15 February 2016
Supreme Court
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STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs DATTARAJ .

Bench: JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR,S.A. BOBDE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000326-000326 / 2012
Diary number: 35693 / 2010
Advocates: ANITHA SHENOY Vs


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‘  REPORTABLE’

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 326 OF 2012

State of Karnataka … Appellant

versus Dattaraj & others … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. Dattaraj  –  the  respondent-accused  no.  1,  married  Savita  (since

deceased),  on 7.6.2002.   About  three  months  before  the marriage,  at  the

asking of Dattaraj, it was agreed to give Rs.21,000/- in cash and 3 tolas of

gold.   Accordingly,  the  family  of  Savita  complied  with  the  aforesaid

commitment, at the time of marriage.  After their marriage, Savita started to

live in her matrimonial house along with Dattaraj (respondent-accused no. 1).

Soon  after  his  marriage,  Dattaraj  went  to  Dubai,  leaving  Savita  at  the

matrimonial  house.   During  his  absence,  she went  to  her  parents’  house.

Dattaraj contacted Savita, and had a telephonic conversation with her, while

she was at her parents’ house.  He enquired from her, with whose permission

she had gone to her maternal house.  He also rebuked her for having left the

matrimonial house, without his permission.

2. While Savita was in her maternal house, Dattaraj required her to get

Rs.20,000/- in cash from her parents, as his brother needed the money to

purchase some agricultural land.  On the asking of Dattaraj, Savita got the

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money from her parents.  After Dattaraj returned from Dubai, he was invited

by Savita’s parents for a “pooja”  (prayer) ceremony. The “pooja”  had been

arranged to celebrate the installation of a bore-well, on the agricultural lands

owned by Savita’s father.  It was alleged, that Dattaraj (respondent-accused

no. 1) had agreed to attend the “pooja”, only if he was given three tolas of

gold, as also, wearing apparel.  As against the above, the assertion of Dattaraj

was, that such gifts were customary, and were given by the parents of Savita,

on their own free will.  In any case, it is not a matter of dispute, that gold and

clothing were indeed given to Dattaraj,  during the “pooja”  arranged by the

parents of Savita, to celebrate the installation of a bore-well.

3. After Dattaraj returned from Dubai, Savita became pregnant.  She left

for her maternal house, prior to her delivery.  She delivered a girl child, at her

parents’ house.  Thereafter, she returned to her matrimonial house.

4. On  yet  another  occasion,  while  Savita  along  with  Dattaraj

(respondent-accused no. 1) had gone to stay with her parents, it was alleged,

that Dattaraj had made similar monetary demands.  On this occasion, Savita’s

parents had expressed their  helplessness,  and had informed Dattaraj,  that

they did not  have adequate resources to meet  his  demands.   It  was also

alleged,  that  on  this  occasion,  Dattaraj  had  picked  up  a  quarrel  with  the

parents  of  Savita.   It  was  alleged,  that  when  Savita  returned  to  her

matrimonial house with Dattaraj, she was taunted by the brother of Dattaraj,

namely,  by  Siddappa  @ Siddaraj  (respondent-accused  no.  3),  as  also  by

Ningesh (respondent-accused no. 2) and Revamma (respondent-accused no.

4),  the  father  and  mother  of  respondent-accused  no.  1  respectively,  for

bringing inadequate gifts from her parents’ house.

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5. Savita  went  to  her  parents’  house  for  “Rakhi  Poornima”  (festival  to

celebrate sanctity of the brother-sister, relationship), to tie a “rakhi” (sacred

thread)  on  her  brother’s  arm.   It  was  alleged,  that  Dattaraj  demanded  a

sewing machine.  This demand made by Dattaraj was allegedly met by the

parents  of  Savita.   This  is  yet  another  incident  of  the  alleged  demand  of

dowry, made by Dattaraj and his family members.

6. The case of the prosecution is, that despite the fact that the parents of

Savita met all the demands made by Dattaraj, as well as, his family members,

they  remained  unsatisfied  and  continued  to  pressurise  Savita’s  family  for

more  dowry.  It  is  also the case of  the prosecution,  that  Dattaraj  used to

harass and ill-treat Savita, and would even assault her.

7. On  1.9.2006,  Savita  died  of  burn  injuries.   The  mother  of  Savita,

Tukkubai – PW-1, was informed about the burn injuries suffered by Savita, on

1.9.2006 itself.   She was also informed, that Savita, had been admitted to

hospital.   When Tukkubai  – PW-1 reached the hospital  along with her son

Dattatry – PW-4, the dead body of Savita was lying in the mortuary of the

Government  hospital,  Gulbarga.   None  of  the  respondents-accused  was

present at the hospital.  Immediately, Tukkubai – PW-1, filed a complaint.  In

the complaint it was alleged, that the respondents-accused had committed the

murder of Savita, on account of their dowry demands having not been met, by

the maternal family of Savita.  The above report was lodged on 2.9.2006 i.e.,

the day following the death of Savita.  The fact,  that Savita was left all  by

herself  at  the  hospital,  and  that  no  one  out  of  the  respondents-accused

attended upon her even during her pitiable condition, was alleged as sufficient

to establish, that the relationship between Savita and the family of her in-laws,

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was not cordial.  The defence repudiated the version of the prosecution by

asserting, that Savita had committed suicide on account of her over-sensitive

nature.   

8. Consequent upon the culmination of the investigation, a chargesheet

was  filed  by  the  prosecution,  leading  to  the  framing  of  charges  against

Dattaraj  (respondent-accused  no.  1),  his  brother  Siddappa  @  Siddaraj

(respondent-accused no. 3), his father Ningesh (respondent-accused no. 2),

and  his  mother  Revamma  (respondent-accused  no.  4).   The

respondents-accused  were  charged  with  the  offences  punishable  under

Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as, the IPC), as well as, under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as, the Dowry Act).

The  factual  position  recorded  above,  constituted  the  basis  of  the  alleged

actions of cruelty, by the respondents-accused towards Savita, and therefore,

the  offence  under  Section  498A.   The  fact  that  Savita  had  died  of  burn

injuries,  within  seven  years  of  her  marriage,  and  that,  she  was  being

subjected to dowry demands, cruelty and harassment by the accused, was

the basis for substantiating the offence under Section 304B of the IPC.

9. The  Sessions  Judge  (Fast  Track  Court-III),  Bidar,  who  tried  the

respondents-accused arrived at the conclusion, that the cash, the gold and

other gifts given by the parents of Savita to the accused, were in the nature of

dowry articles presented by Savita’s family, to Dattaraj and other members of

his family.  This conclusion was arrived at because the term “dowry” means

and includes, property or valuable security given either directly or indirectly,

not only at the time of marriage, but also at any time after marriage.   

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10. Despite  the  fact  that  Tukkubai  –  PW-1,  admitted  that  the  family  of

Dattaraj had gifted the maternal family of Savita, 4 tonnes of sugarcane seeds

and a bag of jowar, when a girl child was delivered by Savita, the trial Court

concluded, that the taunts and physical torture at the hands of the accused,

stood established from eye-witnesses account.  The same were considered

sufficient  to  establish,  mental  and  physical  cruelty  towards  Savita.   The

evidence indicating that Savita had been asking Dattaraj not to go to Dubai,

which according to the defence,  was sufficient  to establish,  that  there was

love  and  harmony  between  them,  was  rejected.   The  threat  of  Savita  to

Dattaraj, that if he went abroad, he may not find her alive, was also found to

be  of  no  substance.   The  trial  Court  also  rejected  the  contention  of  the

accused,  that  Savita had a meal  at  the residence of  the sister  of  Dattaraj

-Sulebai, just two hours before the occurrence, again to indicate that Savita

was  not  being  harassed  by  the  family  of  Dattaraj.   The  ground  for  such

rejection  by  the  trial  Court  was,  that  even  though  it  was  established  that

Savita had eaten her meal two hours before the occurrence, yet there was no

evidence to establish that she had eaten her meal, at the house of Sulebai –

the sister of Dattaraj.  The trial Court also rejected the contention advanced

on behalf  of  the respondents-accused,  that  the  doctor  who conducted  the

post-mortem examination had deposed, that the deceased had no physical

injuries on her person.  This was used by the defence to establish, that the

burn injuries were an act of suicide, at the free will of Savita herself.  And that,

the respondents-accused had not committed any act linked to the incident of

burning.   

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11. Accordingly, the trial Court convicted all the four accused persons for

the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34

of the IPC, and under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act.  The following

sentences were awarded by the trial Court to the accused:-

“All the accused persons are sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC.

Further,  they  are  sentenced  to  undergo  simple  imprisonment  for  3 years, and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) each, for the  offence  punishable  under  Section  498A  of  IPC.   In  default,  to undergo further simple imprisonment for 3 months.

Further, they are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  In default, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

Further, they are ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 years, and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- each, for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  In default to undergo further simple imprisonment for one year; and lastly

They are ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 years, and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) each, for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  In default, to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months.

All  the  said  substantive  sentences  shall  run  concurrently.  They are entitled for set off.

Out of the fine amount, it is ordered to pay Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand) to the mother of the deceased.”

12. All the four respondents-accused preferred Criminal Appeal no. 3514 of

2008  before  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka,  Circuit  Bench  at  Gulbarga

(hereinafter  referred to as,  the High Court).   A Division Bench of  the High

Court convicted Dattaraj and acquitted the other three accused, namely, the

brother,  the  father  and  the  mother  of  Dattaraj.   While  arriving  at  the

conclusion,  that  the  other  three  accused  besides  the  husband  of  Savita,

namely, Dattaraj (respondent-accused no. 1) had played no role in the death

of Savita, the High Court was of the view, that the evidence of Tukkubai –

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PW-1 and  Dattatry  –  PW-4,  the  mother  and  the  brother  of  the  deceased

respectively, did not attribute any kind of overt acts of cruelty or harassment to

respondent-accused nos. 2 to 4, and as such, their conviction under Sections

498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC, was bad in law.  For the

same reason, respondent-accused nos. 2 to 4 were found innocent, insofar

as, the allegations under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act are concerned,

and were accordingly acquitted for the offences punishable thereunder.

13. Dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 30.6.2009 passed by the

High Court,  the State of Karnataka has approached this Court  through the

present appeal.

14. During the course of hearing, learned counsel representing the State of

Karnataka vehemently  contended,  that  the acquittal  of  the accused by the

High Court, was in clear violation of the declaration of law, with reference to

the provisions under which the accused were charged.  Insofar as the instant

aspect of the matter is concerned, reliance in the first instance was placed on

the decision rendered by this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab & Ors.,

(2000)  5  SCC 207.   Learned  counsel  invited  our  pointed  attention  to  the

following observations recorded therein:-

“15. It  is  further  contended  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  that  the statements  of  the  deceased  referred  to  the  instances  could  not  be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband  soon before her death.  “Soon  before”  is  a  relative  term  which  is  required  to  be considered  under  specific  circumstances  of  each  case  and  no straitjacket  formula  can  be  laid  down  by  fixing  any  time-limit.  This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately before” and is opposite  of  the  expression  “soon  after”  as  used  and  understood  in Section 114,  Illustration (a)  of  the Evidence Act.  These words would imply  that  the  interval  should  not  be  too  long  between  the  time  of making the statement and the death.  It  contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under  the peculiar  circumstances  of  each case.  In  relation to dowry

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deaths,  the  circumstances  showing  the  existence  of  cruelty  or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is  shown to  have  persisted,  it  shall  be  deemed to  be  “soon  before death” if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of  such  treatment  is  not  brought  on  record,  before  such  alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.  Proximate and live link between the effect  of  cruelty  based on dowry demand and the consequential death  is  required  to  be  proved  by  the  prosecution.  The  demand  of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.”

(emphasis supplied)

Learned counsel  submitted,  that the view expressed in the Kans Raj case

(supra)  had been  reiterated  in  another  decision  rendered by this  Court  in

Tummala Venkateswar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 240.

15. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, on a

recent judgment rendered by a three-judge Bench of this Court in Rajinder

Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477, wherein Section 304B has been

explained to the effect, that the term “dowry” expressed therein, would not be

limited to the traditional  meaning attached to the aforesaid expression,  but

would include a demand for money for other purposes as well.  In this behalf it

would be relevant to mention, that the three-judge Bench did not accept the

position expressed in Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721,

in  connection  whereof,  this  Court  had  first  explained  the  position  in  the

Appasaheb case (supra), as under:-

“11. This Court has spoken sometimes with divergent voices both on what  would fall  within "dowry"  as defined and what  is  meant  by the expression  "soon  before  her  death".  In Appasaheb v. State  of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721, this Court construed the definition of dowry strictly, as it forms part of Section 304-B which is part of a penal statute.  The  Court  held  that  a  demand  for  money  for  defraying  the expenses of manure made to a young wife who in turn made the same

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demand to her  father  would be outside  the definition of  dowry. This Court said: (SCC p. 727, para 11)

“11.  …A  demand  for  money  on  account  of  some  financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for ‘dowry’ as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the Appellants  as  what  was allegedly  asked for  was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure.”

And thereupon, having examined the object and intent of the legislation, this

Court held in the Rajinder Singh case (supra), as under:-

“26. The facts of this appeal  are glaring. Demands for money were made shortly after one year of the marriage. A she-buffalo was given by the father to the daughter as a peace offering. The peace offering had no effect. The daughter was ill-treated. She went back to her father and demanded money again. The father, then, went along with his brother and the Sarpanch of the village to the matrimonial home with a request that the daughter be not ill-treated on account of the demand for money. The father  also  assured  the  said  persons  that  their  money  demand would be fulfilled and that they would have to wait till the crops of his field  are  harvested.  Fifteen  days  before  her  death,  Salwinder  Kaur again visited her parents' house on being maltreated by her new family. Then came death by poisoning. The cross-examination of the father of Salwinder Kaur has, in no manner, shaken his evidence. On the facts, therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed.”

Based on the above decision it was the vehement contention of the learned

counsel  for  the  appellant,  that  the  demands  made  by  the  accused  for

purchase of agricultural land, as also, with reference to a sewing machine,

were liable to be treated as demands constituting “dowry”.

16. We  have  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  submissions

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the rival parties.  It is not

necessary for us to deal with the statements of various witnesses, relied upon

by the trial Court, as well as, the High Court.  In our considered view, it would

be sufficient  for  the disposal  of  the controversy  in hand,  to refer  to a few

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relevant portions of the cross-examination of Tukkubai – PW-1, the mother of

Savita.   Tukkubai  –  PW-1,  during  the  course  of  her  cross-examination,

acknowledged the following factual position:-

“It is true two years A-1 remained in India after coming from Dubai and after one year my daughter delivered female child my daughter was in our house at the time of delivery for about 4 to 5 months.  By giving all the necessary ornaments to my grand daughter, my daughter was sent to her house.  It is true there is custom to present gold and clothes to the person if they come from foreign country.  At the time of putting my grand daughter  in cradle,  we went to their  house by engaging “Tam Tam”.  They gave four tonnes sugarcane seeds and a bag of jowar to us and we carried them to our village in the said “Tum Tum”.

xxx xxx xxx It  is  true  there  is  custom  to  give  gold  and  clothes  at  the  time  of performing Pooja to the bore-well.  At the time of Rakhi pourna when they came to our house, there was Chikungunya to my husband.  As my son was not there in village, A-1 took my husband to hospital.  It is not true to suggest to avoid coolie work for my daughter, we ourselves voluntarily gave tailoring machine to my daughter.  My daughter was knowing  tailoring.   Tailoring  machine  was  given  to  our  daughter  for tailoring clothes by her.  A-1 once again went to Dubai for about two months to bring Visa service.

xxx xxx xxx It is not true to suggest my daughter was not having a liking of A-1’s going to foreign country second time.

xxx xxx xxx I have studied up to IVth Standard.  My son drafted the complaint by sitting in the Govt. hospital.”

17. On  a  perusal  of  the  statement  of  Tukkubai  –  PW-1,  the  mother  of

Savita, it is apparent that the monetary gifts given to Dattaraj and his family

members, were in the nature of customary gifts exchanged during different

ceremonies.  But what is of extreme significance is the fact,  that even the

family of Dattaraj, the husband of Savita, had given four tonnes of sugarcane

seeds and a bag of jowar to her family, when the family of Savita visited her

matrimonial  house,  on  the  occasion  of  the  birth  of  a  female  child.   It  is

acknowledged by Tukkubai – PW-1, that the aforesaid gifts were taken by the

family  members  of  Savita  to  their  own  village,  by  hiring  a  “tum-tum”  (a

horse-drawn  cart).   This  return  gift  by  the  family  of  Dattaraj  was  also  in

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conformity with the customary tradition for such occasions.  It seems that the

two families celebrated all festivities in the spirit of their customary obligations.

Both  families  engaged  in  offering  gifts  to  each  other,  in  accord  with  the

prevailing practice and tradition.  For this reason, the judgment rendered by

this Court in the Rajinder Singh case (supra), which was strongly relied upon

by the learned counsel for the appellant, in our considered view, would be of

no avail in the determination of the projection canvassed.

18. Insofar as the demand of Rs.20,000/- for the purchase of agricultural

land is concerned,  it  is  apparent  that  the same was allegedly made when

Dattaraj  was in Dubai.   The said demand was allegedly made by Ningesh

(respondent  – accused no.2),  the father of  Dattaraj,  when he had gone to

leave Savita at her maternal  home.  Dattaraj is stated to have returned to

India from Dubai eight to ten months, after the above demand.  A female child

was born to Savita about a year after the return of Dattaraj to India.  After the

birth of the female child, Savita had remained in her maternal house, for about

four to five months.  Therefore, even if the above oral allegation is accepted

as correct,  it  was a demand made about two years before the occurrence.

The same was too remote to the occurrence, and therefore, would not satisfy

the  requirement  of  “soon  before  her  death”  contemplated  under  Section

304B(1) of the Indian Penal Code.  

19. The only remaining alleged dowry demand, besides those referred to

above was, that of a sewing-machine.  Yet again the position was clarified by

Tukkubai – PW-1.  During her cross-examination she stated, that Savita knew

tailoring.  And that, the sewing-machine was given to her for tailoring clothes.

This was really a gift to Savita, and therefore, cannot be considered as a part

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of the demand made by Dattaraj, for himself or for his family members.  This

allegation,  in  our  considered  view,  is  inconsequential,  with  respect  to  the

provisions under which the accused were charged.

20. There was no further attribution, as against the respondent – accused

nos. 2 to 4. It is therefore not possible for us to accept, that the prosecution

was successful in establishing either harassment or violence towards Savita,

as against the aforestated accused, nor of any dowry demand.  In such view

of  the  matter,  it  is  difficult  for  us  to  conclude  the  culpability  of

respondent-accused nos. 2 to 4, in the entire occurrence.  We are satisfied,

that the High Court was fully justified in recording that even the statements of

Tukkubai – PW-1 and Dattatry – PW-4, did not attribute any kind of overt act

to  respondent-accused  nos.  2  to  4.   The High  Court  was,  therefore,  fully

justified  in  acquitting  respondent-accused  nos.  2  to  4,  for  the  offences

punishable under Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC, as

also, for the charges under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act.

21. For  the  reasons  recorded  hereinabove  we  are  satisfied,  that  the

impugned order passed by the High Court, does not justify any interference at

our  hands.   The  instant  appeal  being  devoid  of  any  merit,  is  accordingly

dismissed.

   …………………………….J.   (Jagdish Singh Khehar)

   …………………………….J.   (S.A. Bobde)

New Delhi; February 15, 2016.

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ITEM NO.1A            COURT NO.3            SECTION IIB                 S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS  Criminal Appeal  No(s).  326/2012  STATE OF KARNATAKA                          Appellant(s)                            VERSUS  DATTARAJ &  ORS.                            Respondent(s) [HEARD  BY  HON'BLE  JAGDISH  SINGH  KHEHAR  AND  HON'BLE S.A.BOBDE, JJ.]  

Date:15/02/2016 This appeal was called on for    pronouncement of judgment today.  

For Appellant(s) Ms. Anitha Shenoy,AOR                        For Respondent(s) Mr.Anirudh Sanganeria, Adv.  

Mr. Chinmay Deshpande, Adv.                        

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Jagdish  Singh  Khehar pronounced  the  judgment  of  the  Bench  comprising  His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.A. Bobde.

For  the  reasons  recorded  in  the  Reportable judgment, which is placed on the file, the instant appeal is dismissed, being devoid of any merit.  

(Renuka Sadana) (Parveen Kr. Chawla)   Court Master      AR-cum-PS

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