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     REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10565  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4726 of 2011)

State of Assam …Appellant

Vs.

Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma & Ors. …Respondents

With  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10566  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.9615 of 2011)

Jones Ingti Kathar …Appellant

Vs.

Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma & Ors. …Respondents

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10567  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.25824 of 2011)

Gauhati Metropolitan Development  Authority & Anr. …Appellants

Vs.

Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T

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T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals by special leave are directed against an  

order  dated  21st September,  2010  passed  by  a  Division  

Bench of the High Court of Assam at Guahati whereby Writ  

Appeal No.202 of 2007 filed by the respondents herein has  

been  allowed,  order  dated  13th April,  2007  passed  by  a  

learned  Single  Judge  of  that  Court  set  aside  and  the  

respondents held entitled to restoration of the possession of  

the land in dispute.   

3. Late Bhabadeb Sarma, father of the respondents, was  

recorded as a Pattadar  of a  plot of  land measuring 73.26  

Ares equivalent to 1 Bigha, 4 Kathas and 16 Lachas, covered  

by K.P. Patta No.493 (old)/594 (new) in Dag No.1008(old) of  

Sahar Ulubari, in Mouza Ulubari, Guahati. With the adoption  

of  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976  by  the  

State of  Assam,  the said  Shri  Bhabadev Sarma submitted  

returns  under  Section  6  of  the  said  Act  on  19th October,  

1976.  In Urban Land Ceiling Case No.343 of 1976 initiated  

by the District Collector against the said Shri Sarma, a draft  

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statement under Section 8(3) was served upon the owner in  

regard to the land aforementioned which was, according to  

the  draft  statement,  beyond  the  ceiling  limit  of  2000  sq.  

meters permissible under the Act. Upon consideration of the  

objections raised by the owner to the said draft statement, a  

final statement under Section 9 was prepared and published  

on  3rd September,  1982  declaring  an  area  measuring  

7981.48 Sq. meters to be in excess of the permissible limit.  

A  notification  dated  16th May,  1984  under  Section  10(1)  

followed declaring the vacant land aforementioned to be in  

excess of the ceiling limit.  

4. In November 1984, the owner appears to have sold a  

major portion of the land in question to Mr. Kamala Kanta  

Ozah and five others in terms of different instruments of sale  

executed in their favour. A notification under Section 10(3)  

was published on 1st January, 1987 and the land in question  

declared Ceiling Surplus Government land. A part of the said  

land was  on  that  basis  allotted  in  favour  of  8  families  in  

terms of land policy of the Government while the remaining  

area measuring 8.03 Ares was retained by the Government.  

It is not in dispute that the land record was also corrected by  

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deleting  the  name  of  owner  Bhabadeb  Sarma  as  the  

Pattadar.  It is also not in dispute that no land revenue was  

collected from the erstwhile owners post vesting of the land  

in the State under Section 10(3) of the Act.   

5. The appellant's  case  is  that  possession  of  the  entire  

surplus land was taken over by the Revenue Authority on 7th  

December, 1992. This did not, however, deter Kamala Kanta  

Ozah and others who had purchased the land either from  

filing an appeal against the order of vesting or challenging  

the proceedings in Writ Petition (Civil Writ Case No.2568 of  

1992) filed before the High Court. Both these attempts made  

by the purchasers of the land failed with the dismissal of the  

appeal  by  the  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  Assam,  

Department of Revenue and the dismissal  of  Writ  Petition  

No.2568 of 1992 by the High Court in terms of order dated  

21st May, 2002. The High Court, it is pertinent to mention not  

only  upheld  the  order  passed  by  the  Collector-cum-

Competent Authority but also the allotment of a substantial  

portion of the land in favour of 8 different families eligible for  

such allotment. Writ Appeal No.419 of 2002 filed by Kamala  

Kanta  Ozah  and  others  against  the  order  passed  by  the  

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Single  Judge  also  came  to  be  dismissed  by  the  Division  

Bench of the High Court by an order dated 20th December,  

2002. Special leave petition filed against the said order too  

failed and was dismissed by this Court on 8th August, 2003.

6. With the challenge to the proceedings under the Act  

concluding in the manner indicated above, the Government  

of Assam by an order dated 27th November, 2003 allotted an  

extent of  8.03 Are to Guwahati  Metropolitan Development  

Authority (GMDA) for  construction of an office building for  

the said authority. In the meantime on 12th December, 2003  

the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Repeal  Act  was  

notified which came into force in the State of Assam w.e.f.  

6th August, 2003.  The appellant's case is that possession of  

the  allotted  land  was  handed  over  to  GMDA  on  25th  

December, 2003 which action too came under challenge at  

the instance of the respondents in Writ Petition No.2519 of  

2004, who stepped into the shoes of Bhabadeb Sarma upon  

his death on 3rd October, 1997. A Single Bench of the High  

Court  of  Assam dismissed  the  writ  petition  upholding  the  

allotment of the land to GMDA and declined the prayer for  

restoration of the possession in favour of the writ petitioners-

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respondents  herein.  Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  

respondents  filed  Writ  Appeal  No.202  of  2007  before  the  

High Court which was allowed by a Division Bench of the  

High  Court  by  the  order  impugned  in  this  appeal.  The  

Division Bench while setting aside the order passed by the  

Single  Bench  directed  restoration  of  possession  of  the  

disputed  parcel  of  land  to  the  respondents.  The  present  

appeals filed by the State of  Assam and GMDA assail  the  

correctness  of  the  said  judgment  and  order  of  the  High  

Court.

7. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  at  

considerable  length.  The  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  

Regulation) Act,  1999 repealed the Principal Act w.e.f.  the  

date  the  State  adopted  the  Repeal  Act.  In  terms  of  a  

resolution  passed  under  clause  (2)  Article  252  of  the  

Constitution,  the Repeal  Act  was adopted by the  State of  

Assam w.e.f. 6th August, 2003. We may at this stage usefully  

extract  Sections 2 and 3 of  the Repeal  Act  which have a  

direct  bearing  on  the  questions  that  arise  for  our  

determination:

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“2.  Repeal  of  Act  33  of  1976  –  The  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976,  (hereinafter   referred to as the principal Act) is hereby repealed.

3. Saving. – (1) the repeal of the principal Act shall   not affect –

(a) the  vesting  of  any  vacant  land  under  sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession   of  which  has  been  taken  over  by  the  State  Government  or  any  person  duly   authorised by the  State Government  in  this  behalf  or  by  the  competent   authority;

(b) the  validity  of  any  order  granting  exemption  under  sub-section  (1)  of   Section  20  or  any  action  taken  thereunder,  notwithstanding  any  judgment of any court to the contrary;

(c) any  payment  made  to  the  State  Government as a condition for granting  exemption  under  sub-section  (1)  of   Section 20.

(2) Where –

(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the   State Government under sub-section (3)   of  Section  10  of  the  principal  Act  but   possession of which has not been taken  over  by  the  State  Government  or  any  person  duly  authorised  by  the  State   Government  in  this  behalf  or  by  the  competent authority; and

(b) any amount has been paid by the State   Government with respect to such land

then,  such  land  shall  not  be  restored  unless  the  amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State  Government.”          

8. A bare reading of Section 3 (supra) makes it clear that  

repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of any  

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vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession  

whereof has been taken over by the State Government or  

any person duly authorised by the State Government in that  

behalf or by the competent authority. In the case at hand,  

the appellant claims to have taken over the possession of  

the surplus land on 7th December, 1991. That claim is made  

entirely on the basis of a certificate of handing over/taking  

over of possession, relevant portion whereof reads as under:

“  Certificate of handing over/taking over possession   

Today  on  this  7th December,  1991,  we  took  over  possession  of  70.32  Are  of  acquired  land  as  scheduled   below vide order of the Deputy Commissioner,  Kamrup’s   ULC Case No.343 dated 2-3-91 and as per Assam Gazette   notification dated 1-1-87 in the case No.ULC343/76.

Schedule of land      

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Received the possession

(Taken over possession unilaterally)

Sd/-Illegible Given the possession

Designation – SK (G) Designation

7.12.91 Dated Dated

7/12

Countersigned

Sd/-Illegible

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Circle Officer

Guwahati Revenue Circle”

9. Relying upon the above document it  was strenuously  

argued  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that  actual  physical  

possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner as  

early  as  in  December,  1991,  no  matter  relevant  official  

record does not bear testimony to any notice having been  

issued to the land owners in terms of Section 10, sub-section  

(5) of the Act.  It was argued that so long as actual physical  

possession had been taken over by the competent authority  

title to the land so taken over stood vested absolutely in the  

State  Government  under  Section  10(3)  and  could  not  be  

claimed  back  no  matter  the  Principal  Act  stood  repealed  

after  such  vesting  had  taken  place.  In  support  of  the  

contention that actual physical possession had been taken  

over by the competent authority, the appellant places heavy  

reliance  upon  the  fact  that  challenge  to  the  proceedings  

under the Act mounted in Writ Petition No.2568 of 1992 by  

the purchasers of a part of the disputed land had failed right  

up to this Court and the allotment of a substantial part of the  

surplus  land  in  favour  of  the  8  families  affirmed.  This,  

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according  to  the  appellant,  proves  that  possession  of  the  

surplus land had indeed been taken over from the erstwhile  

owner in terms of proceedings held on 7th December, 1991.  

It was also contended that Bhabadeb Sarma, the erstwhile  

owner, had remained aloof even when he was a party to the  

writ petition filed by the purchasers who had questioned the  

validity  of  the  order  passed  by  the  competent  authority  

including the allotment of the surplus land in favour of third  

parties.   It  was urged that the Repeal  Act would have no  

effect whatsoever even when the taking of possession was  

without notice to the erstwhile owner especially when the  

owner  had  failed  to  question  any  such  take  over  at  the  

appropriate stage in appropriate proceedings. The challenge  

mounted by the legal heirs of the deceased erstwhile owner  

13  years  later  was  clearly  untenable  and  afterthought.  

Failure  of  the  land  owner  to  seek  redressal  against  non-

compliance with the statutory requirement of a notice before  

possession  is  taken would  constitute  abandonment  of  the  

right  of  the  owner  under  Section  10 (5)  which  cannot  be  

resuscitated after lapse of such a long period only to take  

advantage of the Repeal Act.  The question whether actual  

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physical  possession  of  the  disputed  land  had  been  taken  

over  is  in  any  case  a  seriously  disputed  question  of  fact  

which could not be adjudicated or determined by the High  

Court in its writ jurisdiction.

10. Mr.  P.K.  Goswamy,  learned senior  counsel,  appearing  

for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that actual  

physical possession must be proved to have been taken over  

by the State Government or by a person duly authorised by  

the State Government in that behalf  or  by the competent  

authority in order that the saving of clause in the Repeal Act  

could save any action already taken under the principal Act.  

Possession of surplus land could, in turn, be taken only by  

the owner surrendering or delivering possession to the State  

Government  or  the  persons  duly  authorised  by  the  State  

Government.  In the event of failure or refusal of the owner  

to surrender or deliver the same, possession of the surplus  

land could be taken forcibly also but only in accordance with  

the procedure prescribed.   The Scheme of Section 10 does  

not,  according  to  Mr.  Goswamy,  permit  taking  over  of  

possession  by  the  State  Government  or  the  authorised  

person  or  the  public  authority  without  following  the  

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procedure prescribed under Section 10(5), namely, issuing a  

notice in writing to the person to surrender or deliver the  

same.  Inasmuch as actual physical possession in the case at  

hand is alleged to have been taken over without following  

the said procedure the alleged take over shall be deemed to  

be  non-est in  the  eye  of  law  atleast  for  the  purposes  of  

Section 3 of the Repeal Act.   Relying upon the decision of  

this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram (2013)   

4  SCC  280,  it  was  argued  by  Mr.  Goswamy  that  the  

procedure prescribed under Section 10(5) for taking physical  

possession of the land under Section 10(6) was mandatory  

and  so  long  as  the  said  procedure  was  not  followed,  no  

possession can be said to have been taken over within the  

meaning of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.

11. Section 3 of the Repeal Act postulates that vesting of  

any  vacant  land  under  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  10,  is  

subject  to  the condition that  possession thereof  has  been  

taken  over  by  the  competent  authority  or  by  the  State  

Government  or  any  person  duly  authorised  by  the  State  

Government.  The expression "possession" used in Section 3  

(supra)  has  been  interpreted  to  mean  “actual  physical  

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possession” of the surplus land and not just possession that  

goes  with  the  vesting  of  excess  land  in  terms  of  Section  

10(3) of the Act.  The question, however, is whether actual  

physical possession of the land in dispute has been taken  

over in the case at hand by the competent authority or by  

the State Government or an officer authorised in that behalf  

by the State Government.  The case of the appellant is that  

actual physical possession of the land was taken over on 7 th  

December, 1991 no matter unilaterally and without notice to  

the erstwhile land owner. That assertion is stoutly denied by  

the respondents giving rise to seriously disputed question of  

fact  which  may  not  be  amenable  to  a  satisfactory  

determination  by  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its  writ  

jurisdiction.   But assuming that  any such determination is  

possible  even  in  proceedings  under  Article  226  of  the  

constitution, what needs examination is whether the failure  

of  the  Government  or  the  authorised  officer  or  the  

competent authority to issue a notice to the land owners in  

terms  of  Section  10(5)  would  by  itself  mean  that  such  

dispossession  is  no  dispossession  in  the  eye  of  law  and  

hence insufficient to attract Section 3 of the Repeal Act.  Our  

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answer  to  that  question  is  in  the  negative.  We  say  so  

because in  the ordinary course actual  physical  possession  

can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice  

under  Section  10(5)  is  issued  to  him  to  surrender  such  

possession  to  the  State  Government,  or  the  authorised  

officer  or  the  competent  authority.  There  is  enough  good  

sense  in  that  procedure  inasmuch  as  the  need  for  using  

force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily  

arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and  

surrender  or  deliver  possession  of  the  lands  in  question.  

That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the  

Act.  But what would be the position if for any reason the  

competent authority  or  the Government or the authorised  

officer  resorts  to  forcible  dispossession  of  the  erstwhile  

owner even without exploring the possibility of a voluntary  

surrender or delivery of such possession on demand.  Could  

such use of force vitiate the dispossession itself or would it  

only amount to an irregularity that would give rise to a cause  

of action for the aggrieved owner or the person in possession  

to  seek  restoration  only  to  be  dispossessed  again  after  

issuing a notice to him.  It is this aspect that has to an extent  

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bothered  us.  The  High  Court  has  held  that  the  alleged  

dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section  

10(5) of  the Act.  Assuming that to be the case all  that  it  

would  mean  is  that  on  7th December,  1991  when  the  

erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question,  

he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and  

even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he  

would  upon  such  restoration  once  again  be  liable  to  be  

evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his  

failure  to  deliver  or  surrender  such  possession.  In  reality  

therefore unless there was something that  was inherently  

wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as  

the  identity  of  the  land or  the  boundaries  thereof  or  any  

other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of  

the matter hence requiring an adjudication,  a person who  

had  lost  his  land  by  reason  of  the  same  being  declared  

surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile  

to  agitate  the  violation  of  Section  10(5)  for  he  can  well  

understand  that  even  when  the  Court  may  uphold  his  

contention  that  the   procedure  ought  to  be  followed  as  

prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the  

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land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess  

him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section  

10(5).  It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for  

any  owner  or  person  in  possession  to  find  fault  with  his  

dispossession on the ground that  no notice under Section  

10(5) had been served upon him.

12. The  issue  can  be  viewed  from  another  angle  also.  

Assuming  that  a  person  in  possession  could  make  a  

grievance,  no  matter  without  much  gain  in  the  ultimate  

analysis,  the question is  whether such grievance could be  

made long after  the alleged violation of  Section 10(5).   If  

actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile  

land  owner  on  7th December,  1991  as  is  alleged  in  the  

present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to  

have  been  made  within  a  reasonable  time  of  such  

dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over  

of  possession  would  acquire  legitimacy  by  sheer  lapse  of  

time.   In  any  such  situation  the  owner  or  the  person  in  

possession must be deemed to have waived his right under  

Section  10(5)  of  the  Act.   Any  other  view  would,  in  our  

opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not  

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because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be  

redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a  

Repeal  Act  tempted  him  to  raise  the  issue  regarding  his  

dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure.  

13. Reliance  was  placed  by  the  respondents  upon  the  

decision  of  this  Court  in  Hari  Ram’s case  (supra).   That  

decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the  

respondents.  We  say  so,  because  this  Court  was  in  Hari  

Ram's case  (supra)  considering  whether  the  word  ‘may’  

appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority  

the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking  

physical  possession of  the land in  question under  Section  

10(6).  The  question  whether  breach  of  Section  10(5)  and  

possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of  

dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did  

not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what  

Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of  

action  that  ought  to  be  followed  before  the  authorities  

decided  to  use  force  to  dispossess  the  occupant  under  

Section 10(6).  In the case at hand  if the appellant's version  

regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December  

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1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without  

a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and  

would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession  

for  the  purposes  of  Section  3  of  the  Repeal  Act.  That  is  

because  Bhabadeb  Sarma-erstwhile  owner  had  not  made  

any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage  

during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his  

right to do so.

14. Mr. Goswamy drew our attention to a decision of this  

Court  in  State  of  Gujarat  and  Anr.  V.  Gyanaba  

Dilavarsinh Jadega (2013) 11 SCC 486 to argue that a  

Writ Court could also examine the question of dispossession  

as was the position in that case which too arose out of a  

proceeding under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  

Act.  This Court in that case remanded the matter back to  

the  High  Court  to  determine  the  question  whether  

possession  of  the  land  had  been  taken  over  before  the  

Repeal Act came into force. In the instant case the Single  

bench  of  the  High  Court  had  while  dismissing  the  writ  

petition filed by the respondents relied upon the fact that the  

writ  petition  filed  by  the  purchasers  of  a  portion  of  the  

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surplus  land  had  been  dismissed  and  the  allotment  of  a  

portion  of  the  surplus  land  in  favour  of  separate  family  

affirmed not only by the Division Bench of the High Court but  

also by this Court in a further appeal.  The possession of land  

purports to have been taken over from the erstwhile owner  

in  terms  of  proceedings  dated  7th December,  1991.  

Inference  drawn  appears  to  be  that  if  allotment  of  

substantial part of the surplus land to the third parties has  

been  affirmed,  it  only  means  that  possession  was  indeed  

taken over for otherwise there was no question of allotting  

the land to third parties nor was there any question of such  

allottee-occupants  using  the  same.   We cannot,  however,  

ignore  the  fact  that  the  question  of  dispossession  of  the  

owner or the transferee was never agitated or determined by  

the High Court in the writ petition filed by the transferee. We  

could  appreciate  the  argument  if  the  issue  regarding  

dispossession had been raised and determined by the Courts  

in  the  previous  litigation.  That  was,  however,  not  so,  

apparently, because the question of dispossession was not  

relevant in the proceedings initiated by the transferees who  

were challenging the vesting order on the ground of their  

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having  purchased  the  surplus  land  from  the  owner.  That  

attempt failed as the Court found the sale in their favour to  

be void. The question of dispossession relevant to Section 3  

of the Repeal Act thus never arose for consideration in those  

proceedings.  It  will,  therefore,  be  much too  farfetched an  

inference to provide a sound basis for either the High Court  

or for us to hold that dismissal of the writ petition filed by  

the  purchasers  in  the  above  circumstances  should  itself  

support  a  finding  that  possession  had  indeed  been  taken  

over.  Having said that we must hasten to add that even the  

Division Bench has while reversing the view taken by the  

single bench not recorded any specific finding to the effect  

that  possession  had actually  continued with  the  erstwhile  

owner even after the vesting of the land under Section 10(3)  

and the proceedings dated 7th December, 1991.  

15. In support of the contention that the respondents are  

even  today  in  actual  physical  possession  of  the  land  in  

question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and  

bills  paid  for  the  telephone  connection  that  stood  in  the  

name of  one Mr.  Sanatan Baishya.  It  was contended that  

said Mr. Sanatan Baishya was none other than the caretaker  

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of  the  property  of  the  respondents.   There  is,  however,  

nothing  on  record  to  substantiate  that  assertion.  The  

telephone bills and electricity bills also relate to the period  

from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing on record before  

us nor was anything placed before the High Court to suggest  

that between 7th December, 1991 till  the date the land in  

question was allotted to GMDA in December, 2003 the owner  

or his legal  heirs after  his demise had continued to be in  

possession.  All  that  we have is  rival  claims of  the parties  

based on affidavits in support thereof. We repeatedly asked  

learned  counsel  for  the  parties  whether  they  can,  upon  

remand  on  the  analogy  of  the  decision  in  the  case  of  

Gyanaba  Dilavarsinh  Jadega (supra),  adduce  any  

documentary evidence that would enable the High Court to  

record a finding in regard to actual possession. They were  

unable to point out or refer to any such evidence. That being  

so  the  question  whether  actual  physical  possession  was  

taken  over  remains  a  seriously  disputed  question  of  fact  

which is not amenable to a satisfactory determination by the  

High  Court  in  proceedings  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution no matter the High Court may in its discretion in  

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certain situations upon such determination.  Remand to the  

High  Court  to  have  a  finding  on  the  question  of  

dispossession,  therefore,  does  not  appear  to  us  to  be  a  

viable solution.

16. Confronted with the above position, Mr. Goswamy made  

a suggestion. He urged that having regard to the fact that  

Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976  has  been  

repealed as also the fact that no notice under Section 10(5)  

was  ever  issued  any  proceedings  meant  to  determine  

whether  actual  dispossession had or had not  taken place,  

whether by the High Court or any Civil Court is bound to take  

another  decade  if  not  more.   The  respondent  would,  

therefore, be happy and satisfied if the order passed by the  

High  Court  is  upheld  except  to  the  extent  of  land  to  be  

restored  to  the  respondents  equivalent  to  8.03  Are  

(equivalent to 3 Kathas) which extent has been allotted in  

favour of Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority. The  

appellant has responded to the said offer of the respondents  

and  pointed  out  that  out  of  the  eight  families  in  whose  

favour the surplus area was settled in the year 1992, four  

families  have  been  allotted  disputed  land  in  questing  

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measuring 1 bigha, 4 Kathas, 16 laches.  John Ingti  Katha  

one  of  the  respondents  in  these  appeals  is  one  of  such  

allottees of the settled area. The affidavit further states that  

settlement of 8.03 ‘Are’ (equivalent to 3 Kathas) was made  

in  2003  in  favour  of  GMDA  in  the  year  2003  and  that  

restoration of  the balance land i.e.  1 bigha,  4  Kathas,  16  

laches  to  respondents  1  to  3  will  affect  the  settlement  

already made in favour of John Ingti Kathar and his wife, late  

Bansidhar Duara and his wife, Sri Jyotimoyh Chakrabarty and  

his wife and Sri P.S. Bhattacharjee and his wife.  The affidavit  

further give details of the settlement made in respect of the  

dispute  extent  of  land  in  favour  of  GMDA  and  the  four  

families mentioned above.

17. From  the  affidavit  filed  after  the  conclusion  of  the  

argument in this case, it appears that the disputed extent of  

land i.e. 1 bigha, 4 Kathas, 16 laches also stands fully settled  

in favour of allottees. Such being the case the offer made by  

Shri Goswamy does not appear to be a feasible solution at  

this stage particularly when the allotments made are not in  

question  nor  have  the  allottees  been  impleaded  as  party  

respondents.

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18. In the result, these appeals succeed and are, hereby,  

allowed.  The order passed by the Division Bench of the High  

Court is set aside and that passed by the Single Bench of  

that Court affirmed.  The parties are left to bear their own  

costs.        

…………………………..…….…..…J. (T.S. THAKUR)

     …………………………..……………..J. New Delhi;   (R. BANUMATHI) November 27, 2014

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