State of Haryana Vs Mukesh Kumar .

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO. 28034/2011

(Arising out of CC 9038/2010)

State of Haryana …Petitioner

Versus

Mukesh Kumar & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. People are often astonished to learn that a

trespasser may take the title of a building or land from

the true owner in certain conditions and such theft is

even authorized by law.

2. The theory of adverse possession is also perceived

by the general public as a dishonest way to obtain title

to property. Property right advocates argue that

mistakes by landowners or negligence on their part

should never transfer their property rights to a

wrongdoer, who never paid valuable consideration for

such an interest.

3. The government itself may acquire land by adverse

possession. Fairness dictates and commands that if the

government can acquire title to private land through

adverse possession, it should be able to lose title under

the same circumstances.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the State of

Haryana. We do not deem it appropriate to financially

burden the respondents by issuing notice in this Special

Leave Petition. A very vital question which arises for

consideration in this petition is whether the State, which is

in charge of protection of life, liberty and property of the

people can be permitted to grab the land and property of its

own citizens under the banner of the plea of adverse

possession?

5. Brief facts, relevant to dispose of this Special Leave

Petition are recapitulated as under:

6. The State of Haryana had filed a Civil Suit through the

Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon, seeking a relief of

declaration to the effect that it has acquired the rights of

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ownership by way of adverse possession over land

measuring 8 biswas comprising khewat no. 34, khata no.

56, khasra no. 3673/452 situated in the revenue estate of

Hidayatpur Chhavni, Haryana.

7. The other prayer in the suit was that the sale deed

dated 26th March, 1990, mutation no. 3690 dated 22nd

November, 1990 as well as judgment and decree dated 19th

May, 1992, passed in Civil Suit No. 368 dated 9 th March,

1991 are liable to be set aside. As a consequential relief, it

was also prayed that the defendants be perpetually

restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of

the plaintiff (petitioner herein) over the suit land. For the

sake of convenience we are referring the petitioner as the

plaintiff and the respondents as defendants.

8. In the written statement, the defendants raised a

number of preliminary objections pertaining to estoppel,

cause of action and mis-joinder of necessary parties. It was

specifically denied that the plaintiff ever remained in

possession of the suit property for the last 55 years. It was

submitted that the disputed property was still lying vacant.

However, the plaintiff recently occupied it by using force and

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thereafter have also raised a boundary wall of police line. It

was denied in the written statement that the plaintiff

acquired right of ownership by way of adverse possession

qua property in question. The defendants prayed for

dismissal of suit and by way of a counter claim also prayed

for a decree for possession qua suit property be passed.

9. The Trial Court framed the following Issues in the suit.

1. Whether plaintiffs have become owner of disputed property by way of adverse possession? OPP

2. Whether sale deed 26.3.1990 and mutation no. 3690 dated 22.11.90 are null and void as alleged? OPP

3. Whether judgment and decree dated 19.05.92 passed in civil suit no. 368 dated 9.3.91 is liable to be set aside alleged? OPP

4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? OPP

5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the present suit? OPP

6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPP

7. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for mis- joinder of necessary parties? OPP

8. Whether defendants no. 1 to 4 are rightful owners of disputed property on the basis of impugned sale deed dated 23.6.1990 registered on 3.7.1990? OPP

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9. Whether defendants are entitled for possession of disputed property? OPP

10. Relief.

10. Issue No. 1 which relates to adverse possession and

issue No. 4 pertaining to maintainability were decided

together. According to the Trial Court, the plaintiff has

failed to prove the possession over the disputed property

because the plaintiff could not produce any documentary

evidence to prove this. On the contrary, revenue records

placed on the file shows that the defendants are the owners

in possession of disputed property. The Trial Court

observed that possession of State, as claimed in the plaint

for a continuous period of 55 years, stood falsified by the

documents issued by the officials of the State.

11. The Trial Court also observed that despite claiming

adverse possession, there was no pleading qua denial of title

of the defendants by the plaintiff, so much so that the

specific day when the alleged possession of State allegedly

became adverse against the defendants has not been

mentioned in order to establish the starting point of

limitation could be ascertained.

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12. The Trial Court relied on the judgment of this Court in

S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254

wherein this Court has laid down that the adverse

possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and

extent and a plea is required at the least to show when

possession becomes adverse. The Court also held that long

possession is not necessarily adverse possession.

13. The Trial Court also relied on a decision of the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Bhim Singh &

Ors. v. Zile Singh & Ors., AIR 2006 P and H 195,

wherein it was stated that no declaration can be sought by a

plaintiff with regard to the ownership on the basis of

adverse possession.

14. The Trial Court came to specific conclusion that

despite the fact that the possession of the plaintiff over the

disputed land is admitted on behalf of defendants, Issue No.

1 stand decided against the plaintiff. It was held that the

suit of the plaintiff claiming ownership by way of adverse

possession is not maintainable. Consequently, Issue No. 1

was decided against the plaintiff and Trial No. 4 was decided

in favour of the defendants.

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15. The Trial Court decided Issue Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6

together and came to the definite conclusion that the

plaintiff failed to prove its possession over the property in

question. It was also held that the plaintiff had no locus

standi to challenge the validity of the impugned sale deed,

mutation as well as the judgment and decree because the

plaintiff was neither the owner nor in possession of the

property in dispute. Consequently, the plaintiff had no right

to say that the impugned sale deed dated 26th March, 1990

was a sham transaction and the suit of mutation dated 22nd

November, 1990 and, thereafter, the judgment and decree

dated 19th May, 1992 passed in Civil Suit No. 386 dated 9th

March, 1991 are liable to be set aside.

16. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the

plaintiff having no right or title in the suit property has

neither locus standi nor cause of action to file the present

suit. Issue Nos. 2 and 3 were decided against the plaintiff,

whereas, Issue Nos. 5 and 6 were decided in favour of the

defendants.

17. Regarding Issue Nos. 8 and 9, the Trial Court observed

that once it is held that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are owners of

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the disputed property, which is presently in possession of

the plaintiff without any right, they (defendants) are entitled

to its possession. Hence, Issue Nos. 8 and 9 were also

decided in favour of the defendants.

18. Issue No. 7 was not pressed and decided against the

defendants.

19. Regarding Issue No. 10 (relief) the Trial Court observed

as under:

“As a sequel to the findings of this court on the issues mentioned above, the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed, however, counter claim filed by defendants is decreed with costs to the effect that they are entitled to possession of land measuring 8 biswas comprising of khewat no. 34 khata no. 56 khasa no. 3673/452 situated in revenue estate of Hidayatpur Chhavni village now the part of known as Patel Nagar, Gurgaon. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.”

20. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial

Court filed an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 33) before the learned

Additional District Judge, Gurgaon. Learned Additional

District Judge while deciding the appeal, relied on the

judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court delivered in

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the case of Food Corporation of India and Another v.

Dayal Singh 1991 PLJ 425, wherein it was observed that it

does not behove the Government to take the plea of adverse

possession against the citizens.

21. Learned Additional District Judge also relied on other

judgments of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the cases of

Bhim Singh & Ors. (supra) and Kanak Ram & Ors. v.

Chanan Singh & Ors. (2007) 146 PLR 498 wherein it was

held that a person in adverse possession of immovable

property cannot file a suit for declaration claiming

ownership and such a suit was not maintainable.

22. Before parting with the judgment the learned

Additional District Judge observed regarding conduct of the

plaintiff that the present suit was filed by State of Haryana

by the then Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon on 11th May,

1996. It was also observed by the learned Additional

District Judge that the Police department is for the

protection of the people and property of the citizens and the

police department had unnecessarily dragged the

defendants in unnecessary litigation. The appeal was

dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs.25,000/-.

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23. Unfortunately, despite serious strictures passed by the

Court, the State of Haryana did not learn a lesson and

preferred a Second Appeal (RSA No. 3909 of 2008) before

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh against

the judgments and decrees of the two courts below.

24. The High Court, relying on the earlier judgments,

observed that the welfare State which was responsible for

the protection of life and property of its citizens, was in the

present case, itself trying to grab the land/property of the

defendants under the garb of plea of adverse possession and

hence the action of the plaintiff is deplorable and

disgraceful.

25. Unfortunately, the State of Haryana, is still not

satisfied with the three strong judgments by three different

forums given against the State and is still quite anxious and

keen to grab the property of the defendants in a clandestine

manner on the plea of adverse possession.

26. In a democracy, governed by rule of law, the task of

protecting life and property of the citizens is entrusted to

the police department of the government. In the instant

case, the suit has been filed through the Superintendent of

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Police, Gurgaon, seeking right of ownership by adverse

possession.

27. The revenue records of the State revealed that the

disputed property stood in the name of the defendants. It is

unfortunate that the Superintendent of Police, a senior

official of the Indian Police Service, made repeated attempts

to grab the property of the true owner by filing repeated

appeals before different forums claiming right of ownership

by way of adverse possession.

28. The citizens may lose faith in the entire police

administration of the country that those responsible for the

safety and security of their life and property are on a spree

of grabing the properties from the true owners in a

clandestine manner.

29. A very informative and erudite Article was

published in Neveda Law Journal Spring 2007 with the

title ‘Making Sense Out of Nonsense: A Response to

Adverse Possession by Governmental Entities’. The

Article was written by Andrew Dickal. Historical

background of adverse possession was discussed in that

article.

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Historical background

30. The concept of adverse possession was born in

England around 1275 and was initially created to allow

a person to claim right of “seisin” from his ancestry.

Many felt that the original law that relied on “seisin”

was difficult to establish, and around 1623 a statue of

limitations was put into place that allowed for a person

in possession of property for twenty years or more to

acquire title to that property. This early English

doctrine was designed to prevent legal disputes over

property rights that were time consuming and costly.

The doctrine was also created to prevent the waste of

land by forcing owners to monitor their property or

suffer the consequence of losing title.

31. The concept of adverse possession was

subsequently adopted in the United States. The

doctrine was especially important in early American

periods to cure the growing number of title disputes.

The American version mirrored the English law, which

is illustrated by most States adopting a twenty-year

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statue of limitations for adverse possession claims. As

America has developed to the present date, property

rights have become increasingly more important and

land has become limited. As a result, the time period to

acquire land by adverse possession has been reduced in

some States to as little as five years, while in others, it

has remained as long as forty years. The United States

has also changed the traditional doctrine by preventing

the use of adverse possession against property held by a

governmental entity.

32. During the colonial period, prior to the enactment

of the Bill of Rights, property was frequently taken by

states from private land owners without compensation.

Initially, undeveloped tracts of land were the most

common type of property acquired by the government,

as they were sought for the installation of public road.

Under the colonial system it was thought that benefits

from the road would, in a newly opened country, always

exceed the value of unimproved land.

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33. The doctrine of adverse possession arose in an era

where lands were vast particularly in the United States of

America and documentation sparse in order to give quietus

to the title of the possessor and prevent fanciful claims from

erupting. The concept of adverse possession exits to cure

potential or actual defects in real estate titles by putting a

statute of limitation on possible litigation over ownership

and possession. A landowner could be secure in title to his

land; otherwise, long-lost heirs of any former owner,

possessor or lien holder of centuries past could come

forward with a legal claim on the property. Since

independence of our country we have witnessed registered

documents of title and more proper, if not perfect, entries of

title in the government records. The situation having

changed, the statute calls for a change.

34. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai

Harijan and Others (2009) 16 SCC 517 (one of us

Bhandari, J.), this Court had an occasion to examine the

English and American law on “adverse possession”. The

relevant paras of that judgment (Paras 24 and 26 to 29) are

reproduced as under:

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“24. In a relatively recent case in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59, this Court again had an occasion to deal with the concept of adverse possession in detail. The Court also examined the legal position in various countries particularly in English and American systems. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant passages in extenso. The Court dealing with adverse possession in paras 5 and 6 observed as under: (SCC pp. 66-67)

“5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. (See Downing v. Bird 100 So 2d 57 (Fla 1958), Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock 227, Ark 1085 : 303 SW 2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy 207 NY 240 : 100 NE 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm 39 Wyo 494 : 273 P 908 : 97 ALR 1 (1929).)

6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but

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also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p. 81. It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of adverse possession, especially in the backdrop of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given a complete go-by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim.”

35. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities

in his favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the

true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all

facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Though we

got this law of adverse possession from the British, it is

important to note that these days English Courts are taking

a very negative view towards the law of adverse possession.

The English law was amended and changed substantially to

reflect these changes, particularly in light of the view that

property is a human right adopted by the European

Commission. This Court in Revamma (supra) observed

that to understand the true nature of adverse

possession, Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property

Co [1962] 2 WLR 1020 : [1962] 2 All ER 288 can be

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considered where House of Lords referring

to Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B. 16 termed adverse

possession as a negative and consequential right effected

only because somebody else's positive right to access the

court is barred by operation of law. As against the rights of

the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there

evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse

possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the

land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who

has ignored the property.

36. The right to property is now considered to be not only

constitutional or statutory right but also a human right.

Human rights have already been considered in realm of

individual rights such as right to health, right to livelihood,

right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights

are gaining a multi faceted dimension. Right to property is

also considered very much a part of the new dimension.

Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read

in that context.

37. The changing attitude of the English Courts is quite

visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. v.

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Palmer (2005) 3 WLR 554. The Court here tried to read the

human rights position in the context of adverse possession.

But what is commendable is that the dimension of human

rights have widened so much that now property dispute

issues are also being raised within the contours of human

rights. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European

Courts of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind

view to the concept of adverse possession.

38. Paragraphs from 26 to 29 of Hemaji Waghaji Jat

(supra) are set out as under:-

26. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (2005) 49 ERG 90 which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. In the said case, “the applicant company was the registered owner of a plot of 23 hectares of agricultural land. The owners of a property adjacent to the land, Mr and Mrs Graham (the Grahams) occupied the land under a grazing agreement. After a brief exchange of documents in December 1983 a chartered surveyor acting for the applicants wrote to the Grahams noting that the grazing agreement was about to expire and requiring them to vacate the land.” The Grahams continued to use the whole of the disputed land for farming without the permission of the applicants from September 1998 till 1999. In 1997, Mr Graham moved the Local Land Registry against the applicant on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession. The Grahams

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challenged the applicant company’s claims under the Limitation Act, 1980 (the 1980 Act) which provides that a person cannot bring an action to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another.

27. The judgment was pronounced in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham (2000) 3 WLR 242 : 2000 Ch 676. The Court held in favour of the Grahams but went on to observe the irony in law of adverse possession. The court observed that the law which provides to oust an owner on the basis of inaction of 12 years is “illogical and disproportionate”. The effect of such law would “seem draconian to the owner” and “a windfall for the squatter”. The court expressed its astonishment on the prevalent law that ousting an owner for not taking action within limitation is illogical. The applicant company aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision. The Grahams then appealed to the House of Lords, which, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court.

28. The House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham (2003) 1 AC 419 : (2002) 3 WLR 221 : (2002) 3 All ER 865 (HL), observed that the Grahams had possession of the land in the ordinary sense of the word, and, therefore, the applicant company had been dispossessed of it within the meaning of the Limitation Act of 1980.

29. We deem it proper to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59: (SCC p. 79, paras 51-52)

“51. Thereafter the applicants moved the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging that the United Kingdom law on adverse possession, by which they lost land

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to a neighbour, operated in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the Convention’).

52. It was contended by the applicants that they had been deprived of their land by the operation of the domestic law on adverse possession which is in contravention with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the Convention’), which reads as under:

‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession. No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ ”

This Court in Revamma case also mentioned that the European Council of Human Rights importantly laid down three-pronged test to judge the interference of the Government with the right of “peaceful enjoyment of property”: (SCC p. 79, para 53)

“53. ... [In] Beyeler v. Italy [GC] No. 33202 of 1996 §§ 108-14 ECHR 2000-I, it was held that the ‘interference’ should comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim (public interest) by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.”

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The Court observed:(Revamma case 79-80, paras 54-56)

“54. ... ‘The question nevertheless remains whether, even having regard to the lack of care and inadvertence on the part of the applicants and their advisers, the deprivation of their title to the registered land and the transfer of beneficial ownership to those in unauthorized possession struck a fair balance with any legitimate public interest served.

In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the application of the provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts to deprive the applicant companies of their title to the registered land imposed on them an individual and excessive burden and upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest on the one hand and the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions on the other.

There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.’

55. The question of the application of Article 41 was referred for the Grand Chamber Hearing of the ECHR. This case sets the field of adverse possession and its interface with the right to peaceful enjoyment in all its complexity.

56. Therefore it will have to be kept in mind the courts around the world are taking an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights.”

39. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat case, this Court ultimately

observed as under:

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“32. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner.

33. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimising possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose his possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation.”

Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution – a principle of a civilized society

40. Another important development in the protection of

property rights was the Fifth Amendment. James

Madison was the drafter and key supporter for the Fifth

Amendment. The Fifth Amendment states: “nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation”. The main issue is to pay just

compensation for acquiring the property. There are

primarily two situations when a landowner may obtain

compensation for land officially transferred to or

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depreciated by the government. First, an owner may be

entitled to compensation when a governmental entity

intentionally acquires private property through a formal

condemnation proceeding and without the owner’s

consent. The State’s power to take property is

considered inherent through its eminent domain powers

as a sovereign. Through the condemnation proceedings,

the government obtains the necessary interest in the

land, and the Fifth Amendment requires that the

property owner be compensated for this loss.

41. The second situation requiring compensation

under Fifth Amendment occurs when the government

has not officially acquired private property through a

formal condemnation proceeding, but “nonetheless

takes property by physically invading or appropriating

it”. Under this scenario, the property owner, at the

point in which a “taking” has occurred, has the option

of filing a claim against the government actor to recover

just compensation for the loss. When the landowner

sues the government seeking compensation for a taking,

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it is considered an inverse condemnation proceeding,

because the landowner and not the government is

bringing the cause of action.

42. We inherited this law of adverse possession from the

British. The Parliament may consider abolishing the law of

adverse possession or at least amending and making

substantial changes in law in the larger public interest.

The Government instrumentalities – including the police –

in the instant case have attempted to possess land

adversely. This, in our opinion, a testament to the absurdity

of the law and a black mark upon the justice system’s

legitimacy. The Government should protect the property of

a citizen – not steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands,

they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according

to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must

require those who adversely possess land to compensate

title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the

land or property in question. This alternative would provide

some semblance of justice to those who have done nothing

other than sitting on their rights for the statutory period,

while allowing the adverse possessor to remain on property.

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While it may be indefensible to require all adverse

possessors – some of whom may be poor – to pay market

rates for the land they possess, perhaps some lesser

amount would be realistic in most of the cases. The

Parliament may either fix a set range of rates or to leave it

to the judiciary with the option of choosing from within a

set range of rates so as to tailor the compensation to the

equities of a given case.

43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to

abolish “bad faith” adverse possession, i.e., adverse

possession achieved through intentional trespassing.

Actually believing it to be their own could receive title

through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the

society at large. Such a change would ensure that only

those who had established attachments to the land through

honest means would be entitled to legal relief.

44. In case, the Parliament decides to retain the law of

adverse possession, the Parliament might simply require

adverse possession claimants to possess the property in

question for a period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere

12. Such an extension would help to ensure that

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successful claimants have lived on the land for generations,

and are therefore less likely to be individually culpable for

the trespass (although their forebears might). A longer

statutory period would also decrease the frequency of

adverse possession suits and ensure that only those

claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire

it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose

title.

45. Reverting to the facts of this case, if the Police

department of the State with all its might is bent upon

taking possession of any land or building in a clandestine

manner, then, perhaps no one would be able to effectively

prevent them.

46. It is our bounden duty and obligation to ascertain the

intention of the Parliament while interpreting the law. Law

and Justice, more often than not, happily coincide only

rarely we find serious conflict. The archaic law of adverse

possession is one such. A serious re-look is absolutely

imperative in the larger interest of the people.

47. Adverse possession allows a trespasser – a person

guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law - to gain

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legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12

years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted

to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling.

This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its

stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian

citizen would find reprehensible.

48. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a

great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that

time has come for change.

49. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the

property (land and building), then, people will be left with

no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the

entire country.

50. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In

our considered view, it must be arrested without further

loss of time in the larger public interest. No Government

Department, Public Undertaking, and much less the Police

Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the

land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse

possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the

manner that has been done in this case.

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51. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a

fresh look of the entire law on adverse possession. We

recommend the Union of India to immediately consider and

seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse

possession and in the alternate to make suitable

amendments in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this

judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and

Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for

taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.

52. This Special Leave Petition is dismissed with costs of

Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) to be paid by the

State of Haryana for filing a totally frivolous petition and

unnecessarily wasting the time of the Court and

demonstrating its evil design of grabbing the properties of

lawful owners in a clandestine manner. The costs be

deposited within four weeks from the date of pronouncement

of this judgment. In this petition, we did not issue notice to

the defendants, therefore, we direct that the costs be

deposited with the National Legal Services Authority for

utilizing the same to enable the poor litigants to contest their

cases.

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53. This Special Leave Petition being devoid of any merit is

accordingly dismissed.

.….………………………..J. (Dalveer Bhandari)

….………………………..J. (Deepak Verma)

New Delhi: September 30, 2011

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STATE OF HARYANA Vs MUKESH KUMAR .

STATE OF HARYANA Vs MUKESH KUMAR .