1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 501 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 20093 OF 2019)

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MSTC LIMITED            RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) The  present  appeal  raises  interesting  questions  which  arise

under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter

referred to as “the RDB Act” or “the Act”). The brief facts necessary

to appreciate the questions raised are as follows:-

(i) On  29.08.2008,  a  Receivables  Purchase  Agreement  was

executed between Standard Chartered Bank, which is the appellant

before us and MSTC Limited,  which is a Government Company-

respondent herein, whereunder receivables from overseas buyers

in  respect  of  invoices  raised  by  the  respondent  against  foreign

buyers were purchased by the appellant. 95% of the amount raised

by the invoices was remitted to the respondent.  

2

(ii) An Export Insurance Policy was obtained by these parties from

ICICI  Lombard  General  Insurance  Company  under  which  the

Insurance Company agreed to indemnify the respondent and the

appellant in the event of default in payment of foreign buyers.   

(iii)  The  appellant  had  lodged  a  claim  with  the  said  Insurance

Company which, however, was repudiated on 03.03.2011. In this

background, on 13.03.2012, the appellant filed an application under

Section 19 of the RDB Act being O.A. No. 43 of 2012 before the

DRT, Mumbai for recovery of a sum of Rs.191,03,54,070.96.   

(iv)  An  I.A  was  then  filed  by  the  respondent  before  the  DRT

Mumbai, challenging its jurisdiction, which was ultimately disposed

of  on  26.09.2013  and  an  appeal  therefrom  was  dismissed  on

03.02.2017,  holding  that  the  DRT  Mumbai  did  have  territorial

jurisdiction to go ahead with the case.  

(v) At this point, an I.A was filed by the appellant stating that given

the admissions contained in the balance sheet of the relevant years

of  the  respondent-Company,  a  sum  of  Rs.  222,51,00,000/-  was

owed by the respondent to the appellant. This I.A. was allowed by

the DRT Mumbai on 26.10.2017.   

(vi)  An appeal was filed by the respondent-Company against the

said order before the DRAT on 14.11.2017.  While the appeal was

pending, Review Application No. 1 of 2018 was filed on 18.12.2017

3

before the DRT by the respondent-Company after the appeal that

was  lodged  earlier  in  point  of  time  was  withdrawn  by  the

respondent-Company on 02.01.2018.   

(vii) In the meanwhile, an application dated 16.02.2018 was made

to condone a 28 day delay in filing the review petition before the

DRT, the period of limitation under Rule 5A of the Debt Recovery

Tribunal  (Procedure)  Rules,  1993 (hereinafter  referred to as “the

Rules”) being 30 days. This review petition was dismissed by the

DRT on  21.04.2018,  in  which  this  Court’s  judgment  reported  in

International  Asset  Reconstruction  Company of  India  Limited vs.

Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Limited and Others,

(2017) 16 SCC 137 was followed, and Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 was held not to be applicable to review petitions that were

filed under Rule 5A of the Rules.  A further plea to exclude time

taken  under  Section  14  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  was  also

dismissed by the DRT stating that a filing of the review petition after

the appeal would show that the appeal provision, which requires a

minimum  25%  deposit,  was  sought  to  be  circumvented,  and,

therefore, this being the case, time taken under Section 14 cannot

be excluded as the respondent-Company did not move bona fide in

the matter.  

(viii) From the order dated 21.4.2018, a writ petition was filed before

4

the Bombay High Court on 26.04.2018, which was then disposed of

by  the  impugned  judgment  on  03.05.2019,  holding  that  the

alternative remedy of filing an appeal not being available, the writ

petition would be maintainable. In any case, the judgment of this

Court  in  International  Asset  Reconstruction  Company  of  India

Limited (supra) was confined to consideration of Section 30 of the

RDB Act,  and paragraph 14 of the said judgment would make it

clear that it would apply to the facts of this case inasmuch as an

original application made under Section 19 of the RDB Act, (which

by  the  definition  clause  under  Section  2(b)  applies  only  to

applications  made  under  Section  19  and  to  no  others)  would

subsume an application for review as a review application would

originate from an order passed under Section 19 of the RDB Act, as

per procedure prescribed under Section 22 of  the RDB Act,  and

would therefore not  be an application which could be said to be

independent of Section 19 of the RDB Act.  This being the case, the

High Court set aside the judgment of the DRT, condoned the delay

in  filing  of  the  review application  itself,  and  restored  the  review

application to the file.

3) Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the appellant, has contended that the High Court is wrong

on all counts.  First and foremost, the High Court could not have

5

looked at Order XLVII Rule 7 of the CPC in order to hold that an

appeal  from an  order  dismissing  a  review petition  would  not  be

maintainable before the DRAT both for the reason that Order 47

Rule 7 itself is inapplicable under Section 22(1) of the RDB Act and

for the reason that Section 20 of the RDB Act makes it clear that

appeals lie to the DRAT from all applications that may have been

disposed of by the Tribunal under the RDB Act.  He further argued

that the judgment in International Asset Reconstruction Company of

India Limited (supra)  ought to have been applied correctly in that

the  ratio decidendi of  the judgment  made it  clear  that  it  is  only

applications under Section 19 that are referred to in Section 24 of

the RDB Act, and this being the case, a review application, being an

independent  proceeding,  could  not  be  subsumed  within  the

expression “application” contained in Section 24 of the RDB Act.

He  also  cited  the  judgment  reported  in  Kamlesh  Verma vs.

Mayawati and Others, (2013) 8 SCC 320 to buttress the submission

that  a  review  petition  cannot  be  equated  with  the  original

proceeding. Further, contrasting Rule 5A of the Rules with Section

20 of the RDB Act, since peremptory language has been used in

the said rule, making it clear that a review petition filed beyond 30

days would have to be dismissed,  coupled with the fact  that  no

provision for condonation of delay, as in Section 20, is contained in

6

Rule 5A would also make it clear that the impugned judgment has

to be faulted on this ground as well.     

4) Mr. Amar Dave, learned Advocate appearing on behalf  of the

respondent,  stoutly  resisted each one of  these contentions.  First

and foremost, he asked us to consider the fact that the O.A. before

the DRT was in 2012, and it is only after waiting for five years that a

thoroughly  frivolous  application  was  taken  out  in  2017  for  a

judgment  on  admission.  He  also  adverted  to  Section  19,  in

particular, sub-section (2) thereof, to argue that Section 19 is not

exhaustive of the types of applications that can be made under the

Act. He also strongly relied upon the reasoning of the High Court

judgment,  and  stated  that  Section  19  and  22  should  be  read

together,  as  a  review  proceeding  emanates  from  the  original

proceeding and is really part and parcel of the proceeding, and this

being the case, Section 24 of the RDB Act would apply Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, 1963 to review proceedings as well. He strongly

relied  upon  paragraph  12,  in  particular,  in  International  Asset

Reconstruction Company of India Limited (supra)  to contend that

there  was  a  fundamental  difference  between  the  facts  in  that

judgment and the facts of the present case. The difference is that in

the earlier judgment, Section 30 pre and post amendment was set

out,  and it  was stated that  an appeal  that  was filed against  the

7

orders of recovery officers, which will be governed by Section 30 of

the RDB Act, would be appeals filed against a  persona designata

who is not a tribunal, and this being the case, the second sentence

of paragraph 12 becomes very important, in which this Court then

states that had the recovery officer been held to be a tribunal, the

matter would have to be completely differently viewed. It was his

case, therefore, that this judgment is wholly distinguishable. He also

supported  the  impugned  judgment  on  maintainability  of  the  Writ

Petition.  

5) Having heard learned counsel for both sides, it is necessary to

set out some of the provisions of the RDB Act and the Rules made

thereunder. Section 2(b) of the RDB Act states as follows:

“2. Definitions.- (b)  “application”  means  an  application  made  to  a Tribunal under section 19;”

Section 19 of the RDB Act states as follows:  

“19. Application to the Tribunal. –  (1)  Where  a  bank  or  a  financial  institution  has  to recover any debt from any person, it  may make an application  to  the  Tribunal  within  the  local  limits  of whose jurisdiction-

(a)  the  branch  or  any  other  office  of  the  bank  or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding, for the time being; or (aa) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one,  at  the time of  making the application,  actually

8

and  voluntarily  resides  or  carries  on  business,  or personally works for gain; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises xxx xxx xxx (2) Where a bank or a financial institution, which has to  recover  its  debt  from  any  person,  has  filed  an application to the Tribunal under sub-section (1) and against  the  same person  another  bank  or  financial institution also has claim to recover its debt, then, the later bank or financial institution may join the applicant bank  or  financial  institution  at  any  stage  of  the proceedings,  before  the  final  order  is  passed,  by making an application to that Tribunal. xxx xxx xxx (5) (i) the defendant shall within a period of thirty days from  the  date  of  service  of  summons,  present  a written statement  of  his  defence including claim for set-off under sub-section (6) or a counter-claim under sub-section  (8),  if  any,  and  such  written  statement shall be accompanied with original documents or true copies thereof with the leave of the Tribunal, relied on by the defendant in his defence:  Provided  that  where  the  defendant  fails  to  file  the written statement within the said period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional cases and in special  circumstances  to  be  recorded  in  writing, extend  the  said  period  by  such  further  period  not exceeding fifteen days to file the written statement of his defence; xxx xxx xxx (18) Where it appears to the Tribunal to be just and convenient, the Tribunal may, by order— (a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after grant of certificate for recovery of debt;  (b)  remove  any  person  from  the  possession  or custody of the property; (c)  commit  the same to the possession,  custody or management of the receiver;  (d)  confer upon the receiver all  such powers,  as to bringing and defending suits in the courts or filing and defending applications before the Tribunal and for the realisation, management, protection, preservation and improvement  of  the  property,  the  collection  of  the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal

9

of  such  rents  and  profits,  and  the  execution  of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Tribunal thinks fit; and  (e)  appoint  a  Commissioner  for  preparation  of  an inventory of the properties of the defendant or for the sale thereof.”

Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the RDB Act state as follows:  

“20. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. - (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act,  may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. xxx xxx xxx (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of thirty days the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as  may be prescribed:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.

21.  Deposit  of  amount  of  debt  due,  on  filing appeal. - Where an appeal is preferred by any person from whom the amount of debt is due to a bank or a financial  institution  or  a  consortium  of  banks  or financial  institutions,  such  appeal  shall  not  be entertained  by  the  Appellate  Tribunal  unless  such person has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty percent  of  the amount  of  debt  so due from him as determined by the Tribunal under section 19:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in  writing,  reduce the amount  to  be deposited  by  such  amount  which  shall  not  be  less than twenty-five per cent of the amount of such debt so due to be deposited under this section.

10

22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate  Tribunal. -  (1)  The  Tribunal  and  the Appellate  Tribunal  shall  not  be  bound  by  the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of  this  Act  and  of  any  rules,  the  Tribunal  and  the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own  procedure  including  the  places  at  which  they shall have their sittings. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this  Act,  the same powers as are vested in  a  Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) xxx xxx xxx  (e) reviewing its decisions;”

Section 24 of the RDB Act states as follows:

“24. Limitation. - The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal.”

Section 34 (1) of the RDB Act states as follows:

“34. Act to have overriding effect.— (1)  Save  as  provided  under  sub-section  (2),  the provisions  of  this  Act  shall  have  effect notwithstanding  anything  inconsistent  therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.”

Rule  2(b)  and  2(c)  of  the  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal  (Procedure)

Rules, 1993 states as follows:

“2. Definitions.- (b)  –  "applicant"  means  a  person  making  an application under section 19 or under section 31A and includes  an  “applicant”  who  files  an  appeal  under section 30(1) of the Act;

11

(c)  "application"  means  an  application  filed  under section  19  or  under  section  31A and  includes  an “appeal” filed under section 30(1) of the Act”

Rule 4(1) of the Rules states as follows:

“4. Procedure for filing applications  (1) An application under section 19 or section 31A, or under section 30(1) of the Act may be presented as nearly  as  possible  in  Form I,  Form II  and Form III respectively annexed to these rules by the applicant in person or by his agent or by a duly authorised legal practitioner to the Registrar of the Bench within whose jurisdiction his case falls or shall be sent by registered post addressed to the Registrar.”

Rule 5A of the Rules states as follows:

“5A.Review.- (1)Any party considering itself aggrieved by an order made by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error  apparent  on the face of  the record desires to obtain a review of the order made against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Tribunal which had made the order.

(2)No application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order  and  no  such  application  shall  be  entertained unless it is accompanied by an affidavit verifying the application.

(3) Where it appears to the Tribunal that there is no sufficient  ground  for  a  review,  it  shall  reject  the application but where the Tribunal is of opinion that the  application  for  review  should  be  granted,  shall grant the same:

Provided  that  no  such  application  shall  be  granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and to be heard in support of the order, a review of which is applied for.”

Rule 7 of the Rules states as follows:

12

“7. Application fee  (1) Every Application under section 19(1), or section 19(2), or section 19(8), or section 30(1) of the Act, or interlocutory application or application for review of decision of the Tribunal shall be accompanied by a fee provided in the sub-rule (2) and such fee may be remitted through a crossed Bank Demand Draft drawn on a bank or Indian Postal Order in favour of the  Registrar  of  the  Tribunal  and  payable  at  the place where the Tribunal is situated.    (2) The amount of fee payable shall be as follows:-  

S.No. Nature of Application Amount of Fee Payable

1. Application  for  recovery  of debts due under section 19(1) or section 19(2) of the Act

(a)Where  amount  of  debt due is Rs. 10 lakhs

(b)Where  the  amount  of debt  due  is  above  Rs. 10 lakhs

Rs. 12,000

Rs.  12,000 plus Rs. 1,000 for  every  one lakh  rupees  of debt  due  or part  thereof  in excess  of  Rs. 10  lakhs, subject  to  a maximum  of Rs. 1,50,000

2. Application  to  counter  claim under section 19(8) of the Act –  

(a)Where  the  amount  of claim made is upto Rs. 10 lakhs.

(b)Where  the  amount  of claim  made  is  above Rs. 10 lakhs.

Rs. 12,000

Rs.  12,000 plus Rs. 1,000 for  every  one lakh  rupees or part  thereof  in

13

excess  of  Rs. 10  lakhs, subject  to  a maximum  of Rs. 1,50,000

3. Application  for  Review including review application in respect of counter-claim

(a)against an interim order

(b)against a final order ex- cluding  review  for  cor- rection  of  clerical  or arithmetical mistakes

Rs. 125

50%  of  fee payable  at rates  as applicable  on the applications under  section 19(1)  or  19(8) of  the  Act, subject  to  a maximum  of Rs. 15,000

4. Application  for  interlocutory order

Rs. 250

5. Appeals against orders of the Recovery Officer If  the  amount  appealed against is

(i) less  than  Rs.  10 lakhs

(ii) Rs.  10 lakh or more but less than Rs. 30 lakhs

(iii) Rs. 30 lakhs or more

Rs. 12,000

Rs. 20,000

Rs. 30,000

6. Vakalatnama Rs. 5”

14

6)   A reading of  the aforesaid  provisions of  the Act  and Rules

would show that review petitions are dealt with in Section 22(2)(e)

read with  Rule  5A of  the  Rules.  Section 24,  which applies  the

provisions of the Limitation Act to applications made to a Tribunal,

would,  as  per  the  definition  section  contained  in  Section  2(b),

apply only to applications that are made under Section 19, which

are original applications to recover debts that are made by banks

and financial institutions. What is clear is that an application for

review cannot possibly be said to be an application filed under

Section 19 even on a cursory reading of the provisions of the Act,

as it traces its origin to Section 22(2)(e) read with Rule 5A of the

Rules.

7)  As a matter of fact, applications that are made to the Tribunal

under Section 19 of the Act are only made in order to recover a

debt from any person. Even Section 19(2), which is strongly relied

upon by Shri Dave, makes it clear that another bank or financial

institution may join an applicant bank or financial institution at any

stage of the proceeding before the final order is passed by making

an application against  the same debtor for  debts owed to such

other bank or financial institution. Also, under Section 19(5) of the

Act, a written statement may include a claim for set-off and/or a

counter-claim and under Section 19(18) of the Act, interim orders

15

may be passed in applications filed for recovery of debts under

Section  19  of  the  Act.  All  this  must  be  contrasted  with  an

application for review that is filed under Section 22 (2)(e) of the Act

read  with  Rule  5A of  the  Rules.  Such  applications  are  not  for

recovery  of  debts  but  are  only  applications  to  correct  errors

apparent on the face of the record in a judgment that has been

delivered in an application filed under Section 19.

8)  A reading of the Rules is also illuminating. Rules 2(b) and 2(c)

of the Rules define “applicant” and “application”, respectively, as

including applicants and applications filed under Section 19, 31A

as  well  as  appeals  filed  under  Section  30(1)  of  the  Act.  An

application  under  Section  31A is  an  application  to  enforce  a

decree or order passed by any court before the commencement of

the Amendment Act of 2000 and which has not yet been executed.

An appeal under Section 30(1) is an appeal to the Tribunal against

orders of the Recovery Officer made under the Act. The reason

why Rule  2(c)  of  the Rules defines application as including an

application under Section 31A and an appeal filed under Section

31 of the Act,  apart from applications filed under Section 19, is

because under Rule 4 of the Rules, the procedure for filing such

applications/appeal is under Forms I to III appended to the Rules.

What  is  important  to  note is  that  even this  extended definition,

16

under the Rules, does not include an application for review filed

under  Rule  5A of  the  Rules.  In  point  of  fact,  Rule  7  makes it

abundantly clear that each such application, including applications

for  review,  are  viewed  separately  and  independently,  as  fees

payable for filing such applications are vastly different, as is clear

from Rule 7(2) of the Rules.

9)   In  fact,  this  Court  in  International  Asset  Reconstruction

Company of India Limited (supra) had to consider whether Section

5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to condone delay in the filing

of an appeal after the prescribed period of 30 days under Section

30(1) of the RDB Act.  The Court first stated, in paragraph 8, that

the RDB Act is undoubtedly a special law and a complete code by

itself  with regard to expeditious recovery of  dues to banks and

financial institutions. After then noticing Section 22(1) in paragraph

9 and stating that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot  proprio

vigore apply to a tribunal as a tribunal is not a Court (in paragraph

10), the Court went on to hold:

“11. An "application" is defined under Section 2(b) of the RDB Act as one made under Section 19 of the Act.  The  latter  provision  in  Chapter  IV  deals  with institution of  original  recovery  proceedings before  a Tribunal.  An  appeal  lies  against  the  order  of  the Tribunal  under  Section  20  before  the  Appellate Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned for sufficient cause under the proviso to Section 20(3) of the  Act.   The  Tribunal  issues  a  recovery  certificate under Section 19(22) to the Recovery officer who then

17

proceeds  under  Chapter  V  for  recovery  of  the certificate amount in the manner prescribed. A person aggrieved  by  an  order  of  the  Recovery  officer  can prefer an appeal before the Tribunal under Rule 4, by an application in  the prescribed Form III.  Rule  2(c) defines an "application" to include a memo of appeal under Section 30(1).  The appeal is to be preferred before  the  Tribunal,  as  distinct  from  the  Appellate Tribunal, within 30 days. Section 24 of the RDB Act, therefore,  manifestly  makes  the  provisions  of  the Limitation  Act  applicable  only  to  such  an  original "application"  made  under  Section  19  only.  The definition of an "application" under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it in conjunction with Section 2(b) of the Act extending the meaning thereof beyond what the Act provides for and then make Section 24 of the RDB Act applicable to an appeal under Section 30(1) of the Act. Any such interpretation shall be completely contrary to the legislative intent, extending the Rules beyond what the Act provides for and limits. Had the intention  been  otherwise,  nothing  prevented  the Legislature from providing so specifically.

12. A comparative study of Section 30, pre and post- amendment  in  the  year  2000,  reveals  that  the deemed status of  proceedings before the Recovery officer, as a Tribunal, stands denuded. Had the pro- ceedings before the Recovery officer deemed to be before  a  Tribunal,  entirely  different  considerations may have arisen.  

Old  Section  30  before  the

2000 Amendment

Section 30 after  the 2000

Amendment "30 Orders of Recovery Of-

ficer to be deemed as order

of  Tribunal.-  Notwithstand-

ing  anything  contained  in

Section 29, an order made

by the    Recovery Officer in

exercise of  his  powers un-

"30.  Appeal against the or-

der of Recovery     Officer.-

(1)          Notwithstanding

anything contained in Sec-

tion  29,  any  person  ag-

grieved by an order of the

Recovery Officer made un-

18

der Sections 25 to 28 (both

inclusive), shall be deemed

to have been made by the

Tribunal  and  an  appeal

against such orders shall lie

to the Appellate Tribunal."

der  this  Act  may,  within

thirty days from the date on

which a copy of the order is

issued to him, prefer an ap-

peal to the      Tribunal.

(2)  On receipt  of  an   ap-

peal under sub-section (1),

the Tribunal may, after giv-

ing an        opportunity to

the      appellant  to  be

heard,  and  after  making

such  enquiry  as it  deems

fit,  confirm,  modify  or  set

aside  the  order  made  by

the Recovery Officer in ex-

ercise of his powers under

Sections 25 to 28 (both in-

clusive)."

13.  The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the legislature has provided for  application  of  the  Limitation  Act  to  original  pro- ceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The Appellate Tribunal has been conferred the power to  condone  delay  beyond  45  days  under  Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recov- ery officer are not before a Tribunal.  Section 24 is lim- ited in  its  application to proceedings before the Tri- bunal originating under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclu- sion was express.  The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limita- tion  Act,  1963  therefore  does  not  arise.  The  pre-

19

scribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

10) The judgment of this Court makes it plain, though in a slightly

different  context,  that  the  only  application  that  is  referred  to  by

Section 24 of the RDB Act is an application filed under Section 19

and no other. This being the case, an application for review, not

being an application under  Section 19,  but  an application under

Section  22(2)(e)  read  with  Rule  5A of  the  Rules,  this  judgment

would apply on all fours to exclude applications which are review

applications from the purview of Section 24 of the RDB Act.

11)  However, Mr. Dave laid great stress on paragraph 12 of the

said judgment and, in particular, the sentence “had the proceedings

before  the  Recovery  Officer  deemed  to  be  before  a  Tribunal,

entirely  different  considerations  may  have  arisen”.  From  this

sentence, the learned counsel sought to infer that it would not only

be  applications  under  Section  19  that  would  come  within  the

“application” spoken of in Section 24, but other applications also.

12)  We  are  afraid  we  are  unable  to  agree  with  the  aforesaid

submission.  The  clear  ratio  decidendi  of  this  judgment  makes  it

abundantly clear that the only application referred to in Section 24 is

an application filed under Section 19 and to no other. The sentence

that is extracted and relied upon by Mr. Dave only makes sense in

20

the context of Section 30 unamended, when read juxtaposed with

Section 30 as amended. Under the unamended section, when the

recovery officer’s order was deemed as an order of the Tribunal,

appeals would lie to the Appellate Tribunal. This would mean that

Section 20 of the RDB Act would apply, as a result of which Section

20(3) would kick in and would permit condonation of delay. After the

amendment, it  is important to note that the recovery officer is no

longer considered a Tribunal, as result of which an appeal from a

recovery officer’s order is made not to the Appellate Tribunal, but to

the Tribunal of first instance. It is in this context that the aforesaid

sentence in paragraph 12 of the Court’s judgment is to be read,

making it clear that if the unamended Section 30 were to apply, the

provision contained in Section 20(3) would be attracted, permitting

condonation of delay.  

13)   Mr.  Dave’s  second  contention  that,  in  any  case,  a  review

petition  is  only  a  correction  of  the  order  made  in  the  original

proceeding,  and  therefore  part  and  parcel  of  the  original

proceeding,  cannot  be  countenanced  in  view  of  this  Court’s

judgment in Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others (supra). This

Court held:  

“13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of  an error  apparent  on the face of  the record.  A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

21

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) xxx

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.”

14)  The peremptory language of Rule 5A would also make it clear

that beyond 30 days there is no power to condone delay. We may

also note that  Rule 5A was added in 1997 with a longer  period

within which to file a review petition, namely, 60 days. This period

was cut down, by amendment, with effect from 04.11.2016, to 30

days. From this two things are clear: one, whether in the original or

unamended provision, there is no separate power to condone delay,

as is contained in Section 20(3) of the Act; and second, that the

period of 60 days was considered too long and cut down to 30 days

thereby evincing an intention that review petitions, if they are to be

filed, should be within a shorter period of limitation – otherwise they

would not be maintainable.

15)   We are also of the view that the High Court wrongly applied

Order XLVII  Rule 7 of  the Code of  Civil  Procedure.  Order XLVII

Rule 7 states as follows:

“7. Order of rejection not appealable - Objections to order granting application.- (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not  be  appealable;  but  an  order  granting  an application may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in an appeal

22

from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. (2)  Where  the  application  has  been  rejected  in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear, he  may  apply  for  an  order  to  have  the  rejected application restored to the file, and, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by  any  sufficient  cause  from appearing  when  such application was called on for hearing, the Court shall order it to be restored to the file upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for hearing the same. (3) No order shall be made under sub-rule (2) unless notice  of  the  application  has  been  served  on  the opposite party.”

16)   Section 22(1) of the Act makes it clear that the Tribunal and the

Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by

the  Code of  Civil  Procedure,  making  it  clear  thereby  that  Order

XLVII  Rule  7  would  not  apply  to  the  Tribunal.  Also,  in  view  of

Section 20,  which applies  to  all  applications that  may be made,

including applications for  review,  and orders  being made therein

being subject to appeal, it is a little difficult to appreciate how Order

XLVII Rule 7 could apply at all, given that Section 20 of the RDB Act

is part of a complete and exhaustive code. Section 34 of the Act

makes it clear that the 1993 Act, (and, therefore, Section 20), will

have overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force,

which includes the Code of  Civil  Procedure.  The High Court,  in

holding that no appeal would be maintainable against the dismissal

of the review petition, and that therefore a writ petition would be

23

maintainable, was clearly in error on this count also.

17)  Shri Dave’s contention that as to the appellant’s conduct, as in

an application filed in 2012 an I.A praying that a judgment should be

given on admission, was filed unconscionably late i.e. only in 2017,

five years later, also has no legs to stand. In 2013, the respondent

challenged the jurisdiction of the DRT Mumbai which challenge was

repelled finally in appeal only in 2017 after which the said I.A was

filed. In any event, this is not an argument which would, by itself,

lead to a dismissal of the SLP filed by the appellant under Article

136 of the Constitution of India.

18)   For all these reasons therefore, we are of the view that the

High Court  judgment cannot be sustained and is thus set  aside.

The appeal is allowed accordingly.

……………….......................... J.         (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

……………….......................... J.   (V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)

New Delhi; January 21, 2020.