03 May 2017
Supreme Court
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STATE OF HARYANA Vs VED KAUR

Bench: ADARSH KUMAR GOEL,UDAY UMESH LALIT
Case number: C.A. No.-006066-006066 / 2017
Diary number: 17026 / 2015
Advocates: VISHWA PAL SINGH Vs


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Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6066   of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.21622 of 2015)

State of  Haryana and Another         …. Appellants

Versus

Ved Kaur …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T  

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  appellants  seek  to  challenge  the  judgment  and  order  dated

25.08.2014 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh passed

in LPA No.1353 of 2014 (OM), affirming the view taken by the Single Judge

of the High Court on 22.01.2014 in CWP No.14998 of 2007.

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3. One Dharam Singh (since deceased and represented by his widow, the

respondent herein) was working as JBT teacher in Education Department in

State of Haryana since 07.10.1967.  He and two others were convicted under

Section 304 Part-II IPC vide judgment and order passed by the trial court on

29.10.1994 and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four

years.   On the basis of said conviction and sentence,  Dharam Singh was

dismissed  from  service,  without  holding  any  enquiry,  vide  order  dated

28.03.1995  on  the  ground  that  he  was  convicted  and  sentenced  for  an

offence involving moral turpitude.

4. While  the appeal  preferred against  the judgment  of  conviction and

sentence was pending, Dharam Singh expired on 11.12.2002 and his appeal

abated.  Subsequently the appeal of the co-accused was partly allowed and

they were acquitted of the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC but were

convicted under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC.  The role of  the

co-accused was admittedly similar to that of Dharam Singh.

5. After the acquittal of the co-accused, the respondent called upon the

State to set aside the order of dismissal of her husband in the light of the

finding recorded by the appellate court and to release all the service benefits

to  which  her  deceased  husband  was  entitled.   This  claim  having  been

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rejected, the respondent filed CWP No.10134 of 2005  which was disposed

of  by  the  High  Court  directing  the  State  to  reconsider  the  claim of  the

respondent.  The matter was, therefore, reconsidered by the State  but the

claim was again rejected.

6. The rejection of claim was challenged afresh by the respondent by

filing CWP No.14998 of 2007 which was allowed by the Single Judge of the

High Court, relying on the instructions dated 26.03.1975 issued by State of

Haryana wherein offences involving “moral turpitude” stand enlisted.  It was

observed that  the offence  under  Section 323 IPC did not  fall  under  said

category of offences.  It was further observed that the role attributed to the

deceased husband of the respondent was similar to that of his co-accused

and that  the  appellate  court  had held that  the death  in  the  case  was not

because of the injuries attributed to the accused but it was because of renal

failure.

7. The decision of the Single Judge was questioned by the State by filing

Letters Patent Appeal No.1353 of 2014 (OM).   Affirming the view taken by

the Single Judge, the Division Bench dismissed the aforesaid LPA and held

the respondent to be entitled to all consequential benefits.

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8. The  instructions  dated  26.03.1975  which  were  relied  upon  in  the

present case, had been considered by this Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of

Haryana and  another1 and paragraph  12 of  the  decision  is  relevant  for

present purposes.  The said paragraph was as under:

“12.   Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base,  vile,  depraved  or  having  any  connection  showing depravity. The Government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on  2-2-1973  (Annexure  E  in  the  Paper-book),  accepting  the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex-convicts who  were  convicted  for  offences  involving  moral  turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offences which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared  for  information  and  guidance  in  that  connection. Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences  constituting  moral  turpitude.  Later,  on  further consideration,  the  Government  of  Haryana  on  17/26-3-1975 explained  the  policy  decision  of  2-2-1973  and  decided  to modify  the  earlier  decision  by streamlining  determination  of moral turpitude as follows:

“… The following terms should ordinarily be applied in judging whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not;

(1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general.

(2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one.

(3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator  could  be  considered  to  be  of  a  depraved

1(1996) 4 SCC 17

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character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.

Decision  in  each  case  will,  however,  depend  on  the circumstances of the case and the competent authority has to exercise  its  discretion  while  taking a  decision  in  accordance with the above-mentioned principles. A list of offences which involve moral turpitude is enclosed for your information and guidance. This list,  however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and there might be offences which are not included in it but which  in  certain  situations  and  circumstances  may  involve moral turpitude.”

Section 294 IPC still remains out of the list. Thus the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC on its own would not involve  moral  turpitude  depriving  him of  the  opportunity  to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances, which led to the  conviction,  met  the  requirements  of  the  policy  decision above-quoted.”

 9. The aforesaid decision shows that Section 294 IPC was not part of the

list of offences appended to the instructions dated 26.03.1975 and as such it

was held by this Court  that  the conviction of  the appellant  therein under

Section 294 IPC would not involve moral turpitude depriving him of the

opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances which led

to his conviction, met the requirement of the policy decision.

10. In the aforesaid context, decision of the Division Bench of the High

Court  of  Punjab and Haryana in  State  of  Haryana and another v.  Ram

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Chander2 on which reliance was placed by the respondent, is also significant

wherein same instructions dated 26.03.1975 were considered by the Division

Bench and paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said decision were as under:

“11.  Following principles can be culled out, as contained in the aforesaid instructions:-

(a) Those who are involved in moral turpitude should not be taken in government service.

(b) Those who are convicted of offences, which do not involve moral turpitude or those who are released under the Probation of Offenders Act, should not suffer any disability in respect of obtaining government service.

(c)  With  regard  to  those  convicted  of  offence  not  involving moral  turpitude,  laying down uniform policy, is  not  possible and it is left to the appointing authority in each case to make detailed  inquiry and satisfy  himself  fully  that  ex-convict  has reformed himself  after  release  from jail  and nothing adverse about his conduct has come to notice after his conviction. Such an inquiry is to be made invariably through Police Department.

(d) What amounts to moral turpitude is also stated in para (iii) of the instructions.

(e) Discretion is given to the competent authority while taking decision  in  accordance  with  principle  mentioned  in  these instructions.

12.    On  the  basis  of  these  instructions,  when  competent authority is to invoke its power under Rule 7(2)(b) of the P&A Rules,  1978,  the  first  question  would  be  as  to  whether  the offences for which the employee is convicted constitute moral turpitude. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would be open to the competent authority to pass the order of termination without

2 LPA No.95 of 2013 (O&M) decided on 18.02.2013

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holding  inquiry.  However,  if  the  offences  for  which  an employee is convicted have no shades of moral turpitude, the disciplinary  authority  has  to  look  into  the  attendant circumstances leading to the conduct of such an employee to see whether he is suitable for rejection in government service or not.”

11. In the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, the conviction under

Section  323 was  not  held  to  constitute  one  involving moral  turpitude  in

terms  of  the  test  laid  down  in  instructions  dated  26.03.1975.    In  the

premises,  the decision of the Division Bench affirming that of the Single

Judge in the present case does not call for any interference.  However, it

must be noted at this stage and it was fairly accepted by Mr. Tushar Bakshi,

learned Advocate appearing for the respondent that in view of the decision

of this Court  in  State Bank of India and another v.  Mohammed Abdul

Rahim3 the order regarding payment of backwages as directed by the courts

below needed modification.  Paragraph 12 of said decision was as under:

“The respondent was acquitted on 22-2-2002, the demand for reinstatement  was  made  by  him  on  22-4-2002  and  he  was reinstated in service by the appellant bank on 7-11-2002. On the view that we have taken, at the highest,  what can be said in favour of the respondent is that he is entitled to wages from the date  he  had  lodged  the  demand  for  the  same  following  his acquittal,  namely,  from  22-4-2002,  until  the  date  of  his reinstatement, if the same has not already been granted by the appellant Bank.”

3(2013) 11 SCC 67

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12. In  the  present  case  by  the  time  the  benefit  of  acquittal  of  the

co-accused was pressed in service and claim was raised by the respondent,

Dharam Singh had already expired.  In the circumstances, we direct that the

respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits in terms of the judgment under

appeal  except  the  payment  of  back  wages.   All  the  other  consequential

benefits be computed and released to the respondent within two months from

the date of this Judgment.  With the aforesaid modification, the appeal stands

disposed of.

 

………………………J. (Adarsh Kumar Goel)

…………………..……J. (Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi, May 03,  2017