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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.785 OF 2010

STATE OF KARNATAKA           ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS SMT. SUVARNNAMMA & ANR.          ..... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  

Order  dated  22nd  December,  2005,  of  the  High  

Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal  

No.1818 of 2004 setting aside the conviction of  

the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2 passed by the  

Trial Court under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the  

Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) and Sections 3,4 and 6

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of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and sentence imposed  

including the sentence to undergo imprisonment for  

life for the offence punishable under Section 304-

B of the IPC.

2. The  case  of  the  prosecution  is  that  the  

deceased  Soumya  was  married  to  the  accused-

Manjunath on 13th May, 1996.  She was living with  

her husband and his mother co-accused Suvarnamma.  

She  was  not  treated  well  and  was  harassed  for  

dowry.  On 31st August, 1998 at about 6.15 P.M.,  

when  her  husband  had  gone  out,  the  accused  

Suvarnamma brought kerosene can, poured kerosene  

on the deceased-Soumya and ignited the fire.  She  

cried for help but Suvernamma put a rug on her.  

Thereafter, she shifted her to Chigateri General  

Hospital, Davangere.  PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi,  

examined  her.  Next  day  in  the  morning  of  1st  

September,  1998,  at  about  7  A.M.,  PW-26,   

V. Dhananjaya, PSI, in the presence of PW-19, Dr.  

Rajeshwari Devi recorded her statement and on that  

basis registered First Information Report.  Soumya  

died on 3rd September, 1998.  After investigation,

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the accused–the husband, the mother-in-law and the  

sister-in-law, were sent up for trial.   

3. The prosecution examined 26 witnesses which  

included the family members of the deceased who  

gave evidence of demand of dowry and also the oral  

dying  declarations  made  before  them.    

PW-22, Taluqa Executive Magistrate, was examined  

to prove the inquest report.  The prosecution also  

examined the medical experts and the investigating  

officers.   The  accused  denied  the  prosecution  

allegations and stated that they were taken out of  

their house by the police at 12 A.M. mid-night and  

arrested and were not aware of anything.   

4. The Trial Court held that the offences were  

proved against the respondents-accused.  However,  

co-accused  Geetha,  sister  of  Manjunath  was  

acquitted.  The Trial Court held that the demand  

of dowry soon before the death was established by  

the evidence of family members of the deceased  

which was reliable.  The Trial Court rejected the  

plea that the prosecution had withheld the dying  

declaration (Exhibit D-7) recorded by PW-22 that

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the  deceased  caught  fire  accidentally;  she  had  

switched on the gas stove and had gone to change  

her clothes; when after returning back, she lit  

the match stick, as a result of which fire broke  

out resulting in accidental burn injuries.

5. On  appeal,  the  High  Court  reversed  the  

decision of the Trial Court for reasons which can  

be summed up as follows :

“(i) According to PW-1, the brother of the  deceased,  the  police  had  come  to  the  hospital  on  the  night  itself  on  31st  August, 1998 and he gave a complaint to  the police at that time, while, according  to the Investigating Officer he came to  the  hospital  on  1st September,  1998  and  recorded the statement of the deceased.

(ii) The dying declaration recorded by PW- 22 was not produced though recording of  such statement was admitted by the PW-19,  Dr.  Rajeshwari  Devi  and  the  Taluka  Executive Magistrate, PW-22.

(iii) It was doubtful that the death was  either  homicidal  or  suicidal.   The  prosecution  failed  to  discharge  the  burden to prove this fact.  In absence  thereof, the death had to be taken to be  by accident.

(iv)  There  were  discrepancies  in  the  evidence regarding the demand and payment  of  dowry  about  the  place  where  the  negotiations  took  place,  the  persons  present at the time of negotiations and  the items of dowry demanded.   

(v) The  Trial  Court  had  not  recorded  the  statement  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C.  properly  resulting  in  prejudice  to  the

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accused.”

6. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  

parties.

7. Learned counsel for the State vehemently  

submitted that the view taken by the High  

Court  is  perverse.   Mere  defects  in  the  

investigation  could  not  be  the  basis  for  

acquitting  the  accused,  if  sufficient  

evidence to prove the prosecution case was  

available  on  record.   Minor  discrepancies  

about details of demand of dowry were not  

enough  to  discredit  the  overwhelming  

evidence that the deceased was harassed for  

dowry soon before her death.  A pragmatic  

approach was required to be adopted by Court  

in dealing with cases of death of a young  

bride to advance the policy of law.  Though,  

the burden of proof is on the prosecution,  

the  facts  exclusively  in  the  knowledge  of  

the  accused  had  to  be  disclosed  by  the  

accused.   A false plea is to be taken as an  

additional circumstance against the accused.

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Oral dying declaration consistently made by  

the deceased before her brothers, sisters,  

mother and brother in-law also corroborated  

by  the  dying  declaration  (Exhibit  P-10)  

recorded  by  the  PW-26,  the  Police  Officer  

after  due  certification  by  PW-19,  Dr.  

Rajeshwari  Devi,  could  not  be  thrown  out  

only on the plea of the defence that dying  

declaration  (Exhibit  D-7)  made  by  the  

deceased  before   

PW-22, Executive Magistrate, in the presence  

of  PW-19,   

Dr. Rajeshwari Devi was not produced.  The  

evidence on record has to be appreciated in  

its  entirety.   It  was  submitted  that  the  

approach  adopted  by  the  High  Court  was  

clearly  erroneous.   If  two  dying  

declarations are recorded, the Court has to  

find  out  as  to  which  one  was  genuine  and  

truthful.

8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the  

other hand, submitted that the acquittal recorded

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by the High Court could not be reversed merely on  

the ground that a different view could be taken.  

He submitted that the lapses of the investigation  

and discrepancies in evidence are serious enough  

to disbelieve the prosecution version and to give  

benefit of doubt.

9. We  have  given  our  anxious  consideration  to  

the rival contentions and carefully perused the  

evidence on record.

10. The  questions  which  arise  for  our  

consideration are as follows :

(i) Whether the acquittal recorded by  the  High  Court  ought  to  be  interfered with?

(ii)Whether  the  case  against  the  accused  stands  established  beyond  reasonable doubt?

(iii) Whether  the  infirmities  in  investigation  and  discrepancies  pointed  out  in  the  prosecution  evidence  make  out  a  ground  for  rejecting the prosecution version?

(iv)Whether the plea of the accused is  false and conduct of the accused in  taking false plea can be treated as  an additional circumstance against  them?

11. Before dealing with the above questions, it

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may be necessary to refer to well known principles  

for appreciation of evidence.

12. The Court dealing with a criminal trial is to  

perform the task of ascertaining the truth from  

the material before it.  It has to punish the  

guilty and protect the innocent.  Burden of proof  

is on the prosecution and the prosecution has to  

establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.  Much  

weight  cannot  be  given  to  minor  discrepancies  

which are bound to occur on account of difference  

in perception, loss of memory and other invariable  

factors.  In the absence of direct evidence, the  

circumstantial  evidence  can  be  the  basis  of  

conviction if the circumstances are of conclusive  

nature and rule out all reasonable possibilities  

of accused being innocent.  Once the prosecution  

probabilises the involvement of the accused but  

the accused takes a false plea, such false plea  

can  be  taken   

as an additional circumstance against the accused.  

Though   

Article 20 (3) of the Constitution incorporates

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the rule against self incrimination, the scope and  

the content of the said rule does not require the  

Court to ignore the conduct of the accused in not  

correctly  disclosing  the  facts  within  his  

knowledge.  When the accused takes a false plea  

about the facts exclusively known to him, such  

circumstance  is  a  vital  additional  circumstance  

against the accused.   

13. It  is  also  well  settled  that  though  the  

investigating agency is expected to be fair and  

efficient, any lapse on its part cannot per se be  

a ground to throw out the prosecution case when  

there  is  overwhelming  evidence  to  prove  the  

offence.

14. We may refer to the well known observations  

from decisions of this Court :

(i) Shivaji  Sahabrao  Bobade vs. State  of  Maharashtra1

“8. Now to the facts. The scene of murder  is  rural,  the  witnesses  to  the  case  are  rustics  and  so  their  behavioural  pattern  and perceptive habits have to be judged as  such.  The  too  sophisticated  approaches  familiar  in  courts  based  on  unreal  assumptions  about  human  conduct  cannot  

1  (1973) 2 SCC 793

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obviously be applied to those given to the  lethargic  ways  of  our  villages.  When  scanning  the  evidence  of  the  various  witnesses we have to inform ourselves that  variances on the fringes, discrepancies in  details, contradictions in narrations and  embellishments in inessential parts cannot  militate against the veracity of the core  of  the  testimony  provided  there  is  the  impress  of  truth  and  conformity  to  probability  in  the  substantial  fabric  of  testimony delivered. The learned Sessions  Judge  has  at  some  length  dissected  the  evidence,  spun  out  contradictions  and  unnatural  conduct,  and  tested  with  precision  the  time  and  sequence  of  the  events connected with the crime, all on the  touchstone of the medical evidence and the  post-mortem  certificate.  Certainly,  the  court which has seen the witnesses depose,  has a great advantage over the appellate  Judge who reads the recorded evidence in  cold print, and regard must be had to this  advantage  enjoyed  by  the  trial  Judge  of  observing  the  demeanour  and  delivery,  of  reading  the  straightforwardness  and  doubtful candour, rustic naivete and clever  equivocation,  manipulated  conformity  and  ingenious unveracity of persons who swear  to  the  facts  before  him.  Nevertheless,  where a Judge draws his conclusions not so  much on the directness or dubiety of the  witness  while  on  oath  but  upon  general  probabilities and on expert evidence, the  court of appeal is in as good a position to  assess or arrive at legitimate conclusions  as the Court of first instance. Nor can we  make a fetish of the trial Judge’s psychic  insight.”

(ii)Bharwada  Bhoginbhai  Hirjibhai vs. State  of  Gujarat2

“5. ……….We do not consider it appropriate  or permissible to enter upon a reappraisal  or reappreciation of the evidence in the  context  of  the  minor  discrepancies  

2   (1983) 3 SCC 217

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painstakingly  highlighted  by  learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant.  Overmuch  importance  cannot  be  attached  to  minor  discrepancies. The reasons are obvious :

“(1) By  and  large  a  witness  cannot  be  expected to possess a photographic memory  and to recall the details of an incident.  It is not as if a video tape is replayed on  the mental screen.

(2) Ordinarily  it  so  happens  that  a  witness is overtaken by events. The witness  could not have anticipated the occurrence  which so often has an element of surprised.  The  mental  faculties  therefore  cannot  be  expected  to  be  attuned  to  absorb  the  details.

(3) The  powers  of  observation  differ  from person to person. What one may notice,  another  may  not.  An  object  or  movement  might  emboss  its  image  on  one  person’s  mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the  part of another.

(4) By  and  large  people  cannot  accurately  recall  a  conversation  and  reproduce the very words used by them or  heard  by  them.  They  can  only  recall  the  main  purport  of  the  conversation.  It  is  unrealistic  to  expect  a  witness  to  be  a  human tape-recorder.

(5) In  regard  to  exact  time  of  an  incident,  or  the  time  duration  of  an  occurrence,  usually,  people  make  their  estimates by guess-work on the spur of the  moment at the time of interrogation. And  one  cannot  expect  people  to  make  very  precise  or  reliable  estimates  in  such  matters.  Again,  it  depends  on  the  time- sense  of  individuals  which  varies  from  person to person.

(6) Ordinarily  a  witness  cannot  be  expected to recall accurately the sequence  of  events  which  takes  place  in  rapid  succession  or  in  a  short  time  span.  A  witness is liable to get confused, or mixed  up when interrogated later on.

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(7) A witness, though wholly truthful,  is  liable  to  be  overawed  by  the  court  atmosphere  and  the  piercing  cross- examination  made  by  counsel  and  out  of  nervousness  mix  up  facts,  get  confused  regarding sequence of events, or fill up  details from imagination on the spur of the  moment.  The  sub-conscious  mind  of  the  witness sometimes so operates on account of  the  fear  of  looking  foolish  or  being  disbelieved though the witness is giving a  truthful  and  honest  account  of  the  occurrence witnessed by him — Perhaps it is  a sort of a psychological defence mechanism  activated on the spur of the moment.”

(iii) Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat3

“13.  ………The  court  while  appreciating  the  evidence must not attach undue importance  to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies  which do not shake the basic version of the  prosecution  case  may  be  discarded.  The  discrepancies  which  are  due  to  normal  errors of perception or observation should  not be given importance. The errors due to  lapse of memory may be given due allowance.  The  court  by  calling  into  aid  its  vast  experience of men and matters in different  cases must evaluate the entire material on  record by excluding the exaggerated version  given by any witness. When a doubt arises  in respect of certain facts alleged by such  witness,  the  proper  course  is  to  ignore  that fact only unless it goes into the root  of the matter so as to demolish the entire  prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays  go  on  adding  embellishments  to  their  version  perhaps  for  the  fear  of  their  testimony being rejected by the court. The  courts, however, should not disbelieve the  evidence  of  such  witnesses  altogether  if  they are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan  Reddy,  J.,  speaking  for  this  Court  in  Sohrab v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  observed: [SCC p. 756, SCC (Cri) p. 824,  para 8] “This  Court  has  held  that  falsus  in  uno  

3  (1988) Supp SCC 241

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falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for  the reason that hardly one comes across a  witness whose evidence does not contain a  grain  of  untruth  or  at  any  rate  exaggeration,  embroideries  or  embellishments.  In  most  cases,  the  witnesses when asked about details venture  to give some answer, not necessarily true  or relevant for fear that their evidence  may not be accepted in respect of the main  incident which they have witnessed but that  is not to say that their evidence as to the  salient features of the case after cautious  scrutiny cannot be considered.”

(iv)State of Haryana vs. Bhagirath4

“8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal  trial  to  prove  all  the  elements  with  a  scientific  precision.  A  criminal  court  could be convinced of the guilt only beyond  the range of a reasonable doubt. Of course,  the  expression  “reasonable  doubt”  is  incapable of definition. Modern thinking is  in favour of the view that proof beyond a  reasonable doubt is the same as proof which  affords moral certainty to the Judge.

9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on  criminal  law  in  the  United  States  has  quoted from judicial pronouncements in his  book Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (at p. 31,  Vol. 1 of the 12th Edn.) as follows:

“It  is  difficult  to  define  the  phrase  ‘reasonable  doubt’.  However,  in  all  criminal cases a careful explanation of the  term ought to be given. A definition often  quoted or followed is that given by Chief  Justice Shaw in the Webster case. He says:  ‘It  is  not  mere  possible  doubt,  because  everything  relating  to  human  affairs  and  depending upon moral evidence is open to  some  possible  or  imaginary  doubt.  It  is  that  state  of  the  case  which,  after  the  entire comparison and consideration of all  the  evidence,  leaves  the  minds  of  the  jurors  in  that  consideration  that  they  

4   (1999) 5 SCC 96

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cannot say they feel an abiding conviction  to a moral certainty of the truth of the  charge.’ ”

10. In  the  treatise  The  Law  of  Criminal  Evidence authored by H.C. Underhill it is  stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th Edn.)  thus:

“The doubt to be reasonable must be such a  one as an honest, sensible and fair-minded  man  might,  with  reason,  entertain  consistent with a conscientious desire to  ascertain  the  truth.  An  honestly  entertained doubt of guilt is a reasonable  doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference  of the possibility of the innocence of the  accused  is  not  a  reasonable  doubt.  A  reasonable doubt is one which arises from a  consideration of all the evidence in a fair  and reasonable way. There must be a candid  consideration of all the evidence and if,  after this candid consideration is had by  the jurors, there remains in the minds a  conviction  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  then  there  is  no  room  for  a  reasonable  doubt.”

11. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of  Maharashtra (1973)  2  SCC  793)  this  Court  adopted the same approach to the principle  of benefit of doubt and struck a note of  caution  that  the  dangers  of  exaggerated  devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at  the  expense  of  social  defence  demand  special  emphasis  in  the  contemporary  context  of  escalating  crime  and  escape.  This Court further said: (SCC p. 799, para  6)

“The  judicial  instrument  has  a  public  accountability. The cherished principles or  golden  thread  of  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt which runs through the web of our law  should not be stretched morbidly to embrace  every  hunch,  hesitancy  and  degree  of  doubt.”

(v) Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana5

5   (1999) 9 SCC 525

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“9. Be it noted that the High Court is  within  its  jurisdiction  being  the  first  appellate court to reappraise the evidence,  but the discrepancies found in the ocular  account of two witnesses unless they are so  vital, cannot affect the credibility of the  evidence of the witnesses. There are bound  to  be  some  discrepancies  between  the  narrations of different witnesses when they  speak  on  details,  and  unless  the  contradictions are of a material dimension,  the same should not be used to jettison the  evidence  in  its  entirety.  Incidentally,  corroboration of evidence with mathematical  niceties  cannot  be  expected  in  criminal  cases. Minor embellishment, there may be,  but  variations  by  reason  therefor  should  not  render  the  evidence  of  eyewitnesses  unbelievable.  Trivial  discrepancies  ought  not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable  evidence. In this context, reference may be  made to the decision of this Court in State  of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505).  In  para  10  of  the  Report,  this  Court  observed: (SCC pp. 514-15)

“10. While appreciating the evidence of a  witness, the approach must be whether the  evidence  of  the  witness  read  as  a  whole  appears to have a ring of truth. Once that  impression  is  formed,  it  is  undoubtedly  necessary for the court to scrutinise the  evidence more particularly keeping in view  the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities  pointed out in the evidence as a whole and  evaluate  them  to  find  out  whether  it  is  against the general tenor of the evidence  given  by  the  witness  and  whether  the  earlier  evaluation  of  the  evidence  is  shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.  Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not  touching  the  core  of  the  case,  hypertechnical approach by taking sentences  torn out of context here or there from the  evidence,  attaching  importance  to  some  technical  error  committed  by  the  investigating officer not going to the root  of the matter would not ordinarily permit  rejection of the evidence as a whole. If  the  court  before  whom  the  witness  gives  evidence had the opportunity to form the

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opinion about the general tenor of evidence  given by the witness, the appellate court  which  had  not  this  benefit  will  have  to  attach due weight to the appreciation of  evidence  by  the  trial  court  and  unless  there are reasons weighty and formidable it  would not be proper to reject the evidence  on  the  ground  of  minor  variations  or  infirmities  in  the  matter  of  trivial  details. Even honest and truthful witnesses  may differ in some details unrelated to the  main incident because power of observation,  retention  and  reproduction  differ  with  individuals.”

10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v.  State  M.P  with  Bhura v.  State  of  M.P.  (1999) 8 SCC 649) this Court observed: (SCC  p. 656, para 24)

“24.  When  an  eyewitness  is  examined  at  length it is quite possible for him to make  some  discrepancies.  No  true  witness  can  possibly escape from making some discrepant  details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is  well  tutored  can  successfully  make  his  testimony  totally  non-discrepant.  But  courts should bear in mind that it is only  when  discrepancies  in  the  evidence  of  a  witness  are  so  incompatible  with  the  credibility of his version that the court  is justified in jettisoning his evidence.  But too serious a view to be adopted on  mere variations falling in the narration of  an incident (either as between the evidence  of  two  witnesses  or  as  between  two  statements  of  the  same  witness)  is  an  unrealistic  approach  for  judicial  scrutiny.”

This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656- 57, paras 25-27)

“25.  It  is  a  common  practice  in  trial  courts to make out contradictions from the  previous  statement  of  a  witness  for  confronting  him  during  cross-examination.  Merely  because  there  is  inconsistency  in  evidence it is not sufficient to impair the  credit of the witness. No doubt Section 155  of  the  Evidence  Act  provides  scope  for

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impeaching the credit of a witness by proof  of an inconsistent former statement. But a  reading of the section would indicate that  all  inconsistent  statements  are  not  sufficient  to  impeach  the  credit  of  the  witness.  The  material  portion  of  the  section is extracted below:

‘155.  Impeaching  credit  of  witness.—The  credit of a witness may be impeached in the  following ways by the adverse party, or,  with the consent of the court, by the party  who calls him—

(1)-(2)

(3)  by  proof  of  former  statements  inconsistent with any part of his evidence  which is liable to be contradicted;’

26.  A  former  statement  though  seemingly  inconsistent  with  the  evidence  need  not  necessarily  be  sufficient  to  amount  to  contradiction.  Only  such  of  the  inconsistent statement which is liable to  be ‘contradicted’ would affect the credit  of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence  Act also enables the cross-examiner to use  any former statement of the witness, but it  cautions  that  if  it  is  intended  to  ‘contradict’ the witness the cross-examiner  is enjoined to comply with the formality  prescribed  therein.  Section  162  of  Code  also permits the cross-examiner to use the  previous statement of the witness (recorded  under Section 161 of the Code) for the only  limited  purpose  i.e.  to  ‘contradict’  the  witness.

27.  To  contradict  a  witness,  therefore,  must be to discredit the particular version  of the witness. Unless the former statement  has the potency to discredit the present  statement,  even  if  the  latter  is  at  variance with the former to some extent it  would  not  be  helpful  to  contradict  that  witness (vide  Tahsildar Singh v.  State of  U.P. (AIR (1959) SC 1012).”

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(vi)State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj6

“10. The High Court appears to have adopted  a technical approach in disposing of the  appeal filed by the respondents. This Court  in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (1974) 3  SCC 277) held: (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23)

“23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy  tale wherein one is free to give flight to  one’s imagination and phantasy. It concerns  itself with the question as to whether the  accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of  the crime with which he is charged. Crime  is an event in real life and is the product  of interplay of different human emotions.  In  arriving  at  the  conclusion  about  the  guilt  of  the  accused  charged  with  the  commission  of  a  crime,  the  court  has  to  judge  the  evidence  by  the  yardstick  of  probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the  animus  of  witnesses.  Every  case  in  the  final analysis would have to depend upon  its  own  facts.  Although  the  benefit  of  every reasonable doubt should be given to  the accused, the  courts should not at the  same time reject evidence which is ex facie  trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful  or in the nature of conjectures.”

The criminal trial cannot be equated with a  mock  scene  from  a  stunt  film.  The  legal  trial is conducted to ascertain the guilt  or innocence of the accused arraigned. In  arriving at a conclusion about the truth,  the courts are required to adopt a rational  approach  and  judge  the  evidence  by  its  intrinsic  worth  and  the  animus  of  the  witnesses.  The  hyper  technicalities  or  figment  of  imagination  should  not  be  allowed  to  divest  the  court  of  its  responsibility of sifting and weighing the  evidence  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  regarding the existence or otherwise of a  particular circumstance keeping in view the  peculiar  facts  of  each  case,  the  social  position of the victim and the accused, the  larger  interests  of  the  society  particularly the law and order problem and  

6  (2000) 1 SCC 247

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degrading values of life inherent in the  prevalent  system.  The  realities  of  life  have to be kept in mind while appreciating  the evidence for arriving at the truth. The  courts  are  not  obliged  to  make  efforts  either to give latitude to the prosecution  or loosely construe the law in favour of  the  accused.  The  traditional  dogmatic  hypertechnical approach has to be replaced  by  a  rational,  realistic  and  genuine  approach  for  administering  justice  in  a  criminal  trial.  Criminal  jurisprudence  cannot  be  considered  to  be  a  utopian  thought but have to be considered as part  and parcel of the human civilization and  the realities of life. The courts cannot  ignore the erosion in values of life which  are a common feature of the present system.  Such erosions cannot be given a bonus in  favour of those who are guilty of polluting  society and mankind.”

(vii) Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa7

“15. To the same effect is the decision in  State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (1974) 3 SCC  277) and Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002) 3  SCC 76).  Stress was laid by the accused- appellants  on  the  non-acceptance  of  evidence  tendered  by  some  witnesses  to  contend about desirability to throw out the  entire prosecution case. In essence prayer  is  to  apply  the  principle  of  “falsus  in  uno,  falsus  in  omnibus”  (false  in  one  thing, false in everything). This plea is  clearly untenable. Even if a major portion  of the evidence is found to be deficient,  in  case  residue  is  sufficient  to  prove  guilt  of  an  accused,  notwithstanding  acquittal of a number of other co-accused  persons, his conviction can be maintained.  It is the duty of the court to separate the  grain from the chaff. Where chaff can be  separated from the grain, it would be open  to  the  court  to  convict  an  accused  notwithstanding the fact that evidence has  been found to be deficient to prove guilt  of  other  accused  persons.  Falsity  of  a  

7  (2002) 8 SCC 381

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particular  material  witness  or  material  particular  would  not  ruin  it  from  the  beginning to end. The maxim “falsus in uno,  falsus in omnibus” has no application in  India and the witnesses cannot be branded  as liars. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus  in  omnibus”  has  not  received  general  acceptance  nor  has  this  maxim  come  to  occupy the status of rule of law. It is  merely  a  rule  of  caution.  All  that  it  amounts to, is that in such cases testimony  may be disregarded, and not that it must be  disregarded. The doctrine merely involves  the question of weight of evidence which a  court  may  apply  in  a  given  set  of  circumstances, but it is not what may be  called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See  Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. (AIR (1957) SC  366  ) Merely because some of the accused  persons  have  been  acquitted,  though  evidence  against  all  of  them,  so  far  as  direct testimony went, was the same does  not  lead  as  a  necessary  corollary  that  those who have been convicted must also be  acquitted. It is always open to a court to  differentiate  the  accused  who  had  been  acquitted  from  those  who  were  convicted.  (See  Gurcharan  Singh v.  State  of  Punjab  (AIR  (1956)  SC  460).  The  doctrine  is  a  dangerous one specially in India for if a  whole  body  of  the  testimony  were  to  be  rejected, because a witness was evidently  speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is  to  be  feared  that  administration  of  criminal justice would come to a dead stop.  Witnesses  just  cannot  help  in  giving  embroidery to a story, however, true in the  main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in  each case as to what extent the evidence is  worthy of acceptance, and merely because in  some respects the court considers the same  to be insufficient for placing reliance on  the  testimony  of  a  witness,  it  does  not  necessarily follow as a matter of law that  it must be disregarded in all respects as  well. The evidence has to be sifted with  care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound  rule for the reason that one hardly comes  across a witness whose evidence does not  contain a grain of untruth or at any rate  exaggeration,  embroideries  or

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embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P.  (1972) 3 SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir v. State of  Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt has to  be made to, as noted above, in terms of  felicitous  metaphor,  separate  the  grain  from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where  it is not feasible to separate the truth  from falsehood, because grain and chaff are  inextricably mixed up, and in the process  of separation an absolutely new case has to  be  reconstructed  by  divorcing  essential  details  presented  by  the  prosecution  completely  from  the  context  and  the  background against which they are made, the  only  available  course  to  be  made  is  to  discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee  Ariel v.  State of M.P. (AIR (1954) SC 15)  and Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab (1975)  4 SCC 511). As observed by this Court in  State of Rajasthan v.  Kalki (1981) 2 SCC  752)  normal discrepancies in evidence are  those  which  are  due  to  normal  errors  of  observation, normal errors of memory due to  lapse of time, due to mental disposition  such as shock and horror at the time of  occurrence  and  those  are  always  there  however honest and truthful a witness may  be. Material discrepancies are those which  are  not  normal,  and  not  expected  of  a  normal  person.  Courts  have  to  label  the  category  to  which  a  discrepancy  may  be  categorized. While normal discrepancies do  not corrode the credibility of a party’s  case, material discrepancies do so. These  aspects  were  highlighted  recently  in  Krishna Mochi v.  State of Bihar (2002) 6  SCC  81).  Accusations  have  been  clearly  established against the accused-appellants  in the case at hand. The courts below have  categorically indicated the distinguishing  features  in  evidence  so  far  as  the  acquitted  and  the  convicted  accused  are  concerned.”

(viii) State of Punjab vs. Swaran Singh8

“10. The questioning of the accused is done  to  enable  him  to  give  an  opportunity  to  

8  (2005) 6 SCC 101

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explain any circumstances which have come  out in the evidence against him. It may be  noticed  that  the  entire  evidence  is  recorded in his presence and he is given  full opportunity to cross-examine each and  every witness examined on the prosecution  side. He is given copies of all documents  which are sought to be relied on by the  prosecution. Apart from all these, as part  of  fair  trial  the  accused  is  given  opportunity  to  give  his  explanation  regarding  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution. However, it is not necessary  that the entire prosecution evidence need  be put to him and answers elicited from the  accused. If there were circumstances in the  evidence which are adverse to the accused  and his explanation would help the court in  evaluating the evidence properly, the court  should bring the same to the notice of the  accused  to  enable  him  to  give  any  explanation  or  answers  for  such  adverse  circumstance  in  the  evidence.  Generally,  composite questions shall not be asked to  the  accused  bundling  so  many  facts  together. Questions must be such that any  reasonable person in the position of the  accused  may  be  in  a  position  to  give  rational  explanation  to  the  questions  as  had been asked. There shall not be failure  of justice on account of an unfair trial.

11. In  State  (Delhi  Admn.) v.  Dharampal  (2001) 10 SCC 372)   it was held as under:  (SCC pp. 376-77, para 13)

“13. Thus it is to be seen that where an  omission,  to  bring  the  attention  of  the  accused  to  an  inculpatory  material  has  occurred, that does not ipso facto vitiate  the proceedings. The accused must show that  failure of justice was occasioned by such  omission.  Further,  in  the  event  of  an  inculpatory material not having been put to  the accused, the appellate court can always  make good that lapse by calling upon the  counsel  for  the  accused  to  show  what  explanation the accused has as regards the  circumstances  established  against  the  accused but not put to him.”

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12. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (1963) 3  SCR 489)   it was observed thus: (SCR p.  510)

“The ultimate test in determining whether  or not the accused has been fairly examined  under  Section  342  would  be  to  enquire  whether, having regard to all the questions  put to him, he did get an opportunity to  say what he wanted to say in respect of  prosecution case against him. If it appears  that the examination of the accused person  was defective and thereby a prejudice has  been caused to him, that would no doubt be  a serious infirmity.”

13. In Bakhshish Singh Dhaliwal v. State of  Punjab  (1967)  1  SCR  211) a  three-Judge  Bench of this Court held that: (SCR p. 225  D)

“It  was  not  at  all  necessary  that  each  separate piece of evidence in support of a  circumstance should be put to the accused  and he should be questioned in respect of  it under that section;”

14. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of  Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793) a three-Judge  Bench of this Court considering the fallout  of  omission  to  put  to  the  accused  a  question on a vital circumstance appearing  against  him  in  the  prosecution  evidence,  widening  the  sweep  of  the  provision  concerning examination of the accused after  closing  prosecution  evidence  made  the  following observations: (SCC p. 806, para  16)

“It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental,  that  the  prisoner’s  attention  should  be  drawn to every inculpatory material so as  to enable him to explain it. This is the  basic  fairness  of  a  criminal  trial  and  failures in this area may gravely imperil  the  validity  of  the  trial  itself,  if  consequential  miscarriage  of  justice  has  flowed. However, where such an omission has  occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the  proceedings  and  prejudice  occasioned  by  such  defect  must  be  established  by  the  accused.  In  the  event  of  evidentiary

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material not being put to the accused, the  court must ordinarily eschew such material  from consideration. It is also open to the  appellate court to call upon the counsel  for the accused to show what explanation  the  accused  has  as  regards  the  circumstances established against him but  not put to him and if the accused is unable  to offer the appellate court any plausible  or  reasonable  explanation  of  such  circumstances, the court may assume that no  acceptable answer exists and that even if  the  accused  had  been  questioned  at  the  proper time in the trial court he would not  have been able to furnish any good ground  to get out of the circumstances on which  the  trial  court  had  relied  for  its  conviction.”

(ix)Zahira  Habibullha  Sheikh (5) vs. State  of  Gujarat9

“37. A  criminal  trial  is  a  judicial  examination of the issues in the case and  its purpose is to arrive at a judgment on  an issue as to a fact or relevant facts  which may lead to the discovery of the fact  in issue and obtain proof of such facts at  which the prosecution and the accused have  arrived by their pleadings; the controlling  question being the guilt or innocence of  the accused. Since the object is to mete  out justice and to convict the guilty and  protect the innocent, the trial should be a  search for the truth and not a bout over  technicalities, and must be conducted under  such rules as will protect the innocent,  and punish the guilty. The proof of charge  which  has  to  be  beyond  reasonable  doubt  must depend upon judicial evaluation of the  totality  of  the  evidence,  oral  and  circumstantial,  and  not  by  an  isolated  scrutiny.

40. ……….  Consequences  of  defective  investigation  have  been  elaborated  in   Dhanaj Singh v.  State of Punjab (2004) 3  

9  (2006) 3 SCC 374

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SCC 654).  It was observed as follows: (SCC  p. 657, paras 5-7)

“5.  In  the  case  of  a  defective  investigation  the  court  has  to  be  circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But  it  would  not  be  right  in  acquitting  an  accused  person  solely  on  account  of  the  defect;  to  do  so  would  tantamount  to  playing into the hands of the investigating  officer if the investigation is designedly  defective. (See  Karnel Singh v.  State of  M.P.  (1995) 5 SCC 518).

6. In Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999)  2 SCC 126) it was held that if the lapse or  omission is committed by the investigating  agency  or  because  of  negligence  the  prosecution  evidence  is  required  to  be  examined dehors such omissions to find out  whether the said evidence is reliable or  not, the contaminated conduct of officials  should not stand in the way of evaluating  the evidence by the courts; otherwise the  designed mischief would be perpetuated and  justice would be denied to the complainant  party.

7. As was observed in Ram Bihari Yadav v.  State of Bihar (1998) 4 SCC 517) if primacy  is  given  to  such  designed  or  negligent  investigation, to the omission or lapses by  perfunctory investigation or omissions, the  faith and confidence of the people would be  shaken not only in the law-enforcing agency  but also in the administration of justice.  The view was again reiterated in Amar Singh  v. Balwinder Singh (2003) 2 SCC 518). ”

(x) Mani Pal vs. State of Haryana10

“12. There is no embargo on the appellate  court reviewing the evidence upon which an  order of acquittal is based. As a matter of  fact, in an appeal against acquittal, the  High Court as the court of first appeal is  obligated to go into greater detail of the  evidence to see whether any miscarriage has  resulted  from  the  order  of  acquittal,  

10  (2004) 10 SCC 692

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though  it  has  to  act  with  great  circumspection  and  utmost  care  before  ordering  the  reversal  of  an  acquittal.  Generally, the order of acquittal shall not  be interfered with because the presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  is  further  strengthened  by  acquittal.  The  golden  thread  which  runs  through  the  web  of  administration of justice in criminal cases  is that if two views are possible on the  evidence adduced in the case, one pointing  to the guilt of the accused and the other  to  his  innocence,  the  view  which  is  favourable  to  the  accused  should  be  adopted. The paramount consideration of the  court  is  to  ensure  that  miscarriage  of  justice  is  prevented.  A  miscarriage  of  justice which may arise from acquittal of  the  guilty  is  no  less  than  from  the   conviction of an innocent. In a case where  admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is  cast  upon  the  appellate  court  to  reappreciate the evidence where the accused  has  been  acquitted,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  as  to  whether  any  of  the  accused  really  committed  any  offence  or  not. (See  Bhagwan Singh v.  State of M.P.  (2002)  4  SCC  85)  The  principle  to  be  followed by the appellate court considering  the  appeal  against  the  judgment  of  acquittal is to interfere only when there  are compelling and substantial reasons for  doing  so.  If  the  impugned  judgment  is  clearly  unreasonable  and  relevant  and  convincing  materials  have  been  unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it  is  a  compelling  reason  for  interference.  This position has been recently reiterated  in Joseph v. State of Kerala (2003) 1 SCC  465),  Devatha  Venkataswamy v.  Public  Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2003) 10  SCC  700,  State  of  Punjab v.  Phola  Singh  (2003)  11  SCC  58), State  of  Punjab v.  Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271), State of  U.P. v. Babu (2003) 11 SCC 280) and Suchand  Pal v. Phani Pal (2003) 11 SCC 527).”

(xi)State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram11

11  (2008) 12 SCC 51

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“27. In our considered view, this was a fit  case  for  invoking  Section  106  of  the  Evidence Act, which lays down that when any  fact is especially within the knowledge of  any person, the burden of proving that fact  is  upon  him.  In  Ram  Gulam  Chaudhary v.  State  of  Bihar  (2001)  8  SCC  311)   this  Court  considered  the  applicability  of  Section 106 of the Evidence Act in a case  somewhat similar to the present one. This  Court noted that the accused after brutally  assaulting  a  boy  carried  him  away  and  thereafter the boy was not seen alive nor  his body was found. The accused, however,  offered no explanation as to what they did  after they took away the boy. It was held  that  for  the  absence  of  any  explanation  from the side of the accused about the boy,  there was every justification for drawing  an  inference  that  they  had  murdered  the  boy.  It  was  further  observed  that  even  though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may  not be intended to relieve the prosecution  of its burden to prove the guilt of the  accused  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  but  the  section  would  apply  to  cases  like  the  present,  where  the  prosecution  has  succeeded  in  proving  facts  from  which  a  reasonable inference can be drawn regarding  death.  The  accused  by  virtue  of  their  special knowledge must offer an explanation  which  might  lead  the  court  to  draw  a  different inference.

28. In  Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v.  State of  Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681)  a two-Judge  Bench of which one of us (G.P. Mathur, J.)  was a member, considered the applicability  of  Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act  and  observed: (SCC pp. 689-691, paras 13-15)

“13. The demand for dowry or money from the  parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal  increase in the last few years. Cases are  frequently coming before the courts, where  the  husband  or  in-laws  have  gone  to  the  extent of killing the bride if the demand  is  not  met.  These  crimes  are  generally  committed  in  complete  secrecy  inside  the  house and it becomes very difficult for the  prosecution to lead evidence. No member of

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the family, even if he is a witness of the  crime, would come forward to depose against  another  family  member.  The  neighbours,  whose evidence may be of some assistance,  are generally reluctant to depose in court  as they want to keep aloof and do not want  to antagonise a neighbourhood family. The  parents  or  other  family  members  of  the  bride  being  away  from  the  scene  of  commission of crime are not in a position  to give direct evidence which may inculpate  the  real  accused  except  regarding  the  demand  of  money  or  dowry  and  harassment  caused to the bride. But, it does not mean  that a crime committed in secrecy or inside  the houses should go unpunished.

14. If an offence takes place inside the  privacy  of  a  house  and  in  such  circumstances where the assailants have all  the  opportunity  to  plan  and  commit  the  offence at the time and in circumstances of  their  choice,  it  will  be  extremely  difficult  for  the  prosecution  to  lead  evidence  to  establish  the  guilt  of  the  accused  if  the  strict  principle  of  circumstantial evidence, as noticed above,  is  insisted  upon  by  the  courts.  A  judge  does  not  preside  over  a  criminal  trial  merely  to  see  that  no  innocent  man  is  punished. A judge also presides to see that  a  guilty  man  does  not  escape.  Both  are  public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of  Public Prosecutions (1944) AC 315)—quoted  with  approval  by  Arijit  Pasayat,  J.  in  State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11  SCC 271.)  The law does not enjoin a duty  on the prosecution to lead evidence of such  character which is almost impossible to be  led or at any rate extremely difficult to  be led. The duty on the prosecution is to  lead such evidence which it is capable of  leading,  having  regard  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  Here  it  is  necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of  the Evidence Act which says that when any  fact is especially within the knowledge of  any person, the burden of proving that fact  is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to  this  section  throws  some  light  on  the  content and scope of this provision and it

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reads:

‘(b)  A is  charged  with  travelling  on  a  railway  without  ticket.  The  burden  of  proving that he had a ticket is on him.’

15.  Where  an  offence  like  murder  is  committed in secrecy inside a house, the  initial burden to establish the case would  undoubtedly  be  upon  the  prosecution,  but  the nature and amount of evidence to be led  by it to establish the charge cannot be of  the  same  degree  as  is  required  in  other  cases  of  circumstantial  evidence.  The  burden would be of a comparatively lighter  character. In view of Section 106 of the  Evidence Act there will be a corresponding  burden on the inmates of the house to give  a cogent explanation as to how the crime  was  committed.  The  inmates  of  the  house  cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and  offering  no  explanation  on  the  supposed  premise that the burden to establish its  case lies entirely upon the prosecution and  there is no duty at all on an accused to  offer any explanation.”

Similar view has been expressed in State of  Punjab v. Karnail Singh, State of Rajasthan  v.  Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254) and  Raj  Kumar  Prasad  Tamarkar v.  State  of  Bihar  (2007) 10 SCC 433).

29. We  are  sure,  if  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  had  adverted  to  Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act  and  correctly applied the principles of law, he  would not have committed the grave error of  acquitting the respondent.”

15. In the light of above principles, we may  

now  examine  the  questions  arising  in  the  

present case.  Admittedly, the marriage of  

the deceased took place within seven years of  

her death.  Her death is by burn injuries.

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There is evidence of demand of dowry soon  

before the death.  Plea of the deceased who  

were living with the deceased is that they  

had  no  idea  about  the  incident  and  were  

sleeping when plice picked them up at the  

night.  During the trial, inference of death  

being an accident is sought to be drawn on  

the  basis  of  alleged  dying  declaration  

(Exhibit D-7) coupled with the conduct of the  

prosecution in not producing the said dying  

declaration  recorded  by  the  Executive  

Magistrate,  PW-22  in  the  presence  of  Dr.  

Rajeshwari Devi and also the fact that though  

PW-1 admitted that the police came to the  

hospital in the night itself, the stand of  

the Investigating Officer was that he came in  

the morning.

16. Does the alleged suppression or unfair  

conduct of the investigating agency absolve  

the Court of its duty to find out the truth?  

Though  we  are  governed  by  the  adversorial

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system, the Court cannot be a mute spectator,  

particularly in criminal cases and shun its  

primary duty of finding out the truth from  

the material on record.  Thus merely showing  

that  the  prosecution  withheld  dying  

declaration  (Exhibit  D-7)  could  not  be  a  

ground  for  the  Court  not  finding  out  the  

cause of death from the material on record  

and inferring that the death was accidental.  

Once  dying  declaration  (Exhibit  D-7)  was  

produced even by defence, the Court has to go  

into the authenticity of two rival versions  

in the dying declarations.  It was required  

to be ascertained whether (Exhibit D-7) was a  

genuine and reliable dying declaration or the  

oral dying declarations made before PW-1, PW-

3,  PW-4,  PW-5,   

PW-8,  PW-14,  PW-15  and  PW-16  were  more  

reliable in the circumstances on record.   

17. What  is  surprising  and  wholly  

unacceptable is the stand of the accused who  

were  husband  and  mother  in-law  of  the

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deceased, living in the same house and that  

they had no idea that the deceased received  

burn  injuries.   This  stand  is  clearly  

incompatible with the stand in Exhibit D-7  

that  the  accused  mother  in-law  of  the  

deceased was very much present in the house  

and she shifted the deceased to the hospital.  

Even if the dying declaration (Exhibit D-7)  

was recorded, the fact remains that when it  

was  recorded,  even  according  to  the  said  

dying  declaration,  the  deceased  was  

accompanied by her mother in-law who is one  

of the accused.  The deceased could not have  

made  any  voluntary  and  independent  dying  

declaration  in  such  circumstances  as  the  

influence of the accused could not be ruled  

out.   According  to  the  said  dying  

declaration, she raised hue and cry when she  

received burn injuries which attracted her  

mother in-law and the tenant, while according  

to the mother in-law as well as the tenant  

they  never  heard  such  cries.  There  is  no

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evidence of struggle or cries and the burn  

injuries are to the extent of 95%. In the  

case  of  an  accident,  the  deceased   

would have tried to run away or escape. In  

these  circumstances,  there  is  hardly  any  

possibility  of  accidental  burn  injuries.  

Extensive  burns  and  other  circumstances  

support the version of unnatural death. In  

these  circumstances,  the  dying  declaration  

(Exhibit  P-10)  is  consistent  with  the  

circumstances on record while Exhibit D-7 is  

not.

18. The overwhelming evidence to prove the  

demand of dowry has been rejected on account  

of  minor  discrepancies  about  the  place  at  

which  the  negotiations  took  place  or  the  

persons in whose presence demand was made.  

Such minor contradictions are not enough to  

discredit the version of demand of dowry.

19. The High Court has not at all discussed  

the truthfulness or otherwise of the plea of  

the accused that though they were at home,

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they had no knowledge of burn injuries.  This  

stand in their statement under Section 313  

Cr.P.C. is clearly false.  They were expected  

to  know  the  incident  and  make  disclosure  

thereof, absence of which was a circumstance  

against  them.   Mere  contradiction  of  PW-1  

admitting presence of the police in the night  

while  I.O.  stating  that  he  came  in  the  

morning was not enough to discard the entire  

evidence.  Even if dying declaration Exhibit  

D-7 was recorded and not produced, this could  

not absolve the Court from considering the  

truthfulness of available evidence.  There is  

no  justification  to  hold  that  death  was  

accidental nor to reject evidence of demand  

of dowry. There is objective medical evidence  

which  by  itself  shifts  the  burden  on  the  

accused  to  explain  circumstances  in  which  

burn injuries were caused in their house.  In  

these  circumstances,  any  infirmity  in  the  

statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. could not

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be treated to be fatal.

20. As a result of above discussion, it is  

clearly established that :

(i) Death of the deceased was within 7  years  of  marriage  and  she  was  subjected  to  harassment  for  dowry  soon  before  her  death.   The  death  was  in  circumstances  other  than  natural, and not accidental;

(ii)Mere  lapse  of  investigating  agency  could  not  be  enough  to  throw  out  overwhelming  evidence  clearly  establishing  the  case  of  the  prosecution.

(iii) False plea of the accused that  they  had  no  knowledge  of  burn  injuries having been caused to the  deceased  was  an  additional  circumstance against them.

21. In view of the above, the view taken by the  

High Court is clearly unsustainable.

22. In  appeal  against  the  acquittal,  if  a  

possible view has been taken, no interference is  

required, but if the view taken is not legally  

sustainable,  the  Court  has  ample  powers  to  

interfere with the order of acquittal.   

23. Accordingly,  we  hold  that  the  case  against  

the accused stands fully established.  The view

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taken by the High Court for acquittal is not a  

possible view.

24. The appeal is allowed.  The order passed by  

the High Court is set aside and that passed by the  

Trial Court is restored with the modification that  

the  sentence  of  imprisonment  awarded  to  the  

accused under Section 304B will stand reduced to  

R.I. for seven years while maintaining sentence  

under other heads.

25. The accused may be arrested to serve out the  

sentence imposed by the Trial Court, as modified  

above.  

……..…………………………….J. [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

.….………………………………..J. NEW DELHI  [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ] October 14, 2014