REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.271 OF 2011

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2854 of 2010)

Sou. Sandhya Manoj Wankhade        … Appellant   

Vs.

Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This Appeal is directed against the judgment  

and  order  dated  5th March,  2010,  passed  by  the

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Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Crl. W.P.  

No.588 of 2009, inter alia, directing the Appellant  

to vacate her matrimonial house and confirming the  

order of the Sessions Judge deleting the names of  

the other Respondents from the proceedings.

3. The  Appellant  herein  was  married  to  the  

Respondent  No.1  on  20th January,  2005,  and  the  

marriage was registered under the provisions of the  

Special Marriage Act, 1954. After her marriage, the  

Appellant began to reside with the Respondent No.1  

at  Khorej  Colony,  Amravati,  where  her  widowed  

mother-in-law  and  sister-in-law,  the  Respondent  

Nos.2 and 3 respectively, were residing.  According  

to the Appellant, the marriage began to turn sour  

after about one year of the marriage and she was  

even  assaulted  by  her  husband  and  by  the  other  

respondents.  It is her specific case that on 16th  

June,  2007,  she  was  mercilessly  beaten  by  the  

Respondent No.1, which incident was reported to the

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police and a case under Section 498-A I.P.C. came  

to be registered against him.

4. In addition to the above, the Appellant appears  

to  have  filed  a  complaint,  being  Misc.  Crl.  

Application  No.203  of  2007,  on  16th July,  2007,  

against all the Respondents under Sections 12, 18,  

19,  20  and  22  of  the  Protection  of  Women  from  

Domestic Violence Act, 2005, hereinafter referred  

to  as  “the  Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005”.   An  

application  filed  by  the  Appellant  before  the  

Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati, under  

Section 23 of the above Act was allowed by the  

learned  Magistrate,  who  by  his  order  dated  16th  

August, 2007, directed the Respondent No.1 husband  

to pay interim maintenance to the Appellant at the  

rate of  1,500/- per month from the date of the  

application  till  the  final  disposal  of  the  main  

application and also restrained all the Respondents  

from  dispossessing  the  Appellant  from  her

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matrimonial home at Khorej Colony, Amravati, till  

the final disposal of the main application.   

5. It further appears that the said order of the  

learned  Magistrate  dated  16th August,  2007,  was  

challenged by Respondent No.1 in Crl. Appeal No.115  

of  2007  before  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  

Amravati,  who  by  his  order  dated  2nd May,  2008,  

dismissed the said appeal. Aggrieved by the orders  

passed  by  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  the  

Respondent No.1 filed Criminal Application No.3034  

of 2008 in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

challenging the order dated 16th August, 2007 of the  

Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati and the  

order dated 2nd May, 2008 of the Sessions Judge,  

Amravati. The said application was dismissed by the  

High Court on 4th September, 2009.

6. In the meanwhile, the Respondent No.2 filed an  

application  in  Misc.  Crl.  Application  No.203  of  

2007 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First

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Class, Amravati, praying for modification of its  

order dated 16th August, 2007 and a direction to the  

Appellant to leave the house of Respondent No.2.  

The said application for modification was dismissed  

by the learned Magistrate on 14th July, 2008 holding  

that  it  was  not  maintainable.  Thereupon,  the  

Respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed Crl. Appeal No.159 of  

2008 on 11th August, 2008, under Section 29 of the  

Domestic Violence Act, 2005, questioning the orders  

passed  by  the  learned  Magistrate  on  16th August,  

2007 and 14th July, 2008, on the ground that being  

women they could not be made Respondents in the  

proceedings  filed  by  the  Appellant  under  the  

provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and  

that  the  matrimonial  house  of  the  Appellant  at  

Khorej  Colony,  Amravati,  belonged  exclusively  to  

Ramabai, the Respondent No.2 and mother-in-law of  

the Appellant and did not, therefore, come within  

the definition of “shared house”. The said Criminal  

Appeal No.159 of 2008 was allowed by the learned

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Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 15th July,  

2009.  The learned Sessions Judge allowed Criminal  

Appeal No.159 of 2008 and set aside the judgment  

and order dated 14th July, 2008 and also modified  

the order dated 16th August, 2007, to the extent of  

setting  aside  the  injunction  restraining  the  

Respondents  from  dispossessing  or  evicting  the  

Appellant  from  her  matrimonial  house  at  Khorej  

Colony, Amravati.  The Respondent No.1 husband was  

directed to provide separate accommodation for the  

residence of the Appellant or to pay a sum of   

1,000/- per month to the Appellant from the date of  

filing of the application till its final decision,  

in lieu of providing accommodation.  

7.  In Criminal Writ Petition No.588 of 2009, the  

Appellant herein challenged the judgment and order  

dated  15th July,  2009,  passed  by  the  learned  

Sessions Judge, Amravati, in Crl. Appeal No.159 of  

2008, claiming that she had a right to stay in her

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matrimonial  house.  Although,  the  question  as  to  

whether  a  female  member  of  the  husband’s  family  

could be made a party to the proceedings under the  

Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005,  had  been  raised  in  

Crl. Appeal No.159 of 2008, the learned Sessions  

Judge in his order dated 15th July, 2009, did not  

decide the said question and did not absolve the  

Respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein in his order, but  

only observed that female members cannot be made  

parties in proceedings under the Domestic Violence  

Act, 2005, as “females” are not included in the  

definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) of the  

said Act.

8. The  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  

disposed of the writ petition by his judgment and  

order dated 5th March, 2010, with a direction to the  

Appellant to vacate her matrimonial house, which  

was in the name of the Respondent No.2, with a  

further direction to the Trial Court to expedite

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the hearing of the Misc. Crl. Application No.203 of  

2007 filed by the Appellant herein and to decide  

the same within a period of six months.  A further  

direction was given confirming the order relating  

to deletion of the names of the ‘other members’.   

9. Questioning the said judgment and order of the  

Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, Mr. Garvesh  

Kabra,  learned  Advocate  appearing  for  the  

Appellant, submitted that the High Court had erred  

in  confirming  the  order  of  the  learned  Sessions  

Judge  in  regard  to  deletion  of  names  of  the  

Respondent Nos.2 and 3 from the proceedings, upon  

confirmation of the finding of the Sessions Judge  

that no female could be made a party to a petition  

under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, since the  

expression “female” had not been included in the  

definition  of  “respondent”  in  the  said  Act.  Mr.  

Kabra submitted that it would be evident from a  

plain reading of the proviso to Section 2(q) of the

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Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005,  that  a  wife  or  a  

female living in a relationship in the nature of  

marriage can, not only file a complaint against her  

husband or male partner but also against relatives  

of the husband or male partner. The term “relative”  

not having been defined in the Act, it could not be  

said that it excluded females from its operation.  

10. Mr.  Satyajit  A.  Desai,  learned  Advocate  

appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand,  

defended the orders passed by the Sessions Judge  

and  the  High  Court  and  urged  that  the  term  

“relative”  must  be  deemed  to  include  within  its  

ambit only male members of the husband’s family or  

the family of the male partner.  Learned counsel  

submitted that when the expression “female” had not  

been specifically included within the definition of  

“respondent”  in  Section  2(q)  of  the  Domestic  

Violence Act, 2005, it has to be held that it was

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the intention of the legislature to exclude female  

members from the ambit thereof.

11. Having  carefully  considered  the  submissions  

made on behalf of the respective parties, we are  

unable  to  sustain  the  decisions,  both  of  the  

learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court, in  

relation to the interpretation of the expression  

“respondent”  in  Section  2(q)  of  the  Domestic  

Violence Act, 2005.  For the sake of reference,  

Section  2(q)  of  the  above-said  Act  is  extracted  

hereinbelow :-  

“2(q). "respondent" means any adult male  person who is, or has been, in a domestic  relationship with the aggrieved person and  against  whom  the  aggrieved  person  has  sought any relief under this Act:

Provided  that  an  aggrieved  wife  or  female  living  in  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  a  marriage  may  also  file  a  complaint  against  a  relative  of  the  husband or the male partner.”

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12. From the above definition it would be apparent  

that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to  

mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a  

domestic  relationship  with  the  aggrieved  person,  

the proviso widens the scope of the said definition  

by  including  a  relative  of  the  husband  or  male  

partner within the scope of a complaint, which may  

be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in  

a relationship in the nature of a marriage.   

13. It is true that the expression “female” has not  

been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but,  

on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to  

exclude females from the ambit of the complaint,  

which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females  

would have been specifically excluded, instead of  

it being provided in the proviso that a complaint  

could  also  be  filed  against  a  relative  of  the  

husband  or  the  male  partner.   No  restrictive  

meaning  has  been  given  to  the  expression

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“relative”,  nor  has  the  said  expression  been  

specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act,  

2005, to make it specific to males only.

14. In such circumstances, it is clear that the  

legislature  never  intended  to  exclude  female  

relatives of the husband or male partner from the  

ambit of a complaint that can be made under the  

provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.  

15. In our view, both the Sessions Judge and the  

High  Court  went  wrong  in  holding  otherwise,  

possibly being influenced by the definition of the  

expression “respondent” in the main body of Section  

2(q) of the aforesaid Act.   

16. The Appeal, therefore, succeeds.  The judgments  

and  orders,  both  of  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  

Amravati,  dated  15th  July,  2009  and  the  Nagpur  

Bench  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  dated  5th March,  

2010, in Crl. Writ Petition No.588 of 2009 are set

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aside.  Consequently,  the  trial  Court  shall  also  

proceed against the said Respondent Nos.2 and 3 on  

the complaint filed by the Appellant.   

17. The appeal is allowed accordingly.  

…………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

…………………………………………J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi Dated:31.01.2011