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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.18347/2013

SIDHARTHA SARAWGI …  PETITIONER (S)

VERSUS BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.19458- 19459/2013

UNIVERSAL AUTOCRAFTS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER …  PETITIONER (S)   

VERSUS

BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.19600/2013

SIDHARTHA SARAWGI …  PETITIONER (S)   

VERSUS

BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.19652/2013

SIDHARTHA SARAWGI …  PETITIONER (S)   

VERSUS

BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

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REPORTABLE

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J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:

1. Delegatus Non Potest Delegare:  A delegate has no  

power to delegate, is a well-settled principle. Is there any  

exception and is there any distinction between delegation  

of  legislative  and  non-legislative  powers,  are  the  moot  

issues arising for consideration in these cases.  

2. Delegation is the act of making or commissioning a  

delegate.  It  generally  means  parting  of  powers  by  the  

person  who grants  the  delegation  and conferring  of  an  

authority to do things which otherwise that person would  

have to do himself. Delegation is defined in Black’s Law  

Dictionary as “the act of entrusting another with authority  

by  empowering  another  to  act  as  an  agent  or  

representative”.  In  P.  Ramanatha  Aiyar’s,  The  Law  

Lexicon,  “delegation  is  the  act  of  making  or  

commissioning  a  delegate.  Delegation  generally  means  

parting  of  powers  by  the  person  who  grants  the  

delegation, but it also means conferring of an authority to  

do things which otherwise that person would have to do  

himself”.  Justice  Mathew  in  Gwalior  Rayon  Silk  

Manufacturing  (Wvg.)  Co.  Ltd. v. The  Assistant  

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Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax  and  Others1,  has  

succinctly discussed the concept of delegation. Paragraph  

37 reads as follows:

“37.  … Delegation  is  not  the  complete  handing  over or transference of a power from one person  or body of persons to another. Delegation may be  defined as the entrusting, by a person or body of  persons, of the exercise of a power residing in that  person or body of persons, to another person or  body  of  persons,  with  complete  power  of  revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor  or  delegator.  It  is  important  to  grasp  the  implications of this, for, much confusion of thought  has  unfortunately  resulted  from  assuming  that  delegation involves or may involve, the complete  abdication  or  abrogation  of  a  power.  This  is  precluded  by  the  definition.  Delegation  often  involves the granting of discretionary authority to  another,  but  such  authority  is  purely  derivative.  The  ultimate  power  always  remains  in  the  delegator and is never renounced.”

3. There is  a  subtle distinction between delegation of  

legislative  powers  and  delegation  of  

non-legislative/administrative powers. As far as delegation  

of power to legislate is concerned, the law is well-settled:  

the said power cannot be sub-delegated. The Legislature  

cannot  delegate  essential  legislative  functions  which  

consist in the determination or choosing of the legislative  

policy and formally enacting that policy into a binding rule  

1 (1974) 4 SCC 98 3

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of conduct2. Subordinate legislation which is generally in  

the  realm  of  Rules  and  Regulations  dealing  with  the  

procedure  on  implementation  of  plenary  legislation  is  

generally a task entrusted to a specified authority. Since  

the Legislature need not spend its time for working out the  

details on implementation of the law, it has thought it fit  

to entrust the said task to an agency. That agency cannot  

entrust such task to its subordinates; it would be a breach  

of the confidence reposed on the delegate.

4. Regarding  delegation  of  non-

legislative/administrative powers on a person or a body to  

do  certain  things,  whether  the  delegate  himself  is  to  

perform such functions or whether after taking decision as  

per  the  terms  of  the  delegation,  the  said  agency  can  

authorize the implementation of the same on somebody  

else, is the question to be considered. Once the power is  

conferred,  after  exercising  the  said  power,  how  to  

implement the decision taken in the process, is a matter  

of procedure. The Legislature may, after laying down the  

legislative  policy,  confer  discretion on an administrative  

2 Harishanker Bagla v. State of M.P. –  (1955) 1 SCR 380 (Page 388)   Agricultural Market Committee v.  Shalimar Chemical Works  

Limited –       (1997) 5 SCC 516 (Paragraph 24)

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agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the  

agency to work out the details  within the framework of  

that policy3. So long as the essential functions of decision  

making  is  performed  by  the  delegate,  the  burden  of  

performing  the  ancillary  and  clerical  task  need  not  be  

shouldered by the primary delegate.  It  is  not necessary  

that  the  primary  delegate  himself  should  perform  the  

ministerial  acts  as  well.  In  furtherance  of  the  

implementation  of  the  decision  already  taken  by  the  

primary  delegate  as  per  the  delegation,  ministerial  or  

clerical  tasks  may  be performed by  authorized  officers.  

The  complexity  of  modern  day  administration  and  the  

expansion of functions of the State to the economic and  

social spheres have made it necessary that the Legislature  

gives  wide  powers  to  various  authorities  when  the  

situation requires it. Today’s governmental functions are a  

lot more complex and the need for delegation of powers  

has become more compelling. It cannot be expected that  

the head of the administrative body performs each and  

every task himself.   

3 Khambalia Municipality v. State of Gujarat – AIR 1967 SC 1048  (P.1051)

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5. The  issue  was  considered  by  this  Court  in  Jamal  

Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and Another4  

in the context of the procedure for filing of the election  

petitions  under  Section  81  of  the  Representation  of  

Peoples  Act,  1951.  It  was  held  that  the  ministerial  or  

administrative  functions  of  the  authority  on  whom  the  

powers are conferred by the statute can be exercised by  

the authorized officers. It was held that:   

“13. The functions discharged by a High Court can  be divided broadly into judicial and administrative  functions.  The  judicial  functions  are  to  be  discharged essentially  by  the  Judges  as  per  the  Rules  of  the  Court  and  cannot  be  delegated.  However,  administrative  functions  need  not  necessarily  be  discharged  by  the  Judges  by  themselves, whether individually or collectively or  in a group of two or more, and may be delegated  or  entrusted  by  authorization  to  subordinates  unless there be some rule of law restraining such  delegation  or  authorisation.  Every  High  Court  consists  of  some  administrative  and  ministerial  staff which is as much a part of the High Court as  an institution and is meant to be entrusted with  the  responsibility  of  discharging  administrative  and  ministerial  functions.  There  can  be  “delegation” as also there can be “authorization”  in favour of the Registry and the officials therein  by empowering or entrusting them with authority  or by permitting a few things to be done by them  for  and on behalf  of  the Court  so  as  to  aid  the  Judges  in  discharge  of  their  judicial  functioning.  Authorization  may  take  the  form  of  formal  conferral or sanction or may be by way of approval  or countenance. Such delegation or authorization  is  not  a  matter  of  mere  convenience  but  a  

4 (2003) 4 SCC 257 6

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necessity  at  times.  The  Judges  are  already  overburdened with the task of performing judicial  functions  and  the  constraints  on  their  time  and  energy  are  so  demanding  that  it  is  in  public  interest to allow them to devote time and energy  as much as possible in  discharging their  judicial  functions, relieving them of the need for diverting  their limited resources of time and energy to such  administrative or ministerial  functions,  which,  on  any principle of propriety, logic, or necessity are  not required necessarily to be performed by the  Judges.  Receiving  a  cause  or  a  document  and  making it presentable to a Judge for the purpose of  hearing  or  trial  and  many  a  functions  post- decision,  which  functions  are  administrative  and  ministerial  in  nature,  can  be  and  are  generally  entrusted or made over to be discharged by the  staff  of  the  High  Court,  often  by  making  a  provision in the Rules or under the orders of the  Chief Justice or by issuing practice directions, and  at  times,  in  the  absence  of  rules,  by  sheer  practice. The practice gathers the strength of law  and  the  older  the  practice  the  greater  is  the  strength…”

6. Practical necessities or exigencies of administration  

require that the decision making authority who has been  

conferred with statutory power, be able to delegate tasks  

when the situation so requires. Thus, the maxim delegatus  

non  potest  delegare,  gives  way  in  the  performance  of  

administrative  or  ministerial  tasks  by  subordinate  

authorities in furtherance of the exercise of the delegated  

power by an authority.  

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7.  It would also be useful in this context to refer to the  

decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Limited and  

Another v.  The Company Law Board and Another5  

wherein it is held at paragraph 36 as follows:  

“…the maxim delegatus non potest delegare must  not  be  pushed  too  far.  The  maxim  does  not  embody  a  rule  of  law.  It  indicates  a  rule  of  construction  of  a  statute  or  other  instrument  conferring an authority.  Prima facie,  a discretion  conferred by a statute on any authority is intended  to be exercised by that authority and by no other.  But  the  intention  may  be  negatived  by  any  contrary  indications  in  the  language,  scope  or  object of the statute. The construction that would  best achieve the purpose and object of the statute  should be adopted.”   

8. The Constitution confers power and imposes duty on  

the  Legislature  to  make  laws  and  the  said  functions  

cannot be delegated by the Legislature to the executive.  

The Legislature is constitutionally required to keep in its  

own hands the essential legislative functions which consist  

of  the  determination  of  legislative  policy  and  its  

formulation  as  a  binding  rule  of  conduct.  After  the  

performance of  the  essential  legislative  function  by the  

Legislature and laying the guiding policy, the Legislature  

may delegate to the executive or administrative authority,  

any ancillary or subordinate powers that are necessary for  

5 AIR 1967 SC 295 8

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giving effect to the policy and purposes of the enactment.  

In construing the scope and extent of delegated power,  

the  difference  between  the  essential  and  non-essential  

functions of the delegate should also be borne in mind.  

While  there  cannot  be  sub-delegation  of  any  essential  

functions, in order to achieve the intended object of the  

delegation,  the  non-essential  functions  can  be  sub-

delegated  to  be  performed  under  the  authority  and  

supervision of the delegate.  

9. Sometimes,  in  the  plenary  legislation  itself,  the  

lawmakers may provide for such sub-delegation. That is  

what we see under Section 21 and 34 of the Major Port  

Trusts  Act,  1963,  which we shall  be discussing in  more  

detail at a later part of this judgment.

10. Having analysed the legal position as above, we shall  

now deal  with the factual  position in  these cases.   The  

challenge  is  on  the  judgment  dated  28.01.2013  of  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court.  The  issue  

pertains  to  the  determination  of  leases  granted  by  the  

Kolkata  Port  Trust  to  the  petitioners.  In  the  case  of  

Universal  Autocrafts  Private  Limited,  they  were  granted  

lease of a plot of land for 30 years, on 19.08.1990. The  

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lease  deed  was  executed  by  the  Land  Manager  of  the  

Kolkata Port Trust. On 05.02.2008, a letter was issued to  

the said  petitioner  to  demolish  an alleged unauthorized  

construction and eject the sub-tenants from the premises.  

The  petitioner  submitted  its  reply  on  02.05.2008.  Not  

satisfied  with  the  reply,  on  30.01.2009,  a  notice  

terminating the  lease was issued.  The ejectment  notice  

was signed by the Land Manager. The main contention is  

that the ejectment notice issued by the Land Manager is  

illegal and without jurisdiction as he is not competent to  

issue such ejectment notices.  In the case of  Siddhartha  

Sarawgi,  the  leases  were  terminated  during  the  

subsistence  of  the  renewed period  of  30  years,  on  the  

ground of sub-letting without consent of the Kolkata Port  

Trust. In his case also, the ejectment notices were issued  

by  the  Land  Manager  and,  hence,  it  is  contended  that  

there can be no eviction on the basis of ejectment notice  

issued by a person who is  not competent to do so,  the  

same  being  without  jurisdiction.  The  said  ejectment  

notices were challenged by both the petitioners before the  

Calcutta High Court.  In  the case of Universal  Autocrafts  

Private Limited, the learned Single Judge of Calcutta High  

Court  allowed  the  writ  petition  holding  that  the  Land  10

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Manager was not competent to issue the ejectment notice.  

In the writ petition filed by Sidhartha Sarawgi, the learned  

Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court found a conflict  

between two earlier decisions and referred the matter to a  

Division  Bench.  The  Division  Bench  vide  common  

judgment dated 28.01.2003 held in favour of the Kolkata  

Port  Trust  in  the  case  of  both  the  petitioners,  which  is  

challenged in these Special Leave Petitions.

11. The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred  

to as, ‘the Act’) is an Act intended “to make provision for  

the constitution of port authorities for certain major ports  

in  India  and  to  vest  the  administration,  control  and  

management  of  such  ports  in  such  authorities  and  for  

matters  connected  therewith”.  Section  3  of  the  Act  

provides  for  the  constitution  of  a  Board  of  Trustees  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’). Section 5 provides  

that:

“5. Board to be body corporate.-Every Board  constituted  under  this  Act  shall  be  a  body  corporate  having  perpetual  succession  and  a  common seal with power, subject to the provisions  of this Act, to acquire, hold or dispose of property  and may by the name by which it is constituted,  sue or be sued.”   

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12. Section  21  of  the  Act  provides  for  delegation  of  

powers  of  the  Board  with  the  approval  of  the  Central  

Government on the Chairman and specification of exercise  

of such powers conferred on the Chairman by the Deputy  

Chairman or any other officer of the Board. The provision  

reads as follows:  

“21. Delegation of powers.-A Board may, with  the approval of the Central Government, specify-

(a) the  powers  and  duties  conferred  or  imposed upon the Board by or under this  Act,  which  may  also  be  exercised  or  performed by the Chairman; and

(b) the  powers  and  duties  conferred  or  imposed on the Chairman by or under this  Act,  which  may  also  be  exercised  or  performed by the Deputy Chairman or any  officer of the Board and the conditions and  restrictions,  if  any,  subject to which such  powers and duties may be exercised and  performed:

Provided that any powers and duties conferred  or  imposed  upon  the  Deputy  Chairman  or  any  officer  of  the  Board  under  clause  (b)  shall  be  exercised  and  performed  by  him  subject  to  the  supervision and control of the Chairman.”

13. Section  34  of  the  Act  provides  for  the  mode  of  

executing  contracts  on  behalf  of  Board.  It  is  provided  

therein that every contract is to be made by the Chairman  

or any other officer of the Board not below the rank of the  

Head of a Department as authorized by the Chairman, on  

behalf of the Board. The provision reads as follows:

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“34. Mode of executing contracts on behalf  of Board.-(1) Every contract shall, on behalf of a  Board, be made by the Chairman or by any such  officer of the Board not below the rank of the Head  of a Department as the Chairman may, by general  or special order, authorise in this behalf and shall  be sealed with the common seal of the Board:

Provided that no contract whereof the value  or amount exceeds such value or amount as the  Central Government may from time to time fix in  this  behalf  shall  be  made  unless  it  has  been  previously approved by the Board:

Provided  further  that  no  contract  for  the  acquisition or  sale of  immovable property or  for  the  lease  of  any  such  property  for  a  term  exceeding  thirty  years,  and  no  other  contract  whereof the value or amount exceeds such value  or amount as the Central Government may from  time  to  time  fix  in  this  behalf,  shall  be  made  unless  it  has  been  previously  approved  by  the  Central Government. (2) Subject  to  the provisions  of  sub-  section (1),  the form and manner in which any contract shall  be made under this Act shall be such as may be  prescribed by regulations made in this behalf. (3) No contract which is not made in accordance  with the provisions of this Act and the regulations  made thereunder shall be binding on the Board.”

14. In  exercise  of  the  power  under  Section  21  on  

delegation of powers, the Board of the Kolkata Port Trust  

passed Resolution No. 82 dated 26.05.1988 delegating the  

power  to  terminate  any  lease  on  the  Chairman.  The  

Chairman was also authorized by the said Resolution to  

issue ejectment notices. The text of the Resolution reads  

as follows:  

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“..  Resolution  No.  82-  Resolved  to  sanction  the  proposal for delegation of powers to the Chairman  by invocation of  section 21(a)  of  the Major  Port  Trust  Act,  1963,  the  power  to  terminate  leases  sanctioned by the Trustees and to authorizing him  to issue ejectment notices, subject to the sanction  of the Government.”

15. It is the contention of the petitioners that the power  

to terminate the lease having been specifically conferred  

on  the  Chairman,  the  steps  now  taken  by  the  Land  

Manager by issuing the impugned notices for eviction, are  

clearly  without  jurisdiction  and,  hence,  illegal  and  

inoperative. On behalf of the Board of Kolkata Port Trust, it  

is contended that the decision to terminate the lease has  

actually been taken by the Chairman and the issuance of  

notice of termination in furtherance of the decision taken  

by the Chairman alone, has been delegated to the Land  

Manager. Our attention is also invited to Office Order No.  

6480/3/0 dated 22.01.1990, which reads as under: -

“CALCUTTA PORT TRUST No. 6480/3/0            January 22,  1990

OFFICE ORDER

Henceforth  ejectment  (sic)  notices  in  respect  of  leases  determined  with  my  approval  may  be  signed by any one of the undernoted officers:

Calcutta (1) Deputy Chairman (Calcutta)

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(2) Land Manager

Haldia (1) Deputy Chairman (Haldia) (2) General Manager (Mas) (3) Manager (I&C.F)”

16. The power that is delegated to the Chairman as per  

Resolution No. 82 is the power to terminate a lease. The  

decision  to  terminate has  been taken by the  Chairman  

only  and  there  is  no  dispute  in  that  regard.  In  

implementation  of  the  decision  thus  taken  by  the  

Chairman  to  terminate  the  leases,  the  Chairman  has  

authorized  the  Land  Manager  to  issue  the  ejectment  

notices. The issuance of such notices is a mere ministerial  

act for the implementation of a decision already taken by  

the Chairman as delegated by the Board. The Chairman  

having duly authorized the Land Manager in that regard, it  

cannot be said that the ejectment notice issued by the  

Land Manager is without jurisdiction. It  is not a case of  

sub-delegation.  It  is  merely  a  ministerial  exercise  of  

issuance of a notice in implementation of the decision, as  

per the specific authorization in that regard.  

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17. The situation can be viewed from another angle as  

well.  Section  21  of  The  General  Clauses  Act,  1897  

provides that power to issue would include power to add,  

amend, vary or rescind. The provision reads as follows:

“21. Power to issue, to include power to add  to,  amend,  vary  or  rescind  notifications,  orders,  rules  or  bye-laws.-Where,  by  any  Central  Act  or  Regulations  a  power  to  issue  notifications,  orders,  rules  or  bye-laws  is  conferred,  then  that  power  includes  a  power,  exercisable in the like manner and subject to the  like  sanction  and  conditions  (if  any),  to  add  to,  amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders,  rules or bye-laws so issued.”

18. Admittedly, in the case of the petitioners, the lease  

deed  has  been  executed  by  the  Land  Manager.  The  

execution of the lease deed is as per the decision by the  

competent  authority.  If  that  be  so,  the  lease  can  be  

terminated by the same authority who executed the lease  

deed, after a decision has been made in that regard by  

the competent authority. In P. Saibaba Rao S/o Amruth  

Rao v. Dr.     Dugyala     Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami Rao   and  

Dr. N. Sudhakar Rao S/o. Late N. Yethiraja Rao v.  

Dr.     Dugyala     Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami Rao and Ors.  6  

High Court of Andhra Pradesh considered the situation of  

6 Election Petition Nos. 1 and 3 of 2004, Judgment dated 30.08.2007.  16

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termination  of  a  contract.  The  contention  was  that  the  

Superintendent Engineer was not competent to terminate  

the contract in terms of the guidelines. His authority was  

only to execute the contract. Negating the same, it was  

held as follows:  

“It is very interesting to notice that entry 5(b)  of  the  Government  order  as  above  speaks  of  instruments  relating  to  execution  of  works  including  Highways.  The  officer  authorized  to  execute  these  instruments  among  others  is  SE.  Chapter  II  of  PWD Code  deals  with,  "Works".  It  contains  paragraphs  88  to  224.  Nowhere  has  it  mentioned  any  authority,  who  is  conferred  with  power  to  terminate/cancel  the  contract  entered  into by SE as per Paragraph 159 of PWD Code read  with executive instructions. Petitioners have failed  to bring any evidence in this regard. Furthermore,  in  G.O.Ms.  No.  2209,  dated  24.9.1965,  it  was  clarified that SE is competent to execute contracts  and  piece  work  agreements  upto  the  limit  of  tenders  accepted  by  the  competent  authority  regardless of whether they were accepted by SE  and  irrespective  of  restrictions  imposed  on  the  powers  of  SE  in  the  matter  of  acceptance  of  contract. This means that SE is competent to enter  into  contract  and  also  for  terminating/  closing/cancelling the contract. The power to enter  into  contracts  or  the  authorisation  to  execute  instruments  also  includes  the  power  to  execute  contracts or instruments cancelling a contract. It  may  also  be  noticed  that  under  preliminary  specification  Nos.  7  and  8  of  APSS,  SE  is  competent to alter the standard specifications for  a particular contract. Thus authorization given to  SE under G.O.Ms. No. 1632, dated 24.10.1958, is  all pervasive and the same cannot be interpreted  in a restrictive manner.”

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We respectfully endorse the legal principle.

19. We do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned  

notices issued by the Land Manager of the Kolkata Port  

Trust, as noted by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High  

Court, in the impugned judgment. The power is exercised  

only  as  duly  authorized  by  the  Chairman.  The  Land  

Manager is also otherwise competent to issue notices after  

due  decision  has  been  taken  in  that  regard  by  the  

competent authority since he is the one who executed the  

lease deed. There is no merit in these Petitions.  

20. The  Special  Leave  Petitions  are  hence  dismissed.  

There is no order as to costs.

…………….…..…………J.          (GYAN SUDHA  

MISRA)

.……..……………………J.          (KURIAN  

JOSEPH)

New Delhi; April 16, 2014.  

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