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CONT. PETN. (C) NO. 459/2015                                                           1

NON REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 459 OF 2015  IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009

TAMILNADU TERMINATED FULL TIME   TEMPORARY LIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION    …PETITIONER

Vs.   S.K. ROY, THE CHAIRMAN, LIFE    INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR.  …CONTEMNORS  

                    WITH  CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 634 OF 2015

                    IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009,

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 3846 OF 2015 IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009, REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2994 OF 2015

IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2991 OF 2015 IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009, CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 637 OF 2015

IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2990 OF 2015

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CONT. PETN. (C) NO. 459/2015                                                           2

  IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2009,

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2993 OF 2015    IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009, CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 502 OF 2015

IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009,

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2989 OF 2015 IN

         CIVIL APPEAL NO.6951 OF 2009     AND

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2016                         IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6950 OF 2009

J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.             Delay condoned in filing the Review Petitions.

2.  These  Review  Petitions  arise  from  the  impugned

judgment  and  order  dated  18.03.2015  passed  by  this

Court in Civil Appeal No. 6950 of 2009 and connected

appeals, whereby it was held that the Award passed by

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CONT. PETN. (C) NO. 459/2015                                                           3

Central  Government  Industrial  Tribunal,  New  Delhi

(CGIT) in I.D. No. 27 of 1991 is legal and valid and

the  same  be  restored  and  implemented  by  the  Life

Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to

as the “LIC”) by absorbing the concerned workmen in the

permanent  posts.  It  was  further  held  that  the

Corporation would be liable to pay all consequential

benefits  including  monetary  benefits  taking  into

consideration the revised pay scale in the cases of

those  workmen  who  had  attained  the  age  of

superannuation.     

3.As the facts of the case are already stated in the

judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6950 of 2009, the same

need not be reiterated herein for the sake of brevity.

The following contentions were advanced by the learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the parties in support

of their case:     Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Attorney General

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  review  petitioner-LIC

contends that this Court, while passing the judgment

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and order dated 18.03.2015, failed to appreciate that

the Tulpule and Jamdar awards stood substituted by the

“Terms  of  Compromise”  way  back  on  01.03.1989,  which

stood finally disposed of vide judgment and order dated

07.02.1996 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No.

1790 of 1989. It is further contended that this Court

failed to appreciate the effect of settlement of an

award, in the light of the decision of this Court in

the  case  of  Herbertsons  Ltd.  v. Workmen1, which  has

further been followed by this Court in the cases of

Transmission Corpn., A.P. Ltd. v. P. Ramchandra Rao2 and

ITC Ltd. Workers Welfare Assn. v. ITC Ltd.3

4.The learned Attorney General further submits that under

Section 24 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956

(hereinafter referred to as the “LIC Act, 1956”), the

Central Government does not allocate any fund for LIC,

1(1976) 4 SCC 736

 2(2006) 9 SCC 623

 3(2002) 3 SCC 411

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CONT. PETN. (C) NO. 459/2015                                                           5

and the funds for LIC are generated from the payments

made to it and that the Central Government does not

contribute towards the funding of LIC. It is further

submitted that under Section 28 of the LIC Act, 1956,

95% of the surplus of LIC is to be allocated to or

reserved for its life insurance policy-holders. Thus,

the contention that LIC has a huge surplus and is in a

position  to  implement  the  order  of  this  Court  is

misconceived  as  the  same  goes  against  the  statutory

provisions of the LIC Act, 1956. 5.The learned Attorney General further submits that the

financial  implications  on  LIC  in  complying  with  the

impugned judgment and order of this Court cannot be

ignored.  

At this stage, we would deem it fit to point out

that the same, however, does not find any mention in

the Review Petition filed by LIC before this Court and

does not form a part of its pleadings.

6.The learned Attorney General further submits that as on

31  03.2015,  LIC  had  55,427  Class  III  employees  and

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5,190  Class  IV  employees.  If  LIC  is  directed  to

consider  the  absorption  of  the  workmen  to  the

advertisement, then the number of Class III employees

will  increase  by  11.14%  and  Class  IV  employees  by

56.65% and the same will affect the employee’s ratio in

addition to the increase in its financial burden and

that the same will be contrary to the interests of the

policyholders. The learned Attorney General estimates

the financial liability for implementing the order of

this Court at approximately Rs.7087 crores, with the

annual liability at around Rs.728 crores per year and

that this will be a huge financial burden for LIC to

bear.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on

behalf  of  the  respondents-workers  submit  that  it

becomes clear from a perusal of the Review Petitions

filed by LIC that it is trying to re-agitate the case

on merits. The learned counsel placed reliance on the

decision  of this  Court in  the case  of  Enviro Legal

Action v. Union of India4 wherein this Court elaborated 4 (2011) 8 SCC 161

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the  scope  of  the  review  power  of  this  Court  under

Article 137 of the Constitution. It was held as under:

“The ratio of these judgments is that a court of final appeal has power  in  truly  exceptional circumstances to recall its order even after they have been entered in  order  to  avoid  irremediable injustice. Reviewing  of  various  cases  of different  jurisdictions  lead  to irresistible  conclusion  that though the judgments of the apex court  can  also  be  reviewed  or recalled but it must be done in extremely  exceptional circumstances where there is gross violation of principles of natural justice.”

Further  reliance  is  placed  on  the  decision  of  this

Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati5, wherein

this Court held as under: “20.1  When  the  review  will  be maintainable:-  

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of  due  diligence,  was  not  within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;  

 5(2013) 8 SCC 320

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(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.  The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this  Court  in  Moran  Mar  Basselios Catholicos  vs.  Most  Rev.  Mar  Poulose Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520, to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least  analogous  to  those  specified  in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors. 20.2  When  the  review  will  not  be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument  is  not  enough  to  reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii)  Review  proceedings  cannot  be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi)The mere possibility of two views on the  subject  cannot  be  a  ground  for review.

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(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same  relief  sought  at  the  time  of arguing  the  main  matter  had  been negatived.”

8.The learned counsel contend that the ground raised in

the review petitions filed by LIC do not warrant any

interference by this Court in the name of exercise of

power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution,

as all the averments in the Review petition are nothing

but  attempts  made  by  the  review  petitioner-LIC  to

protract the implementation of the order passed by this

Court.

9.We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the parties. At this stage, it would be useful to

reiterate  what  this  Court  had  held  in  the  impugned

judgment and order dated 18.03.2015:

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“27.  In view of the law laid by this Court in the case referred to supra, both  the  Award  of  Justice  Tulpule reiterated  by  way  of  clarification Award  by  Justice  Jamdar  are  still operative  as  the  same  are  not terminated by either of the parties as provided  under  Section  19(6)  of  the Act.  The  compromise  between  the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988 and the Scheme formed in E. Prabhavathy & Ors. and G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  cases referred  to  supra  do  not  amount  to substitution of the Awards passed by Justice R. D. Tulpule and by Justice S. M. Jamdar. Hence, in view of the aforesaid  reasons,  the  submissions made  by  Mr.  Naphade,  learned  Amicus Curiae, in justification of the Award passed  by  the  CGIT  is  based  on  the terms and conditions laid down in the Awards passed by the NIT (by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar) in favour of the workmen for absorption as they have been rendering their service to the  Corporation  in  the  perennial nature of work for a number of years and  hence,  the  High  Court  was  not justified in interfering with the said Award  passed  by  the  CGIT.  The  said contention urged by the learned amicus curiae  is  accepted  by  us,  as  the impugned  judgment  and  order  of  the High Court is contrary to the Awards referred to supra, the provisions of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  the law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the aforesaid cases. The Awards passed by the  NIT  is  binding  upon  the Corporation till it is substituted by

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CONT. PETN. (C) NO. 459/2015                                                           11

another Award or replaced by another settlement in relation to the service conditions  of  the  workmen  of  the Corporation in accordance with law as provided  under  Section  12  read  with Section 18(3) of the Act or another Award that is required to be passed by the Jurisdictional CGIT in relation to the  above  subject  matter  after  the Awards  which  are  in  operation  are terminated by either of the parties as provided  under  Section  19(6)  of  the Act. Until then, the said Award passed by the NIT will still be operative in law.  Therefore,  the  same  has  been rightly applied to the fact situation on  hand  in  the  Award  passed  by  the CGIT and it could not have been set aside by the High Court. Thus, we are of the opinion that the single Judge erroneously set aside the Award passed by the CGIT and the said judgment of the  single  judge  has  been  further erroneously  affirmed  by  the  Division Bench  of  the  High  Court.  The  said judgments  of  the  High  Court  are clearly  contrary  to  law  and  legal principles laid down by this Court in cases  referred  to  supra.  Hence,  the same  are  liable  to  be  set  aside  by allowing  these  appeals  and  restoring the Award of the CGIT.”

The review petitioner-LIC has not submitted anything on

record to suggest that the impugned judgment and order

suffers from an error apparent in law. While in the

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review petitions the factual and legal submissions urged

in the Civil Appeal have been reiterated, in the written

submissions placed before us, the emphasis shifted to

the practical difficulty in implementation of the order

of this Court. It has been well settled by this Court

that a mere repetition of the same arguments which were

urged  in  the  appeal  and  have  been  rejected,  is  not

sufficient to justify the exercise of power of review

under Article 137 of the Constitution by this Court. In

the case of Kamlesh Verma (supra), this Court has held

as under:

“Review is not re-hearing of an original matter.  The  power  of  review  cannot  be confused with appellate power which enables a  superior  court  to  correct  all  errors committed  by  a  subordinate  court.  A repetition of old and overruled argument is not  enough  to  re-open  concluded adjudications. This Court, in Jain Studios Ltd.  v.  Shin  Satellite  Public  Co.  Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 501, held as under:

11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the Learned Counsel for the opponent is right  in  submitting  that  virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been

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negatived.  Once  such  a  prayer  had been  refused,  no  review  petition would  lie  which  would  convert rehearing of the original matter. It is  settled  law  that  the  power  of review  cannot  be  confused  with appellate  power  which  enables  a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is  not  rehearing  of  an  original matter.  A  repetition  of  old  and overruled argument is not enough to reopen  concluded  adjudications.  The power of review can be exercised with extreme  care,  caution  and circumspection  and  only  in exceptional cases.”

                         (emphasis laid by this Court)

10. While  ordinarily,  the  aspect  of  financial

hardship  would  not  be  a  sufficient  ground  to

warrant our interference in the instant case, but

keeping in view the fact that LIC is a statutory

Corporation operating in the interest of the public

at large, on the limited point of payment of full

back wages to the temporary and badli workers who

are entitled for regularisation, we may reconsider

the same. A constitution bench of this Court in the

case of Keshav Mills Co. v. CIT6 held as under:

6 AIR 1965 SC 1636

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“23.  ………In  reviewing  and  revising  its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself  whether  in  the  interests  of  the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its  decisions  are,  under Art.  141, binding  on  all  courts  within  the territory of India, and so, it must be the  constant  endeavour  and  concern  of this Court to introduce and maintain an element  of  certainty  and  continuity  in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent  exercise  by  this  Court  of  its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law  uncertain  and  introduce  confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier  decision  was  clearly  erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but  before  a  previous  decision  is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court  must  be  satisfied  with  a  fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified.  It  is  not  possible  or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient  to  lay  down  any  principles which should govern the approach of the Court  in  dealing  with  the  question  of reviewing  and  revising  its  earlier decisions.  It  would  always  depend  upon several relevant considerations: What is the nature of the infirmity or error on

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which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question  remain  unnoticed,  or  was  the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant  and  material  statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly  unanimous  that  there  is  such  an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or  by  the  High  Courts?  And,  would  the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public  inconvenience,  hardship  or mischief?  These  and  other  relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  to  review and revise its earlier decisions.”

11. For the limited purpose of modifying the relief

granted in the Civil Appeal only with regard to the

Back wages, we directed Mr. Ashok Panigrahi, the

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review

petitioner-LIC to submit a document containing the

pay  scales  indicating  the  basic  pay  and  other

emoluments  payable  to  the  concerned  workmen.  The

same were furnished with the periodic revisions in

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the years 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012, without

furnishing the other component figures which would

be  the  gross  salary  of  the  different  classes  of

workmen  in  the  present  dispute.  These  periodic

revisions of pay of basic salary, along with other

component  figures  comprising  the  gross  salary

including Dearness Allowance, House Rent Allowance

etc.  etc.,  as  applicable,  must  be  accounted  for

while  computing  the  amount  due  to  the  workmen

towards the back wages.

12. The temporary and badli workers of LIC, who are

entitled for regularisation as permanent workmen in

terms  of  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated

18.03.2015 passed by this Court, by applying the

terms and conditions of the modified award dated

26.08.1988 passed by Justice Jamdar, are held to be

entitled  to  full  back  wages  as  well.  However,

keeping in mind the immense financial burden this

would cause to LIC, we deem it fit to modify the

relief only with regard to the back wages payable

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and therefore, we award 50% of the back wages with

consequential  benefits.  The  back  wages  must  be

calculated on the basis of the gross salary of the

workmen,  applicable  as  on  the  date  as  per  the

periodical revisions of pay scale as stated supra.

The  computation  must  be  made  from  the  date  of

entitlement of the workmen involved in these cases,

that  is,  their  absorption,  till  the  age  of

superannuation,  if  any  concerned  workman  has

attained  the  age  of  superannuation  as  per  the

regulations  of  the  review  petitioner-LIC,  as

applicable to the concerned workman.

13. With  the above  modifications to  the judgment

and  order  sought  to  be  reviewed,  these  review

petitions are disposed of in the terms as indicated

above. Since the judgment and order is passed in

favour  of  workmen  and  their  dispute  is  being

litigated  for  nearly  twenty  five  years,  the

directions  contained  in  the  judgment  and  order

dated 18.03.2015 with the above modifications shall

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be  complied  with  by  the  review  petitioner-LIC

within eight weeks of the receipt of the copy of

this order.

14.  In  view  of  the  disposal  of  the  Review

Petitions, the Contempt Petitions are also disposed

of,  but  in  case  of  non-compliance  of  the  above

order within the stipulated time, the parties will

be at liberty to file Contempt Petitions afresh.

All pending applications are disposed of.

…………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

                       …………………………………………………J.   [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi, August 9, 2016

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