   has taken a view that departmental  proceedings can   proceed even though a person is acquitted when the  acquittal is other than honourable.

25. The  expression  “honourable  acquittal”  was  considered by this  Court in  S.  Samuthiram [2013 (1)  SCC 598].  In that case this Court was concerned with a   situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated  against  a  police  officer.  Criminal  case  was  pending  against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4   of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case  because  of  the  non-examination  of  key  witnesses.   There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal   case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring  to the judgment of  this Court in  RBI v.  Bhopal Singh  Panchal  [1994 (1) SCC 541] where in somewhat similar   fact  situation,  this  Court  upheld  a  bank’s  action  of   refusing  to  reinstate  an  employee  in  service  on  the   ground that in the criminal  case he was acquitted by  giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not   an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High  Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment   imposed in the departmental proceedings.  This  Court   observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”,  “acquitted  of  blame”  and  “fully  exonerated”  are  unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal   Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is   difficult  to  define  what  is  meant  by  the  expression   “honourably  acquitted”.  This  Court  expressed  that  when the accused is acquitted after full consideration   of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably   fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused,   it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably   acquitted.

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26. In light of  the above, we are of  the opinion that   since the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to   keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or   dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of   moral  turpitude,  out  of  the  department,  if  found  necessary, because they pollute the department, surely   the above principles will apply with more vigour at the   point of entry of a person in the police department i.e.   at  the  time  of  recruitment.  If  it  is  found  by  the   Screening Committee that the person against whom a  serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is   discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the   same charge but the acquittal  is  not honourable,  the   Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel  his   candidature.  Stricter  norms need to be applied  while   appointing  persons  in  a  disciplinary  force  because   public interest is involved in it.

27. Against  the  above  background,  we  shall  now  examine  what  is  the  nature  of  acquittal  of  the  respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal,   respondent  Mehar  Singh and others  armed with  iron   chains,  lathis,  danda,  stones,  etc.  stopped  a  bus,   rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to   take the fare from one of their associates. Those who  intervened were beaten up. They received injuries. The   miscreants broke the side windowpanes of the bus by  throwing  stones.  The  complainant  was  also  injured.   This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public   order.  The assault  on  the conductor  was  preplanned   and  premeditated.  The  FIR  was  registered  under   Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 IPC. The order dated   30-1-2009  passed  by  the  Additional  Chief  Judicial   Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under   Sections  323,  341  and  427  IPC  are  concerned,  the  accused  entered  into  a  compromise  with  the  complainant. Hence, the learned Magistrate acquitted   respondent  Mehar  Singh  and  others  of  the  said  offences.  The  order  further  indicates  that  so  far  as  offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 IPC is   concerned,  three  main  witnesses  turned  hostile.  The  learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused   of  the  said  offence.  This  acquittal  can  never  be   described as an acquittal on merits after a full-fledged   trial. Respondent Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in   

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the  police  force  by  portraying  this  acquittal  as  an   honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no discussion   on merits of the case in this order. Respondent Mehar   Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the   evidence.

28. So far as respondent  Shani Kumar is  concerned,   the FIR lodged against him stated that he along with   other  accused  abused  and  threatened  the  complainant’s brother. They opened fire at him due to   which he sustained bullet injuries. The offences under   Sections 307, 504 and 506 IPC were registered against   respondent Shani Kumar and others. The order dated   14-5-2010  passed  by  the  Sessions  Judge,   Muzaffarnagar  shows  that  the  complainant  and  the  injured person did not  support  the prosecution  case.   They  were  declared  hostile.  Hence,  the  learned  Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt   and acquitted them. This again is not a clean acquittal.   The use of firearms in this manner is a serious matter.   For entry in the police force, acquittal order based on   benefit  of  doubt  in  a  serious  case  of  this  nature  is   bound to act as an impediment.

29. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil  Kumar  [1996(11)  CC  605].   In  that  case,  the  respondent therein had appeared for recruitment as a   Constable  in  Delhi  Police  Services.  He  was  selected  provisionally,  but,  his  selection  was  subject  to   verification of character and antecedents by the local   police.  On  verification,  it  was  found  that  his   antecedents  were  such  that  his  appointment  to  the   post  of  Constable  was  not  found  desirable.   Accordingly,  his  name was  rejected.  He  approached  the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on  the  ground  that  since  the  respondent  had  been  discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable  under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34   and Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of   appointment to the post under the State. This Court   disapproved  of  the  Tribunal’s  view.  It  was  observed  that verification of  the character and antecedents is   one  of  the  important  criteria  to  test  whether  the   selected candidate is suitable for the post under the  State. This Court observed that though the candidate  

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was  provisionally  selected,  the  appointing  authority   found it not desirable to appoint him on account of his   antecedent  record  and  this  view  taken  by  the  appointing  authority  in  the  background  of  the  case   cannot  be  said  to  be  unwarranted.  Whether  the  respondent  was  discharged  or  acquitted  of  the   criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the   question as to whether he should be appointed to the   post.  What  would  be  relevant  is  the  conduct  or   character  of  the  candidate  to  be  appointed  to  a   service and not the actual result thereof.

30. It  was  argued  that  Sushil  Kumar must  be  distinguished  from  the  facts  of  the  instant  case  because  the  respondent  therein  had  concealed  the   fact that a criminal case was registered against him,   whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment.   It is not possible for us to accept this submission. The   aspect of  concealment was not  considered in  Sushil  Kumar   at  all.  This  Court  only  concentrated  on  the   desirability  to  appoint  a  person,  against  whom  a  criminal case is pending, to a disciplined force.  Sushil  Kumar cannot  be restricted to cases where there is   concealment of the fact by a candidate that a criminal   case was registered against him. When the point of   concealment  or  otherwise  and  its  effect  was  not  argued  before  this  Court,  it  cannot  be  said  that  in   Sushil  Kumar this  Court  wanted  to  restrict  its   observations to the cases where there is concealment   of facts.

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33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned,   his case appears to have been compromised. It was  urged  that  acquittal  recorded  pursuant  to  a   compromise  should  not  be  treated  as  a  disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose  of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no   merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements  have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and   amiable atmosphere in  the society by according a   quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also   to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from   the  agony  of  pending  litigation.  But  these  

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considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to   maintain integrity and high standard of police force,   the  Screening  Committee  may  decline  to  take  cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be   dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted  for that.

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35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders   the great responsibility of maintaining law and order   and public order in the society. People repose great   faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that   confidence.  A  candidate  wishing  to  join  the  police   force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must   have  impeccable  character  and  integrity.  A  person   having  criminal  antecedents  will  not  fit  in  this   category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the   criminal  case,  that  acquittal  or  discharge order  will   have to  be  examined to  see whether  he  has  been  completely  exonerated in  the case because even a   possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a   threat  to  the  discipline  of  the  police  force.  The   Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of   taking  decisions  in  these  matters  to  the  Screening  Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee   must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent   times,  the  image  of  the  police  force  is  tarnished.   Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward  manner by misusing power are in public domain and  are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police   force  has  taken  a  beating.  In  such  a  situation,  we   would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of   a mechanism like the Screening Committee created  by the Delhi  Police to ensure that persons who are   likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police   force.  At  the  same  time,  the  Screening  Committee   must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed   in  it  and  must  treat  all  candidates  with  an  even  hand.”

13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a  

candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of  

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confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must  

have  impeccable  character  and  integrity.  A  person  having  

criminal antecedents will not fit in this category.  Even if he is  

acquitted  or  discharged,  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  he  was  

completely  exonerated.   Persons  who  are  likely  to  erode  the  

credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force.  No  

doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the  

case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned  

counsel  for  the  Respondent,  in  the  present  case,  the  

Superintendent  of  Police  has  gone  into  the  matter.   The  

Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority.  There is no  

allegation  of  mala  fides against  the  person  taking  the  said  

decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.  

There  is  no  material  to  show  that  the  appellant  was  falsely  

implicated.    Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want of  

evidence or discharge based on compounding.

14. The plea of parity with two other persons who were recruited  

can also not help the respondent.  This aspect of the matter was  

also gone into by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and it was  

held :

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“36. The  Screening  Committee’s  proceedings  have  been  assailed  as  being  arbitrary,  unguided  and  unfettered.  But,  in  the  present  cases,  we  see  no   evidence of this. However, certain instances have been  pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious   offences have been recommended for appointment by   the Screening Committee. It is well settled that to such   cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of   the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine   does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur (2010  (11) SCC 455). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or   fraud  because it  embodies  a  positive  concept.  If  the  Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out   the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that   people  with  doubtful  background  do  not  enter  the  police force, deviates from the policy, makes exception   and  allows  entry  of  undesirable  persons,  it  is   undoubtedly  guilty  of  committing  an  act  of  grave  disservice to the police force but we cannot allow that   illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents   to  rely  on  such  cases.  It  is  for  the  Commissioner  of   Police,  Delhi  to  examine  whether  the  Screening   Committee has compromised the interest of the police   force in any case and to take remedial action if he finds   that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-depth  examination  of  this  allegation  at  the  highest  level.   Perhaps,  such  deviations  from  the  policy  are  responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect   the  Commissioner  of  Police,  Delhi  to  look  into  the   matter and if  there is substance in the allegations to   take  necessary  steps  forthwith  so  that  policy   incorporated  in  the  Standing  Order  is  strictly   implemented.”

15. Having given our thoughtful  consideration,  we are of  the  

view that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified  

in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the respondent  

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for  recruitment  to  the  police  service  by  way  of  giving  him  

compassionate appointment.

16. Accordingly,  we  allow  this  appeal  and  set  aside  the  

impugned order.  There will be no order as to costs.

…………………………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

.…………………………………………J. (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 1, 2014.

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