SHRI BRAJENDRA SINGH YAMBEM Vs UNION OF INDIA
Bench: ANIL R. DAVE,V. GOPALA GOWDA,C. NAGAPPAN
Case number: C.A. No.-008323-008323 / 2016
Diary number: 27513 / 2013
Advocates: MOMOTA DEVI OINAM Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8323 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.30907 of 2013)
BRAJENDRA SINGH YAMBEM …APPELLANT Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. …RESPONDENTS WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8324 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.10092 of 2014)
J U D G M E N T
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise out of the common impugned judgment and order dated 05.08.2013
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
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Manipur at Imphal in Writ Appeal Nos. 39 and 40
of 2011, whereby the judgment and order dated
01.09.2010 passed by the learned single Judge of
the High Court of Gauhati, Imphal Bench in W.P.
(C) Nos. 904 of 2008 and 264 of 2010 was set
aside.
3. The necessary facts required to appreciate the rival legal contentions advanced on behalf of
the parties are stated in brief hereunder:
The appellant was serving as a regular
Commandant of 61st Battalion, CRPF and at the time
of incidents, was posted at Mantripukhri, Imphal.
He is alleged to be involved in two cases. The
first case, i.e. Civil Appeal arising out of the
SLP (C) No. 30907 of 2013 relates to missing of
arms and ammunition. The second case, i.e. Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 10092 of 2014
relates to the alleged supply of contraband
ganja, by 11 CRPF personnel posted in the unit of
the appellant.
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Between 03.06.1995 and 05.07.1995, one AK-47
rifle with 3 magazines and 90 rounds of 7.62
ammunition issued in the name of one Lance Naik
Man Bahadur, who was posted at the same battalion
of which the appellant was the commandant went
missing. According to the respondents, the loss
occurred as a result of the verbal orders issued
by the appellant, which action amounted to a
violation of Rules 3(1)(i) & (iii) of the Central
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter
referred to as the “CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964”).
4. On 28.05.1997, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (OPS), CRPF, Imphal sent a letter to
the appellant, directing him to submit a written
statement of defence in connection with the said
lapse. The relevant portions of the said letter
are extracted hereunder:
“It has been intimated by IGP, N/ Sector, CRPF that one AK-47 Rifle, 3 Magazines and 90 rounds of 7.62 ammunition of commanding 61 Bn at Mantripukhri, Imphal. A Court of Inquiry was conducted. IGP N/Sector
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has intimated to this office that the said weapon and ammunition belonging to HQr Coy was shown as issued to LNK Man Bahadur but was actually being used by a civilian on your orders. It has further been intimated that S.M. P.N. Gupta (OC HQr Coy 61 Bn) had brought it to your notice that the said weapon and ammunition were not returned by the civilian and were missing from the HQr Coy Kote. To this effect, Shri P.N. Gupta had informed you in writing on 21.08.1995. However, no action was taken nor any decision given by you…… ………Therefore, I am directed by IGP, N/Sector that to request you to send your written statement to this office at an early date……”
5. Pursuant to the above letter, the appellant submitted his written statement on 07.04.1998,
explaining the reasons which resulted in the loss
of the said weapon and ammunition.
6. By letter dated 24.06.1998, the Deputy Inspector General CRPF, Imphal, on the basis of
the conclusion arrived at by the internal Court
of Inquiry, issued a warning to the appellant to
be more careful and also ordered for a sum of
Rs.3,750/- to be recovered from the appellant in
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lieu of the lost weapon.
7. Subsequently, on 15.03.1999, the IGP, Northern Sector, CRPF, sent a letter to the
appellant stating that after review of the case,
the Directorate General had come to the
conclusion that the penalty inflicted upon him
vide letter dated 24.06.1998 was being withdrawn
as the same did not commensurate with the gravity
of the offence committed by the appellant in
discharge of his official duties. After obtaining
approval from the competent authority, major
penalty proceedings were initiated and Memorandum
of Charges dated 23.06.1999 was issued to the
appellant. Subsequently, pursuant to the
Presidential Order dated 14.10.1999, a regular
departmental inquiry under Rule 14 of the Central
Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal)
Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965”) was ordered in connection
with the said incident of the loss of AK-47 Rifle
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along with its ammunition.
8. Aggrieved of the said action of withdrawal of imposition of minor penalty and initiating
departmental inquiry, the appellant filed Writ
Petition (C) No. 720 of 2002 before the High
Court of Gauhati, Imphal Bench, by questioning
the validity of the said Memorandum of Charges
dated 15.03.1999 on the ground that it is in
violation of the principles of natural justice
and is also contrary to the settled position of
law.
9. The learned single Judge allowed the Writ Petition vide judgment and order dated 18.05.2006
by placing reliance on various decisions of this
Court on the aspect of principles of natural
justice. It was observed that the earlier
punishment imposed upon the appellant was
withdrawn suo motu by the competent authority by
order dated 15.03.1999 without affording him the
opportunity of being heard, by passing a non
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speaking order. The learned single Judge
accordingly set aside the order dated 15.03.1999
as the earlier penalty imposed upon the appellant
was withdrawn by which the letter dated
24.06.1998 was withdrawn by the IGP-NS.
10. In the meanwhile, the appellant retired from service as a regular Commandant/Police Officer,
CRPF on 31.08.2006.
11. The respondent-Union of India preferred Writ Appeal No. 45 of 2006 before the Division Bench
of the High Court against the said judgment and
order of the learned single Judge.
12. The Division Bench of the High Court by way of judgment and order dated 07.11.2006 upheld the
finding and reasons recorded by the learned
single Judge and held that the appellant should
have been afforded an opportunity of being heard
before the Memorandum of Charges dated 15.03.1999
was issued to him. The Division Bench however,
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observed that it was open for the Disciplinary
Authority to initiate fresh action in the matter
against the appellant by complying with the
principles of natural justice. The appeal was
accordingly dismissed.
13. In pursuance of the liberty granted by the Division Bench to the respondents, a show cause
notice dated 02.02.2007 was issued to the
appellant, by which he was given time of fifteen
days to reply to the same. After considering the
reply of the appellant, the DG-CRPF came to the
conclusion that it was appropriate to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
afresh.
14. Accordingly, on 22.08.2008, the respondents issued another Memorandum of Charges to the
appellant in pursuance of the sanction accorded
by the President of India under Rule 9(2)(b)(i)
of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “CCS
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(Pension) Rules, 1972”) for initiating
departmental inquiry proceedings against him in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule
14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and directed him
to submit his written statement of defence to the
said Memorandum of charges. The articles of
charges framed against the appellant are
extracted hereunder:
“Article-I That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant (Retired) while posted and functioning as Commandant 61 Bn CRPF at Mantripukhri, Imphal (Manipur) during the period from 1.5.95 to 31.8.95 committed an act of misconduct in that he allowed, kote UO to issue arms and ammunitions more than authorization. Thus the said B.S. Yambem, Commandant (Retired) failed to maintain absolute devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government Servant and thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1)(ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II
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That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant (Retired) while posted and functioning in the aforesaid capacity and during the aforesaid period committed an act of misconduct in that he passed verbal orders to issue service arms and ammunitions to ex-undergrounds through kote UC’s without keeping/maintaining proper records violating the instructions on the subject. Thus, the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Comdt. (Retired) failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Govt. servant and thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1) (ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-III That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant(Retired)while posted and functioning as Commandant 61 Bn CRPF, Mantripukhri, Imphal (Manipur) during the period from 1.5.95 to 31.8.95 committed an act, of misconduct in that he got issued service weapons to undergrounds through No.793020336 LNK Man Bahadur in violation of orders which resulted in missing of one AK-47 Body No. 313422 Butt No. 77, 3 Magazine and 90 rounds. That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant (Retired) failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to the duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Govt. Servant and
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thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct)Rules, 1964.
Article-IV That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Comdt. (u/s) while posted and functioning in the aforesaid capacity during the aforesaid period committed an act of misconduct in that he passed verbal orders to issue service arms and ammunitions to ex-undergrounds resulting missing of one AK 47 Body No. 313422 Butt No. 77, 3 Magazines and 90 Rounds. He had hidden the above fact and failed to take appropriate action after missing the service weapon. Thus the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Comdt. (u/s) failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Govt. Servant and thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”
15. Aggrieved of the same, the appellant filed Writ Petition(C) No.904 of 2008 before the High
Court of Gauhati, Imphal Bench questioning the
issuance of the Memorandum of Charges urging
various legal grounds.
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16. In the meanwhile, another set of disciplinary proceedings had been initiated
against the appellant in connection with the
arrest of 11 personnel and seizure of two trucks
of the unit of the appellant carrying contraband
ganja. The allegation against the appellant was
that he tried to cover up the same and that the
said act of the appellant amounted to a violation
of the Rules 3(1)(i),(ii) &(iii) of CCS (Conduct)
Rules, 1964. The departmental enquiry was
initiated against him on 14.05.1998. Aggrieved of
the initiation of disciplinary proceedings in
connection with the above alleged misconduct, the
appellant filed W.P. No. 805 of 2005 before the
High Court of Gauhati, Imphal Bench. The learned
single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ
Petition by way of judgment and order dated
16.06.2006 by the learned single Judge of the
High Court. The single Judge, however, granted
liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to initiate
departmental enquiry afresh against the appellant
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after complying with the directions given in the
judgment.
17. Aggrieved of the said judgment, the respondents filed Writ Appeal No. 25 of 2007
before the Division Bench of the High Court
questioning the correctness of the same. The
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
said Writ Appeal vide judgment and order
13.11.2008 and upheld the impugned judgment and
order of the learned single Judge. Thereafter,
the said Memorandum of Charges dated 14.05.1998
was withdrawn by the respondents, and another
Memorandum of Charges dated 16.10.2009 was
issued. The Articles of Charges framed against
the appellant are extracted as hereunder:
“Article-I That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant while posted and functioning as Commandant in 61 Bn. CRPF at Mantripukhri, Imphal during August 1995 committed a serious misconduct in that he on 08/08/1995 sent three vehicles, one Asstt. Commandant and 18 other
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ranks of his Unit out of the area of operational jurisdiction without the approval of IGP (Ops) Manipur and Nagaland. Two of the above vehicles and 11 men were later intercepted and apprehended by the Customs and Central Excise Authorities at Didarganj check post near Patna on the night of 11/08/1995 as a huge quantity of contraband ganja was found loaded in these vehicles. Thus, the said Shri B.S. Yambem, failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1), (i),(ii)and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid Unit in the aforesaid capacity, the said Shri B.S. Yambem committed a serious misconduct in that he fabricated office records to cover illegal dispatch of CRPF vehicles and men out of operational jurisdiction without proper permission or orders of the competent authority and also tried to secure false medical certificates in respect of Officers and men allegedly involved in the illegal transshipment of ganja from civil hospital on coming to know about the detention of his Unit vehicles and men by Central Excise
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authorities of Patna on 12/08/1995. Thus, the said Shri B.S. Yambem, failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion of duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1), (i), (ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-III That the said Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant (under suspension) while posted and functioning as Commandant 61 Bn. CRPF, Mantripukhri, Imphal during August, 1995 committed a serious misconduct in that he suppressed the information of arrival of Shri Ram Singh, Asstt. Comdt (under suspension), 4 Ors. with Civil TATA 608 truck with civilian driver at Bn. HQrs on 15/16-8-95 and kept them hiding at remote Coy location at Mayang, Imphal and shown their arrival at Bn HQrs on 0245 hrs on 17/08/1995 though they were wanted by Central Excise authorities in connection with the seizure of ganja from two trucks of his Unit at Didarganj check-post near Patna on the night of 11/8/1995. Thus, the said Shri B.S. Yambem, failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby violated the provisions contained in Rule 3(1), (i) (ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”
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18. Aggrieved of the same, the appellant filed Writ Petition(C) No. 264 of 2010 before the High
Court of Gauhati, Imphal Bench.
19. As the legal issue was same in both the Writ Petitions, i.e., No. 904 of 2008 (filed
against the Memorandum of Charges dated
22.08.2008-issued in 1st case i.e. Arms case) and
Writ Petition No. 264 of 2010 (filed against
Memorandum of Charges dated 16.10.2009-issued in
2nd case i.e. Ganja case), they were heard
together and disposed of by the learned single
Judge vide common judgment and order dated
01.09.2010. The learned single Judge held that
the Memorandum of Charges in both the cases make
it clear that the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant by the
Disciplinary Authority for the alleged incidents
which took place more than 10 years earlier was
barred by limitation as provided for under Rule
9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
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Accordingly, the learned single Judge quashed the
Memorandum of Charges dated 22.08.2008 and
16.10.2009 and allowed the above Writ Petitions
filed by the appellant.
20. Aggrieved of the common judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge, the
respondents filed Writ Appeal (C) Nos. 39 of 2011
and 40 of 2011 (against Writ Petition No. 904 of
2008 and Writ Petition No. 264 of 2010,
respectively) before the Division Bench of the
High Court questioning the correctness of the
same.
21. The Division Bench of the High Court after hearing the parties decided the above said Writ
Appeals by passing the impugned common judgment
and order dated 05.08.2013, observing that once
the sanction was obtained by the Disciplinary
Authority from the President of India, then the
bar of period of limitation of four years as
contained in Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS
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(Pension) Rules, 1972 will not apply. Hence, the
proceedings of serving the Memorandum of Charges
to the appellant after his retirement falls
within the ambit of Rule 9(2)(a) read with Rule
9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. The
Division Bench of the High Court, thus, allowed
the appeals and set aside the order of the
learned single Judge and upheld the decision of
the respondents to hold departmental enquiry
against the appellant. The Division Bench of the
High Court further directed the Enquiry Officer
to hold the departmental enquiry strictly in
accordance with law without being influenced by
any observation of its order. The respondents
were further directed to proceed with the
departmental enquiry against the appellant and
conclude the same after affording adequate
opportunity of hearing to him in the enquiry
proceedings. Hence, the present appeals filed by
the appellant.
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22. Mr. Lenin Singh Hijam, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contends
that the initiation of the disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant by the
Disciplinary Authority in the year 2008, after
long lapse of 13 and 14 years of the occurrence
of the alleged incidents in the two cases is
violative of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972. In support of the same,
reliance is placed on the decision of this Court
in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. v. Shri
Krishna Pandey1, wherein it has been held that a
government employee cannot be subjected to a
departmental enquiry after his retirement from
service for any event or occurrence which took
place more than four years prior to the date of
the institution of the disciplinary proceedings
against an employee.
23. The learned counsel further contends that
1 (1996) 9 SCC 395
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the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in
bypassing the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 in
extending the limitation period for initiating
departmental enquiry against the appellant, which
action of the disciplinary authority is contrary
to the Rules as well as the decision of this
Court in the case of Shri Krishna Pandey (supra).
24. The learned counsel further contends that neither the Inspector General of Police (NS-CRPF)
nor the Director General, CRPF could have issued
the Memorandum of Charges dated 22.08.2008 and
16.10.2009 for initiating fresh departmental
enquiry proceedings against the appellant as they
were not the competent authority to do so. It is
further contended that the statutory safeguards
provided for retired government employees under
the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 should not have
been overlooked by the respondents.
25. The learned counsel further contends that enquiry proceedings that were initiated by the
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respondents under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
1965 in respect of the alleged incident of loss
of weapon and ammunition, were quashed by the
learned single Judge of the High Court.
Subsequently, enquiry proceedings were initiated
afresh against the appellant under Rule 9(2)(b)
(ii) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Therefore, the
respondents cannot mislead this Court by
justifying their action of initiation of the
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant on
the ground that the second enquiry proceeding
which was initiated by them by issuing the
Memorandum of Charges was merely a continuation
of the first enquiry proceeding itself, when the
same was initiated afresh by the disciplinary
authority after obtaining sanction from the
President as required under Rules 9(2)(b)(i)
after the retirement of the appellant from
service and more than four years from the date of
the alleged incidents.
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26. As far as the case in the Civil Appeal arising out of the SLP (C) No. 10092 of 2014 is
concerned (ganja case), the learned counsel on
behalf of the appellant refutes the involvement
of the appellant in the same. It is contended
that there were 11 CRPF personnel who were
charge-sheeted and booked in the said case and
tried before the District and Sessions Judge,
Patna for the alleged offences punishable under
the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act. The
Trial Court acquitted the said personnel.
Further, no departmental enquiry was conducted
against them. Strangely, the departmental enquiry
proceedings were initiated only against the
appellant and that too, after 13 years of the
alleged incident which is in violation of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972. The learned counsel
further contends that the above departmental
enquiry was initiated against the appellant with
a mala fide intention to harass him.
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27. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the respondents, has sought to justify
the common impugned judgment and order dated
05.08.2013 passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court contending that the High Court was
right in allowing the Writ Appeals filed by the
respondents and that the same does not suffer
from either erroneous reasoning or any error in
law which warrants interference by this Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
28. The learned ASG further contends that Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972
cannot come to the rescue of the appellant as the
departmental inquiry had already been initiated
against the appellant vide letter dated
15.03.1999, while he was still in service.
29. The learned ASG further places reliance on clause (a) of sub-rule 2 of Rule 9 of the CCS
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(Pension) Rules, 1972 which reads thus:
“9(2)(a)… The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1) if instituted, while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the Authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in the service”
Further, reliance is placed by the learned ASG on
the decision of this Court in the case of D.V.
Kapoor v. Union of India2, wherein this Court has
held that the proceedings under Rule 9 of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972 can be instituted or
continued against a government servant who has
retired from service in those cases in which
grave misconduct is alleged to have been
committed. In the case on hand, prior sanction of
the President was obtained by the Disciplinary
Authority as required under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of
2 (1990) 4 SCC 314
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the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 for continuing the
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant.
The learned ASG further places reliance on the
decision of this Court in the case of State of
M.P. v. Dr. Yashwant Trimbak3, wherein it was
held that personal sanction of the Governor or
President is not required and it is sufficient
that the sanction be issued by a duly authorized
officer and is properly authenticated. No court
can look into the validity of such sanction in
terms of Articles 77(3) and 166(3) of the
Constitution of India.
30. The learned ASG further contends that the legal principles enunciated by this Court in the
case of Shri Krishna Pandey (supra) cannot be
relied upon in the instant case, as the factual
situations in the two cases are very different
from each other. In the case of Shri Krishna
Pandey (supra), the concerned officer therein
3 (1996) 2 SCC 305
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retired from service on 31.03.1987 and the
proceedings against him were initiated on
21.04.1991. This Court observed in the said case
that it was clear that the incident of
embezzlement had taken place four years prior to
the date of his retirement and the embezzlement
had resulted in pecuniary loss to the State
Government. The State Government did not take any
action and allowed the officer to escape from the
provisions of regulations 351-A of the Civil
Services Regulations. It was further observed by
this Court in the above case that the decision of
this Court did not preclude the Disciplinary
Authority from carrying on with the investigation
into the offence and take action thereon. While
in the instant case, the appellant retired from
service on 31.08.2006 and sanction was accorded
by the President of India within 3 years, that
is, on 22.8.2008 for conducting departmental
enquiry against him, which is within the limit of
four years period as prescribed in the said
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Rules. Therefore, the learned ASG submits that
the facts of the instant case do not attract Rule
9(2)(b)(ii)of the CCS (Pension)Rules, 1972.
According to the learned ASG, the date of
institution of the disciplinary proceedings
should be considered from the date on which the
Memorandum of Charges was issued. The learned ASG
further places reliance on the decision of this
Court in the case of Union of India v. Kewal
Kumar4, wherein it was held that the requirement
of issuance of the Memorandum of Charges is not
necessary to be complied with when decision is
taken by the competent Disciplinary Authority to
initiate disciplinary proceedings on the basis of
an FIR. Hence, the appellant cannot place
reliance on the decision of this Court on the
case of Shri Krishna Pandey (supra), when the
charges framed against him by the disciplinary
authority pertain to a matter as serious as
smuggling contraband ganja.
4 AIR 1993 SC 1585
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31. The learned ASG further places reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of
Railway Board Representing The Union of India v.
Niranjan Singh5 and State of Madras v. G.
Sundaram6, wherein this Court has held that the
High Court while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India should
not interfere with the conclusions arrived at by
the Disciplinary Authority after holding an
enquiry, unless the findings of fact are not
supported by any evidence.
32. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties. The following
essential questions would arise for our
consideration in the case:
1. Whether the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court correctly appreciates the scope of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 in light of
5 (1969) 1 SCC 502
6 AIR 1965 SC 1103
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the fact the disciplinary proceedings were initiated more than four years after the alleged incidents?
2. Whether the impugned judgment and order is erroneous and is vitiated in law?
3. What Order?
Answer to Point Nos. 1 and 2 Since Points 1 and 2 are inter-related, the same
are answered together as under:
33. With reference to the aforesaid factual and rival legal contentions urged before this Court,
to answer the same, at the outset it would be
necessary to refer to the letter dated 20.02.2009
issued by the DIGP (CR & Vig.) which reads as
under:
“Directorate General, CRPF (Ministry of Home Affairs)
Sub : Department Enquiry Against Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant (Retd.) ------
A DE was conducted against Shri B.S. Yambem, Commandant on the charges of sending vehicle of his Unit along with men
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on 8.8.1995 out of his jurisdiction and when the vehicles were seized by the Customs authorities for illegal transshipment of Ganja, he made efforts to conceal the same by manipulating documents. Article of charge is at P/72 of C/file.
2. The DE was completed and a copy of IOs report was served on the C/O. The C/O filed a WP No. 805 of 2005 in the Guwahati High Court, Imphal Bench in which first the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 18.7.2005 stayed the DE and then vide judgment dated 16.6.2006 (copy at P/55/c/side), quashed the DE initiated vide Memo dated 14.5.1998 and report of the IO. The Hon’ble Court, however, left it open for the DA/IOP to conduct the DE afresh, after supplying copies of proceedings of the COI and also the English translated copies of statements of the witnesses and documents recorded in Hindi to the petitioner.
3. Against the above order, the Department filed W.A. No. 25 of 2007 in the Division Bench which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Court on 13.11.2008 (copy at P/125c/Side). The matter was referred to MOL and the ASG opined that it is not a fit case for filing SLP (copy of relevant notes at P/120c/side).
4. In view of the above, the judgment dated 16.6.2006 of the Hon’ble Court is required to be implemented now which would require taking the following actions :-
(i) Supplying copies of proceedings of the COI and the English translated copies of statements of the witnesses and
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documents recorded in Hindi to the petitioner. This would be pre-requisite for starting the DE against the C/O afresh.
(ii) Memorandum dated 14.5.1998 will have to be cancelled and DE against the C/O started afresh on the same charges. However, fresh Memorandum would be issued after supplying the C/O with a copy of the COI file and English translation of the statement of witnesses.
5. MHA may therefore like to see the case and convey approval of Competent Authority to take the above actions. Since the Officer has already proceeded on superannuation (while under suspension) w.e.f 31.8.2006, the DE ordered afresh would be under Rule 9(2) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
6. This has the approval of the DG. (Ranjit Singh) DIGP (CR & Vig) 20.02.2009”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
A perusal of the said letter makes it clear that
the Disciplinary Authority, following the
judgment and order dated 16.06.2006 passed in
W.P. No.805 of 2005 by the learned single Judge
of the High Court and judgment and order dated
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13.08.2008 passed in W.A. No. 25 of 2007 by the
Division Bench of the High Court initiated
disciplinary proceedings afresh against the
appellant under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972 and also sought the sanction of the
President of India.
Rule 9(2) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972
reads thus:
“9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension-
(2) (a) The departmental proceedings re- ferred to in sub-rule (1), if in- stituted while the Government ser- vant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re- employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government ser- vant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be con- tinued and concluded by the au- thority by which they were com- menced in the same manner as if the Government servant had contin- ued in service : Provided that where the departmen- tal proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President.
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33
(b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Govern- ment servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his re-employment, -
(i) shall not be in- stituted save with the sanction of the President,
(ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and
(iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure ap- plicable to de- partmental pro- ceedings in which an order of dis- missal from ser- vice could be made in relation to the Government servant during his ser- vice.”
A perusal of the above Rule makes it clear
that if the disciplinary proceedings are not
instituted against the Government servant by the
disciplinary authority while he was in service,
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34
then the prior sanction of the President of India
is required to institute such proceedings against
such a person. It is also clear that such
sanction shall not be in respect of an event
which took place more than four years before the
institution of such disciplinary proceedings.
34. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has rightly placed strong reliance
on Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,
1972. It is an undisputed fact that the appellant
retired from service on 31.08.2006. The learned
single Judge of the High Court by way of judgment
and order dated 18.05.2006 in Writ Petition No.
720 of 2002 quashed the disciplinary proceedings
in the case pertaining to the missing arms and
ammunitions. However, liberty was granted to the
Disciplinary Authority/Enquiry Officer to conduct
the disciplinary enquiry afresh after supplying
the copies of the proceedings of the enquiry to
the appellant. The said judgment and order of the
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35
single Judge was challenged by the respondents by
way of Writ Appeal No. 45 of 2006, in which the
Division Bench, by judgment and order dated
07.11.2006 upheld the order of the single judge
of the High Court. It was only pursuant to this
that the fresh memorandum of charges dated
22.08.2008 was issued to the appellant, which was
clearly beyond the period of limitation of four
years as provided for under the CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972. Similarly, in the case involving the
contraband ganja, the single Judge of the High
Court by way of judgment and order dated
16.06.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 805 of
2005 quashed the departmental enquiry under the
memorandum of charges dated 14.05.1998. The
Division Bench dismissed the Writ Appeal No. 25
of 2007 filed by the respondents vide judgment
and order dated 13.11.2008 and upheld the order
of the learned single Judge. It was pursuant to
this that the fresh departmental enquiry was
initiated against the appellant on 16.10.2009
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36
after obtaining sanction from the President of
India under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972. The appellant challenged the
correctness of the sanction and charges framed
against him before the High Court of Gauhati,
Imphal Bench in W.P. (C) No. 264 of 2010. The
High Court quashed the Memorandum of Charges on
the ground that it was issued after four years
from the date of the alleged incident. Therefore,
it was held that the said action of the
Disciplinary Authority in initiating disciplinary
proceedings is not valid in law as the same was
barred by limitation as per the provision of Rule
9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972.
This important legal aspect of the case was not
considered by the Division Bench of the High
Court while setting aside the common judgment and
order dated 01.09.2010 passed by the learned
single Judge in Writ Petition No. 904 of 2008
(arms and ammunitions case) and Writ Petition No.
264 of 2010 (contraband ganja case).
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37
35. It is a well established principle of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is
prescribed under any statute then the act must be
done in that manner or not at all. The aforesaid
legal position has been laid down by this Court
in the case of Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar
Council of Kerala & Ors.7, the relevant
paragraphs of which are extracted hereunder :
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is pre- scribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under:
“[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.”
32. This rule has since been ap- proved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Ra- jasthan. These cases were consid- ered by a three-Judge Bench of this
7 (1999) 3 SCC 422
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Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of adminis- trative law.”
The aforesaid important aspect of the case should
have been considered by the Division Bench of the
High Court instead of mechanically accepting the
argument advanced on behalf of the respondents
that the case of the appellant squarely falls
under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) read with Rule 9 (2)(b)(ii)
of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Therefore, the
findings recorded by the Division Bench in the
impugned judgment are erroneous in law and are
liable to be set aside.
36. The learned ASG appearing on behalf of the respondents contends that the period of
limitation of four years as stipulated in 9(2)(b)
(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 does not
apply to the facts of the present case for the
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39
reason that the departmental proceedings against
the appellant had already been initiated while he
was in service, and it was because of the
pendency of the litigation before the High Court
that the proceedings could not be concluded and
further disciplinary proceedings were continued
after obtaining prior sanction of the President
of India as required under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the
CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. The said contention is
untenable both on facts as well as in law.
37. The Division Bench of the High Court failed to appreciate the fact that liberty had been
granted by the High Court vide its judgment and
order dated 07.11.2006 in W.A. (C) No. 45 of 2006
to the Disciplinary Authority to take
disciplinary action against the appellant. Thus,
there was no need for the respondent Disciplinary
Authority to withdraw the Memorandum of Charges
dated 14.05.1998 for the purpose of initiating
disciplinary proceedings afresh against the
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40
appellant on the same charges by obtaining an
order of sanction from the President of India as
required under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972. The Division Bench of the
High Court in its judgment and order dated
05.08.2013 has completely ignored this important
legal aspect of the matter, that the prior
sanction accorded by the President under the
above said Rules was in fact, barred by
limitation. Thus, it has committed serious error
in law in arriving at the conclusion that the
respondent Disciplinary Authority had obtained
due sanction from the President of India to
conduct the departmental proceedings against the
appellant for the same charges, which action was
barred by limitation as provided under Rule 9(2)
(b)(ii) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Therefore,
the impugned judgment and order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court cannot be
allowed to sustain in law.
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41
38. The similar question of law came for consideration before this Court in the case of
Shri Krishna Pandey (supra), wherein it was held
as under:
“6. It would thus be seen that proceed- ings are required to be instituted against a delinquent officer before re- tirement. There is no specific provision allowing the officer to continue in ser- vice nor any order passed to allow him to continue on re-employment till the enquiry is completed, without allowing him to retire from service. Equally, there is no provision that the proceed- ings be initiated as a disciplinary mea- sure and the action initiated earlier would remain unabated after retirement. If Regulation 351-A is to be operative in respect of pending proceedings, by necessary implication, prior sanction of the Governor to continue the proceedings against him is required. On the other hand, the Regulation also would indicate that if the officer caused pecuniary loss or committed embezzlement etc. due to misconduct or negligence or derelic- tion of duty, then proceedings should also be instituted after retirement against the officer as expeditiously as possible. But the events of misconduct etc. which may have resulted in the loss to the Government or embezzlement, i.e., the cause for the institution of pro- ceedings, should not have taken place more than four years before the date of institution of proceedings. In other
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42
words, the departmental proceedings must be instituted before lapse of four years from the date on which the event of mis- conduct etc. had taken place. Admit- tedly, in this case the officer had re- tired on 31-3-1987 and the proceedings were initiated on 21-4-1991. Obviously, the event of embezzlement which caused pecuniary loss to the State took place prior to four years from the date of his retirement. Under these circumstances, the State had disabled itself by their deliberate omissions to take appropriate action against the respondent and al- lowed the officer to escape from the provisions of Regulation 351-A of the Regulations. This order does not pre- clude proceeding with the investigation into the offence and taking action thereon.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
39. The judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (supra) also does not apply
to the facts of the case on hand. This Court had
held in that case that the order of sanction to
initiate disciplinary proceedings granted by the
Governor cannot be scrutinized by this Court in
exercise of its power of judicial review, as the
said action comes within the protection of
Article 166(2) of the Constitution of India. This
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43
principle of law is not applicable to the present
fact situation for the reason that the order of
sanction granted by the President of India is not
in exercise of his executive power under Article
77(2) of the Constitution which speaks of orders
and other instruments made and executed in the
name of President of India. The Rules specified
under Article 77(3) of the Constitution are rules
framed by the President of India for transaction
of business of the Government of India. The said
constitutional immunity conferred either upon the
Governor or President is confined only to the
executive action of the appropriate Government.
The order of sanction to be granted by the
President of India as provided under Rule 9(2)(b)
(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 is for
initiation of the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant, which cannot be treated as
an executive action of the Government of India.
Rather, it is a statutory exercise of power by
the President, under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS
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44
(Pension) Rules, 1972. The said Rules are framed
by the President of India in exercise of
legislative power conferred under Article 309 of
the Constitution of India. Article 309 of the
Constitution provides for framing Rules and
Regulations for the regulation of recruitment and
conditions of service of persons serving under
the Union or a State government, and reads as
under :
“309.Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State:
Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to
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45
such services and posts until provisions in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.”
Discussing the scope and powers of the
President and Governor under Article 309, a
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
B.S Yadav v. State of Haryana8, held as under:
“……It is in this context that the proviso to Article 309 assumes relevance and importance. The State legislature has the power to pass laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of judicial officers of the State. But it was necessary to make a suitable pro vision enabling the exercise of that power until the passing of the law by the legislature on that subject. The Constitution furnishes by its provisions ample evidence that it abhors a vacuum. It has therefore made provisions to deal with situations which arise on account of the ultimate repository of a power not exercising that power. The proviso to Article 309 provides, in so far as material, that until the State legislature passes a law on the particular subject, it shall be competent to the Governor of the State to make rules regulating the recruitment
8 AIR 1981 SC 561
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and the conditions of service of the judicial officers of the State. The Governor thus steps in when the legislature does not act. The power, exercised by the Governor under the proviso is thus a power which the legislature is competent to exercise but has in fact not yet exercised. It par takes of the characteristics of the legislative, not executive, power. It is legislative power. That the Governor possesses legislative power under our Constitution is incontrovertible and, therefore, there is nothing unique about the Governor's power under the proviso to Article 309 being in the nature of a legislative power. By Article 158, the Governor of a State is a part of the legislature of the State. And the most obvious exercise of legislative power by the Governor is the power given to him by Article 213 to promulgate Ordinances when the legislature is not in session. Under that Article, he exercises a power of the same kind which the legislature normally exercises, the power to make laws. The heading of Chapter IV of Part VI of the Constitution, in which Article 213 occurs, is significant: 'Legislative Power of the Governor". The power of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 to make appropriate rules is of the same kind. It is legislative power. Under Article 213, he substitutes for the legislature because the legislature is in recess. Under the proviso to Article 309, he substitutes for the legislature because the legislature has not yet exercised its power to pass an appropriate law on the subject.”
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(emphasis laid by this Court)
The distinction between the powers under
Articles 77(3), 166(3) and 309, regarding the
framing of Rules and Regulations was discussed by
a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir9, as
under:-
“……As an example, under Article 77(3), the President, and, under Article 166(3) the Governor of a State are empowered to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India or the Government of the State, as the case may be, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. If, for the interpretation of these provisions, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not applied, the result would be that the rules once made by the President or a Governor would become inflexible and the allocation of the business among the Ministers would forever remain as laid down in the first rules. Clearly, the power of amending these rules from time to time to suit changing situations must be held to exist and that power can only be found in these articles by applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. There are other similar rule-making
9 AIR 1970 SC 1118
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powers, such as the power of making service rules under Article 309 of the Constitution. That power must also be exercisable from time to time and must include within it the power to add to, amend, vary or rescind any of those rules……” (emphasis laid by this Court)
40. It becomes clear from a perusal of the constitutional provisions and the decisions by
constitution benches of this Court referred to
supra that the powers under Articles 77(3),
166(3) and 309 operate in completely different
fields. It would thus, be clear that the Rules
framed in exercise of power under Articles 77(3)
and 166(3) cannot be compared while exercising
power under Article 309 of the Constitution and
framing rules and regulations for recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to
such posts either in connection with the affairs
of the Union government or a state government. It
is for this reason that the statutory exercise of
power by the President of India under Rules 9(2)
(b)(i) and (ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972
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49
cannot be equated with power exercised under
Article 77(2) of the Constitution of India. The
High Courts and this Court can exercise power of
judicial review under Articles 226 and 32,
respectively, of the Constitution of India in
cases of statutory exercise of power by the
President or Governor. In the case of Dr.
Yashwant Trimbak (supra), this Court held that
the power of judicial review is not available in
case of executive exercise of power by the
President or the Governor. The said observation
made by this Court in the said case is not
tenable in law in view of the decision of this
Court in the landmark judgment of His Holiness
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v.
State of Kerala and Anr.10 wherein this Court has
clearly held that the power of judicial review is
part of the basic structure of the Constitution
of India. The relevant portion of the judgment is
extracted hereunder:
10 (1973) 4 SCC 225
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“577 ……The observations of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in State of Madras v. V.G. Row which have become locus classicus need alone be repeated in this connection. Judicial review is undertaken by the courts “not out of any desire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusader’s spirit, but in discharge of a duty plainly laid down upon them by the Constitu- tion”. The respondents have also contended that to let the court have judicial review over constitutional amendments would mean involving the court in political questions. To this the answer may be given in the words of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales:
“The problem to be solved will of- ten be not so much legal as politi- cal, social or economic, yet it must be solved by a Court of law. For where the dispute is, as here, not only between Commonwealth and citi- zen but between Commonwealth and in- tervening States on the one hand and citizens and States on the other, it is only the Court that can decide the issue, it is vain to invoke the voice of Parliament.”
There is ample evidence in the Con- stitution itself to indicate that it creates a system of checks and bal- ances by reason of which powers are so distributed that none of the three organs it sets up can become so pre-dominant as to disable the
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others from exercising and discharg- ing powers and functions entrusted to them. Though the Constitution does not lay down the principle of separation of powers in all its rigidity as is the case in the United States Constitution yet it envisages such a separation to a de- gree as was found in Ranasinghe case. The judicial review provided expressly in our Constitution by means of Articles 226 and 32 is one of the features upon which hinges the system of checks and balances…”
The observation made by this Court in the case of
Dr. Yashwant Trimbak (supra) to the extent that
orders of sanction granted by the Governor are
outside the scope of judicial review, is
untenable in law. The same is contrary not only
to the law laid down by this Court referred to
supra, but also the provisions of Articles 77(2)
& 166(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore,
the same has no application to the fact situation
for the reason that the President has exercised
his statutory power for grant of sanction under
Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972
to initiate the disciplinary action but not the
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52
executive action against the appellant.
41. In the instant case, the action of the Disciplinary Authority is untenable in law for
the reason that the interpretation of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972 which is sought to be made
by the learned ASG on behalf of the respondents
amounts to deprivation of the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed to the appellant under Part III of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, we have to hold
that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by
the disciplinary authority after obtaining
sanction from the President of India under Rule
9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 are
liable to be quashed.
Answer to Point No. 3
42. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the questions of law that arose for consideration of
this Court in favour of the appellant. The
Division Bench of the High Court erred in
allowing the Writ Appeal Nos. 39 and 40 of 2011.
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Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be
set aside and accordingly, set aside.
43. Though we have answered the questions of law framed in this case in favour of the appellant
and set aside the impugned judgment by allowing
these appeals, however, having regard to the
seriousness of the allegations made against the
appellant, in exercise of power of this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
we direct the Disciplinary Authority to continue
the disciplinary proceedings and conclude them
within six months in accordance with the relevant
provisions of law as well as the principles of
natural justice. If the same are not completed
within the said time period by the disciplinary
authority, the said liberty granted by this Court
in this order to the respondents will not ensue
to their benefit.
44. The Appeals are partly allowed only to the extent of answering the legal questions framed
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and the impugned judgment and order is set aside
to that extent with the above liberty given to
the respondents. All the pending applications are
disposed of. No costs. …………………………………………………………J. [ANIL R. DAVE]
…………………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]
…………………………………………………………J. [C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi, August 26, 2016
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ITEM NO.1A-For JUDGMENT COURT NO.8 SECTION XIV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS C.A. NO.8323/2016 @ Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 30907/2013 BRAJENDRA SINGH YAMBEM Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ANR Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No.8324/2016 @ SLP(C) NO.10092/2014 Date : 26/08/2016 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today. For Petitioner(s) Ms. Momota Devi Oinam,AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. B. Krishna Prasad,AOR Ms. Sushma Suri,AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil R. Dave, His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.
Leave granted.
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The appeals are partly allowed in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment.
(VINOD KUMAR JHA) AR-CUM-PS
(MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER
(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)