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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.25  OF 2014

(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 8423 OF 2012)

STATE (NCT OF DELHI)      … APPELLANT VERSUS

NARENDER …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

The  State  of  Delhi,  aggrieved  by  the  order  

dated 28th of November, 2011 passed by the Delhi  

High  Court  in  Criminal  M.C.  No.  2540  of  2011,  

whereby it had directed for release of the vehicle  

bearing  Registration  No.  HR-56-7290  to  the  

registered owner on security, has preferred this  

special leave petition.

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Leave granted.

Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise  

to  the  present  appeal  are  that  while  constables  

Raghmender Singh and Sunil were on night patrolling  

duty at Kirari Nithari turn on 17th of April, 2011,  

they saw a vehicle coming from the side of the  

Nithari  Village.   Constable  Raghmender  Singh  

signalled the driver to stop the vehicle, but he  

did  not  accede  to  his  command  and  turned  the  

vehicle into the Prem Nagar Extension Lane.  Both  

the  constables  chased  the  vehicle  on  their  

motorcycle  and  the  driver  of  the  vehicle,  

apprehending  that  he  would  be  caught,  left  the  

vehicle  and  ran  away  from  the  place,  taking  

advantage of the darkness.  The vehicle abandoned  

by  the  driver  was  “Cruiser  Force”  and  had  

registration No. HR-56-7290.  After opening of the  

windows of the vehicle, 27 Cartons, each containing  

12  bottles  of  750  ml.  Mashaledar  country-made  

liquor and 20 Cartons, each containing 48 quarters  

of Besto Whisky were found inside the vehicle.  All  

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the 47 Cartons were embossed with ‘Sale in Haryana  

only’.  Constable Raghmender Singh gave a report to  

the police and on that basis FIR No. 112 of 2011  

dated  17.04.2011  was  registered  at  Aman  Vihar  

Police Station under Section 33(a) and Section 58  

of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009.  During the course  

of  investigation,  Narender,  respondent  herein,  

claiming to be the owner of the vehicle, filed an  

application for its release on security, before the  

Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini, who, by his order  

dated 24th of May, 2011 rejected the same, inter  

alia, holding that he has no power to release the  

vehicle seized in connection with the offence under  

the Delhi Excise Act.  The respondent again filed  

an application for the same relief i.e. for release  

of the vehicle on security before the Metropolitan  

Magistrate but the said application also met with  

the same fate.  By order-dated 14th of July, 2011,  

the  learned  Metropolitan  Magistrate  declined  to  

pass the order for release, inter alia, observing  

that any order directing for release of the vehicle  

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on security would amount to review of the order  

dated 24th of May, 2011, which power the court did  

not possess.

Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed an  

application before the High Court under Section 482  

of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (hereinafter  

referred  to  as  ‘the  Code’),  assailing  the  order  

dated  24th May,  2011  passed  by  the  learned  

Metropolitan Magistrate.  The High Court, by its  

impugned order dated 28th of November, 2011 directed  

the  vehicle  to  be  released  in  favour  of  the  

registered  owner  on  furnishing  security  to  the  

satisfaction of the Metropolitan Magistrate.  While  

doing so, the High Court has observed as follows:

“………The  vehicle  in  question  was  seized  by  the  Police  and  not  confiscated  and  if  that  was  so,  Section 58, Delhi Excise Act would  not apply with regard to the vehicle  in question and the procedure that  was  to  be  followed  regarding  the  vehicle was to be found in Chapter  VI  of  Delhi  Excise  Act  and  also  Section 451, Cr.P.C………”

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Mr.  Mohan  Jain,  Additional  Solicitor  General  

appears  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  whereas  the  

respondent  is  represented  by  Mr.  Harish  Pandey.  

Mr. Jain submits that in view of the embargo put by  

Section 61 of the Delhi Excise Act, the High Court  

had no jurisdiction to pass an order for release of  

the  vehicle  on  security.   Mr.  Pandey,  however,  

submits that the High Court has the power under  

Section 451 of the Code to direct for release of  

the vehicle on security and the same is legal and  

valid.   

Rival  submissions  necessitate  examination  of  

the  scheme  of  the  Delhi  Excise  Act,  2009  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).  Section 33  

of  the  Act  provides  for  penalty  for  unlawful  

import, export, transport, manufacture, possession,  

sale etc. of intoxicant and Section 33(a), which is  

relevant for the purpose reads as follows:

“33.  Penalty  for  unlawful  import,  export,  transport,  manufacture,  possession, sale, etc.- (1) Whoever,  

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in  contravention  of  provision  of  this  Act  or  of  any  rule  or  order  made  or  notification  issued  or  of  any licence, permit or pass, granted  under this Act-

(a) manufactures, imports, exports,  transports  or  removes  any  intoxicant;

xxx xxx xxx

shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment for a term which shall  not  be  less  than  six  months  but  which may extend to three years and  with fine which shall not be less  than fifty thousand rupees but which  may extend to one lakh rupees.”

Section 58 of the Act provides for confiscation  

of certain things and Section 58(d) thereof, with  

which we are concerned in the present appeal, reads  

as follows:

“58.  Certain  things  liable  to  confiscation.-  Whenever  an  offence  has  been  committed,  which  is  punishable under this Act, following  things  shall  be  liable  to  confiscation, namely-

xxx xxx xxx

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(d) any animal, vehicle, vessel, or  other  conveyance  used  for  carrying  the same.”

From a plain reading of Section 33(a) of the  

Act,  it  is  evident  that  transportation  of  any  

intoxicant in contravention of the provisions of  

the  Act  or  of  any  rule  or  order  made  or  

notification issued or any licence, permit or pass,  

is  punishable  and  any  vehicle  used  for  carrying  

the same, is liable for confiscation under Section  

58(d) of the Act.  Section 59 of the Act deals with  

the power of confiscation of Deputy Commissioner in  

certain cases.  Section 59(1) thereof provides that  

notwithstanding anything contained in any other law  

where  anything  liable  for  confiscation  under  

Section  58  is  seized  or  detained,  the  officer  

seizing and detaining such thing shall produce the  

same before the Deputy Commissioner.  On production  

of the seized property, the Deputy Commissioner, if  

satisfied that the offence under the Act has been  

committed, may order confiscation of such property.  

Therefore, under the scheme of the Act any vehicle  

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used for carrying the intoxicant is liable to be  

confiscated  and  on  seizure  of  the  vehicle  

transporting the intoxicant, the same is required  

to be produced before the Deputy Commissioner, who  

in turn has been conferred with the power of its  

confiscation.

Section  61  of  the  Act  puts  an  embargo  on  

jurisdiction of courts, the same reads as follows:

“61.  Bar  of  jurisdiction  in  confiscation.-  Whenever  any  intoxicant,  material,  still,  utensil, implement, apparatus or any  receptacle, package, vessel, animal,  cart,  or  other  conveyance  used  in  committing any offence, is seized or  detained  under  this  Act,  no  court  shall,  notwithstanding  anything  to  the contrary contained in any other  law  for  the  time  being  in  force,  have jurisdiction to make any order  with regard to such property.”

According  to  this  section,  notwithstanding  

anything contrary contained in any other law for  

the  time  being  in  force,  no  court  shall  have  

jurisdiction to make any order with regard to the  

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property used in committing any offence and seized  

under the Act.

It  is  relevant  here  to  state  that  in  the  

present case, the High Court, while releasing the  

vehicle on security has exercised its power under  

Section 451 of the Code.  True it is that where any  

property  is  produced  by  an  officer  before  a  

criminal  court  during  an  inquiry  or  trial  under  

this section, the court may make any direction as  

it  thinks  fit  for  the  proper  custody  of  such  

property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or  

trial, as the case may be.  At the conclusion of  

the inquiry or trial, the court may also, under  

Section 452 of the Code, make an order for the  

disposal  of  the  property  produced  before  it  and  

make  such  other  direction  as  it  may  think  

necessary.  Further,  where  the  property  is  not  

produced before a criminal court in an inquiry or  

trial, the Magistrate is empowered under Section  

457 of the Code to make such order as it thinks  

fit.   In  our  opinion,  the  general  provision  of  

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Section 451 of the Code with regard to the custody  

and disposal of the property or for that matter by  

destruction, confiscation or delivery to any person  

entitled to possession thereof under Section 452 of  

the  Code  or  that  of  Section  457  authorising  a  

Magistrate  to  make  an  order  for  disposal  of  

property, if seized by an officer and not produced  

before a criminal court during an inquiry or trial,  

however,  has  to  yield  where  a  statute  makes  a  

special provision with regard to its confiscation  

and disposal. We have referred to the scheme of the  

Act and from that it is evident that the vehicle  

seized  has  to  be  produced  before  the  Deputy  

Commissioner, who in turn has been conferred with  

the power of its confiscation or release to its  

rightful owner.  The requirement of production of  

seized  property  before  the  Deputy  Commissioner  

under Section 59(1) of the Act is, notwithstanding  

anything contained in any other law, and,  so also  

is  the  power  of  confiscation.   Not  only  this,  

notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained  

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in any other law for the time being in force, no  

court,  in  terms  of  Section  61  of  the  Act,  has  

jurisdiction to make any order with regard to the  

property used in commission of any offence under  

the Act.  In the present case, the Legislature has  

used a non-obstante clause not only in Section 59  

but also in Section 61 of the Act.  As is well  

settled,  a  non-obstante  clause  is  a  legislative  

device to give effect to the enacting part of the  

section  in  case  of  conflict  over  the  provisions  

mentioned  in  the  non-obstante  clause.   Hence,  

Section 451, 452 and 457 of the Code must yield to  

the provisions of the Act and there is no escape  

from the conclusion that the Magistrate or for that  

matter the High Court, while dealing with the case  

of seizure of vehicle under the Act, has any power  

to pass an order dealing with the interim custody  

of the vehicle on security or its release thereof.  

The view which we have taken finds support from a  

judgment of this Court in the case of  State of  

Karnataka v. K.A. Kunchindammed, (2002) 9 SCC 90,  

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which  while  dealing  with  somewhat  similar  

provisions under the Karnataka Forest Act held  as  

follows:-  

“23……….The position is made clear by  the  non  obstante  clause  in  the  relevant  provisions  giving  overriding effect to the provisions  in the Act over other statutes and  laws.  The  necessary  corollary  of  such provisions is that in a case  where  the  Authorized  Officer  is  empowered  to  confiscate  the  seized  forest  produce  on  being  satisfied  that an offence under the Act has  been  committed  thereof  the  general  power vested in the Magistrate for  dealing with interim custody/release  of the seized materials under CrPC  has  to  give  way.  The  Magistrate  while  dealing  with  a  case  of  any  seizure of forest produce under the  Act should examine whether the power  to  confiscate  the  seized  forest  produce is vested in the Authorized  Officer  under  the  Act  and  if  he  finds that such power is vested in  the Authorized Officer then he has  no power to pass an order dealing  with interim custody/release of the  seized material. This, in our view,  will  help  in  proper  implementation  of provisions of the special Act and  will help in advancing the purpose  and  object  of  the  statute.  If  in  such  cases  power  to  grant  interim  custody/release of the seized forest  

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produce is vested in the Magistrate  then it will be defeating the very  scheme  of  the  Act.  Such  a  consequence is to be avoided.

24. From  the  statutory  provisions  and  the  analysis  made  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  the  position  that  emerges  is  that  the  learned  Magistrate and the learned Sessions  Judge were right in holding that on  facts  and  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  is  the  Authorized  Officer who is vested with the power  to pass order of interim custody of  the vehicle and not the Magistrate.  The  High  Court  was  in  error  in  taking a view to the contrary and in  setting aside the orders passed by  the  Magistrate  and  the  Sessions  Judge on that basis.”

From  a  conspectus  of  what  we  have  observed  

above,  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  Court  is  

found  to  be  vulnerable  and,  therefore,  the  same  

cannot be allowed to stand.

To put the record straight it is relevant here  

to state that the counsel for the respondent had  

not,  and  in  our  opinion  rightly,  challenged  the  

vires of the provisions of the Act in view of the  

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decision of this Court in the case of  Oma Ram v.  

State of Rajasthan, (2008) 5 SCC 502, which upheld  

a  somewhat  similar  provision  existing  in  the  

Rajasthan Excise Act.

In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside  

the impugned judgment and order of the High Court  

and  hold  that  the  High  Court  exceeded  in  its  

jurisdiction  in  directing  for  release  of  the  

vehicle on security.

 ………..………..……………………………….J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

………………….………………………………….J. (KURIAN JOSEPH)

NEW DELHI, JANUARY 06, 2014.

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