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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.741 OF 2009

SHLOK BHARDWAJ                            … APPELLANT

VERSUS

RUNIKA BHARDWAJ & ORS.                      … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and  

Order dated 21st November, 2006 passed by the High Court of  

Allahabad in Criminal Revision Case No.1159 of 2002.

2. By  the  impugned  order,  the  High  Court  has  allowed  the  

revision  petition  filed  by  the  Respondent,  set  aside  the  order  

dated 30th July, 2002 passed by Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, in  

Case No.356 of 2002 and remanded the matter back to the trial  

Court for fresh decision in accordance with law.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

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4. The  question  raised  for  our  consideration  is  whether  in  

exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court was justified in  

setting aside the acquittal of the appellant, having regard to the  

facts and circumstances of the case.

5. The appellant and Respondent No.1 were married on 25th  

January,  1996.   The appellant  belongs to  Allahabad where his  

parents live and the respondent belonged to Jabalpur where her  

parents are living.  The appellant is said to be employed at Delhi  

in Central Government.   The appellant-husband filed a divorce  

petition on 7th July,  1997 at Allahabad Family Court.  The wife  

lodged  First  Information  Report  dated  4th November,  1997  at  

Ghaziabad making  allegations  of  cruelty  against  the  husband.  

After investigation, the husband and four of his family members  

were tried under Sections 498-A, 406, 506 IPC and 3/4 of  the  

Dowry Prohibition Act before the Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad,  

in  Case  No.356/2002.   The  trial  ended  in  acquittal  of  all  the  

accused including the appellant vide Order dated 30th July, 2002.  

6. The divorce petition filed by the husband was ordered to be  

transferred to Jabalpur at the instance of the wife.  The wife also  

filed a divorce petition at Jabalpur.   The husband filed Transfer  

Petition  (Civil)  No.150  of  2004  before  this  Court  which  was  

disposed of on 11th March, 2005.  This Court noted that since  

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both the parties had sought divorce, the marriage had broken  

down  and  the  parties  had  agreed  to  a  decree  of  divorce  by  

mutual  consent.   Accordingly,  this  Court  directed  the  Family  

Court, Jabalpur, to take up the matter on 4th April, 2005 without  

entertaining any prayer for adjournment and pass a decree of  

divorce.   Accordingly,  the  Family  Court,  Jabalpur  passed  the  

decree of divorce on 4th April, 2005 after recording the statement  

of the parties that they mutually agreed to decree of divorce.  

The wife did not press her counter claim for maintenance.  She  

also  did  not  reserve  liberty  for  any  other  action  against  the  

husband.   

7. It  may  be  mentioned  that  against  the  Order  of  the  

Magistrate acquitting the appellant and his family members, the  

Respondent-wife  had  preferred  Criminal  Revision  No.1159  of  

2002  before  the  Allahabad  High  Court.  The  husband  filed  

affidavit dated 4th September, 2006 placing on record the order  

of this Court and the order of the Family Court, Jabalpur and also  

mentioning that after the dissolution of marriage, the wife has re-

married and in view of the order of this  Court and the Family  

Court, the revision petition ought to be dismissed.   

8. The High Court, instead of dismissing the revision petition,  

without  referring  to  the  above  developments,  allowed  the  

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revision petition by the impugned order with the observation that  

documents Exhibit Ka2 and Ka3 showed harassment, cruelty and  

mental torture and the Magistrate had skipped over the facts and  

wrongly acquitted the appellant.  Aggrieved by the said order,  

the  appellant  has  approached  this  Court  as  already  noticed  

above.

9. The  appellant  appearing  in  person  submitted  that  the  

parties had taken divorce by mutual consent as per agreement  

reached before this Court and thereafter, the respondent was not  

justified  in  proceeding  against  the  appellant.   It  was  further  

submitted that the High Court failed to advert to the settlement  

between the parties and also exceeded its jurisdiction in setting  

aside the order of acquittal.  The Magistrate in its detailed order  

duly appreciated the entire evidence and found that no case for  

cruelty  was  made  out  against  the  appellant.   In  exercise  of  

revisional jurisdiction, the said acquittal could not be set aside in  

absence of perversity.  Reliance has been placed on Judgment of  

this Court in  Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar  1    

laying down as follows :

“12. We have carefully considered the material   on  record  and  we  are  satisfied  that  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  reappreciating  the  evidence  on  record  and  coming  to  a  different   

1  (2002) 6 SCC 650

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conclusion  in  a  revision  preferred  by  the   informant  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of   Criminal  Procedure.  Sub-section  (3)  of  Section   401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401   shall  be  deemed  to  authorize  a  High  Court  to  convert  a  finding  of  acquittal  into  one  of   conviction.  The  aforesaid  sub-section,  which   places a limitation on the powers of the revisional   court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of   acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative   of the nature and extent of the revisional power   conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal   Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a   finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly,   it  could  not  do  so  indirectly  by  the  method  of   ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of   decisions of  this  Court  that the High  Court  will   ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of   acquittal except in exceptional cases where the   interest of public justice requires interference for   the  correction  of  a  manifest  illegality  or  the   prevention  of  gross  miscarriage  of  justice.  The  High Court will not be justified in interfering with   an  order  of  acquittal  merely  because  the  trial   court has taken a wrong view of the law or has   erred  in  appreciation  of  evidence.  It  is  neither   possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list   of circumstances in which exercise of revisional   jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this   Court have laid down the parameters of exercise   of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under   Section  401   of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal   against  acquittal  by  a  private  party.  (See  D.  Stephens v.  Nosibolla  [AIR  (1951)  SC 196],   K.  Chinnaswamy  Reddy  v. State of A.P. [AIR (1962) SC 1788] ,  Akalu Ahir  v.  Ramdeo Ram [(1973) 2 SCC 583],  Pakalapati  Narayana  Gajapathi  Raju v.  Bonapalli  Peda  Appadu[(1975) 4 SCC 477] and Mahendra Pratap  Singh v.  Sarju  Singh   [AIR (1968) SC 707].)

10. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent,  on  the  other  hand,  

submitted  that  even  though  the  parties  had  re-married  after  

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obtaining divorce by mutual consent as noticed above, the wife  

was not debarred from pursuing the criminal  case against the  

appellant.  He further submitted that the High Court was justified  

in  setting aside the order  of  the Magistrate and remitting the  

matter back for a fresh decision.

11. We  have  given  our  anxious  consideration  to  the  rival  

submissions.  We are satisfied that the view taken by the High  

Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not just and  

fair and needs to be set aside.

12. It is clear from perusal of the impugned order of the High  

Court that the development of settlement between the parties  

during  pendency  of  the  revision  petition  has  not  even  been  

adverted to.  Once the matter was settled between the parties  

and the said settlement was given effect to in the form of divorce  

by  mutual  consent,  no  further  dispute  survived  between  the  

parties, though it was not so expressly recorded in the order of  

this  Court.   No  liberty  was  reserved  by  the  wife  to  continue  

further proceedings against the husband.  Thus, the wife was,  

after  settling  the  matter,  estopped  from  continuing  the  

proceedings.   In  any case,  it  is  well  settled that  the scope of  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court does not extend to re-

appreciation of evidence.  In exercise of revisional jurisdiction,  

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the High Court can interfere with the acquittal  only if  there is  

perversity  in  the  order  of  acquittal.   In  the  present  case,  the  

order of acquittal could not be held to be perverse.  The High  

Court  observed  that  the  demand  of  articles,  papers  of  house  

property of Jabalpur and Noida and the contents of Exhibits Ka2  

and Ka3 amounted to harassment, cruelty and mental torture.  

This observation amounted to substitution of its view by the High  

Court  for  the  view  taken  by  the  Magistrate  after  due  

consideration  of  all  the  allegations.   The  Magistrate  inter  alia  

found the version of the respondent-wife to be not believable and  

also found that the allegations were not substantiated.  It was  

observed  that  the  wife  herself  admitted  that  the  documents  

Exhibit  Ka2 and Ka3 were merely guidelines for  good conduct  

and behavior expected of her and did not amount to cruelty.  It  

was also admitted that there was no demand of dowry at the  

time of  marriage.   The Investigating  Officer  had never  visited  

Jabalpur  and  the  demand  of  house  at  Jabalpur  was  not  

substantiated.  It was further observed that criminal case filed by  

the wife was a counter  blast  to  the divorce case filed by the  

husband.  Version before the Court was improvement over the  

original version in the First Information Report.  She had given  

contradictory  statement  about  the  place  where  her  husband  

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demanded the house.  Thus, the Magistrate having dealt with the  

matter  threadbare,  the  High  Court,  in  exercise  of  revisional  

jurisdiction  was  not  justified  in  interfering  with  the  order  of  

acquittal  particularly  when  the  parties  had  reached  the  

settlement before this  Court  on the basis of  which divorce by  

mutual consent was granted by the Family Court, Jabalpur which  

fact was placed on record of the High Court.

13.  In view of the above, we allow this appeal,  set aside the  

impugned order passed by the High Court and restore the order  

of the Magistrate.

.…………...…………………………………………J. (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

…………...…………………………………………J.                                  (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 10, 2014

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