SHUBHAM BAHUUDDESHIYA SANSTHA, WADDHAMANA Vs DNYANESHWAR GOVINDRAO DAIGAVHANE
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-009161-009161 / 2017
Diary number: 11649 / 2017
Advocates: AMOL B. KARANDE Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.9161 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.12747/2017)
Shubham Bahuuddeshiya Sanstha, Waddhamana & Anr. ...Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Shri Dnyaneshwar Govindrao Daigavhane & Ors. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 16.03.2017 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
Nagpur in Writ Petition No. 1958 of 2015 whereby
the High Court set aside the judgment and order of
the School Tribunal, Nagpur, cancelled the
termination order of respondent No.1 and permitted
him (writ petitioner) to withdraw his writ petition.
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3) In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved in this appeal, the relevant facts need
mention in brief infra.
4) There is a Trust called “Shubham
Bahuuddeshiya Sanstha, Waddhamana,
Nagpur-23”. It is registered under the provisions of
the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”). The Trust is running one
school by and under the name of “Swami
Vivekanand High School" at "Waddhamana" in Tah.
Hingna, District Nagpur, Maharashtra. The affairs
of the school is managed and looked after by the
Managing Committee of the Trust. Respondent No.
1 was working as Assistant Teacher in this school.
5) On 26.06.2003, Respondent No. 1 was served
with charge-sheet as per the procedure prescribed
under Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools
(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act (hereinafter
referred to as “MEPS Rules”). The charge-sheet
contained as many as 17 charges levelled against
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Respondent No. 1 which he is alleged to have
committed in discharge of his duties as Assistant
Teacher. It is not necessary to set out the details of
the charges here except to mention that perusal of
the charges would reveal that most of them were
quite serious in nature.
6) The Managing Committee of the School then
appointed Three-Member Inquiry Committee to hold
an inquiry into the charges levelled against
respondent No.1 as per the provisions of the MEPS
Rules and submit the report. Respondent No.1, felt
aggrieved of this action of the School Management,
filed a civil suit and sought stay of the proceedings
initiated against him. The matter eventually went to
the High Court at the instance of the respondent in
writ petition (W.P. No. 892/2004) wherein the High
Court disposed of the writ petition with the consent
of the parties by order dated 22.11.2005 and
directed the Inquiry Committee to conclude the
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inquiry within 4 months strictly in accordance with
the provisions of the MEPS Rules.
7) The Inquiry Committee then held an inquiry
wherein respondent No. 1 appeared and
participated through his representative-one Mr.
Keshavarao Dahake. He filed his reply and denied
the charges levelled against him. Both parties, i.e.,
the appellant (School Management) and respondent
No.1, filed documents and examined the witnesses
in support of their case. The Inquiry Committee
held several sittings.
8) The Inquiry Committee on 20.03.2006
submitted the report, which runs into 43 pages
(Annexure-P-3). The Committee (by majority) held
all the 17 charges proved against respondent No. 1.
The School Management concurred with the report
and keeping in view the gravity of the charges which
stood proved, terminated the services of respondent
No.1 by order dated 01.02.2010 (Annexure-P-5 ).
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9) Respondent No. 1, felt aggrieved of his
termination order, filed appeal being Appeal No.
STN10/2010 before the School Tribunal at Nagpur
as provided in the Rules. The School Management
(Employer) on being noticed of the appeal filed reply
and defended the termination order including the
inquiry report. By order dated 30.01.2015
(Annexure-P-6) the School Tribunal dismissed the
appeal and upheld the termination order holding it
legal and proper.
10) Respondent No. 1, felt aggrieved of the order of
the School Tribunal, filed writ petition (W.P.No.
1958 of 2015) out of which this appeal arises before
the High Court.
11) It appears from the record that during the
pendency of the writ petition, the disputes started
inter se Members of the Management Committee of
the Trust resulting in emerging of two rival groups
in the Management of the school.
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12) One group of the Committee, who are
prosecuting this appeal, supported the termination
order of respondent No.1 before the School Tribunal
and the High Court in the writ petition and wanted
the termination to be upheld whereas the other rival
group was opposing the termination order and was
keen to settle the matter with respondent No.1 by
withdrawing his termination order and reinstating
him in service. This rival group of Committee
Members, therefore, filed intervention application in
the writ petition and made a statement that they
have resolved to reinstate respondent No. 1 and are
also ready to cancel his termination. The intervener
also stated that having regard to the fact that
respondent No. 1 was in school since long and
secondly, some charges have also not been proved
against him, particularly the charge in relation to
mass copying, the Management Committee has
resolved to withdraw his termination and reinstate
respondent No.1 in service of the school. It was
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opposed by other group who was supporting the
termination, i.e., the group which has filed this
appeal.
13) The writ Court accepted the aforementioned
statement of the intervener and on that basis set
aside the order of the Tribunal impugned by
respondent No. 1 in his writ petition and at the
same time also allowed respondent No.1 to
withdraw his writ petition. This is how the writ
Court (single Judge) dealt with the issue in para 8 of
the impugned order.
“8. As referred to above, in the peculiar circumstances, when the management is ready to reinstate the petitioner and to cancel the termination order on the backdrop of the facts that the petitioner is served in the institute for more than 16 years. In addition, the charge leveled against the petitioner of his involvement in mass copy was not supported by any material in the investigation carried out by the investigation agency and the investigation agency sought discharge of the petitioner from the criminal charges leveled against the petitioner. In this situation, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw the petition in view of the resolution passed by the management committee dated 15.1.2017. On the backdrop of the resolution passed by the management dated 15.1.2017, the judgment and order passed by the learned Presiding
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Officer, School Tribunal is quashed and set aside.”
14) It is this order, which is impugned in this
appeal by one group, who had been defending the
termination of respondent No.1 before the Tribunal
and the High Court and opposing the prayers made
by the intervener in the writ petition which found
acceptance to the writ Court resulting in passing of
the impugned order.
15) It may be mentioned that the effect of the
impugned order is that firstly, the order of Tribunal
dated 30.01.2015 stands set aside; secondly, the
termination order dated 01.02.2010 of respondent
No.1 also stands set aside; and thirdly, respondent
No.1 stands reinstated in services of the School. It is
stated at the bar that respondent No. 1 has since
been reinstated in service and now serving.
16) Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior
counsel for the appellant, Mr. R. Basant, learned
senior counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Kishor
Lambat, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
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17) Having heard learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
inclined to allow the appeal in part and while setting
aside the impugned order restore the writ petition
filed by respondent No. 1 to its original file and
request the High Court to decide the writ petition on
merits in accordance with law.
18) In our considered view, the question before the
High Court (writ court) was only one, namely,
whether the order passed by the School Tribunal
dated 30.01.2015, which upheld the Inquiry Report
and, in consequence, the termination of respondent
No.1, is legal or not? It is this question, which the
High Court had to answer on its merits in
accordance with law, one way or the other.
19) The disputes which had surfaced in the
meantime between two rival groups of Management
Committee in regard to managing the affairs of the
School wherein one group was supporting
respondent No.1’s termination and the other group
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opposing the termination should not have been
taken note of much less relied on by the Writ Court
for disposal of the writ petition nor these facts, in
our view, could be made subject matter of writ
petition filed by respondent No.1-they being wholly
irrelevant for deciding the lis involved in the writ
petition.
20) Had there been unanimity between the
Members of the Managing Committee of the School
resolving to settle the issue with respondent No.1
amicably on terms agreed upon then perhaps,
compromise between respondent No.1 on the one
hand and the Management of School on the other
would have been permissible subject to obtaining of
any sanction from the authorities, if provided under
the Rules for giving effect to it.
21) However, such was not the case. Here, as
mentioned supra, appears to be a case where there
is a split between the Members of the Managing
Committee - one group saying that we should
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compromise with respondent No.1 and the other
group saying that we should not compromise with
respondent No.1.
22) In such situation, the High Court should not
have accepted the stand of one group and should
have proceeded to decide the writ petition on its
merits regardless of any internal differences
between the Management Committee Members with
a view to find out as to whether the order of the
Tribunal impugned by respondent No.1 (writ
petitioner) is legally sustainable or not?
23) It is for these reasons, we are of the considered
view that we cannot concur with the manner,
reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court,
which on the one hand allowed respondent No.1 to
withdraw his writ petition and on the other hand
proceeded to set aside the order of the School
Tribunal without examining its legality and
correctness on merits and at the same time
proceeded to set aside the termination order also by
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accepting the statement of one group of
Management.
24) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order is set
aside and the writ petition filed by respondent No.1
is revived for being heard on merits in accordance
with law.
25) We, however, consider it apposite to make it
clear that the writ Court would only decide the main
question which is involved in the writ petition as to
whether the order passed by the School Tribunal,
which is impugned by the writ petitioner
(respondent No.1) is legally sustainable or not?
Depending upon the outcome of the writ petition,
consequential orders would be passed. We also
make it clear that the writ Court would consider the
Management (employer) to be the contesting
respondent who would be supporting the order of
the Tribunal and opposing the writ petition. We also
make it clear that the writ Court would not probe
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into any internal issues arising between these
warring groups of Managing Committee of the
School nor they would be allowed to take
inconsistent stand qua the writ petitioner except the
one mentioned above. We also make it clear that we
have not gone into the merits of the controversy
which is subject-matter of writ petition before the
High Court and hence writ court would decide the
writ petition strictly in accordance with law on
merits uninfluenced by any observations made in
this order.
26) During the pendency of the writ petition,
respondent No. 1 will not be allowed to work (if he is
already reinstated pursuant to the impugned order).
In other words, so long as the termination order
remains and not set aside by the competent Court,
respondent No. 1 would remain out of employment
of the appellant - Trust-School. We also grant
liberty to the Members of Managing Committee (two
rival groups) to settle their internal disputes, if any,
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in appropriate forum in accordance with law and in
doing so, this order would not, in any manner, come
in their way.
27) We request the writ Court to ensure early
disposal of the writ petition preferably within 6
months as an outer limit.
………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J. [R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi; July 17, 2017