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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6690 of 2004

The State of A.P. & Ors.                              …Appellant(s)

Versus

M/s. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co.              …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment  

and order dated 22.3.2004, passed by the High Court of Judicature of  

Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad  in City Civil Court Appeal No. 72 of  

1989, by way of which the Civil Suit filed by the respondent against  

the appellants,  claiming title over the suit land in dispute, has been  

upheld.

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2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:

A. One Shri M.A. Samad, Assistant Engineer, City Improvement  

Board,  Hyderabad,  alongwith  his  associate,  converted  the  land  in  

dispute measuring 3.525 acres i.e. 17061 sq. yards, in favour of the  

Forest Department in 1920.   

B. The  suit  land  was  given  on  lease  on  21.5.1943  to  M/s.  A.  

Allauddin & Sons for a fixed time period, incorporating the terms and  

conditions, that the lessee would not be entitled to extend the  existing  

building in any way, or to erect any structure on the land leased. The  

lessee  was  also  prohibited  from  transferring  the  suit  land  by  any  

means.   

C. The said M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, a proprietory concern, sent  

a letter dated 29.9.1945 in response to the eviction notice, informing  

the appellants  that  it  was not  possible  for  it  to remove the factory  

established  on  the  suit  land,  and  thus,  the  said  lessee  asked  the  

appellants to put up the said property for rent. The said firm, then sent  

a letter dated 1.5.1951, offering rent of Rs.600/- per annum.  

D. The appellants vide letter dated 20.12.1954, informed M/s. A.  

Allauddin & Sons to vacate the site within a period of one month, or  

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else be evicted in accordance with law, and in that case it would also  

be liable to pay damages.  In spite of receiving such a letter, the said  

lessee/tenant  remained  in  possession  of  the  suit  premises,  and  

continued to pay rent, as is evident from the letter dated 15.8.1956.  

The appellants, however, vide letter dated 21.2.1958, asked the said  

lessee/tenant M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, yet again, to vacate the suit  

land.  

E. Instead of  vacating the suit  land,  M/s.  A.  Allauddin & Sons  

executed  a  lease  deed  dated  24.2.1958,  and  got  it  registered  on  

6.4.1958, in favour of Syed Jehangir Ahmed and others (Partners of  

the  respondent  firm,  M/s  Star  Bone Mill  and Fertiliser  Co.),  for  a  

period of two years.  During the subsistence of the said sub-lease, the  

partners of the firm M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, executed a sale deed  

on  11.11.1959  in  favour  of  the  respondent,  for  a  consideration  of  

Rs.45,000/-.  The said sale deed was also registered, and possession  

was handed over to the respondent.   

F. The  respondent  herein  filed  a  petition  in  1964  before  the  

Minister for Agriculture & Forest, seeking permanent lease of the suit  

premises in his favour.   On 26.4.1967, an order was passed by the  

Ministry of Agriculure & Forest in respect of recovery of arrears of  

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rent  as  regards  the  said  land.   The  respondent  vide  letter  dated  

7.5.1969, offered higher rent to the appellants for the suit land.   

G. On  22.5.1970,  the  respondent  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Chief  

Minister  of  Andhra  Pradesh  (Ex.B-39),  stating  that  he  had  been  

cheated by M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, as it had executed a sale deed  

in his favour, even though it had no title, and a very high rate of rent  

was fixed by the department, which should be reduced and till  the  

matter  is  finally  decided,  a  rent  of  Rs.569/-  per  month  should  be  

accepted.  The said application/petition was rejected by the Assistant  

Secretary to the Government, Food & Agriculture Department, vide  

letter dated 18.12.1970.

H. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 187 of 1971  

wherein an interim order dated 12.1.1971 was passed, to the effect  

that the recovery of rent for the period prior to 26.4.1969 would be  

made  at  the  rate  of  Rs.568/-  per  month  instead  of  Rs.1279/-  per  

month. Subsequent to 26.4.1969, rent would be recovered at the rate  

of  Rs.1279/-  per  month.   In  case,  arrears  are  not  paid  by  the  

respondent, he would be vacated from the suit land.   

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I. In view of the interim order of the High Court, the appellants  

issued a demand notice for a sum of Rs.45,484.62 paise.  However,  

vide order dated 19.10.1971, the High Court directed the respondent  

to deposit a sum of Rs.30,000/-, in eight monthly installments. The  

said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 18.2.1972, asking  

the  respondent  to  approach  the  appropriate  forum  to  establish  his  

rights  over  the  suit  land,  or  to  make  a  representation  to  the  State  

Government for this  purpose.  

J.  The  appellants  served  notice  dated  8.4.1974,  upon  the  

respondent under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, and the  

respondent  submitted  a  reply  to  the  said  show  cause  notice  on  

24.6.1974.  The matter  was adjudicated and decided on 21.8.1974,  

under Section 6 of the Land Encroachment Act, and the respondent  

was directed to vacate the suit land.   

K. The respondent filed Writ Petition No. 5222 of 1974 before the  

High Court, however, the same was dismissed, after giving liberty to  

the respondent to approach the civil court.  Thus, the respondent filed  

Original  Suit  No.  582  of  1974  for  declaration  of  title  and  for  

injunction,  restraining  the  appellants  from  evicting  the  said  

respondent/plaintiff from the property in dispute.  

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The appellants contested the suit by filing a written statement,  

and on the basis of the pleadings therein, a large number of issues  

were  framed,  including  whether  M/s.  A.  Allauddin  &  Sons  was  

actually the owner and possessor of the suit land; and whether it could  

transfer the suit land to the respondent/plaintiff, vide registered sale  

deed dated 11.11.1959.

L. The  City  Civil  Court,  vide  judgment  and  decree  dated  

25.4.1989 decreed the suit, holding that the Government was not the  

owner of the suit land, and that the respondent/plaintiff had a better  

title  over  it.  Thus,  he  was  entitled  for  declaration  of  title,  and  

injunction as sought by him.   

M. Aggrieved,  the  appellants  preferred  City  Civil  Court  Appeal  

No. 72 of 1989 before the High Court, challenging the said judgment  

and decree dated 25.4.1989, which was dismissed vide judgment and  

decree dated 22.3.2004, affirming the judgment and decree of the trial  

court.   

Hence, this appeal.  

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3.  Shri Amarendra Sharan, learned senior counsel appearing on  

behalf  of  the  appellants,  has  submitted  that  the  courts  below  

misdirected themselves  and did not  determine the issue as regards,  

whether the vendor of the respondent/plaintiff had any title over the  

suit property. The same is necessary to determine the validity of the  

sale deed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff.  The issue before the  

trial court was not whether the Government was the owner of the said  

land or not. No such issue framed either.  Moreover, such an issue  

could  not  be  framed  in  view  of  the  admission  made  by  the  

respondent/plaintiff itself,  as it had been paying rent regularly to the  

Government, and the same was admitted by it, by way of filing an  

application before the Government stating, that M/s. A. Allauddin &  

Sons had cheated it by executing a sale deed in its favour, without any  

authority/title.  It  thus, requested the Government to execute a lease  

deed/rent deed in its favour.  It was not its case, that in its earlier two  

writ petitions filed by it, it had acquired title over the land validly,  or  

that  M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons etc., had any title over the said suit  

land. The lease deed executed by the Government in favour of M/s. A.  

Allauddin & Sons, dated 21.5.1943 must be considered in light of the  

provisions  of  Section  90  of  the  Evidence  Act,  1872  (hereinafter  

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referred  to  as  the  `Evidence  Act’),  and  not  the  sale  deed  dated  

11.11.1959,  as the suit was filed in 1974, just after a period of 15  

years  of  sale,  and  not  30  years.   The  courts  below have  erred  in  

applying  the  provisions  of  Section  90  of  the  Evidence  Act.   The  

findings  of  fact  recorded  by  the  courts  below are  perverse,  being  

based on no evidence and have been recorded by a misapplication of  

the law. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.  

4. On the contrary, Shri D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel  

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondent,  has  opposed  the  appeal,  

contending that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below, do  

not warrant interference by this Court.  It is evident from the revenue  

records that possession is prima facie evidence of ownership, and that  

the same is by itself, a limited title, which is good except to the true  

owner.   The admission and receipt  of  tax constitutes  admission of  

ownership,  and  the  entries  in  the  revenue  record  must  hence,  be  

presumed to  be  correct.  In  the  revenue record,  one  Raja  Ram has  

been shown to be the owner of the land, the Forest Department cannot  

claim any title or interest therein.  The said appeal lacks merit, and is  

liable to be dismissed.  

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5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the records.  

6. Admittedly, the High Court erred in holding that the sale deed  

dated 11.11.1959,  must  be considered in light  of  the provisions of  

Section  90  of  the  Evidence  Act,  instead  of  the  period  mentioned  

therein,  thereby  treating  the  appeal  as  a  continuation  of  the  suit.  

Therefore,  the  period  of  30  years  mentioned  therein,  has  been  

calculated  from 1959, till the date of the decision of the appeal, i.e.  

22.3.2004.  This view itself is impermissible and perverse,  and cannot  

be  accepted.   The  courts  below  have  not  given  any  reason,  

whatsoever,  for  the  said  lease  deed  to  be  treated  as  having  been  

executed on 21.5.1943, under Section 90 of  the Evidence Act and,  

thus, for believing that the land belonging to the Forest Department,  

which had in turn,  given it to M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons on lease.  

7. Section 90 of the Evidence Act is based on the legal maxims :  

Nemo dat quid non habet (no one gives what he has not got);  and  

Nemo plus juris tribuit quam ipse habet (no one can bestow or grant a  

greater right, or a better title than he has himself).

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This  section  does  away  with  the  strict  rules,  as  regards  

requirement  of  proof,  which  are  enforced  in  the  case  of  private  

documents, by giving rise to a presumption of genuineness, in respect  

of certain documents that have reached a certain age.  The period is to  

be reckoned backward from the date of the offering of the document,  

and not any subsequent date, i.e., the date of decision of suit or appeal.  

Thus,  the  said  section  deals  with  the  admissibility  of  ancient  

documents, dispensing with proof as would be required, in the usual  

course of events in usual manner.

8. There has been a clear admission by the respondent/plaintiff in  

its  letter  dated  22.5.1970 (Ex.B-39),  to  the  effect  that  it  had  been  

cheated by M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons, who had no title over the suit  

land,  and sale   deed  dated  11.11.1959,  had  thus  been executed  in  

favour of the respondent/plaintiff by way of misrepresentation.  The  

said  application  was  rejected  vide  order  dated  18.12.1970.  While  

filing the writ petition, the respondent/plaintiff did not raise the issue  

of title of the Forest Department, infact, the dispute was limited only  

to the extent of  the amount of rent, and its case remained the same  

even  in  the  second  writ  petition,  when  it  was  evicted  under  the  

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Encroachment  Act.    The  trial  court  framed  various  issues,  and  

without  giving  any  weightage  to  the  documents  filed  by  

appellant/defendant,  decided  the  case  in  favour  of  the  

respondent/plaintiff,  with total  disregard to  any legal  requirements.  

The  courts  below  have  erred  in  ignoring  the  revenue  record,  

particularly,  the  documents  showing  that  the  Government  was  the  

absolute owner of the suit land since at least 1920.   

9. No person can claim a title better than he himself possess.  In  

the instant case, unless it is shown that M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons had  

valid  title,  the  respondent/plaintiff  could  not  claim  any  relief  

whatsoever from court.

10. In  Gurunath  Manohar  Pavaskar  &  Ors.  v.  Nagesh  

Siddappa Navalgund & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 901, this Court held as  

under:-

“A revenue record is not a document of title.  It   merely  raises  a  presumption  in  regard  to   possession.   Presumption  of  possession  and/or   continuity thereof both forward and backward can   also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence   Act.”

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11. In  Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander & Ors. &  

Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1165, dealing with the provisions of Section 110  

of the Evidence Act, this Court held as under:-

“Possession may prima facie raise a presumption   of title no one can deny but this presumption can   hardly arise when the facts are known.  When the   facts  disclose no title  in either party,  possession   alone decides.”

12. In Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector  

& Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1805, this Court held that :

“Presumption,  which  is  rebuttable,  is  attracted   when  the  possession  is  prima  facie  lawful  and   when the contesting party has no title.”   

13. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the Evidence Act, is  

based on public  policy with the object  of  preventing persons  from  

committing  breach  of  peace  by  taking  law  into  their  own  hands,  

however good their title over the land in question may be.  It is for this  

purpose, that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,  

1963, Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Sections  

154 and 158 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, were enacted.  All the afore-

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said provisions have the same object.  The said presumption is read  

under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a case  

where there is either no proof, or very little proof of ownership on  

either  side.  The  maxim “possession  follows  title”  is  applicable  in  

cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected,  

for instance, in the case of waste lands, or where nothing is known  

about possession one-way or another. Presumption of title as a result  

of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in  

any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and  

title  of  the  plaintiff  is  not  proved.  It  certainly  does  not  mean that  

because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession  

of  it.  It  infact  means,  that  if  at  any time a  man with  title  was  in  

possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that  

such  possession  was  in  continuation  of  the  title  vested  in  him.  A  

person  must  establish  that  he  has  continued possession  of  the  suit  

property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of  

trespass/encroachment  etc.  Where  the  apparent  title  is  with  the  

plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace  

this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself,  

he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that  

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favour his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title.  

It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.  Presumption  

of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward,  

can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.

14. The courts below have failed to appreciate that mere acceptance  

of municipal tax or agricultural tax by a person, cannot stop the State  

from challenging ownership of the land, as there may not be estoppel  

against the statute.  Nor can such a presumption arise in case of grant  

of loan by a bank upon it hypothecating the  property.  

15. The trial court has recorded a finding to the effect that the name  

of one Raja  Ram was shown as Pattadar  in respect  of  the land in  

dispute and the respondent/plaintiff  is  in possession.  Therefore, the  

burden of proof was shifted on the government to establish that the  

suit land belonged to it. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff  

could not furnish any explanation before us as to who was this Raja  

Ram, Pattadar  and how respondent/plaintiff  was concerned with it.  

Moreover, in absence of his impleadment by the respondent/plaintiff  

such a finding could not have been recorded.  

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16. The courts below erred in holding, that revenue records confer  

title, for the reason that they merely show possession of a person. The  

courts  below  further  failed  to  appreciate  that  the  sale  deed  dated  

11.11.1959 was invalid and inoperative, as the documents on record  

established that the vendor was merely a lessee of the Government.   

17. In view of the above,  we are  of  the considered opinion that  

findings of fact recorded by the courts below are perverse and liable to  

be set aside.  The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of  

the  courts  below  are  hereby  set  aside.  The  suit  filed  by  the  

respondent/plaintiff is dismissed.   

                            .……….…………………………………………… J.           (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

 ………………………………………………………J.  (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

New Delhi,                                                                                  February 21, 2013   

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