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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.7421-7422 OF 2008

SHEHAMMAL     … PETITIONER

Vs. HASAN KHANI RAWTHER & ORS.         … RESPONDENTS

WITH  SLP(C)NOS.14303-14304 OF 2008

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. Special  Leave  Petition  (Civil)  Nos.7421-7422  of  2008  

filed by one Shehammal and Special Leave Petition (Civil)

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Nos.14303-14304 of 2008 filed by one Amina and others, both  

directed  against  the  final  judgment  and  order  dated  

18.10.2007 passed by the Kerala High Court in R.F.A.No.75 of  

2004  (B)  and  R.F.A.No.491  of  2006,  have  been  taken  up  

together for final disposal.  The parties to the aforesaid  

SLPs,  except  for  the  Respondent  No.6,  Hassankhan,  are  

siblings.  While  the  petitioner  in  SLP(C)Nos.7421-7422  of  

2008  is  the  daughter  of  Late  Meeralava  Rawther,  the  

Respondent No.1, Hassan Khani Rawther, and the Respondent  

Nos.2 and 5 are the sons and the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 are  

the daughters of the said Meeralava Rawther.  The Respondent  

No.6,  Hassankhan,  is  a  purchaser  of  the  shares  of  the  

Respondent  Nos.2  and  5,  both  heirs  of  Late  Meeralava  

Rawther.  The remaining respondents are the legal heirs of  

Muhammed  Rawther,  the  second  respondent  before  the  High  

Court.  The petitioner in SLP(C)Nos.7421-7422 of 2008 is the  

plaintiff in O.S.No.169 of 1994 and the third defendant in

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O.S.No.171 of 1992, filed by Hassan Khani Rawther, is the  

Respondent No.1 in all the four SLPs.

2. Meeralava  Rawther  died  in  1986,  leaving  behind  him  

surviving  three  sons  and  three  daughters,  as  his  legal  

heirs.  At the time of his death he possessed 1.70 acres of  

land in Survey No.133/1B of Thodupuzha village, which he had  

acquired on the basis of a partition effected in the family  

of  deceased  Meeralava  Rawther  in  1953  by  virtue  of  Deed  

No.4124  of  Thodupuzha,  Sub-Registrars  Office.   Meeralava  

Rawther and his family members, being Mohammedans, they are  

entitled  to  succeed  to  the  estate  of  the  deceased  in  

specific  shares  as  tenants  in  common.   Since  Meeralava  

Rawther had three sons and three daughters, the sons were  

entitled to a 2/9th share in the estate of the deceased,  

while  the  daughters  were  each  entitled  to  a  1/9th share  

thereof.   

3. It is the specific case of the parties that Meeralava  

Rawther helped all his children to settle down in life. The

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youngest son, Hassan Khani Rawther, the Respondent No.1, was  

a Government employee and was staying with him even after  

his marriage, while all the other children moved out from  

the family house, either at the time of marriage, or soon,  

thereafter.  The case made out by the Respondent No.1 is  

that  when  each  of  his  children  left  the  family  house  

Meeralava  Rawther  used  to  get  them  to  execute  Deeds  of  

Relinquishment,  whereby,  on  the  receipt  of  some  

consideration,  each  of  them  relinquished  their  respective  

claim to the properties belonging to Meeralava Rawther.  The  

Respondent No.1, Hassan Khani Rawther, was the only one of  

Meeralava Rawther’s legal heirs who was not required by his  

father to execute such a deed.

4. Meeralava Rawther died intestate in 1986 leaving 1.70  

acres  of  land  as  his  estate.   On  31st March,  1992,  the  

Respondent No.1, Hassan Khani Rawther filed O.S.No.171 of  

1992  before  the  Court  of  Subordinate  Judge,  Thodupuzha,  

seeking declaration of title, possession and injunction in

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respect of the said 1.70 acres of land, basing his claim on  

an oral gift alleged to have been made in his favour by  

Meeralava Rawther in 1982.

5. On  6th April,  1992,  the  Respondent  No.2,  Muhammed  

Rawther, one of the brothers, filed O.S.No.90 of 1992 before  

the  Court  of  Munsif,  Thodupuzha,  praying  for  injunction  

against his brother, Hassan Khani Rawther, in respect of the  

suit property.  The said suit was subsequently transferred  

to  the  Court  of  Subordinate  Judge,  Thodupuzha,  and  was  

renumbered as O.S.No.168 of 1994.

6. On the basis of her claim to a 1/9th share in  the estate  

of Late Meeralava Rawther the petitioner, Shehammal filed  

O.S.No.126 of 1992 on 25th May, 1992, seeking partition of  

the plaint properties comprising the same 1.70 acres of land  

in respect of which the other two suits had been filed. The  

said suit was also subsequently transferred to the Court of  

Subordinate  Judge,  Thodupuzha,  and  was  renumbered  as

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O.S.No.169 of 1994 and was jointly taken up for trial along  

with  O.S.No.171  of  1992.   By  a  common  judgment  dated  

15.11.1996, the learned Trial Judge dismissed O.S.No.171 of  

1992 filed by the Respondent No.1, for want of evidence.  

O.S.No.169 of 1994 filed by Shehammal was decreed and in  

view of the findings recorded in O.S.No.169 of 1994, the  

trial court dismissed O.S.No.168 of 1994 filed by Muhammed  

Rawther,  the  Respondent  No.2  herein.   A  subsequent  

application filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.171 of 1992 for  

restoration  of  the  said  suit  and  another  application  for  

setting  aside  the  decree  in  O.S.No.169  of  1994,  were  

dismissed by the trial court.   

7. The Respondent No.1 herein, Hassan Khani Rawther, moved  

the High Court by way of C.M.A.Nos.191 of 2000 and 247 of  

2000 and the High Court by its judgment dated 17.1.2003 set  

aside the decree in O.S.Nos.171 of 1992 and 169 of 1994 and  

directed the trial court to take back O.S.Nos.171 of 1992  

and  169  of  1994  to  file  and  to  dispose  of  the  same  on

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merits.  On remand, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed  

O.S.No.171  of  1992,  disbelieving  the  story  of  oral  gift  

propounded by the Respondent No.1.  The matter was again  

taken to the High Court against the order of the learned  

Subordinate Judge.  The Respondent No.1 filed R.F.A.Nos.75  

of 2004 and 491 of 2006 in the Kerala High Court and the  

same were allowed by the learned Single Judge holding that  

even if the plaintiff failed to prove the oral gift in his  

favour,  he  could  not  be  non-suited,  since  he  alone  was  

having the rights over the assets of Meeralava Rawther in  

view of the various Deeds of Relinquishment executed by the  

other sons and daughters of Meeralava Rawther.   

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment of reversal passed by  

the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the petitioners  

herein in the four Special Leave Petitions have questioned  

the validity of the said judgment.         

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9. Appearing for the Petitioners in both the SLPs, Mr. M.T.  

George,  learned  Advocate,  submitted  that  the  impugned  

judgment  of  the  High  Court  was  based  on  an  erroneous  

understanding of the law relating to relinquishment of right  

in a property by a Mohammedan.  It was submitted that the  

High Court had failed to truly understand the concept of  

spes successionis which has been referred to in paragraph 54  

of  Mulla’s  “Principles  of  Mahomedan  Law”,  which  

categorically indicates that a Muslim is not entitled in law  

to relinquish an expected share in a property.  Mr. George  

submitted that the said doctrine was based on the concept  

that the Mohammedan Law did not contemplate inheritance by  

way of expectancy during the life time of the owner and that  

inheritance opened to the legal heirs only after the death  

of an individual when right to the property of the legal  

heirs  descended  in  specific  shares.  Accordingly,  all  the  

Deeds of Relinquishment executed by the siblings, except for  

the Respondent No.1, were void and were not capable of being

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acted  upon.   Accordingly,  when  succession  opened  to  the  

legal heirs of Meeralava Rawther on his death, each one of  

them succeeded to a specified share in his estate.

10. It was also submitted that as a result, the finding of  

the High Court in R.F.A.No.491 of 2006 that even if the  

story of oral gift set up by the plaintiff was disbelieved,  

he would still be entitled to succeed to the entire estate  

of the deceased, on account of the Deeds of Relinquishment  

executed by the other legal heirs of Meeralava Rawther, was  

erroneous  and  was  liable  to  be  set  aside.   Mr.  George  

contended  that  the  High  Court  wrongly  interpreted  the  

decision of this Court in the case of Gulam Abbas Vs. Haji  

Kayyum Ali & Ors. [AIR 1973 SC 554].  In the said decision,  

this Court held that the applicability of the Doctrine of  

Renunciation  of  an  expectant  right  depended  upon  the  

surrounding  circumstances  and  the  conduct  of  the  parties  

when such a renunciation/relinquishment was made.  It was  

further  held  that  if  the  expectant  heir  received

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consideration  for  renouncing  his  expectant  share  in  the  

property and conducted himself in a manner so as to mislead  

the owner of the property from disposing of the same during  

his life time, the expectant heir could be debarred from  

setting up his right to what he was entitled. Mr. George  

submitted that the High Court overlooked the fact that this  

Court had held that mere execution of a document was not  

sufficient to prevent the legal heirs from claiming their  

respective shares in the parental property.   

11. Mr. George submitted that apart form the above, the High  

Court allowed itself to be misled into accepting a “family  

arrangement” when such a contingency did not arise.  The  

transactions involving the separate Deeds of Relinquishment  

executed  by  each  of  the  heirs  of  Meeralava  Rawther,  

constituted an individual act and could not be construed to  

be a family arrangement.  Mr. George submitted that even if  

the story made out on behalf of the Respondent No.1, that  

Meeralava Rawther made each of his children execute Deeds of

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Relinquishment  on  their  leaving  the  family  house,  is  

accepted, the same cannot by any stretch of imagination be  

said to be a family arrangement which had been accepted by  

all the legal heirs of Meeralava Rawther.  Thus, misled into  

accepting a concept of “family arrangement”, the High Court  

erroneously  relied  on  the  decision  of  the  Allahabad  High  

Court in Latafat Hussain Vs. Bidayat Hussain [AIR 1936 All.  

573], Kochunni Kochu Vs. Kunju Pillai (1956 Trav – Co 217,  

Thayyullathil Kunhikannan Vs Thayyullathil Kalliani And Ors.  

[AIR 1990 Kerala 226] and  Hameed Vs  Jameela (2004 (1) KLT  

586), where it had been uniformly held that when there is a  

family arrangement binding on the parties, it would operate  

as estoppel by preventing the parties from resiling from the  

same or trying to revoke it after having taken advantage of  

such arrangement. Mr. George submitted that having regard to  

the doctrine of  spes successionis, the concept of estoppel  

could not be applied to Muslims on account of the fact that  

the law of inheritance applicable to Muslims is derived from

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the Quran, which specifies specific shares to those entitled  

to  inheritance  and  the  execution  of  a  document  is  not  

sufficient  to  bar  such  inheritance.   Accordingly,  

renunciation by an expectant heir in the life time of his  

ancestor is not valid or enforceable against him after the  

vesting of the inheritance.  Mr. George reiterated that the  

Deeds  of  Relinquishment  between  A2  to  A6  could  not  be  

treated as a “family arrangement” since all the members of  

the  family  were  not  parties  to  the  said  Deeds  and  his  

position not having altered in any way, the Respondent No.1  

is not entitled to claim exclusion of the other heirs of  

Late Meeralava Rawther from his estate.   

12. In this regard, Mr. George also drew our attention to  

Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where the  

concept of spes successionis has been incorporated.  It was  

pointed out that Clause (a) of Section 6 is in pari materia  

with the doctrine of  spes successionis, as incorporated in  

paragraph 54 of Mulla’s “Principles of Mahomedan Law” and

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provides that the chance of a person succeeding to an estate  

cannot be transferred.   

13. In  view  of  his  aforesaid  submissions,  Mr.  George  

submitted that the impugned judgment and decree of the High  

Court was liable to be set aside and that of the learned  

Subordinate Judge was liable to be restored.

14. Mr.  V.  Giri,  learned  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  the  

Respondent No.1, urged that in view of the three-Judge Bench  

decision in Gulam Abbas’s case (supra), it was not open to  

the Petitioner to claim that the Doctrine of Estoppel would  

not  be  applicable  in  the  facts  of  this  case.   Mr.  Giri  

submitted  that  the  view  expressed  in  Gulam  Abbas’s  case  

(supra) had earlier been expressed by other High Courts to  

which reference has been made hereinbefore.  He urged that  

all  the  Courts  had  taken  a  consistent  view  that  having  

relinquished his right to further inheritance, a legal heir  

could not claim a share in the property once inheritance  

opened on the death of the owner of the property.  

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15. Mr. Giri contended that any decision to the contrary  

would  offend  the  provisions  of  Section  23  of  the  Indian  

Contract Act, 1872, as being opposed to public policy.  Mr.  

Giri urged that the principles of Mahomedan law in relation  

to the law as incorporated in the Transfer of Property Act  

and the Indian Contract Act, had been considered in great  

detail  by  the  three-Judge  Bench  in  Gulam  Abbas’s  case  

(supra).  Learned counsel pointed out that on a conjoint  

reading of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and  

paragraph  54  of  Mulla’s  “Principles  of  Mahomedan  Law”  it  

would be quite evident that what was sought to be protected  

was  the  right  of  a  Mohammedan  to  the  chance  of  future  

succession  to  an  estate.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that  

neither  of  the  two  provisions  takes  into  consideration  a  

situation where a right of spes successionis is transferred  

for  a  consideration.   Mr.  Giri  submitted  that  in  Gulam  

Abbas’s  case  (supra)  the  said  question  was  one  of  the  

important questions which fell for consideration, since it

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had a direct bearing on the question in the light of Section  

23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.  Mr. Giri submitted  

that the bar to a transfer of a right of spes successionis  

is  not  an  absolute  bar  and  would  be  dependent  on  

circumstances  such  as  receipt  of  consideration  or  

compensation for relinquishment of such expectant right in  

future.  Mr. Giri urged that the Special Leave Petitions  

were wholly misconceived and were liable to be dismissed.   

16. From the submissions made on behalf of the respective  

parties  and  the  facts  of  the  case,  three  questions  of  

importance emerge for decision, namely:-

(i) Whether  in  view  of  the  doctrine  of  spes  

successionis, as embodied in Section 6 of the Transfer  

of Property Act, 1882, and in paragraph 54 of Mulla’s  

“Principles  of  Mahomedan  Law”,  a  Deed  of  

Relinquishment  executed  by  an  expectant  heir  could  

operate as estoppel to a claim that may be set up by

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the Executor of such Deed after inheritance opens on  

the death of the owner of the property?

(ii) Whether on execution of a Deed of Relinquishment  

after  having  received  remuneration  for  such  future  

share,  the  expectant  heir  could  be  estopped  from  

claiming a share in the inheritance?       

(iii) Can  a  Mohammedan  by  means  of  a  Family  Settlement  

relinquish his right of spes successionis when he had  

still not acquired a right in the property?

17. Chapter  VI  of  Mulla’s  “Principles  of  Mahomedan  Law”  

deals with the general rules of inheritance under Mohammedan  

law.   Paragraph  54  which  falls  within  the  said  Chapter  

relates  to  the  concept  of  transfer  of  spes  successionis  

which has also been termed as “renunciation of a chance of  

succession”. The said paragraph provides that the chance of  

a Mohammedan heir–apparent succeeding to an estate cannot be  

said to be the subject of a valid transfer or release.  The

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same is included in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property  

Act and the relevant portion thereof, namely, clause (a) is  

extracted below :-

“6. What may be transferred.- Property of any kind  may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by  this Act or by any other law for the time being in  force.  

(a) The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an  estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a  legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other  mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be  transferred.”

The provisions of Section 6(a) have to be read along  

with Section 2 of the Act, which provides for repeal of Acts  

and  saving  of  certain  enactments,  incidents,  rights,  

liabilities etc. It specifically provides that nothing in  

Chapter II, in which Section 6 finds place, shall be deemed  

to affect any rule of Mohammedan Law.

18. Inspite of the aforesaid provisions, both of the general  

law and the personal law, the Courts have held that the

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fetters imposed under the aforesaid provisions are capable  

of being removed in certain situations.  Two examples in  

this regard are –  

(i)  When an expectant heir willfully does something which  

has the effect of attracting the provisions of Section  

115 of the Evidence Act, is he estopped from claiming  

the benefit of the doctrine of spes successionis, as  

provided for under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of  

Property Act, 1882, and also under the Mohammedan Law  

as embodied in paragraph 54 of Mulla’s “Principles of  

Mahomedan Law”?

(ii)   When  a  Mohammedan  becomes  a  party  to  a  family  

arrangement, does it also entail that he gives up his  

right of spes successionis.   

The  answer  to  the  said  two  propositions  is  also  the  

answer to the questions formulated hereinbefore in paragraph  

16.

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19. The  Mohammedan  Law  enjoins  in  clear  and  unequivocal  

terms that a chance of a Mohammedan heir-apparent succeeding  

to an estate cannot be the subject of a valid transfer or  

release.  Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act was  

enacted  in  deference  to  the  customary  law  and  law  of  

inheritance prevailing among Mohammedans.   

20. As opposed to the above, are the general principles of  

estoppel as contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act and  

the doctrine of relinquishment in respect of a future share  

in  property.  Both  the  said  principles  contemplated  a  

situation where an expectant heir conducts himself and/or  

performs  certain  acts  which  makes  the  two  aforesaid  

principles  applicable  inspite  of  the  clear  concept  of  

relinquishment  as  far  as  Mohammedan  Law  is  concerned,  as  

incorporated  in  Section  54  of  Mulla’s  “Principles  of  

Mahomedan Law”.  Great reliance has been placed by both the  

parties  on  the  decision  in  Gulam  Abbas’s  case  (supra).

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While dealing with a similar situation, this Court watered  

down  the  concept  that  the  chance  of  a  Mohammedan  heir  

apparent succeeding to an estate cannot be the subject of a  

valid transfer on lease and held that renunciation of an  

expectancy in respect of a future share in a property in a  

case where the concerned party himself chose to depart from  

the earlier views, was not only possible, but legally valid.  

Referring  to  various  authorities,  including  Ameer  Ali’s  

“Mohammedan  Law”,  this  Court  observed  that  “renunciation  

implies the yielding up of a right already vested”.  It was  

observed in the facts of that case that during the lifetime  

of the mother, the daughters had no right of inheritance.  

Citing the decision in the case of Mt. Khannum Jan vs. Mt.  

Jan Bibi [(1827) 4 SDA 210] it was held that renunciation  

implies  the  yielding  up  of  a  right  already  vested.  

Accordingly,  renunciation  during  the  mother’s  lifetime  of  

the daughters’ shares would be null and void on the ground  

that an inchoate right is not capable of being transferred

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as such right was yet to crystallise.  This Court also held  

that  “under  the  Muslim  Law  an  expectant  heir  may,  

nevertheless,  be  part  of  a  course  of  conduct  which  may  

create an estoppel against claiming the right at a time when  

the right of inheritance has accrued”. It was observed by  

the learned Judges that the Contract Act and the Evidence  

Act  would  not  strictly  apply  since  they  did  not  involve  

questions  arising  out  of  Mohammedan  Law.   This  Court  

accordingly held that the renunciation of a supposed right,  

based  upon  an  expectancy,  could  not,  by  any  test  be  

considered “prohibited”.     

21. This Court ultimately held that the binding force of the  

renunciation  of  a  supposed  right,  would  depend  upon  the  

attendant circumstances and the whole course of conduct of  

which it formed a part. In other words, the principle of an  

equitable estoppel far from being opposed to any principle  

of Mohammedan Law, is really in complete harmony with it.  

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22. On  the  question  of  family  arrangement,  this  Court  

observed  that  though  arrangements  arrived  at  in  order  to  

avoid future disputes in the family may not technically be a  

settlement, a broad concept of a family settlement could not  

be the answer to the doctrine of spes successionis.

23. There is little doubt that ordinarily there cannot be a  

transfer of spes successionis, but in the exceptions pointed  

out by this Court in  Gulam Abbas’s case (supra), the same  

can  be  avoided  either  by  the  execution  of  a  family  

settlement or by accepting consideration for a future share.  

It could then operate as estoppel against the expectant heir  

to claim any share in the estate of the deceased on account  

of the doctrine of spes successionis. While dealing with the  

various decisions on the subject, which all seem to support  

the view taken by the learned Judges, reference was made to  

the decision of Chief Justice Suleman of the Allahabad High  

Court in the case of  Latafat Hussain Vs.  Hidayat Hussain  

[AIR  1936  All  573],  where  the  question  of  arrangement

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between  the  husband  and  wife  in  the  nature  of  a  family  

settlement, which was binding on the parties, was held to be  

correct in view of the fact that a presumption would have to  

be drawn that if such family arrangement had not been made,  

the husband could not have executed a deed of Wakf if the  

wife had not relinquished her claim to inheritance.  It is  

true that in the case of  Mt. Khannum Jan (supra), it had  

been  held  by  this  Court  that  renunciation  implied  the  

yielding  up  of  a  right  already  vested  or  desisting  from  

prosecuting a claim maintainable against another, and such  

renunciation during the lifetime of the mother of the shares  

of the daughters was null and void since it entailed the  

giving  up  of  something  which  had  not  yet  come  into  

existence.   

24. The High Court after considering the aforesaid views of  

the different jurists and the decision in connection with  

the doctrine of relinquishment came to a finding that even  

if the provisions of the doctrine of spes successionis were

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to  apply,  by  their  very  conduct  the  Petitioners  were  

estopped from claiming the benefit of the said doctrine.  In  

this  context,  we  may  refer  to  yet  another  principle  of  

Mohammedan Law which is contained in the concept of Wills  

under  the  Mohammedan  Law.   Paragraph  118  of  Mulla’s  

“Principles of Mahomedan Law” embodies the concept of the  

limit of testamentary power by a  Mohammedan.  It records  

that a Mohammedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a  

third of the surplus of his estate after payment of funeral  

expenses and debts.  Bequests in excess of one-third cannot  

take effect unless the heirs consent thereto after the death  

of  the  testator.   The  said  principle  of  testamentary  

disposition  of  property  has  been  the  subject  matter  of  

various decisions rendered by this Court from time to time  

and it has been consistently stated and reaffirmed that a  

testamentary disposition by a Mohammedan is binding upon the  

heirs if the heirs consent to the disposition of the entire  

property  and  such  consent  could  either  be  express  or

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implied. Thus, a Mohammedan may also make a disposition of  

his entire property if all the heirs signified their consent  

to the same. In other words, the general principle that a  

Mohammedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a third of  

his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts is  

capable of being avoided by the consent of all the heirs.  

In  effect,  the  same  also  amounts  to  a  right  of  

relinquishment  of  future  inheritance  which  is  on  the  one  

hand forbidden and on the other accepted in the case of  

testamentary disposition. Having accepted the consideration  

for  having  relinquished  a  future  claim  or  share  in  the  

estate of the deceased, it would be against public policy if  

such a claimant be allowed the benefit of the doctrine of  

spes successionis. In such cases, we have no doubt in our  

mind that the principle of estoppel would be attracted.   

25. We  are,  however,  not  inclined  to  accept  that  the  

methodology resorted to by Meeralava Rawther can strictly be

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said to be a family arrangement. A family arrangement would  

necessarily  mean  a  decision  arrived  at  jointly  by  the  

members  of  a  family  and  not  between  two  individuals  

belonging to the family.  The five deeds of relinquishment  

executed by the five sons and daughters of Meeralava Rawther  

constitute  individual  agreements  entered  into  between  

Meeralava  Rawther  and  the  expectant  heirs.   However,  

notwithstanding the above, as we have held hereinbefore, the  

doctrine of estoppel is attracted so as to prevent a person  

from receiving an advantage for giving up of his/her rights  

and yet claiming the same right subsequently.  In our view,  

being opposed to public policy, the heir expectant would be  

estopped under the general law from claiming a share in the  

property of the deceased, as was held in Gulam Abbas’s case  

(supra).

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26. We are not, therefore, inclined to entertain the Special  

Leave Petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed, but  

without any order as to costs.  

……………………………………………………J.                       (ALTAMAS KABIR)

……………………………………………………J.                       (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

……………………………………………………J. (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

New Delhi Dated: 02.08.2011