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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 318 OF 2011   

STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.                        .…..APPELLANTS

Versus

DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS.                     …..RESPONDENTS

WITH

C.A. Nos. 459-462 of 2011

HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT  AUTHOIRTY& ORS.                        .…..APPELLANTS

Versus

P.K. DHAWAN & ORS.                      …..RESPONDENTS

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

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CIVIL APPEAL No. 318 OF 2011

1 This  Appeal  questions  the  correctness  of  the  Judgment  dated

12.3.2008 delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana in C.W.P. No. 1123 of 2006, on the basis of which the High Court

had also allowed C.W.P. No. 1465 of 2006, C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007, C.W.P.

No. 7066 of 2008 and C.W.P. No. 7353 of 2008.   Civil Appeal No. 318 of

2011  and  Civil  Appeal  Nos.  459-462  of  2011  respectively  assail  these

Judgments.   It merits to mention that the connected Civil Appeal No. 535 of

2011 was, on the unrefuted submission made by the learned counsel for the

Respondents/Landowners  in  that  Appeal,  dismissed  as  infructuous  by  an

Order  dated 11.3.2015 of  this  Court;  the  submission was that  the Public

Notice dated 8.4.2010 had released the subject land from acquisition.   

2 The State of Haryana had issued a Notification under Section 4 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (‘L.A. Act’ for brevity) on 18.1.2001 to acquire

12.18 acres of land falling in Village Khera Markanda and 11.64 acres of

land falling in Village Ratgal as mentioned in the Schedule thereto for the

construction  of  a  fell-storm  sewer,  a  sewage-treatment  plant  and  a

crematorium  (Shamshan  Ghat)  at  Kurukshetra.   Simultaneous  with  the

issuance  of  this  Notification,  the  Appellant  State  had  also  invoked  the

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urgency provisions contained in Sections 17(1) and 17(4), thereby denying

to  the  landowners  (some  of  whom  are  the  Respondents  before  us)  the

opportunity  to  file  Objections  under  Section  5A of  the  L.A.  Act.    A

Declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued the very next day, i.e.

19.1.2001.  It was at this juncture that the Respondents/Landowners filed

C.W.P. No. 2503 of 2002 and C.W.P. No. 8696 of 2002, (along with a third

party  namely  Neelam  Ram,  the  petitioner  in  C.W.P. No.  4887  of  2002)

challenging the Section 4 Notification dated 18.1.2001 and the Section 6

Declaration dated 19.1.2001.   

3 It will be pertinent to point out that by the time interim orders came to

be passed in the Writ Petitions by the Division Bench on 7.2.2002, the one

year  period  prescribed  in  the  statute  to  advance  from  Notification  to

Declaration  stage  had already elapsed.   It  is  also  relevant  to  record that

notwithstanding the interim order dated 7.2.2002, the Appellant State passed

an Award on the next day, namely 8.2.2002, obviously oblivious of those

interim orders.   It also took possession of certain parts of the Scheduled

lands.    The  one  year  prescription  having been transgressed,  the  subject

acquisition would have met its statutory death but for the feature that the

urgency provisions had been invoked by the State in the event without legal

propriety.  The  time table  established under  the  L.A.  Act  requires  to  be

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recalled.  Upon the publication of a Notification, affected landowners are

required to file Objections within thirty days.  Although no period has been

prescribed for disposal  of Objections by the Collector, this exercise must

reach its culmination within one year of the Notification’s issuance.  If these

actions are so done, the Government must direct the Collector to “take order

for the acquisition of the land” which is a statutory provision which smacks

superficiality.   The  Collector  must  also  mark  and  measure  the  land  in

question, cause public notice to be given of the Government’s intention to

take possession of the land and invite claims for compensation etc.  After

deciding any objection or representation received from the interested parties,

an Award has to be made within two years of the Declaration, failing which

the  entire  acquisition  proceedings  would  lapse.   Of  course  the  period

covered by stay orders granted by a Court would be excluded.  Parliament

was, as is manifestly evident, alive to the injury that would inexorably visit

the landowners if acquisition proceedings were not circumscribed by time,

as  compensation  is  pegged  to  the  date  of  the  Notification.   The  entire

exercise has to be completed within three years.  This time prescription is

thus  obviously intended to ensure  that  the  landowners whose  lands have

been  expropriated  on  the  State’s  continuing  powers  of  eminent  domain

receive the market price for their property in close proximity of the time of

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acquisition. These persons would thus be in a position to purchase alternate

property,  which  indubitably  would  not  be  possible  if  the  compensation

award is implemented after delay.  Courts must be ever vigilant and resolute

in protecting these persons from unfair treatment by the State.  Thankfully,

Parliament  has,  in  terms  of  the  Right  to  Fair  Compensation  and

Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Act

2013, provided amelioration against Governmental apathy.    

4 By a brief Order delivered on 12.1.2004, that is in the era of Padma

Sundara Rao vs.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu (2002)  3  SCC 533,  the  Division

Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, noting the contentions that

the  Appellant  State  had  not  adhered  to  the  mandatory  requirement  of

payment of 80 per cent compensation to the landowners and that it did not

qualify as a case of urgency since the Appellant State passed had failed to

publish an Award within one year after the Section 6 Declaration, quashed

the  latter.   However,  for  reasons  recondite,  the  Division  Bench

simultaneously  permitted  the  petitioners  before  it  to  file  Section  5A

Objections within thirty days and permitted the Appellant State to issue a

fresh Section 6 Declaration in the event that it found no substance in those

Objections.   The  directions  could  not  have  been  given  by  the  Division

Bench. Instead, the Division Bench should have simply quashed the Section

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6 Declaration, at which point the Section 4 Notification would have lapsed,

due to the fact that the one year period for filing a Declaration had already

elapsed.  In Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. Devendra

Kumar (2011) 12 SCC 375 it has been clarified that it is impermissible for

the Government to proceed with the acquisition from the stage of Section 4.

Applying the ratio of  Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117

which  has  been  followed  in  Dr.  Jogmittar  Sain  Bhagat  vs.  Dir.  Health

Services, Haryana (2013) 10 SCC 136 to the effect that a decree without

jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be a subject at any stage in

any proceedings and even at the stage of execution, the said Order of the

Division Bench can be ignored.    We think it appropriate to reproduce the

operative part of this Order for reasons that will become apparent later:-

“In  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  as  mentioned above, in our view, interest of justice would be served, if we quash declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 19.1.2001, and  all  subsequent  proceedings  that  might  have  been  taken thereafter with liberty to the petitioners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act within 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, which, naturally shall be heard by the State or the authority constituted by the State for that purpose, in accordance with law and after giving an appropriate hearing  to  the  petitioners  if  the  objections  are  rejected, naturally,  the  Government  will  be  in  its  power  to  issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

Petition is disposed of accordingly.  However, parties are left to bear their own costs.”          (emphasis supplied)

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5 We must highlight the lapses by the Appellant State in the manner in

which  it  conducted  the  acquisition.   Significantly,  no  compensation

whatsoever,  leave  alone  the  80  per  cent  postulated  by  the  Statute  under

Section  17(3),  was  given  at  the  time  that  the  urgency  provisions  were

invoked.  This  exercise  ought  to  have  been  carried  out  by  passing  a

provisional  or  ad hoc Award containing the Collector’s estimation of  the

compensation to be paid to the landowners.  The State seems to be oblivious

of the law and impervious to the plight of the landowners whose livelihood

is virtually deracinated.    Section 6 requires particular perusal and we are

extracting  its  relevant  portions  for  convenience.   Also,  for  facility  of

reference, Sections 17(3A) is reproduced in order to emphasize that those

provisions  could  be  correctly  and  properly  resorted  to  only  if  the  State

Government,  through  its  Collector,  had  tendered  80  per  cent  of  the

compensation estimated by him.   

Section  6  –  Declaration  that  land  is  required  for  a public purpose – (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this  Act,  when the appropriate  Government  is  satisfied,  after considering  the  report,  it  any,  made  under  section  5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of  some  officer  duly  authorized  to  certify  its  orders,  and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under  section  4,  sub-section  (1)  irrespective  of  whether  one

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report  or  different  reports  has  or  have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2):

Provided that  no declaration in respect  of  any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1),_

(i) xxx xxx xxx

(ii) Published  after  the  commencement  of  the  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:

 17. Special powers in cases of urgency —

xxx xxx xxx (3A) Before taking possession of any land under  

sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without  prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), —

(a) tender  payment  of  eighty  per  centum  of  the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and

(b)pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2),

and  where  the  Collector  is  so  prevented,  the  provisions  of section  31,  sub-section  (2)  (except  the  second  provision thereto),  shall  apply  as  they  apply  to  the  payment  of compensation under that section.

6 Even though the holding of property is no longer a fundamental right

guaranteed under  Part  III  of  the  Constitution of  India,  it  has been given

constitutional protection under Article 300A which came to be inserted into

the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act,  1978

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which  omitted  Article  19(1)(f),  viz.,  “to  acquire,  hold  and  dispose  of

property”.     The  Constitution  now  guarantees  that  no  person  shall  be

deprived of his property save by authority of law.  We have mentioned this

for  the  reason  that  if  the  Union or  the  State  Government  is  desirous  of

depriving any person of his property it can only do so by authority of law.

That authority, as is facially evident, inter alia, is the necessity to tend the

payment of 80 per cent of the compensation estimated by the Collector in the

event  that  Section 17 is to be pressed into service,  with the objective of

denying  the  landowners  remonstration  rights  by  filing  Objections  in

consonance with Section 5A of the L.A. Act.    Expropriatory legislation,

such  as  the  L.A.  Act,  must  compulsorily  be  construed  strictly.    The

Appellant State cannot be permitted to invoke one part of Section 17 while

discarding another.    Sections 17(3A) and 17(3B), which were inserted by

the Act 68 of 1964 with effect from 24.9.1994, cannot be rendered nugatory.

In  this  regard,  we  are  reminded  of  the  Judgment  of  this  Court  in  Babu

Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 422 which held that: “It is

the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular

act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or

not at all.”  The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v.

Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir

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Ahmad v. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253, and has been upheld in  Rao

Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, State of

U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358 and Hussein Ghadially v. State of

Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425.

7 Prima  facie,  time  for  filing  of  5A Objections  would  have  to  be

computed to have commenced on the date of the Order, i.e. 12.1.2004, and

further  there  seems to be no alternative but  to  deem the issuance  of  the

Section 4 Notification for the same date.   Hence the Section 6 Declaration

would have to be made at the latest by 11.1.2005.  However, we reiterate

that the High Court ought to have simply quashed the Section 4 Declaration

in personam, or if circumstances so commanded, in rem.  By permitting nay

enjoining the petitioners  to file Objections,  the High Court  has caused a

piquant position to come into place.   But, as is trite, no party can be made to

suffer any disadvantage due to an act of the Court.   The Respondents filed

Objections on 11.2.2004 which were dismissed in September 2004 paving

the way for the passing of a fresh Section 6 Declaration on 30.12.2004.   The

Respondents  thereupon  challenged  the  Section  4  Notification  dated

18.1.2002 and the Section 6 Declaration dated 30.12.2004 in terms of C.W.P.

No. 1123 of 2006, C.W.P. No. 1465 of 2006 and C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007.  

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8 In the second salvo of writ petitions, the Division Bench has found in

the  impugned  Judgment  dated  12.3.2008  that  the  second  Section  6

Declaration had been made after the passing of the period prescribed in the

L.A. Act, as the Section 4 Notification was issued on 18.1.2001.   It noted

that this Court had held in  Padma Sundara Rao that the subject statutory

period has to be imparted a strict construction; the period could be increased

only in the circumstances postulated and provided for in the Act itself.   The

Division Bench also observed that even if the second Section 6 Declaration

were to be accepted as valid by construing the one year period from the date

of the Order of the previous Division Bench dated 12.1.2004, the Appellant

State  had failed  to  pass  an  Award within two years,  thus  falling foul  of

Section 11A of  the L.A.  Act.   The Section 4 Notification,  the Section 6

Declaration and all proceedings pursuant thereto were therefore quashed. We

find  it  apposite  to  note  the  error  in  the  latter  observation.  According  to

Section 11A of the L.A. Act, the award has to be made within two years of

the date of the Declaration, which requirement was met in this case. There

was no basis on which to calculate this period from the date of the previous

Order, as the Division Bench has done.  

9 It  would  be  pertinent  to  clarify  that  the quashing  of  the  entire

acquisition proceeding has to be explicitly expressed.   This  Court  has in

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Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255,  Abhey Ram,

Delhi  Administration  v.  Gurdip  Singh  Uban  (1999)  7  SCC  44,  Delhi

Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296 and The Chairman

and M.D.,  TNHB v. S.  Saraswathy (Judgment  delivered on 11.5.2015 in

Civil Appeal Nos. 736-737 of 2008) reiterated and restated the established

and consistent view that quashing of acquisition proceedings at the instance

of one or two landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the entire

acquisition.   In  A.P.  Industrial  Infrastructure  Corporation  Limited  v.

Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao (2012) 12 SCC 797, this Court has reiterated

the  established  proposition  that  landowners  who  are  aggrieved  by  the

acquisition proceedings would have to lay a challenge to them at least before

an Award is pronounced and possession of the land is taken over by the

Government.   Numerous  decisions  of  this  Court  have  been  discussed

obviating the need to analyze all of them once again.   However, generally

speaking, Courts come to the succour of those who approach it.  In some

instances equities are equalized by allowing subsequent slothful petitioners,

belatedly and conveniently jumping on the bandwagons, to receive, at the

highest, compensation granted to others sans interest.  

10 The Appellant State has filed this Appeal contending that the parties

are bound by the Division Bench Order dated 12.1.2004, which allowed for

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filing  of  a  fresh  Section  6  Declaration.   This  is  a  specious  submission

because the State  ought to have assailed that  Order since its  conclusions

were contrary to the ratio of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma

Sundara Rao.   It may be contended that the landowners could equally have

challenged this Order.   However, given the resources available virtually at

the beck and call of the State, it cannot be excused for its neglect or jural

folly and must be held responsible for its failures.  This is especially so since

the concerned citizens face the draconian consequences of expropriation of

their land with its  attendant loss of income.  The Appellant  State further

contended that the initial Section 6 Declaration was within the statutory time

period  and  upon  the  curing  of  technical  defects,  the  original  Section  6

Declaration continued.    The Appellant State also argued that the possession

of certain lands has already been taken by the Haryana Urban Development

Authority  (HUDA) and  therefore  those  matters  have  acquired  finality  in

accordance with the ratio of  Padma Sundara Rao,  which is available in

these extracted paragraphs:

11. It  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  stipulation  regarding  the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period of limitation seems to be the avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be  acquired.  Compensation  gets  pegged  from  the  date  of notification  under  Section  4(1).  Section  11 provides  that  the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication

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of notification under Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.  The prescription of time-limit in that background is, therefore,  peremptory  in  nature.  In  Ram Chand v.  Union  of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 it was held by this Court that though no period  was  prescribed,  action  within  a  reasonable  time  was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription  of  specific  periods.  After  the  quashing  of declaration,  the same became non est  and was effaced.  It  is fairly  conceded  by  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  that there is no bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure.  It  is,  however, contended that in case a fresh notification  is  to  be  issued,  the  market  value  has  to  be determined on the basis of the fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count.

******

14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to  amend,  modify  or  repeal  it,  if  deemed  necessary.   (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd.  v.  P.N.B. Capital  Services Ltd.) The legislative  casus  omissus  cannot  be  supplied  by judicial interpretative process.  Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous.  There is no scope for reading something into it, as  was  done  in  Narsimhaiah  case.  In  Nanjudaiah  case  the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1).  If  the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but

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also  by  a  non-prescribed  period.   Same  can  never  be  the legislative intent.

.* * * * *

16. The  plea  relating  to  applicability  of  the  stare  decisis principles  is  clearly  unacceptable.  The  decision  in  K. Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu AIR 1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)was rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e.  much  prior  to  the  amendment  by  the  1984  Act.  If  the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for  it.  The  fact  that  the  legislature  specifically  provided  for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.

 11 The  Division  Bench  has  predicated  its  decision  to  set  aside  the

Notification  as  well  as  the  Declaration  on Padma Sundara Rao, which

ironically the previous Division Bench had failed to follow.  The decision of

the Constitutional Bench in Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in

Section  6(1)  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  and  the  time  period  cannot  be

stretched as this would not be in keeping with the legislative intent.  The

contention of the Appellant State that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 is a

continuation of the initial Declaration is thus clearly erroneous, as such a

finding would be in the face of the strict interpretation of time prescribed by

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Padma Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section 6. Had the

Legislature intended to allow for such a continuation, it would have done so

by specifically providing for it, as it has done for periods covered by orders

of  stay  and  injunction.  Furthermore,  the  Appellant  State  cannot  place

reliance on an erroneous Order which caused grave prejudice to the rights of

the Respondents. It would be apt to mention the legal principle that no party

should suffer for the mistake of the Court. Since compensation is calculated

based on the value of the land on the date of the Section 4 Notification, the

Order  of  the Division Bench dated  12.1.2004 resulted  in  the landowners

getting  compensation  at  2001  rates  even  though  the  Award  was  finally

passed in 2006 and the compensation is yet to be paid to the Respondents.

Had the Division Bench Order struck down only the Declaration, which in

turn would have resulted in the entire acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State

would  have  had  to  reinitiate  acquisition  proceedings,  resulting  in  the

Respondents receiving compensation at the market rates current at the time

of  the  fresh  Notification.   We therefore  find  that  the  Declaration  dated

30.12.2004  cannot  be  upheld  merely  by  virtue  of  the  previous  Division

Bench’s erroneous and prejudicial Order.   We are in agreement with the

decision of  the  High Court  in  the  impugned Judgment  and consequently

dismiss the Appeal.  

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C.A. Nos. 459-460 of 2011

12 We are of the opinion that the substance of the issues in question in

this batch of petitions are analogous to those in Civil Writ Petition No. 1123

of 2006 which has been assailed in Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, save for

the difference that it is the Haryana Urban Development Authority which has

filed the Appeal.  In that light, the findings made in the preceding Appeal

apply squarely to this batch of Appeals as well, and are decided in the same

terms.

C.A. Nos. 461-462 of 2011

13 The factual scenario in these Appeals is different from Civil Appeal

No.  318 of  2011,  in  that  compensation  has  been  paid  to  the  Contesting

Respondents,  whose  land  is  now  in  the  possession  of  Haryana  Urban

Development Authority.   Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Act,

2013 makes it clear that the three requirements for an acquisition to attain

finality are the passing of an award, payment of compensation and taking of

possession,  all  of  which  are  met  here.   Furthermore,  the  Contesting

Respondents in these Appeals had not been parties before the Division

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Bench in its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not explicitly

state that  it  would apply to all  the landowners affected by the impugned

acquisition  process,  it  was  limited  in  scope  to  the  parties  before  it,  for

reasons that we have already discussed herein.  It would also be pertinent to

note  that  the  Contesting  Respondents  in  these  Appeals  only  filed  writ

petitions challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008 was

passed.  We  find  that  till  the  date  of  the  12.3.2008  Judgment,  these

Respondents had acquiesced to the acquisition and had allowed it to become

final, and therefore they could not seek to challenge it by placing reliance on

a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit.   

14 A number of Proforma Respondents were impleaded in Civil Appeal

No. 462 vide order dated 12.4.2013, and we are not aware of whether the

acquisitions with regard to  their  land has  become final.   However, these

Proforma  Respondents  first  challenged  the  acquisition  by  filing  a  writ

petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008.  It is thus clear

that  these Respondents,  too,  initially consented to the acquisition process

and  only  challenged  it  belatedly  by  seeking  to  rely  upon  a  favourable

Judgment that did not relate or pertain to them. The impugned Orders dated

12.5.2008 in C.W.P. No 7066 of 2008 and 13.5.2008 in C.W.P. No. 7353 of

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2008 as  well  as  Order  dated 19.1.2010 in C.W.P. No.  163 of   2010 are

therefore set aside, and these Appeals are accordingly allowed.

..................................................J.          [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]  

                ....................................................J.        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; September 7, 2015.

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