Page 1

REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 860 OF 2015

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.1059/2014)

STATE OF M.P Appellant

VERSUS

MANISH & ORS Respondent(s)      

   O R D E R

Leave granted. Heard  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant

and the respondents.  The  appellant/State  of  Madhya  Pradesh

seeks to challenge the order of the High Court of  Madhya  Pradesh  dated  25.6.2013  passed  in Misc.  Criminal  Case  No.4013/2013,  in  and  by which the High Court in exercise of its powers under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  by  taking  into account the stand of the de facto complainant, who was present before the Court, that she did not wish to prosecute the respondents herein as the disputes have been amicably settled between them, curiously proceeded to quash the FIR in Crime No.512/2012 registered at Police Station Thatipur, District Gwalior for offences under

1

Page 2

Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC as well as the subsequent criminal proceedings being Criminal Case No.2602/2013 for the same offences pending before  the  Court.   The  High  Court,  however, made  it  clear  that  the  proceedings  pending against  the  private  respondents  herein  in relation to the offences under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act were not quashed by the Court.   

Therefore, the moot question that arises for consideration is whether based on out of Court settlement alleged to have been reached between the private parties, the offences of this nature falling under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC which are not covered by Section 320 Cr.P.C. can be taken note of and such orders of quashing of the proceedings can be passed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

The  question  is  no  longer  res  integra, inasmuch as the Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 which has been subsequently  followed  in  a  number  of  other decisions  including  the  recent  decision  in State of M.P. v. Deepak and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 285, clearly sets out as to in what circumstances and in what type of cases such exercise of inherent powers under Section

2

Page 3

482 Cr.P.C. can be  invoked de hors Section 320 Cr.P.C.  for  recognizing  such  out  of  Court settlement  for  the  purpose  of  quashing  of criminal proceedings.   

The  Three-Judge  Bench  decision  in  Gian Singh (supra) is an illuminating judgment on this  issue.   In  paragraph  61  ultimately  the position has been set out in clear terms as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the  above  discussion  can  be summarised  thus:  the  power  of  the High  Court  in  quashing  a  criminal proceeding  or  FIR  or  complaint  in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is  distinct  and  different  from  the power given to a criminal court for compounding  the  offences  under Section  320  of  the  Code.  Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised  in  accord  with  the guideline  engrafted  in  such  power viz;  (i)  to  secure  the  ends  of justice or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the  process  of  any  Court.  In  what cases  power  to  quash  the  criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would  depend  on  the  facts  and circumstances  of  each  case  and  no

3

Page 4

category can be prescribed.  However, before  exercise  of  such  power,  the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous  and  serious  offences  of mental  depravity  or  offences  like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly  quashed  even  though  the victim  or  victim’s  family  and  the offender  have  settled  the  dispute. Such  offences  are  not  private  in nature and have a serious impact on society.  Similarly,  any  compromise between the victim and the offender in  relation  to  the  offences  under special statutes like the Prevention of  Corruption  Act  or  the  offences committed  by  public  servants  while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide  for  any  basis  for  quashing criminal  proceedings  involving  such offences.  But  the  criminal  cases having  overwhelmingly  and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on  a  different  footing  for  the purposes  of  quashing,  particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial,  mercantile,  civil, partnership or such like transactions or  the  offences  arising  out  of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their  entire  dispute.  In  this

4

Page 5

category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the  possibility  of  conviction  is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and  compromise  with  the  victim.  In other  words,  the  High  Court  must consider whether it would be unfair or  contrary  to  the  interest  of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding  or  continuation  of  the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the  above  question(s)  is  in  the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”  

(emphasis added)

When  we  apply  the  principles  set  down therein, it can be stated that when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections  307,  294  and  34  IPC  along  with

5

Page 6

Sections  25  and  27  of  the  Arms  Act,  by  no stretch of imagination, it can be held to be an offence  as  between  the  private  parties simpliciter.  Inasmuch  as  such  offences  will have a serious impact on the society at large, it runs beyond our comprehension to state that after  the  commission  of  such  offence  the parties involved have reached a settlement and, therefore, such settlement can be given a seal of approval by the Judicial Forum.  

In  the  circumstances,  the  High  Court unfortunately having failed to appreciate the said legal position, the impugned order cannot be  sustained.   We  are,  therefore,  convinced that  in  a  situation  where  the  private respondents  herein  are  facing  trial  for offences under Sections 307, 294 read with 34 IPC as well as Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, the cases pending trial before the Court in  Criminal  Case  No.2602  of  2013,   as  the offences are definitely as against the society, the  private  respondents  will  have  to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.  The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the Trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law.

6

Page 7

With  the  above  observations  and directions, the appeal stands allowed.

................................J. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]

................................J. [UDAY UMESH LALIT]

NEW DELHI; JULY 06, 2015.

7