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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5166-5190 OF 2013     

State of Karnataka & Anr.                                … Appellants Versus

Associated Management of (Government  Recognised – Unaided – English Medium) Primary & Secondary Schools & Ors.            …  Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (C) No.290 of 2009

Nallur Prasad & Ors.                                        … Appellants

Versus

State of Karnataka & Ors.                             …  Respondents

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5191-5199 OF 2013     

R.G. Nadadur & Ors.                                        … Appellants Versus

Shubodaya Vidya Samasthe & Anr.              …  Respondents

AND

CIVIL APPEAL No.     5090         OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.32858 of 2013)  

  State of Karnataka & Ors.                                … Appellants

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Versus

Mohamed Hussain Jucka                               … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

Leave granted in S.L.P. (C) No.32858 of 2013.

Facts leading to the reference to the Constitution  Bench:   

2. The Government of Karnataka issued a Government  

Order  dated  19.06.1989  prescribing  that  “from  1st  

standard  to  IVth standard,  mother  tongue  will  be  the  

medium of instruction”.  On 22.06.1989, the Government  

of  Karnataka  issued  a  corrigendum  substituting  the  

aforesaid  words  in  the  earlier  Government  Order  dated  

19.06.1989 by the following words:

“from  1st standard  to  IVth standard,  where  it  is  expected  that  normally   mother tongue will  be the medium of   instruction.”

The  orders  dated  19.06.1989  and  22.06.1989  were  

challenged before this Court and a Division Bench of this  

Court in its judgment dated 08.12.1993 in English Medium

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Students Parents Association v. State of Karnataka & Ors.  

[(1994)  1  SCC  550]  held  that  the  two  orders  of  the  

Government of Karnataka were constitutionally valid.  

3. Thereafter,  in  cancellation  of  all  earlier  orders  

pertaining  to  the  subject,  the  Government  of  

Karnataka  issued  a  fresh  order  dated  29.04.1994  

regarding  the  language  policy  to  be  followed  in  

primary  and  high  schools  with  effect  from  the  

academic  year  1994-1995.   Clauses 2 to  8  of  the  

Government Order dated 29.04.1994, with which we  

are  concerned  in  this  reference,  are  extracted  

hereinbelow:-

“2. The medium of instruction should be  mother  tongue  or  Kannada,  with  effect  from the  academic  year  1994-95  in  all  Government  recognized  schools  in  classes 1 to 4.

3. The students admitted to 1st standard  with effect  from the academic year 94- 95, should be taught in mother tongue or  Kannada medium.

4.  However,  permission can be granted  to the schools to continue to teach in the  pre-existing  medium to  the  students  of

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standards  2  to  4  during  the  academic  year 94-95.

5. The students are permitted to change  over to English or any other language as  medium  at  their  choice,  from  5th  standard.

6.  Permission  can  be  granted  to  only  students  whose  mother  tongue  is  English,  to  study  in  English  medium in  classes  1  to  4  in  existing  recognized  English medium schools.

7.  The  Government  will  consider  regularization  of  the  existing  unrecognized  schools  as  per  policy  indicated in paragraphs 1 to 6 mentioned  above.  Request  of  schools  who  have  complied with the provisions of the code  of  education  and  present  policy  of  the  government  will  be  considered  on  the  basis of the report of the Zilla Panchayat  routed  through commissioner  for  public  instructions.

8.  It  is  directed  that  all  unauthorized  schools  which  do  not  comply  with  the  above conditions, will be closed down.”

Thus,  these  clauses  of  the  Government  order  dated  

29.04.1994 provided that medium of instruction should be  

mother tongue or Kannada with effect from the academic  

year 1994-1995 in all Government recognized schools in  

classes  I  to  IV  and  the  students  can  be  permitted  to

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change over to English or any other language as medium  

of their choice from class V.  The Government Order dated  

29.04.1994,  however,  clarified  that  permission  can  be  

granted to only those students whose mother tongue is  

English, to study in English medium in classes I to IV in  

existing recognized English medium schools.

4.  Aggrieved by the clauses of the Government Order  

dated 29.04.1994 which prescribed that the medium  

of  instruction  in  classes  I  to  IV  in  all  Government  

recognized  schools  will  be  mother  tongue  or  

Kannada  only,  the  Associated  Management  of  

Primary  and  Secondary  Schools  in  Karnataka  filed  

Writ Petition No.14363 of 1994 and contended inter  

alia that  the  right  to  choose  the  medium  of  

instruction  in  classes  I  to  IV  of  a  school  is  a  

fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g),  

26,  29 and 30(1)  of  the Constitution and that  the  

impugned clauses of the order dated 29.04.1994 of  

the  Government  of  Karnataka  are  ultra  vires the  

Constitution.  The State of Karnataka and its officers,

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on  the  other  hand,  relied  on  the  decision  of  the  

Division  Bench  of  this  Court  in  English  Medium  

Students Parents Association v. State of Karnataka &   

Ors.  (supra)  and  contended  that  the  State  in  

exercise of its power to regulate primary education  

can,  as  a  matter  of  policy,  prescribe  that  the  

medium of instruction in classes I to IV would be in  

mother tongue of the child or Kannada.  The State of  

Karnataka also contended that Article 350A of the  

Constitution casts a duty on the State to provided  

adequate  facilities  for  instruction  in  the  mother  

tongue at the primary stage of education to children  

belonging  to  linguistic  minority  groups  and  the  

Government of Karnataka, after considering a report  

of experts in the field of education, has prescribed in  

the  Government  Order  dated  29.04.1994  that  

medium  of  instruction  for  children  studying  in  

classes I to IV shall be in the mother tongue of the  

child.  

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5. A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court heard the  

writ  petition and all  other connected writ  petitions  

and  in  its  common   judgment  dated  02.07.2008,  

held:

“(1)  Right  to  education  is  a  fundamental  right being a species of right to life flowing  from  Article 21 of  the  Constitution.  By  virtue  of  Article 21-A right  to  free  and  compulsory  primary  education  is  a  fundamental  right  guaranteed  to  all  children of the age of six to fourteen years.  The  right  to  choose  a  medium  of  instruction  is  implicit  in  the  right  to  education. It is a fundamental right of the  parent and the child to choose the medium  of instruction even in primary schools.

(2)  Right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression includes the right to choose a  medium of instruction. (3)  Imparting  education  is  an  occupation  and,  therefore,  the right  to  carry  on any  occupation  under  Article 19(1)(g) includes  the  right  to  establish  and  administer  an  educational  institution  of  one's  choice.  'One's  choice'  includes  the  choice  of  medium of instruction.

(4) Under Article 26 of the Constitution of  India  every  religious  denomination  has  a  right  to  establish  and  maintain  an  institution  for  charitable  purposes  which  includes an educational institution. This is  a right available to majority and minority  religious denominations.

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respect of unaided Government recognised primary  

schools  and for  a  writ  of  mandamus directing the  

State  Government  to  implement  the  Government  

Order dated 29.04.1994.  

7. As the judgment dated 02.07.2008 of the Full Bench  

of  the  High  Court  was  not  implemented  for  more  

than  a  year,  a  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  

passed  an  order  dated  03.07.2009  in  Writ  Appeal  

No.1682  of  2009  and  other  connected  matters  

asking the Government of Karnataka to comply with  

the judgment dated 02.07.2008 of the Full Bench of  

the  High  Court  and  aggrieved  by  the  said  order  

dated 03.07.2009 in Writ Appeal No.1682 of 2009,  

different officers of the Education Department of the  

Government  of  Karnataka  have  filed  Civil  Appeal  

Nos.5191-5199 of 2013.   

8. A learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court  

directed  the  State  of  Karnataka  in  Writ  Petition  

No.3044 of 1994 to grant permission to an institution  

to run English medium school from 1st standard to 4th

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standard by order dated 22.01.1996.  The order of  

the learned Single Judge was challenged before the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  Writ  Appeal  

No.2740  of  1997,  but  on  21.02.2012  the  Division  

Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal  

saying that the order dated 08.07.2008 of the Full  

Bench of the High Court in Associated Management  

of Primary and Secondary Schools in Karnataka v.   

The State of Karnataka & Ors. has not been stayed  

by  this  Court  in  the  Special  Leave  Petition  under  

Article  136 of  the  Constitution.   Aggrieved by  the  

order  dated  21.02.2012  passed  by  the  Division  

Bench in Writ Appeal No.2740 of 1997, the State of  

Karnataka  has  filed  Special  Leave  Petition  (C)  

No.32858 of 2013.

The questions referred to the Constitution Bench:

9. All these matters were heard by a Division Bench of  

this  Court  and  on  05.07.2013,  the  Division  Bench

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passed an order referring the following questions for  

consideration by the Constitution Bench:

“(i)  What  does  Mother  tongue  mean?  If  it  referred to as the language in which the child  is comfortable with, then who will decide the  same?

(ii) Whether a student or a parent or a citizen  has a right to choose a medium of instruction  at primary stage?

(iii) Does the imposition of mother tongue in  any way affect the fundamental rights under  Article 14, 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution?

(iv)  Whether  the  Government  recognized  schools  are  inclusive  of  both  government- aided schools and private & unaided schools?

(v) Whether the State can by virtue of Article  350-A  of  the  Constitution  compel  the  linguistic  minorities  to  choose  their  mother  tongue  only  as  medium  of  instruction  in  primary schools?”

In  its  order  dated  05.07.2013,  the  Division  Bench  also  

observed  that  the  Constitution  Bench  may  take  into  

consideration  ancillary or incidental questions which may  

arise during the course of hearing of the cases and further  

directed  that  all  other  connected  matters  including

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petitions/applications  shall  be  placed  before  the  

Constitution Bench.   

Contentions  of  learned  counsel  for  the  State  of  Karnataka:

10. At  the  hearing  before  the  Constitution  Bench,  

Professor Ravi Varma Kumar, the learned Advocate  

General for the State of Karnataka, submitted that  

the  State  Reorganization  Commission,  1955  in  

paragraphs 773 to 777 of its report has referred to  

the  resolution  adopted at  the  Provincial  Education  

Ministers’ Conference held in August, 1949 that the  

medium of instruction and examination in the junior  

basic stage must be the mother tongue of the child  

and that the mother tongue of the child will be the  

language declared by the parent or guardian to be  

the  mother  tongue.   He  submitted  that  this  

resolution  adopted  at  the  Provincial  Education  

Ministers’  Conference  held  in  August,  1949,  has  

been approved by the Government of India and now  

serves  as  a  guide  for  the  State  Governments  in

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making  arrangements  for  the  education  of  the  

school-going children in the respective States.  He  

submitted  that  after  the  report  of  the  State  

Reorganization Commission, 1955, Article 350A has  

been introduced in the Constitution providing that it  

shall be the endeavour of every State and of every  

local authority within the State to provide adequate  

facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the  

primary stage of education to children belonging to a  

linguistic minority group.  

11. The learned Advocate General submitted that, in this  

background,  the  Government  order  dated  

29.04.1994  was  issued  by  the  Government  of  

Karnataka prescribing that the medium of instruction  

for children studying in classes I to IV in all primary  

schools  recognized  by  the  Government  will  be  

mother tongue or Kannada from the academic year  

1994-95.   He  cited  the  judgment  of  the  Division  

Bench  of  this  Court  in  English  Medium  Students  

Parents  Association  v.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Ors.

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(supra)  to  submit  that  experts  are  unanimous  in  

their  view that  the basic  knowledge can easily  be  

acquired by a child through his mother tongue and  

that  the  State  Government  has  the  power  to  lay  

down  a  policy  prescribing  that  the  medium  of  

instruction for children studying in I to IV standards  

in all  Government recognized schools in Karnataka  

will be Kannada or mother tongue.

12.   The learned Advocate General next submitted that  

the  High  Court  was  not  right  in  coming  to  the  

conclusion that the right to freedom of speech and  

expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the  

Constitution includes the right to choose a medium  

of instruction and that in exercise of this right, it is a  

fundamental  right  of  the  parents  and the  child  to  

choose  a  medium  of  instruction  in  the  primary  

schools.  He submitted that similarly the High Court  

was not right in coming to the conclusion that the  

right  to  establish  and  administer  an  educational  

institution  under  Articles  19(1)(g)  and  26  of  the

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Constitution  will  include  the  right  to  choose  a  

medium of  instruction.   He  submitted  that  in  any  

case  if  the  State  takes  a  policy  decision  that  the  

medium of  instruction for  the  children studying in  

classes I to IV will  be their mother tongue, such a  

policy  decision  of  the  State  Government  will  be  

within the regulatory powers of the State.  He cited  

the judgment of this Court in  Gujarat University &  

Anr.  v.  Shri  Krishna  Ranganath  Mudholkar  &  Ors.  

[AIR 1963 SC 703] in which a Constitution Bench of  

this  Court  has  taken  the  view  that  the  State  

Legislature has the regulatory power to legislate on  

medium of  instruction in  institutions of  primary or  

secondary  education.   He  submitted  that  under  

Article  162  of  the  Constitution,  the  State  

Government has executive powers co-extensive with  

its legislative powers and therefore the Government  

order dated 29.04.1994 prescribing that the medium  

of instruction of all children studying in classes I to  

IV will be mother tongue was well within the powers  

of the State Government.  He argued that even if it

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is  held  that  children  and  parents  have  a  right  to  

choose a medium of instruction for classes I to IV or  

that citizens who have established schools  have a  

fundamental  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution  to  choose  the  medium  in  which  

education will be imparted to the children studying  

in their schools, the State could restrict their right by  

virtue of its regulatory powers and prescribe that a  

medium  of  instruction  for  children  studying  in  

classes I to IV will be their mother tongue.

13.   The learned Advocate General next submitted that  

the High Court was again not right in coming to the  

conclusion  that  the  Government  policy  compelling  

children  studying  in  schools  recognized  by  the  

Government  to  have  primary  education  only  in  

mother tongue or the regional language is violative  

of  Article 30(1) of the Constitution.   He submitted  

that  so  long  as  the  State  permits  a  medium  of  

instruction to be the same as the language of the  

minority  community  which  has  established  the

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educational institution, the fundamental rights under  

Article 29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution are not  

violated because the purport  of  Articles 29(1)  and  

30(1) of the Constitution is to promote the language  

of  every  community  including  the  language  of  a  

linguistic  minority.   He  cited  State  of  Bombay  v.   

Bombay Education Society & Ors. [AIR 1954 SC 561]  

wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court has held  

that  a  minority  group  such  as  the  Anglo-Indian  

community,  which  is  based,  inter  alia,  on  religion  

and language, has the fundamental right to conserve  

its language, script and culture under Article 29(1)  

and  has  the  right  to  establish  and  administer  

educational  institutions  of  its  choice  under  Article  

30(1) and, therefore, there must be implicit in such  

fundamental right, the right to impart education in  

its  own  institution  to  the  children  of  its  own  

community in its own language.  He also cited D.A.V.  

College, etc. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [(1971) 2  

SCC 269] wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court  

has  held  that  the purpose and object  of  linguistic

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States  is  to  provide  greater  facility  for  the  

development  of  the  people  of  that  area  

educationally, socially and culturally in the language  

of that region but while the State or the University  

has every right to provide for the education of the  

majority in the regional medium, it is subject to the  

restrictions  contained  in  Articles  25  to  30  of  the  

Constitution and accordingly neither the University  

nor the State could impart education in a medium of  

instruction in a language and script which stifles the  

language and script of any section of the citizens.  

According to him, the rights under Articles 29(1) and  

30(1) of the Constitution are thus not affected by the  

order  dated  29.04.1994  of  the  Government  of  

Karnataka because it prescribes that the students in  

classes  I  to  IV  will  be  imparted  education  in  the  

medium of instruction of the mother tongue of the  

children and the mother tongue of the children will  

be none other than the language of their linguistic  

community.

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14. The learned Advocate General further submitted that  

this Court has held in Usha Mehta & Ors. v. State of   

Maharashtra  &  Ors. [(2004)  6  SCC  264]  that  the  

State  can  impose  reasonable  regulations  for  

protecting the larger interests of the State and the  

nation  even  in  the  case  of  minority  educational  

institutions enjoying the right under Article 30(1) of  

the  Constitution  and  the  “choice”  that  could  be  

exercised by the minority community in establishing  

educational institutions is subject to such reasonable  

regulations  imposed  by  the  State,  but  while  

imposing regulations, the State shall be cautious not  

to destroy the minority character of institutions.  He  

argued  that  the  Government  Order  dated  

29.04.1994  by  providing  that  the  medium  of  

instruction of children studying in classes I to IV in  

primary  schools  will  be  the  mother  tongue of  the  

children does not in any way destroy the minority  

character of the institutions protected under Article  

30(1) of the Constitution.

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15. The  learned  Advocate  General  submitted  that  the  

High Court has relied on the judgment of this Court  

in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka   

&  Ors. [(2002)  8  SCC  481]  in  coming  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  Government  order  dated  

29.04.1994  violates  the  fundamental  rights  under  

Articles 19(1)(g) and 30(1) of the Constitution.  He  

submitted that the High Court has not noticed some  

of the paragraphs of the majority judgment in T.M.A.  

Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.  

(supra) in coming to its conclusions.  He referred to  

the paragraph 54 of the aforesaid majority judgment  

in which it has been held that the right to establish  

and maintain institutions for religious and charitable  

purposes  under  Articles  19(1)(g)  and  26(a)  of  the  

Constitution is  subject  to  regulations made by the  

State for maintaining educational standards etc.  He  

referred to paragraph 115 of the majority judgment  

in which it has also been held that the right of the  

religious  and  linguistic  minorities  to  establish  and  

administer educational institutions of their choice is

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not absolute and that such institutions have to follow  

statutory measures regulating educational standards  

etc.   He  submitted  that  in  paragraph  122  of  the  

majority judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v.   

State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra),  however,  it  has  

been held that such regulations must satisfy the test  

of  reasonableness.   He  submitted  that  the  

Government  Order  dated  29.04.1994  prescribing  

that  the  medium  of  instruction  for  all  children  

studying in classes I to IV in primary schools in the  

State of Karnataka would be the mother tongue of  

the  children  is  a  regulatory  measure  and satisfies  

the test of reasonableness.

16.  The learned Advocate General finally submitted that  

Article  21A  of  the  Constitution  is  titled  ‘Right  to  

Education’ and provides that the State shall provide  

free and compulsory education to all children of the  

age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the  

State  may,  by  law,  determine.   He  argued  that  

Article 21A is thus the sole depository of the right to

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education and it is not open for any citizen to invoke  

any other fundamental right like Article 19(1)(a) or  

Article  21  to  contend  that  he  has  a  right  to  be  

educated in a medium of instruction of his choice.  

He submitted that Parliament has made the Right of  

Children  to  Free  and  Compulsory  Education  Act,  

2009  under  Article  21A  of  the  Constitution,  and  

Section 29(2)(f) of this Act provides that the medium  

of  instruction  shall,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  the  

child’s mother tongue.  He submitted that the High  

Court  was,  therefore,  not  right  in  coming  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  right  to  choose  a  medium  of  

instruction is implicit in the right to education under  

Articles 21 and 21A of the Constitution.

Contentions  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  who  support the Government order dated 29.04.1994:

17.  Mr. K. N. Bhat, learned senior counsel appearing for  

respondent nos. 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17 and 18  

in  Civil  Appeal  No.5166  of  2013,  submitted  that  

mother tongue is the language in which the child is

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the most comfortable.  He cited Usha Mehta & Ors.   

v.  State of  Maharashtra & Ors.  (supra)  in  which a  

three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly held that the  

State  can  impose  reasonable  regulations  in  the  

larger interests of the State and the nation even on  

institutions  established  by  religious  and  linguistic  

minorities and protected under Article 30(1) of the  

Constitution and that the word ‘choice’ in Article 30  

of  the  Constitution  is  subject  to  such  regulation  

imposed by the State.  He submitted that the only  

caution  that  the  State  has  to  exercise  is  that  by  

imposing such regulations the minority character of  

the institutions is not destroyed.  He submitted that  

accordingly if the State Government has issued the  

order  dated  29.04.1994  under  Article  162  of  the  

Constitution  prescribing  that  the  medium  of  

instruction for all children studying in classes I to IV  

would  be  mother  tongue,  such  an  order  being  

regulatory in nature and not affecting the minority  

character  of  the institutions,  does  not  in  any  way  

affect the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the

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Constitution.   He submitted that  the conclusion of  

the  High  Court  that  the  Government  Order  dated  

29.04.1994  insofar  as  it  compels  minority  

institutions  to  adopt  medium  of  instruction  for  

students studying in classes I to IV as mother tongue  

is  violative  of  right  under  Article  30  of  the  

Constitution, therefore, is not correct.

18.  Mr. Bhat next submitted that Article 19(1)(a) of the  

Constitution  guarantees  the  right  to  freedom  of  

speech and expression to all  citizens and the only  

restrictions that the State can impose on this right  

are  those  mentioned  in  Article  19(2)  of  the  

Constitution.  He submitted that a reading of Article  

19(2) of the Constitution will show that it empowers  

the  State  to  make  law  imposing  reasonable  

restrictions  in  the  interest  of  the  sovereignty  and  

integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly  

relation with foreign States, public order, decency or  

morality  or  in  relation  to  contempt  of  court,  

defamation or incitement to an offence, but does not

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empower the State to impose reasonable restrictions  

in  the  interest  of  general  public.   He  vehemently  

argued that if  the right to freedom of speech and  

expression is interpreted so as to include the right to  

choose  the  medium  of  instruction,  the  State  will  

have no power to impose any reasonable restrictions  

in the larger interests of the State or the nation on  

this right to choose the medium of instruction and  

such  an  interpretation  should  be  avoided  by  the  

Court.  He submitted that the rationale of the right to  

freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a)  

of  the Constitution and the power  of  the  State to  

impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of  

the Constitution in the interests of the sovereignty  

and  integrity  of  India,  the  security  of  the  State,  

friendly  relations  with  foreign States,  public  order,  

decency  or  morality  or  in  relation  to  contempt  of  

court, defamation or incitement to an offence, have  

been explained in the judgments of P.B. Sawant, J.  

and B.P.  Jeevan Reddy,  J.  in  Secretary,  Ministry of  

Information & Broadcasting, Government of India &  

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Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors. [(1995) 2  

SCC  161].   He  submitted  that  considering  these  

serious consequences which may arise if we take the  

view  that  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  

expression includes the right to choose medium of  

instruction, we should leave this question open if it is  

not necessary to decide it in this case.  

Contentions  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  who  challenge the Government order dated 29.04.1994:

19.  Mr. Mohan V. Katarki, learned counsel appearing for  

respondent  no.1  in  Civil  Appeal  No.5166  of  2013,  

submitted  that  under  Article  350A  of  the  

Constitution, the State has no power to compel any  

educational  institution  to  adopt  mother  tongue  as  

the medium of instruction.  He submitted that Article  

350A of the Constitution only casts a duty on every  

State and every local authority within the State to  

provide  adequate  facilities  for  instruction  in  the  

mother- tongue at the primary stage of education to  

children belonging to linguistic minority groups, and

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does not empower the State to interfere with right to  

freedom of speech and expression and the right to  

establish and administer schools under Article 19 of  

the Constitution.

20.  Mr.  Katarki  submitted that the reliance placed by  

the  State  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  English  

Medium  Students  Parents  Association  v.  State  of   

Karnataka  &  Ors.  (supra)  in  which  the  earlier  

Government  Order  dated  22.06.1989   prescribing  

mother  tongue  as  the  medium  of  instruction  was  

upheld  is  misplaced  as  the  reason  given  by  this  

Court  in  the  aforesaid  decision  for  upholding  the  

order dated 22.06.1989 of the State Government is  

that  the  order  did  not  have  an  element  of  

compulsion.   He  submitted  that  the  Government  

order dated 29.04.1994, on the other hand, makes it  

compulsory  for  all  Government  recognized schools  

including private unaided schools  to  adopt mother  

tongue of the child as the medium of instruction in  

classes I to IV.  

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21.  Mr.  Katarki  submitted that  this  Court  has  held in  

Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh  

& Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 645] that the right to education  

of a child up to the age of 14 years is part of the  

right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution and,  

therefore, the High Court was right in coming to the  

conclusion  that  the  right  to  be  educated  in  the  

medium of instruction of the choice of the child is  

also  part  of  the  right  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution. He submitted that similarly the right to  

freedom of speech and expression will  include the  

right to choose the medium of instruction in which  

the child is to be educated and the High Court was,  

therefore,  right  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  

compelling  a  child  to  be  educated  through  a  

particular medium of instruction, such as his mother  

tongue, is violative of his right under Article 19(1)(a)  

of the Constitution.  

22.  Mr. Katarki next submitted that Article 30(1) of the  

Constitution  confers  on  religious  and  linguistic

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minority  communities  the  right  to  establish  and  

administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice  

and  the  word  “choice”  clearly  indicates  that  the  

State cannot compel an institution established by a  

religious or linguistic minority to impart education in  

their institution to the children of classes I to IV only  

in the mother tongue of the children.  In support of  

this  submission,  he relied on the  decisions  of  this  

Court in In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959  

SCR 995], Rev. Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The State   

of Bihar & Ors. [1969 (2) SCR 73],  D.A.V. College,  

etc.  etc.  v.  State of  Punjab & Ors.  (supra),  D.A.V.  

College, Bhatinda, etc. v. The State of Punjab & Ors.  

(supra)  and  The  Ahmedabad  St.  Xavier’s  College  

Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [(1974) 1  

SCC 717].  He submitted that even the educational  

institutions  which  have not  been established by  a  

religious  or  linguistic  minority  have  a  right  to  

freedom  under  Articles  19(1)(g)  and  26  of  the  

Constitution and in exercise of this right, they have a  

right to choose the medium of instruction in which

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they want to impart education to their students.  In  

support of this proposition, he relied on the majority  

judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of   

Karnataka & Ors. (supra) and P.A. Inamdar & Ors. v.   

State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(2005) 6 SCC 537].

23.  Mr.  G.R. Mohan, appearing for respondent Nos.10  

and  11  in  Civil  Appeal  No.5186  of  2013,  while  

adopting the  aforesaid  submissions  of  Mr.  Katarki,  

further submitted that Article 26(3) of the Universal  

Declaration  of  Human  Rights  adopted  by  the  

members  of  the  United  Nations  including  India  

provides that parents have a prior right to choose  

the  kind  of  education  that  shall  be  given  to  their  

children.   Mr.  K.V.  Dhananjay,  learned  counsel  

appearing for some of the respondents, also adopted  

the submissions of Mr. Katarki.     

Our answers to the five questions referred to us:

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24. Question No.(i): “What does Mother tongue mean? If   

it referred to as the language in which the child is   

comfortable with, then who will decide the same?”.   

As  this  question  is  referred  to  us  in  context  of  our  

Constitution,  we  have  to  answer  this  question  by  

interpreting the expression “mother  tongue” as used in  

the Constitution.  We must not forget that the Constitution  

is not just an ordinary Act which the court has to interpret  

for the purpose of declaring the law, but is a mechanism  

under  which  the  laws  are  to  be  made.   As  Kania  C.J.  

observed in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC  

27):

“Although we are to interpret words of  the Constitution on the same principles  of  interpretation  as  we  apply  to  any  ordinary  law,  these  very  principles  of  interpretation  compel  us  to  take  into  account the nature and scope of the Act  that we are interpreting – to remember  that  it  is  a  Constitution,  a  mechanism  under which laws are to be made and  not a mere Act which declares what the  law is to be.”

The only provision in the Constitution which contains the  

expression  “mother  tongue”  is  Article  350A.  We  must

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therefore understand why Article 350A was inserted in the  

Constitution.  The State Reorganization Commission, 1955,  

made  recommendations  for  reorganizing  the  States  on  

linguistic  basis.   In  Part  IV  of  its  report,  the  State  

Reorganization Commission, 1955, has devoted Chapter I  

to  “safeguards  for  linguistic  groups”  and  has  

recommended that the linguistic minorities of the States  

should have the right to instruction in mother tongue.  In  

support of this recommendation, the State Reorganization  

Commission, 1955, has relied on the resolution adopted at  

the  Provincial  Education  Ministers’  Conference  held  in  

August,  1949,  which  had  been  approved  by  the  

Government of India and which had served as a guide to  

the State Governments in making arrangements for  the  

education  of  the  school-going  children  whose  mother  

tongue  is  different  from  the  regional  language.   This  

resolution is extracted hereinbelow:

“The  medium  of  instruction  and  examination  in  the  junior  basic  stage  must be the mother tongue of the child  and,  where  the  mother  tongue  is  different  from  the  regional  or  State  language, arrangements must be made  for instruction in the mother tongue by

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appointing  at  least  one  teacher,  provided  there  are  not  less  than  40  pupils  speaking  the  language  in  the  whole  school  or  10  such  pupils  in  a  class.   The mother  tongue  will  be  the  language  declared  by  the  parent  or  guardian to be the mother tongue.  The  regional  or  State language,  where it  is  different  from  the  mother  tongue,  should  be  introduced  not  earlier  than  Class III  and not  later than the end of  the  junior  basic  stage.   In  order  to  facilitate  the  switching-over  to  the  regional  language  as  medium  in  the  secondary  stage,  children  should  be  given the option of answering questions  in their mother tongue, for the first two  years after the junior basic stage.”

From the aforesaid  resolution  adopted at  the  Provincial  

Education Ministers’ Conference held in August, 1949, and  

from the  recommendations  of  the  State  Reorganization  

Commission,  1955,  it  is  clear  that  while  recommending  

language as the basis for reorganization of the States in  

India, the Commission wanted to ensure that the children  

of the linguistic minority which had a language different  

from the language of the State were imparted education  

at  the  primary  stage  in  their  mother  tongue.   In  the  

resolution adopted at the Provincial  Education Ministers’  

Conference held in August, 1949, extracted above, it was

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also clarified that the mother tongue will be the language  

declared  by  the  parent  or  guardian  to  be  the  mother  

tongue.

25. After  the  recommendations  of  the  State  

Reorganization Commission, 1955, Article 350A was  

inserted in the Constitution by the Constitution (VIIth  

Amendment) Act.  Article 350A reads:

“It shall be the endeavour of every State  and of  every local  authority within the  State to provide adequate facilities  for  instruction in the mother tongue at the  primary  stage of  education  to  children  belonging to linguistic minority groups;  and  the  President  may  issue  such  directions to any State as he considers  necessary  or  proper  for  securing  the  provision of such facilities.”

A mere reading of Article 350A of the Constitution would  

show that it casts a duty on every State and every local  

authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for  

instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of  

education  to  children  belonging  to  linguistic  minority  

groups.  Hence, the expression ‘mother tongue’ in Article  

350A means the mother tongue of the linguistic minority

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group in a particular State and this would obviously mean  

the language of that particular linguistic minority group.

26. Mother  tongue  in  the  context  of  the  Constitution  

would, therefore, mean the language of the linguistic  

minority  in  a  State  and  it  is  the  parent  or  the  

guardian  of  the  child  who  will  decide  what  the  

mother tongue of child is.  The Constitution nowhere  

provides that mother tongue is the language which  

the child is comfortable with, and while this meaning  

of “mother tongue” may be a possible meaning of  

the ‘expression’, this is not the meaning of mother  

tongue in Article 350A of the Constitution or in any  

other  provision  of  the  Constitution  and  hence  we  

cannot  either  expand  the  power  of  the  State  or  

restrict a fundamental right by saying that mother  

tongue  is  the  language  which  the  child  is  

comfortable with.  We accordingly answer question  

no.(i).

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27. Question No.(ii): Whether a student or a parent or a   

citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction   

at primary stage ?   

The High Court has held that the parent or a child has a  

right to choose medium of instruction in primary schools as  

part  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  

under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the right to  

choose the medium of  instruction is  also  implicit  in  the  

right  to  education  under  Articles  21  and  21A  of  the  

Constitution.   We  have  to  decide  whether  these  

conclusions of the High Court that the parent or a child has  

a  right  to  choose  the  medium of  instruction  in  primary  

schools  as  part  of  the  right  to  freedom of  speech  and  

expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and  

also has a right  to  choose the medium of  instruction in  

primary  schools  under  Articles  21  and  21A  of  the  

Constitution are correct.

28. Article  19  of  the  Constitution  is  titled  “Right  to  

Freedom” and it states that all citizens shall have the  

right—

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(a)   to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without  

arms; (c)  to form associations or unions; (d)  to  move  freely  throughout  the  

territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the  

territory of India;  (f)  x x x (g) to practise any profession, or to carry  

on any occupation, trade or business.

The word ‘freedom’ in Article 19 of the Constitution means  

absence of control by the State and Article 19(1) provides  

that the State will not impose controls on the citizen in the  

matters mentioned in sub-clauses (a),(b),(c),(d),(e) and (g)  

of Article 19(1) except those specified in clauses 2 to 6 of  

Articles 19 of the Constitution.  In all matters specified in  

clause  (1)  of  Article  19,  the  citizen  has  therefore  the  

liberty to choose, subject only to restrictions in clauses (2)  

to (6) of Article 19.

29.   One of the reasons for  giving this  liberty to the  

citizens is contained in the famous essay ‘On Liberty’  

by John Stuart Mill.  He writes:  

“Secondly, the principle requires liberty of   tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of  

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our life to suit our own character; of doing   as we like, subject to such consequences  as  may follow:  without  impediment  from  our fellow creatures, so long as what we   do does not harm them, even though they   should think our conduct foolish, perverse,   or wrong.”   

According  to  Mill,  therefore,  each  individual  must  in  

certain matters be left alone to frame the plan of his life to  

suit his own character and to do as he likes without any  

impediment and even if he decides to act foolishly in such  

matters,  society  or  on  its  behalf  the  State  should  not  

interfere with the choice of the individual.  Harold J. Laski,  

who was not prepared to accept Mill’s attempts to define  

the limits  of  State interference,  was also of the opinion  

that  in  some  matters  the  individual  must  have  the  

freedom of choice.  To quote a passage from “A Grammar  

of Politics” by Harold J. Laski:

“My  freedoms  are  avenues  of  choice   through  which  I  may,  as  I  deem  fit,   construct  for  myself  my  own  course  of   conduct.  And the freedoms I must possess   to enjoy a general liberty are those which,   in  their  sum,  will  constitute  the  path   through which my best self is capable of   attainment.   That is not to say it  will  be   attained.  It is to say only that I alone can  

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make  that  best  self,  and  that  without   those freedoms I have not the means of   manufacture at my disposal.”  

Freedom or choice in the matter of speech and expression  

is  absolutely  necessary  for  an  individual  to  develop  his  

personality in his own way and this is one reason, if not  

the  only  reason,  why  under  Article  19(1)(a)  of  the  

Constitution every citizen has been guaranteed the right  

to freedom of speech and expression.   

30. This  Court  has  from  time  to  time  expanded  the  

scope  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  

expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the  

Constitution by consistently adopting a very liberal  

interpretation.  In  Romesh Thappar v. The State of   

Madras  [AIR  1950  SC  124],  this  Court  held  that  

freedom of speech and expression includes freedom  

of propagation of ideas which is ensured by freedom  

of circulation and in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of   

India [AIR  1962  SC  305],  this  Court  held  that  

freedom of speech and expression carries with it the  

right to publish and circulate one’s ideas, opinions

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and views.  In  Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of   

India [(1972)2 SCC 788], this Court also held that the  

freedom of press means right of citizens to speak,  

publish and express their views as well as right of  

people to read and in  Odyssey Communications (P)   

Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana [(1988) 3 SCC 410],  

this Court has further held that freedom of speech  

and  expression  includes  the  right  of  citizens  to  

exhibit films on Doordarshan.   

31. This  Court  also  went  into  the  question  whether  

receiving information or education by a citizen was  

part of his right to freedom of speech and expression  

in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,   

Government of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of   

Bengal  &  Ors.  (supra)  and  held  that  the  right  to  

freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1(a)  

of the Constitution will not only include the right to  

impart  information  but  also  the  right  to  receive  

information.  In his opinion, P.B. Sawant, J. observed  

that the right to freedom of speech and expression

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also includes the right to educate, to inform and to  

entertain  and  also  the  right  to  be  educated,  

informed and entertained.   In  line with the earlier  

decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the  

right  to  freedom of  speech  and  expression  under  

Article  19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution  includes  the  

freedom of  a  child  to  be educated at  the primary  

stage of school in a language of the choice of the  

child and the State cannot impose controls on such  

choice  just  because  it  thinks  that  it  will  be  more  

beneficial for the child if he is taught in the primary  

stage of school in his mother tongue. We, therefore,  

hold  that  a  child  or  on  his  behalf  his  parent  or  

guardian,  has  a  right  to  freedom  of  choice  with  

regard  to  the  medium  of  instruction  in  which  he  

would like to be educated at the primary stage in  

school.   We  cannot  accept  the  submission  of  the  

learned Advocate General that the right to freedom  

of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a) of the  

Constitution does not include the right of a child or  

on his behalf his parent or guardian, to choose the

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medium  of  instruction  at  the  stage  of  primary  

school.

32. We cannot also accept the submission of Mr.  Bhat  

that if the right to freedom of speech and expression  

in  Article  19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution  is  held  to  

include the right to choose the medium of instruction  

at the stage of primary school,  then the State will  

have no power under clause (2) of Article 19 to put  

reasonable  restrictions  on  the  right  to  freedom of  

speech  and  expression  except  in  the  interest  of  

sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the  

State,  friendly  relations  with  foreign States,  public  

order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt  

of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.  In  

our view, the Constitution makers did not intend to  

empower the State to impose reasonable restrictions  

on  the  valuable  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  

expression  of  a  citizen  except  for  the  purposes  

mentioned  in  clause  (2)  of  Article  19  of  the  

Constitution  because  they  thought  that  imposing

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other  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  speech  and  

expression will be harmful to the development of the  

personality of the individual citizen and will not be in  

the larger  interest  of  the nation.   In  the words of  

Pantanjali  Shastri  speaking for  the majority  of  the  

judges in  Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras  

(supra):

“Thus,  very  narrow  and  stringent  limits  have  been  set  to  permissible  legislative  abridgment of the right of free speech and  expression and this was doubtless due to  the realisation that freedom of speech and  of  the  press  lay  at  the  foundation  of  all  democratic organisations, for without free  political discussion no public education, so  essential for the proper functioning of the  processes  of  popular  Government,  is  possible.   A  freedom  of  such  amplitude  might  involve  risks  of  abuse.   But  the  framers of the Constitution may well have  reflected  with  Madison  who  was  ‘the  leading spirit in the preparation of the First  Amendment  of  the  Federal  Constitution’,  that “it is better leave a few of its noxious  branches to their luxuriant growth than, by  pruning them away, to injure the vigour of  those yielding the proper fruits” (Quoted in  Near v. Minnesotta,  283 U.S. 607 at 717- 8).”       

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Therefore,  once  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  

freedom of speech and expression will include the right of  

a child to be educated in the medium of instruction of his  

choice,  the  only  permissible  limits  of  this  right  will  be  

those  covered  under  clause  (2)  of  Article  19  of  the  

Constitution and we cannot exclude such right of a child  

from the right to freedom of speech and expression only  

for the reason that the State will have no power to impose  

reasonable  restrictions  on  this  right  of  the  child  for  

purposes other than those mentioned in Article 19(2) of  

the Constitution.

33.  We may now consider whether the view taken by  

the High Court in the impugned judgment that the  

right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in  

the right to education under Articles 21 and 21A of  

the  Constitution  is  correct.   Article  21  of  the  

Constitution  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  

deprived  of  his  life  or  personal  liberty  except  

according to procedure established by law.  In Unni  

Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh &  

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Ors. (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court has  

held that under Article 21 of the Constitution every  

child/citizen  of  this  country  has  a  right  to  free  

education until  he completes the age of 14 years.  

Article  21A  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  

State shall provide free and compulsory education to  

all  children of  the  age of  six  to  fourteen years  in  

such manner as the State may, by law, determine.  

Under  Articles  21  and  21A  of  the  Constitution,  

therefore, a child has a fundamental right to claim  

from the State free education upto the age of  14  

years.   The  language  of  Article  21A  of  the  

Constitution  further  makes  it  clear  that  such  free  

education which a child can claim from the State will  

be in a manner as the State may, by law, determine.  

If,  therefore,  the  State  determines  by  law  that  in  

schools  where  free  education  is  provided  under  

Article  21A  of  the  Constitution,  the  medium  of  

instruction would be in the mother tongue or in any  

language, the child cannot claim as of right under  

Article 21 or Article 21A of the Constitution that he

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has a right to choose the medium of instruction in  

which the education should be imparted to him by  

the State.  The High Court, in our considered opinion,  

was not right in coming to the conclusion that the  

right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in  

the right to education under Articles 21 and 21A of  

the  Constitution.   Our  answer  to  Question  No.(ii),  

therefore, is that a child, and on his behalf his parent  

or guardian, has the right to choose the medium of  

instruction at the primary school stage under Article  

19(1)(a) and not under Article 21 or Article 21A of  

the Constitution.   

34.  Question  No.(iii): Does  the  imposition  of  mother   

tongue  in  any  way  affect  the  fundamental  rights   

under Article 14, 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution?

As the High Court has not come to the conclusion in the  

impugned judgment that imposition of mother tongue in  

any way affects the fundamental right under Article 14 of  

the Constitution, it is not necessary for us to decide this  

question.  We will  have to  decide  whether  imposition  of

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mother tongue in any way affects the fundamental rights  

under Articles 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution.

35. Articles  29(1)  and  30(1)  of  the  Constitution  are  

quoted hereinbelow:

29. Protection of interests of minorities:-  (1) Any section of the citizens residing in the  territory of India or any part thereof having a  distinct language, script or culture of its own  shall have the right to conserve the same.

30.Right  of  minorities  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions:-  (1)  All  minorities,  whether  based on religion or  language,  shall  have  the  right  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their choice.”

A reading of clause (1) of Article 29 of the Constitution  

provides that any section of the citizens residing in the  

territory  of  India  or  any  part  thereof  having  a  distinct  

language, script or culture of its own shall have the right  

to conserve the same and clause (1) of Article 30 provides  

that all minorities, whether based on religion or language,  

shall  have  the  right  to  establish  and  administer  

educational institutions of their choice.  

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36. In  D.A.V.  College,  Bhatinda,  etc.  v.  The  State  of   

Punjab  &  Ors.  (supra),  the  Punjabi  University  in  

exercise of its power under Section 4(2) of Punjabi  

University Act (35 of 1961), made Punjabi the sole  

medium  of  instruction  and  examination  in  all  

colleges affiliated under Punjabi University.  It was  

contended  inter  alia before  this  Court  that  

prescription  of  such  medium  of  instruction  and  

examination in a language which is not the mother  

tongue  of  the  minority  which  has  established  the  

educational  institution  is  violative  of  the  rights  

conferred under clause (1) of Article 29 and clause  

(1)  of  Article  30  of  the  Constitution  and  the  

Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  has  upheld  this  

contention in the following words:

“The right of the minorities to establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of their choice would include the right to  have  a  choice  of  the  medium  of  instruction  also  which  would  be  the  result  of  reading  Article  30(1)  with  Article 29(1).”

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Thus, a Constitution Bench of this Court in D.A.V. College,  

Bhatinda, etc. v. The State of Punjab & Ors. (supra) has  

already held that minorities have a right to establish and  

administer educational institutions of ‘their choice’,  and  

therefore they have the choice of medium of instruction in  

which  education  will  be  imparted  in  the  institutions  

established and administered by them.

37. The  contention  of  the  learned  Advocate  General,  

however,  is  that  the  aforesaid  decision  and  other  

decisions of this Court have been rendered in cases  

where the State imposed a medium of instruction in  

a  language  different  from  the  language  of  the  

minority community, but if the State prescribes the  

medium of instruction to be the mother tongue of  

the  child,  which  is  the  language  of  the  minority  

community, there is no violation of the right of the  

linguistic  minority  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  

Constitution.   We  do  not  find  any  merit  in  this  

contention because this Court has also held that the  

“choice”  of  the  minority  community  under  Article

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30(1) need not be limited to imparting education in  

the language of the minority community.  In re The  

Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957 (supra),  S.R.  Das,  CJ,  

writing the majority opinion of a seven Judge Bench  

of this Court, held:

“23. Having disposed of the minor point  referred to above,  we now take up the  main argument advanced before us as to  the content of Art. 30(1).  The first point  to  note is  that  the article gives  certain  rights not only to religious minorities but  also to linguistic minorities.  In the next  place,  the  right  conferred  on  such  minorities  is  to  establish  educational  institutions of their  choice.   It  does not  say  that  minorities  based  on  religion  should  establish  educational  institutions  for  teaching  religion  only,  or  that  linguistic minorities should have the right  to  establish  educational  institutions  for  teaching their language only.  What the  article  says  and  means  is  that  the  religious  and  the  linguistic  minorities  should  have  the  right  to  establish  educational  institutions  of  their  choice.  There  is  no  limitation  placed  on  the  subjects to be taught in such educational  institutions.   As  such  minorities  will  ordinarily  desire  that  their  children  should  be  brought  up  properly  and  efficiently  and  be  eligible  for  higher  university  education  and  go  out  in  the  world  fully  equipped  with  such  intellectual  attainments  as  will  make  them fit for entering the public services,

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educational  institutions  of  their  choice  will  necessarily  include  institutions  imparting general secular education also.  In  other  words,  the  article  leaves  it  to  their choice to establish such educational  institutions as will  serve both purposes,  namely, the purpose of conserving their  religion,  language  or  culture,  and  also  the purpose of giving a thorough, good  general education to their children.”

38. We  may  now  examine  whether  an  unaided  non-

minority  school  has  a  similar  right  to  choose  a  

medium of instruction under Article 19(1)(g) of the  

Constitution  at  the  primary  school  stage.   Under  

Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, a citizen has the  

right to practise any profession, or to carry on any  

occupation,  trade  or  business.   In  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation  &  Ors.  v.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Ors.  

(supra),  Kirpal  C.J.  writing  the  majority  judgment  

interpreted  this  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution to include the right to establish and run  

educational  institutions.   In  paragraph  25  of  the  

aforesaid judgment in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors.   

v.  State of  Karnataka & Ors. (supra),  the majority  

judgment held:

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“The  establishment  and  running  of  an  educational  institution  where  a  large  number  of  persons  are  employed  as  teachers or administrative staff, and an  activity is carried on that results in the  imparting of knowledge to the students,  must  necessarily  be  regarded  as  an  occupation, even if there is no element  of  profit  generation.   It  is  difficult  to  comprehend that education,  per se, will  not  fall  under  any  of  the  four  expressions  in  Article  19(1)(g).  “Occupation” would be an activity of a  person  undertaken  as  a  means  of  livelihood or a mission in life. ”

Thus,  the  word  “occupation”  in  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution was interpreted by the majority judgment of  

this  Court  in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation  &  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Karnataka  &  Ors. (supra),  to  include  the  activity  which  

results in imparting of knowledge to the students even if  

there is no element of profit generation in such activity.  

However,  unlike Article 30(1) of the Constitution,  Article  

19(1)(g) does not have the word “choice”.  The absence of  

the  word  “choice”,  in  our  considered  opinion,  does  not  

make a material difference because we find that Article 19  

of the Constitution is  titled “Right to Freedom” and the  

word  “freedom”  along  with  the  word  “any”  before  the

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word “occupation” in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution  

would mean that the right to establish and administer an  

educational institution will include the right of a citizen to  

establish a school for imparting education in a medium of  

instruction of his choice.  If a citizen thinks that he should  

establish a school and in such a school,  the medium of  

instruction should be a particular  language then he can  

exercise such right subject to the reasonable regulations  

made by the State under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.  

We  are  thus  of  the  considered  opinion  that  a  private  

unaided school which is not a minority school and which  

does not enjoy the protection of Articles 29(1) and 30(1) of  

the Constitution can choose a medium of instruction for  

imparting education to the children in the school.

39.  It  is,  however,  well  settled  that  all  educational  

institutions  can  be  subject  to  regulations  by  the  

State for inter alia maintenance of proper academic  

standards.   While  discussing the right  to  establish  

and  administer  an  educational  institution  under  

Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution,  Kirpal  C.J.,

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speaking  for  the  majority  of  Judges  in  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation  &  Ors.  v.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Ors.  

(supra), held:

“The  right  to  establish  an  educational  institution  can  be  regulated;  but  such  regulatory  measures  must,  in  general,  be to ensure the maintenance of proper  academic  standards,  atmosphere  and  infrastructure  (including  qualified  staff)  and the prevention of maladministration  by those in charge of management……”

Again, in the majority judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation &  

Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra), Kirpal C.J. while  

discussing the right of a minority educational  institution  

protected under Article 30(1) of the Constitution;  

“……It was permissible for the authorities  to  prescribe  regulations,  which  must  be  complied with, before a minority institution  could  seek  or  retain  affiliation  and  recognition.  But it was also stated that the  regulations made by the authority should  not impinge upon the minority character of  the institution.  Therefore, a balance has to  be kept between the two objectives – that  of ensuring the standard of excellence of  the institution, and that of preserving the  right  of  the  minorities  to  establish  and  administer  their  educational  institutions......”

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Thus, whether it is a private unaided institution enjoying  

the  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution  or  

whether  it  is  a  private  institution  enjoying  the  special  

protection of a minority institution under Article 30(1) of  

the  Constitution,  the  State  has  the  power  to  adopt  

regulatory  measures  which  must  satisfy  the  test  of  

reasonableness.   Moreover,  the State may exercise this  

regulatory power either by making a law or by issuing an  

executive order.

40.  The  learned  Advocate  General  for  the  State  of  

Karnataka relied  on the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Gujarat University & Anr. v. Shri Krishna Ranganath   

Mudholkar & Ors. (supra) to submit that this power  

to  prescribe  regulations  for  maintaining  the  

standards of education would include the power to  

prescribe the medium of instruction.  We quote the  

relevant portion of the decision of the Constitution  

Bench of this Court in  Gujarat University & Anr. v.   

Shri Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar & Ors. (supra) on  

which he has placed reliance:

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“23.…..The power to legislate in respect  of  primary  or  secondary  education  is  exclusively vested in the States by item  No.II of List II, and power to legislate on  medium of instruction in institutions of  primary  or  secondary  education  must  therefore  rest  with  the  State  Legislatures.   Power  to  legislate  in  respect  of  medium  of  instruction  is,  however, not distinct legislative head; it  resides  with  the  State  Legislatures  in  which  the  power  to  legislate  on  education  is  vested,  unless  it  is  taken  away  by  necessary  intendment  to  the  contrary.   Under  items  63  to  65  the  power to legislate in respect of medium  of instruction having regard to the width  of those items, must be deemed to vest  in  the  Union.   Power  to  legislate  in  respect of medium of instruction, in so  far  it  has  a  direct  bearing  and impact  upon  the  legislative  head  of  co- ordination  and  determination  of  standards  in  institutions  of  higher  education or research and scientific and  technical  institutions,  must  also  be  deemed by item 66 List I to be vested in  the Union.”

From the aforesaid quotation, we find that the Constitution  

Bench has held that under the scheme of distribution of  

legislative powers between the States and the Union, the  

power  to  legislate  in  respect  of  primary  or  secondary  

education  is  exclusively  vested  in  the  States  and  has

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further held that in exercise of this power the State can  

prescribe  the  medium  of  instruction.   The  Constitution  

Bench, however, has not held that this power of the State  

to  prescribe  the  medium  of  instruction  in  primary  or  

secondary schools  can be exercised in  contravention of  

the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g)  

of the Constitution.  The Constitution Bench has only held  

that if the medium of instruction has a direct bearing or  

impact on the determination of standards in institutions of  

higher education, the legislative power can be exercised  

by the Union to prescribe a medium of instruction.  For  

example, prescribing English as a medium of instruction in  

subjects of higher education for which only English books  

are available and which can only  be properly  taught  in  

English  may  have  a  direct  bearing  and  impact  on  the  

determination of standards of education.  Prescribing the  

medium of instruction in schools to be mother tongue in  

the primary school stage in classes I to IV has, however,  

no  direct  bearing  and  impact  on  the  determination  of  

standards of  education,  and will  affect  the fundamental

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rights  under  Articles  19(1)(a)  and  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution.  

41. We may now consider the decision of the Division  

Bench  of  this  Court  in  English  Medium  Students  

Parents  Association  v.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Ors.  

(supra)  on which reliance has been placed by the  

State of Karnataka.  In paragraph 20 at page 560 of  

the aforesaid decision as reported in the SCC, this  

Court  has  held  that  all  educational  experts  are  

uniformly  of  the  opinion  that  pupils  should  begin  

their schooling through the medium of their mother  

tongue and the reason for this opinion is that if the  

tender minds of the children are subject to an alien  

medium,  the  learning  process  becomes  unnatural  

and  inflicts  a  cruel  strain  on  the  children  which  

makes  the  entire  learning  process  mechanical,  

artificial and torturous but if the basic knowledge is  

imparted  through  mother  tongue,  the  young  child  

will  be  able  to  garner  knowledge  easily.   In  

paragraph  17  at  page  559  of  the  aforesaid

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judgment, the Division Bench of this Court has also  

given the reasons why it did not find the impugned  

Government order to be ultra vires Articles 14, 29(1)  

and 30(1)  of  the Constitution.   These reasons are  

quoted hereinbelow:

“16. In view of the liberty given to the  State  of  Karnataka  the  present  GO  bearing  No.87  PROU  SE  BHA  88,  Bangalore dated June 19, 1989 (quoted  above)  has  come  to  be  passed.   A  corrigendum also came to be issue on  June 22, 1989 which reads as under:

“For para (i) of Order portion of the  abovesaid Government Order dated  June 19,  1989 i.e.,  from the words  ‘From  Ist  standard  ….  subject  to  study’  the  following  para  shall  be  substituted:

‘From Ist standard to IVth standard,  where it  is  expected that  normally  mother tongue will  be the medium  of  instruction,  only  one  language  from Appendix I will be compulsory  subject of study.’ “

17. A careful  reading of the above GO  would clearly indicate that the element  of compulsion at the primary stage is no  longer  there  because  the  GO  is  unequivocal when it says from Ist to IVth  standards  mother  tongue  will  be  the  medium  of  instruction,  only  one  language  from  Appendix  I  will  be  compulsory subject of study.  From IIIrd

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standard  onwards  Kannada  will  be  an  option subject  for  non-Kannada  speaking students.  It is to be taught on  voluntary  basis  there  being  no  examination at  the end of  the year  in  Kannada language……”

Thus,  the  reasons  given  by  the  Division  Bench  of  this  

Court  to  uphold  the  Government  order  of  the  State  of  

Karnataka dated 19.06.1989 are that the Government had  

issued a corrigendum on 22.06.1989 and a reading of the  

Government order after the corrigendum would show that  

there was no element of compulsion at the primary stage  

any longer that the medium of instruction from I standard  

to IV standard would be in mother tongue.  The decision of  

this Court in English Medium Students Parents Association   

v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra), is, therefore, not an  

authority for  the proposition that prescription of mother  

tongue  in  classes  I  to  IV  in  the  primary  school  can  be  

compelled  by  the  State  as  a  regulatory  measure  for  

maintaining the standards of education.   

42. We are of  the considered opinion that  though the  

experts may be uniform in their opinion that children

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studying in classes I to IV in the primary school can  

learn  better  if  they  are  taught  in  their  mother  

tongue, the State cannot stipulate as a condition for  

recognition  that  the  medium  of  instruction   for  

children  studying  in  classes  I  to  IV  in  minority  

schools protected under Articles 29(1) and 30(1) of  

the  Constitution  and  in  private  unaided  schools  

enjoying the right to carry on any occupation under  

Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution  would  be  the  

mother tongue of the children as such stipulation.  

We accordingly answer question No.(iii) referred to  

us and hold that  the imposition of  mother  tongue  

affects the fundamental rights under Articles 19, 29  

and 30 of the Constitution.

43. Question  No.(iv): Whether  the  Government  

recognized  schools  are  inclusive  of  both   

government-aided  schools  and  private  &  unaided   

schools?”

In Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh &   

Ors. (supra),  Jeevan  Reddy  J.  writing  the  judgment  for

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himself and for Pandian J.  has held in paragraph 204 at  

page  753  that  the  right  to  establish  an  educational  

institution does not carry with it the right to recognition or  

the right to affiliation and that recognition and affiliation  

are  essential  for  meaningful  exercise  of  the  right  to  

establish and administer educational institutions.  In this  

judgment, the two Judges of this Court have also held that  

recognition may be granted either by the Government or  

by  any  other  authority  or  body  empowered  to  accord  

recognition  and  affiliation  may  be  granted  by  the  

academic  body  empowered  to  grant  affiliation.   In  this  

judgment, the two Judges of this Court have further held  

that  it  is  open to  a  person  to  establish  an  educational  

institution,  admit  students,  impart  education,  conduct  

examination  and  award  certificates  but  the  educational  

institution  has  no  right  to  insist  that  the  certificates  or  

degrees awarded by such institution should be recognized  

by the State and therefore the institution has to seek such  

recognition or affiliation from the appropriate agency.  In  

the aforesaid case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of   

Andhra  Pradesh  &  Ors. (supra),  S.  Mohan  J.  in  his

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concurring judgment has also observed in paragraph 76 at  

page 693 that recognition is for the purpose of conforming  

to the standards laid down by the State and affiliation is  

with regard to the syllabi and the courses of study and  

unless  and  until  they  are  in  accordance  with  the  

prescription of the affiliating body, certificates cannot be  

conferred and hence the educational institution is obliged  

to follow the syllabi and the course of the study.  These  

views expressed by the three Judges in the Constitution  

Bench judgment of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors.   

v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (supra) have not been  

departed  from  in  the  majority  judgment  in  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation & Ors.  v.  State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra).  

Kirpal C.J. writing the judgment in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  

(supra) on behalf of the majority Judges has held that the  

fundamental  right to establish an educational  institution  

cannot be confused with the right to ask for recognition or  

affiliation.  From  the  aforesaid  discussion  of  the  law  as  

developed  by  this  Court,  it  is  clear  that  all  schools,  

whether  they  are  established  by  the  Government  or  

whether  they are aided by the Government  or  whether

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they are not aided by the Government, require recognition  

to  be  granted  in  accordance  of  the  provisions  of  the  

appropriate  Act  or  Government  order.   Accordingly,  

Government  recognized  schools  will  not  only  include  

government aided schools but also unaided schools which  

have been granted recognition.  

44. Question No.(v):  whether the State can by virtue of   

Article  350-A  of  the  Constitution  compel  the   

linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue   

only as medium of instruction in primary schools ?   

We have extracted Article 350A of the Constitution above  

and we have noticed that in this Article it is provided that  

it shall be the endeavour of every State and of every local  

authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for  

instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of  

education  to  children  belonging  to  linguistic  minority  

groups.  We have already held that a linguistic minority  

under  Article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution  has  the  right  to  

choose the medium of instruction in which education will  

be imparted in the primary stages of the school which it

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has  established.   Article  350A  therefore  cannot  be  

interpreted to empower the State to compel a linguistic  

minority to choose its mother tongue only as a medium of  

instruction  in  a  primary  school  established  by  it  in  

violation of this fundamental right under Article 30(1).  We  

accordingly  hold  that  State  has  no  power  under  Article  

350A of the Constitution to compel the linguistic minorities  

to  choose  their  mother  tongue  only  as  a  medium  of  

instruction in primary schools.

45.  In view of our answers to the questions referred to  

us, we dismiss Civil Appeal Nos.5166-5190 of 2013, 5191-

5199 of  2013,  the  Civil  Appeal  arising out  of  S.L.P.  (C)  

No.32858 of 2013 and Writ Petition (C) No.290 of 2009.  

There shall be no order as to costs.

                                     .....……………..……………………CJI.

                                (R.M. Lodha)

                              .....……………..……………………….J.                                  (A. K. Patnaik)

                              .....……………..……………………….J.                                  (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

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                                          .....……………..……………………….J.

                                (Dipak Misra)                                   

...…....………….……………………..J.                          (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla) New Delhi, May 06, 2014.