REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2094 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.9919 of 2010)

Shiji @ Pappu and Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Radhika and Anr. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

              1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  arises  out  of  an  order  passed by the  High  

Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, whereby Criminal M.C. no. 3715  

of  2010  filed  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

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Procedure,  1973,  with  a  prayer  for  quashing  criminal  

proceedings in FIR No.6/2010 alleging commission of offences  

punishable under Sections 354 and 394 of the IPC, has been  

dismissed.   The  High  Court  has  taken  the  view  that  the  

offences  with  which  the  appellants  stand  charged,  are  not  

'personal  in  nature’  so  as  to  justify  quashing  the  pending  

criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise arrived at  

between  the  first  informant-complainant  and  the  appellants.  

The only question that,  therefore,  arises for  consideration is  

whether the criminal proceedings in question could be quashed  

in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the  

settlement that the parties had arrived at.      

3. Respondent-Radhika filed an oral complaint in the Police  

Station at Nemom in the State of Kerala, stating that she had  

accompanied her husband to see a site which the latter had  

acquired at Punjakari. Upon arrival at the site, her husband and  

brother Rajesh went inside the plot while she waited for them  

near the car parked close by. Three youngsters at this stage  

appeared on a motorbike, one of whom snatched the purse and  

mobile phone from her hands while the other hit her on the  

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cheek and hand. She raised an alarm that brought her husband  

and brother  rushing to the car  by which time the offenders  

escaped towards Karumam on a motorcycle. The complainant  

gave the registration number of  the motorbike to the police  

and sought action against the appellants who were named by  

her in the statement made before the Additional Police Sub-

Inspector  attached  to  the  Nemom  Police  Station.  FIR  

No.6/2010 was, on the basis of that statement, registered in  

the  police  station  and  investigation  started.  A  charge  sheet  

was,  in  due  course,  filed  against  the  appellants  before  the  

Judicial  Magistrate  First  Class,  Neyyattinkara,  eventually  

numbered CC 183/2010.  

4. During  the  pendency  of  the  criminal  proceedings  

aforementioned, the parties appear to have amicably settled  

the matter among themselves. Criminal M.C. No.3715 of 2010  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was on that basis filed before the  

High  Court  of  Kerala  at  Ernakulam  for  quashing  of  the  

complaint  pending  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate  First  Class,  

Neyyattinkara. That prayer was made primarily on the premise  

that appellant No.1 Shiji @ Pappu who also owns a parcel of  

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land adjacent to the property purchased by the respondent-

Radhika, had some dispute in regard to the road leading to the  

two  properties.  An  altercation  had  in  that  connection  taken  

place between the appellants on the one hand and the husband  

and brother of the respondent on the other, culminating in the  

registration of the FIR mentioned above. The petition further  

stated that all disputes civil and criminal between the parties  

had  been  settled  amicably  and  that  the  respondent  had  no  

grievance against the appellants in relation to the access to the  

plots in question and that the respondent had no objection to  

the criminal proceedings against the appellants being quashed  

by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482  

Cr.P.C. The petition further stated that the disputes between  

the parties being personal in nature the same could be taken  

as settled and the proceedings put to an end relying upon the  

decision of  this  Court  in  Madan Mohan Abbot v.  State of  

Punjab  (2008)  4  SCC  582.   An  affidavit  sworn  by  the  

respondent stating that the matter stood settled between the  

parties was also filed by the appellants before the High Court.  

The  High  Court  has  upon  consideration  declined  the  prayer  

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made by the appellants holding that the offences committed by  

the appellants were not of a personal nature so as to justify  

quashing of the proceedings in exercise of its extra-ordinary  

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

5. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  

perused the impugned order. Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. enlists  

offences  that  are  compoundable  with  the  permission  of  the  

Court before whom the prosecution is pending and those that  

can be compounded even without such permission.  An offence  

punishable under Section 354 of the IPC is in terms of Section  

320(2)  of  the  Code  compoundable  at  the  instance  of  the  

woman against whom the offence is committed. To that extent,  

therefore,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  either  quashing  the  

proceedings or compounding the offence under Section 354, of  

which the appellants are accused,  having regard to the fact  

that the alleged victim of the offence has settled the matter  

with  the  alleged  assailants.   An  offence  punishable  under  

Section 394 IPC is not, however, compoundable with or without  

the permission of the Court concerned. The question is whether  

the High Court could and ought to have exercised its power  

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under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the prosecution under  

the  said  provision  in  the  light  of  the  compromise  that  the  

parties have arrived at.  

6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the first  

informant-complainant  had,  in  the  affidavit  filed  before  this  

Court,  clearly  admitted  that  the  complaint  in  question  was  

lodged  by  her  on  account  of  a  misunderstanding  and  

misconception about the facts and that the offences of which  

the  appellants  stand  accused  are  purely  personal  in  nature  

arising out of personal disputes between the parties.  It was  

also evident that the complainant was no longer supporting the  

version on which the prosecution rested its case against the  

appellants.  According  to  the  learned  counsel  there  was  no  

question of the Trial Court recording a conviction against the  

appellants in the light of what the complainant had stated on  

affidavit.  That  was  all  the  more  so,  when  the  other  two  

prosecution witnesses were none other than the husband and  

the brother of the complainant who too were not supporting  

the  charges  against  the  appellants.  Such  being  the  case,  

continuance of criminal trial against the appellants was nothing  

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but an abuse of the process of law and waste of valuable time  

of the Courts below. Exercise of power by the High Court under  

Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent such abuse is perfectly justified,  

contended the learned counsel. Reliance in support was placed  

by  the  learned  counsel  upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Madan Mohan Abbot’s case (supra).  

7. This Court has, in several decisions, declared that offences  

under Section 320 Cr.P.C. which are not compoundable with or  

without the permission of the Court cannot be allowed to be  

compounded.  In Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K (1999)  

2 SCC 213, this Court referred to Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C.  

to declare that such offences as are made compoundable under  

Section 320 can alone be compounded and none else.  This  

Court  declared  two  earlier  decisions  rendered  in  Y.  Suresh  

Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT (1987) 2 SC 361 and  

Mahesh Chand v.  State  of  Rajasthan,  1990 Supp.  SCC  

681,  to be per incuriam in as much as the same permitted  

composition  of  offences  not  otherwise  compoundable  under  

Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. What is important, however, is that  

in  Ram Lal’s case (supra) the parties had settled the dispute  

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among themselves after the appellants stood convicted under  

Section 326 IPC.  The mutual settlement was then sought to be  

made a basis for compounding of the offence in appeal arising  

out of the order of conviction and sentence imposed upon the  

accused. This Court observed that since the offence was non-

compoundable,  the  court  could  not  permit  the  same  to  be  

compounded,  in  the  teeth  of  Section  320.  Even  so,  the  

compromise was taken as an extenuating circumstance which  

the  court  took  into  consideration  to  reduce  the  punishment  

awarded to the appellant to the period already undergone.  To  

the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ishwar Singh  

v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 667;  where  

this Court said:

“14. In  our  considered  opinion,  it  would  not  be   appropriate  to  order  compounding  of  an  offence  not   compoundable  under  the  Code  ignoring  and  keeping   aside statutory provisions. In our judgment, however,   limited  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the   appellant  deserves  consideration  that  while  imposing   substantive  sentence,  the  factum  of  compromise  between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance   which the Court may keep in mind.”

8. There is another line of decisions in which this Court has  

taken note of the compromise arrived at between the parties  

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and quashed the prosecution in exercise of powers vested in  

the  High  Court  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  In  State  of  

Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699 this  

Court  held  that  the  High  Court  was  entitled  to  quash  the  

proceedings if it came to the conclusion that the ends of justice  

so required.  This Court observed:

“…..Section 482 of the new Code, which corresponds to   Section 561-A o the Code of 1898, provides that:

“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit, or   affect  the  inherent  powers  of  the  High Court  to   make such orders  as  may be necessary  to  give   effect to any order under this Code or to prevent   abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to   secure the ends of justice.”

In  the  exercise  of  this  wholesome  power,  the  High  Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to   the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue   would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that   the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to   be quashed. The saving of the High Court's  inherent   powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to   achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court   proceeding ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  degenerate   into  a  weapon  of  harassment  or  persecution.  In  a   criminal  case,  the  veiled  object  behind  a  lame   prosecution, the very nature of the material on which   the  structure  of  the  prosecution  rests  and  the  like   would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding   in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher   than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be   administered according to laws made by the legislature.   The compelling necessity for making these observations   is that without a proper realisation of the object and   purpose  of  the  provision  which  seeks  to  save  the   inherent  powers  of  the  High  Court  to  do  justice   between  the  State  and  its  subjects  it  would  be   

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impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that   salient jurisdiction.”

9. In  Madhavrao  Jiwajirao  Scindia  and  Ors.  v.  

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC  

692, this  Court  held  that  the  High  Court  should  take  into  

account any special features which appear in a particular case  

to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice  

to permit a prosecution to continue or quash the prosecution  

where in its opinion the chances of an ultimate conviction are  

bleak.  This Court observed:

“7. The  legal  position  is  well  settled  that  when  a  prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed,   the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the   uncontroverted  allegations  as  made  prima  facie   establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into   consideration any special  features  which appear  in  a  particular case to consider whether it is expedient and   in  the  interest  of  justice  to  permit  a  prosecution  to   continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot   be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the   opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction   are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to   be  served  by  allowing  a  criminal  prosecution  to   continue, the court may while taking into consideration   the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding   even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

10. In B.S Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4  

SCC 675, the question that fell  for consideration before this  

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Court  was  whether  the  inherent  powers  vested  in  the  High  

Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised to quash  

non-compoundable offences.  The High Court had, in that case  

relying upon the decision of this Court in  Madhu Limaye v.  

The  State  of  Maharashtra,  (1977)  4  SC  551,  held  that  

since  offences  under  Sections  498-A and 406 IPC were  not  

compoundable, it was not permissible in law to quash the FIR  

on the ground that there has been a settlement between the  

parties.  This  Court  declared  that  the  decisions  in  Madhu  

Limaye’s  case (supra) had been misread and misapplied by  

the High Court and that the judgment of this Court in Madhu  

Limaye’s case (supra) clearly supported the view that nothing  

contained in Section 320(2) can limit or affect the exercise of  

inherent power of the High Court if interference by the High  

Court was considered necessary for the parties to secure the  

ends of justice.  This Court observed:

“8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case (1977)  4 SC 551  does not lay down any general proposition   limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or   FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code   or  extraordinary  power  under  Article  226  of  the   Constitution of  India.  We are,  therefore,  of  the view   that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice,   quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would   not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is,   

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however, a different matter depending upon the facts   and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or   not such a power.

15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the   High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash  criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section   320 of  the Code does not limit  or  affect  the powers   under Section 482 of the Code.”

11. That brings to the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan  

Abbot’ case (supra) whereby the High Court had declined the  

prayer for quashing of the prosecution for offences punishable  

under  Sections  379,  406,  409,  418,  506/34  IPC  despite  a  

compromise  entered  into  between  the  complainant  and  the  

accused.  The High Court  had taken the view that  since the  

offence punishable under Section 406 was not compoundable  

the settlement between the parties could not be recognized nor  

the pending proceedings quashed. This Court summed up the  

approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words:

“6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable   that  in  disputes  where  the question involved is  of  a   purely  personal  nature,  the  court  should  ordinarily   accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal   proceedings  as  keeping  the  matter  alive  with  no  possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a   luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they   are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be   utilised  in  deciding  more  effective  and  meaningful   litigation.  This  is  a  common  sense  approach  to  the   

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matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the  technicalities of the law.

7. We see from the impugned order that the learned  Judge has  confused  compounding of  an offence with   the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs 250   which has led to the dismissal of the application is an  irrelevant  factor  in  the  later  case.  We,  accordingly,   allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case   direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali,   Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall   be deemed to be quashed.”

12. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Nikhil  

Merchant v. CBI 2008(9) SCC 677 where relying upon the  

decision  in  B.S.  Joshi (supra),  this  Court  took  note  of  the  

settlement  arrived  at  between  the  parties  and  quashed  the  

criminal  proceedings  for  offences  punishable  under  Sections  

420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of IPC and held  

that since the criminal proceedings had the overtone of a civil  

dispute which had been amicably settled between the parties it  

was a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand  

in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings since the  

continuance  of  the  same  after  the  compromise  arrived  at  

between the parties would be a futile exercise.   We may also  

at  this  stage  refer  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Manoj  

Sharma v. State and Ors.  (2008) 16 SCC 1.  This court  

observed: 13

“8.  In our view, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its   jurisdiction  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  for   quashing  the  criminal  proceedings  cannot  be  supported.   The  first  information  report,  which  had  been  lodged  by  the  complainant  indicates  a  dispute   between the complainant and the accused which is of a   private  nature.   It  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  first   information report was the basis of the investigation by   the  police  authorities,  but  the  dispute  between  the  parties remained one of a personal nature.  Once the   complainant decided not to pursue the matter further,   the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view  of the matter. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

9.  As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of   power  under  Section 482 CrPC of  Article  226 of  the   Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts   of each case.  In the facts of this case we are of the   view  that  continuing  with  the  criminal  proceedings   would be an exercise in futility…..”  

13. It  is  manifest  that  simply  because  an  offence  is  not  

compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for  

the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section  

482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases  

where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the  

accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an  

exercise  in  futility.  There  is  a  subtle  distinction  between  

compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court  

or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High  

Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on  

the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal  14

against  conviction,  may  not  be  competent  to  permit  

compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at  

between  the  parties  in  cases  where  the  offences  are  not  

compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash  

the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which  

the  accused  stand  charged  are  non-compoundable.  The  

inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

are  not  for  that  purpose  controlled  by  Section  320  Cr.P.C.  

Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of  

the  power  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  by  itself,  makes  it  

obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost  

care and caution.  The width and the nature of the power itself  

demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where  

the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view  

that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an  

abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper  

for  us  to  enumerate  the  situations  in  which  the exercise  of  

power under Section 482 may be justified.  All that we need to  

say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends  

of  justice  and  only  in  cases  where  refusal  to  exercise  that  

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power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High  

court may be justified in declining interference if  it  is  called  

upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an  

appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482  

of the Criminal Procedure Code.  Subject to the above, the High  

Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each  

case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent  

powers may be invoked.

14. Coming to the case at hand we are of the view that the  

incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to the  

access to the two plots which are adjacent to each other. It  

was not a case of broad day light robbery for gain. It was a  

case  which  has  its  origin  in  the  civil  dispute  between  the  

parties, which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them.  

That  being  so,  continuance  of  the  prosecution  where  the  

complainant is not ready to support the allegations which are  

now described by her as arising out of some “misunderstanding  

and misconception” will be a futile exercise that will serve no  

purpose.  It is noteworthy that the two alleged eye witnesses,  

who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer  

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supportive of the prosecution version. The continuance of the  

proceedings is  thus nothing but an empty formality.  Section  

482 Cr.P.C. could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked  

by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and  

thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the Courts below.

15. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the impugned  

order passed by the High Court and quash the prosecution in  

CC 183/2010 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First  

Class, Neyyattinkara.                       

……………………..………J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

……………………..………J. New Delhi (T.S. THAKUR) November 14, 2011

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