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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.2562 OF 2014 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.1009 of 2007)

STATE OF M.P. & ORS.              …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

KHUMAN SINGH & ANR.              …RESPONDENTS

O R D E R

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya  

Pradesh against  Order dated 5th December,  2003 passed by  

the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Writ Petition  

No.1077   

of 2003.

3. The question raised for our consideration is whether the  

High Court ought to release a person under the provisions of  

Madhya  Pradesh  Prisoner’s  Release  on  Probation  Act,  1954  

read with M.P. Prisoner’s Release on Probation Rules, 1964 (for  

short “Act and the Rules”), if it is found that rejection of the  

prayer  for  said  release by the competent  authority  was  not  

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proper.     

4. The respondent was tried for a charge of murder under  

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted under the  

said provision in Session Trial No.106 of 1988 and sentenced to  

undergo life  imprisonment  vide Order  dated 26th July,  1989.  

He applied for release under the provisions of  aforesaid Act  

and the Rules.  His request was considered by the statutory  

Board, in compliance of the Division Bench order of the High  

Court in Writ Petition No.1138 of 2002 but he was not found  

entitled to be released.  The opinion of the Board was accepted  

by the State Government.  The said opinion and the order of  

the State Government are as follows :

“In the light of the background of the case, it   is  clear  that  the  past  antecedents  of  the  prisoners  are  not  good.   The  prisoner   alongwith  other  co-accused  persons  mercilessly murdered the deceased with the  knot of the saree.  The District Magistrate has   not  recommended  the  release  and  the  opposite party has also objection on release   of the prisoner.  The State Probation Board is   of the unanimous opinion that it would not be  appropriate  to  release  the  prisoner  on  probation.  Therefore, the State Government   is  recommended  that  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  release  the  prisoner  on  probation.

Recommendation  of  the  State  Probation  Board  Dt.  23.12.2002  are   accepted  vide  Memorandum  No.F.  3- 5/2003/3/Jail dated 3.1.2003 of the Jail   Department,  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh.”

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5. Aggrieved by the above, the respondent preferred a writ  

petition  which  was  allowed  by  Order  dated  5th December,  

2003.   It may be mentioned that prior to the passing of the  

impugned  order,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  vide  

Judgment dated 11th April, 2002 in LPA No.212 of 2001 in the  

matter  of  Subrato  Bachaspati vs. State  of  M.P.1,  had  

expressed the view that if  the relatives of the victim of the  

crime  do  not  object  and  there  is  no  evidence  of  extreme  

brutality,  the  High  Court  itself  could  direct  release  

notwithstanding the opinion of the Board and the State.  This  

view was reversed by this Court in Arvind Yadav vs. Ramesh  

Kumar  &  Others2.   Thereafter,  the  same  view  has  been  

followed  inter alia in  State of Madhya Pradesh vs.  Abdul  

Kadir and Another3.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

7. Learned counsel for the State pointed out that in view of  

the Judgment of this Court in Arvind Yadav (supra), the view  

taken by the High Court cannot be sustained.

8. In spite of service, no one has entered appearance for the  

respondent.   However,  this  Court  appointed  Mr.  Praveen  

Agrawal, Advocate as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.

9. We find force in the contention raised on behalf of the  

1  (2003) 1 JLJ 6 2  (2003) 6 SCC 144 3  (2009) 3 SCC 450

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appellant in view of earlier decision of  this  Court in  Arvind  

Yadav (supra) wherein this Court held :

“6. We  are  unable  to  sustain  the  impugned   judgment of the High Court. Each of the convicts   before the High Court had been found guilty of   commission  of  serious  crime.  The  impugned  judgment  notices  that  offences  against  the  convicts  were  under  Sections  302/307/394/304- B/498-A/325  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  and  the   convicts were serving their respective sentences  in jail. In all the cases before the High Court, the   recommendations of the Probation Board that had  been  accepted  by  the  State  Government  were   against the release of the convicts.  If there was  non-application  of  mind  to  the  relevant  considerations,  the  appropriate  course  was  to  remand  the  case  for  fresh  decisions  by  the   authorities except, if in a given exceptional case,   for  strong  cogent  reasons,  the  High  Court  may  have  examined  itself  the  relevant  facts  and  quashed the order declining the release. The High  Court, instead of adopting this course, has made  a  general  observation  that  the  remand  to  the   State  Government  for  fresh  consideration  is   bound  to  delay  the  matter  causing  further   injustice to the convicts.

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9. Having regard to the aforesaid, we are unable   to  sustain  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court.  It  is  accordingly  set  aside.”   (emphasis added)

10. Again  in  State  of  Punjab vs. Kesar  Singh4,  it  was  

observed :

“3. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties. In our opinion the direction given by the   High  Court  was  not  at  all  appropriate  or   permissible in law. The mandate of Section 433  CrPC enables the Government in an appropriate   case to commute the sentence of a convict and to   prematurely order his release before expiry of the   

4  (1996) 5 SCC 495

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sentence as imposed by the courts. Clause (b) of  Section 433 CrPC provides that the sentence of   imprisonment  for  life  may  be  commuted  for   imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years  or  fine.  Undisputedly,  the  respondent  had  not   completed 14 years’ sentence when he filed the  petition  under  Section  482  CrPC  seeking  premature  release.  The  direction  of  the  High  Court  therefore  to  prematurely  release  the  respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could   not have been made. That apart, even if the High   Court  could give such a direction,  it  could only   direct  consideration  of  the  case  of  premature   release by the Government and could not have  ordered the premature release of the respondent   itself.  The  right  to  exercise  the  power  under   Section 433 CrPC vests in the Government and  has  to  be  exercised  by  the  Government  in   accordance  with  the  rules  and  established  principles. The impugned order of the High Court   cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set   aside.”

11. It  is  thus  clear  that  even  if  approach  adopted  by  the  

Board and the State is not germane, normally procedure to be  

followed  by  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  power  of  judicial  

review is to remand the matter to the competent authority in  

the  light  of  such  observations  as  may  be  found  to  be  

appropriate, instead of the High Court itself directing release,  

as has been done in the present case.   There is no reason in  

the present case to deviate from this established procedure, in  

exercise of power in judicial matter in cases of this nature.

12. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned  

order and direct that the matter may be considered afresh by  

the competent authority under the provisions of the Act and  

the Rules in accordance with law within three months from the  

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date of receipt of the copy of this order taking into account  

upto date developments.

           …………………………………………J.                                                         (T.S. THAKUR)

          .…………………………………………J.                               (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 10, 2014

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