13 January 2015
Supreme Court
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SHASIDHAR Vs ASHWINI UMA MATHOD

Bench: FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-000324-000324 / 2015
Diary number: 10313 / 2013
Advocates: Vs S. N. BHAT


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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 324 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) No.14024/2013)

Shasidhar & Others            Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Smt. Ashwini Uma Mathad & Anr.        Respondent(s)                   

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is filed by the defendants against  

the judgment and order dated 06.12.2012 passed  

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by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  

Karnataka  Circuit  Bench  at  Dharwad  in  Regular  

First Appeal No. 3052 of 2010, which in turn arises  

out of the judgment and decree dated 10.02.2010  

passed  by  the  Ist  Additional  Civil  Judge  (Sr.  

Division) at Hubli in Original Suit No. 73 of 2004.

3. In  order  to  appreciate  the  short  issue  

involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state a  

few relevant facts:

4. One  Basavantayya  Revanayya  Mathad  was  

married to Shantakka Mathad (defendant no.  2).  

Out of this wedlock, three children were born - one  

son  Shashidhar  (defendant  no.1)  and  two  

daughters  -  Rajeshwari  (Died  in  2003)  and  -  

Gayatri  (Died  in  2004)  -  defendant  no.3.  

Shashidhar  was married to  Uma and out  of  this  

wedlock,  three  daughters  were  born  -  Ashwini  

(plaintiff  no. 1), Nivedita (plaintiff  no.2) and Puja  

who  was  given  in  adoption  to  Uma's  sister.  

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Shashidhar  divorced  to  Uma  and  re-married  to  

Manjula  (defendant  no.4).  Out  of  this  second  

marriage,  two  daughters  were  born  -  Aishwarya  

(defendant no.5) and Vaishnavi (defendant no.6).  

5. Basavantayya had extensive properties.  On  

21.07.1991,  Basavantayya  died  leaving  behind  

him the aforementioned members of his family. On  

his  death  and  also  on  the  death  of  his  one  

unmarried  daughter  Rajeshwari,  disputes  arose  

between his legal representatives regarding their  

respective  shares  in  the  properties  and  also  

regarding  ownership  of  some  members  of  his  

family in relation to certain properties standing in  

the name of members of his family. The disputes  

unfortunately could not be settled amicably which  

led  to  filing  of  civil  suit  by  the  daughters  of  

defendant No.1 from his first wife-Uma (deceased)  

against the other members of the family, i.e., their  

father,  step-mother  and  step-sisters  for  

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determination of their respective shares, partition  

by meets and bounds and separate possession in  

the  suit  properties  held  and  possessed  by  the  

members of the family of late Basavantayya . The  

defendants contested the civil suit by denying the  

plaintiffs’  claim.   The  trial  Court  framed  issues.  

Parties adduced evidence.  

6. By judgment and decree dated 10.02.2010,  

the  trial  Court  partly  decreed  the  plaintiffs’  suit  

and  accordingly  passed  preliminary  decree  in  

relation  to  the  suit  properties.  It  was  held  that  

plaintiffs  are  entitled  for  partition  and  separate  

possession  of  their  1/6th  share  each  in  some  

properties specified in the decree whereas 1/10th  

share each in other suit properties as specified in  

the decree.

7. Dissatisfied with the preliminary decree,  the  

defendants filed first appeal being R.F.A. No. 3052  

of  2010  and  the  plaintiffs  filed  cross  objections  

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being R.F.A. CROB No. 103 of 2011 under Order  

XLI Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in  

short  “the  Code”).   This  is  how  the  entire  

preliminary decree became the subject-matter of  

first appeal filed by the defendants.  

8. By  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

06.12.2012, the Division Bench of the High Court  

disposed of the appeal  and cross objections and  

modified  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  

court  to  the  detriment  of  the  defendants.  It  is  

against this judgment and order,  the defendants  

have filed this appeal by way of special leave.   

9. Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellants,  while  

assailing  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the  

impugned  judgment,  contended  that  the  High  

Court without adverting to all  the factual  details  

and  various  grounds  raised  in  the  first  appeal,  

disposed  of  the  same  in  a  cryptic  manner.  

According  to  learned  counsel,  the  High  Court  

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neither dealt  with any issue nor appreciated the  

ocular and documentary evidence adduced by the  

parties  nor  examined  the  legal  principles  

applicable to the issues arising in the  case and  

nor rendered its findings on any contentious issues  

though urged by the appellants herein in support  

of the appeal. Learned counsel further contended  

that it was the duty of the High Court being the  

first appellate Court exercising its appellate power  

under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 31 of  

the  Code   to  have  dealt  with  the  submissions,  

which  were  urged  by  the  appellants  after  

appreciating  the  entire  evidence  on  facts,  

independent of the findings recorded by the trial  

Court and should have come to its own conclusion  

keeping in view the legal principles governing the  

issues  and  since  it  was  not  done  by  the  High  

Court,  the  impugned  judgment  is  not  legally  

sustainable. Lastly, the learned counsel urged that  

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in case his arguments are accepted, the remand of  

the case to the High Court to decide the appeal on  

merits afresh is inevitable.

10. In  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents (plaintiffs) vehemently urged that no  

interference in  the impugned judgment  is  called  

for  because  firstly,  the  first  appellate  Court  

rendered  the  judgment  on  the  appellants’  

concession and hence, it was not necessary for the  

High Court to record any elaborate finding on any  

of the issues; secondly, the suit is pending since  

two  decades  with  no  end  and  lastly,  the  

determination of the shares of the suit properties  

made by the High Court, if examined on merits by  

this  Court,  would  be  found to  be  in  accordance  

with law.

11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties  

and  on  perusal  of  the  record  of  the  case  and  

examining the issue arising in this appeal, we find  

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force in the submissions of the learned counsel for  

the appellants.  

12. The powers of the first appellate Court, while  

deciding  the  first  appeal  under  Section  96  read  

with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code, are indeed well  

defined by various judicial pronouncements of this  

Court and are, therefore, no more res integra.  

13. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge – V.R.  

Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge  

of  Kerala  High  Court)  while  deciding  the  first  

appeal  under  Section  96  of  the  CPC  in  Kurian  

Chacko vs.  Varkey Ouseph,  AIR   1969 Kerala  

316, reminded the first appellate Court of its duty  

as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should  

be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and  

subtle power of expression, the learned judge held  

as under:  

“1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two  Courts,  has  come up  here  aggrieved  by  the dismissal of his suit which was one for  declaration  of  title  and  recovery  of  possession.  The  defendant  disputed  the  

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plaintiff's title to the property as also his  possession  and claimed both in  himself.  The  learned  Munsif,  who  tried  the  suit,  recorded  findings  against  the  plaintiff  both  on  title  and  possession.  But,  in  appeal,  the  learned  Subordinate  Judge  disposed of the whole matter glibly and  briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of  fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is  entitled to a full and fair and independent  consideration  of  the  evidence  at  the  appellate stage. Anything less than this is  unjust to him and I have no doubt that in  the present case the learned Subordinate  Judge  has  fallen  far  short  of  what  is  expected  of  him  as  an  appellate  Court.  Although there is furious contest between  the counsel for the appellant and for the  respondent, they appear to agree with me  in this observation…..”

            (Emphasis  supplied)

14. This  Court  in  a  number  of  cases  while  

affirming  and  then  reiterating  the  aforesaid  

principle  has laid down the scope and powers of  

the first appellate Court under Section 96 of the  

Code.

15. We consider it apposite to refer to some of  

the decisions.   

16. In   Santosh Hazari  vs.  Purushottam Tiwari  

(Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179, this Court  

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held (at pages 188-189) as under:

“.……..the appellate court has jurisdiction  to  reverse  or  affirm the  findings  of  the  trial court. First appeal is a valuable right  of  the  parties  and  unless  restricted  by  law,  the  whole  case  is  therein  open for  rehearing both on questions of  fact and  law. The judgment of the appellate court  must,  therefore,  reflect  its  conscious  application  of  mind  and  record  findings  supported  by  reasons,  on  all  the  issues  arising  along  with  the  contentions  put  forth,  and  pressed  by  the  parties  for  decision  of  the  appellate  court……while  reversing a finding of fact the appellate  court must come into close quarters with  the reasoning assigned by the trial court  and  then  assign  its  own  reasons  for  arriving at a different finding. This would  satisfy the court hearing a further appeal  that  the  first  appellate  court  had  discharged  the  duty  expected  of  it…………”  

17. The above view has been followed by a three-

Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar &  

Ors. v.  Sangram  &  Ors.,(2001)  4  SCC  756,  

wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of  

first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal  

with  all  the issues and the  evidence led by  the  

parties before recording its findings.

18. In  H.K.N.  Swami v.  Irshad  Basith,(2005)  

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10 SCC 243, this Court (at p. 244) stated as under:  

“3. The first appeal has to be decided  on  facts  as  well  as  on  law.  In  the  first  appeal parties have the right to be heard  both on questions of law as also on facts  and the first appellate court is required to  address itself to all issues and decide the  case  by  giving  reasons.  Unfortunately,  the High Court,  in the present case has  not recorded any finding either on facts  or  on law.  Sitting  as  the  first  appellate  court it was the duty of the High Court to  deal with all the issues and the evidence  led  by  the  parties  before  recording  the  finding regarding title.”

19. Again  in  Jagannath v.  Arulappa  &  Anr.,   

(2005) 12 SCC 303,  while considering the scope of  

Section 96 of the Code  this Court (at pp. 303-04)  

observed as follows:  

“2.  A  court  of  first  appeal  can  reappreciate  the  entire  evidence  and  come to a different conclusion……...”

20. Again  in  B.V  Nagesh  &  Anr. vs.  H.V.  

Sreenivasa  Murthy, (2010)  13  SCC  530,  this  

Court taking note of all  the earlier  judgments of  

this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle  

with these words:

“3. How the regular first  appeal is to  be  disposed  of  by  the  appellate  

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court/High Court has been considered by  this Court in various decisions. Order 41  CPC  deals  with  appeals  from  original  decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31  mandates  that  the  judgment  of  the  appellate court shall state:

(a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is  

reversed or varied, the relief to which the  appellant is entitled.

4. The appellate court has jurisdiction  to  reverse  or  affirm the  findings  of  the  trial court. The first appeal is a valuable  right of the parties and unless restricted  by law, the whole case is therein open for  rehearing both on questions of  fact and  law. The judgment of the appellate court  must,  therefore,  reflect  its  conscious  application  of  mind  and  record  findings  supported  by  reasons,  on  all  the  issues  arising  along  with  the  contentions  put  forth,  and  pressed  by  the  parties  for  decision of the appellate court. Sitting as  a court of first appeal, it was the duty of  the High Court to deal with all the issues  and  the  evidence  led  by  the  parties  before  recording  its  findings.  The  first  appeal is a valuable right and the parties  have  a  right  to  be  heard  both  on  questions  of  law  and  on  facts  and  the  judgment in the first appeal must address  itself to all the issues of law and fact and  decide it by giving reasons in support of  the  findings.  (Vide  Santosh  Hazari v.  Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at  p.  188,  para  15  and  Madhukar v.  Sangram,  (2001)  4  SCC  756  at  p.  758,  para 5.)

5. In  view  of  the  above  salutary  principles,  on  going  through  the  impugned  judgment,  we  feel  that  the  High  Court  has  failed  to  discharge  the  

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obligation placed on it as a first appellate  court.  In  our  view,  the  judgment  under  appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant  aspects  have  even  been  noticed.  The  appeal  has  been  decided  in  an  unsatisfactory  manner.  Our  careful  perusal  of  the  judgment  in  the  regular  first  appeal  shows  that  it  falls  short  of  considerations  which  are  expected  from  the  court  of  first  appeal.  Accordingly,  without going into the merits of the claim  of  both  parties,  we  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  and  decree  of  the  High Court and remand the regular first  appeal  to  the  High  Court  for  its  fresh  disposal in accordance with law.”

21. The aforementioned cases were relied upon  

by this Court while reiterating the same principle  

in  State Bank of  India  & Anr. vs.  Emmsons  

International Ltd. & Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 174.  

This Court has recently taken the same view on  

similar  facts  arising  in  Vinod  Kumar  vs.  

Gangadhar, 2014(12) Scale 171.

22. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts  

of  the  case,  we  find  that  the  High  Court  while  

deciding  the  first  appeal  failed  to  keep  the  

aforesaid principle in consideration and rendered  

the impugned decision. Indeed, it is clear by mere  

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reading of the impugned order quoted below:

“The  appellants  are  defendants  in  the  suit.  The plaintiffs are the respondents.  The  respondents  are  the  children  of  1st  appellant born in the wedlock between 1st  appellant and his divorced wife Smt. Uma  Mathad.  It  is admitted fact that the 1st  appellant has married the 2nd respondent  after the divorce and in the wedlock he  has two children and they are appellant  Nos.3 and 4.  The suit properties at item  Nos.1  and  4  are  admitted  to  be  the  ancestral  properties.   Item Nos.2  and  3  are  the  properties  belonging  to  the  mother of the 1st appellant and after her  demise  the  said  properties  are  bequeathed to  1st appellant.   Therefore,  the said properties acquired the status of  self-acquired properties.

The respondents filed a suit for partition.  The  parties  are  governed  by  Bombay  School  of  Hindu  Law.   In  view  of  the  provisions  of  Hindu  Succession  Amendment Act of 2005, the respondent  Nos.  1 and 2 are entitled to a share as  co-parceners in the ancestral properties.  The wife who is the second appellant also  would  be  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  partition.  In that view, the appellant Nos.  1 and 2 and respondent Nos.1 and 2 will  have 1/4th share each in item Nos.1 and 4  of the suit properties.

The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  submitted  that  the  appellants  2  to  4  would not claim any independent share in  item Nos.1 and 4 of the suit properties,  but  they  would  take  share  in  the  1/4th  share allotted to their father.

In  view  of  the  said  submissions,  the  appellant  Nos.1  and  2  and  respondent  Nos.1  and  2  would  be  entitled  to  1/4th  

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share  in  item  Nos.1  and  4  of  the  suit  properties.

Accordingly,  a  preliminary  decree  to  be  drawn  and  the  appeal  and  cross  objections  are  disposed  of  in  the  terms  indicated above.”

23. In our considered opinion, the High Court did  

not deal with any of the submissions urged by the  

appellants and/or respondents nor it took note of  

the grounds taken by the appellants in grounds of  

appeal nor took note of cross objections filed by  

plaintiffs under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code and  

nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence  

adduced by the parties in the light of the settled  

legal principles and decided case laws applicable  

to the issues arising in the case with a view to find  

out as to whether the judgment of the trial Court  

can be sustained or not and if so, how, and if not,  

why?  

24. We may consider it apposite to state being a  

well settled principle of law that in a suit filed by a  

co-sharerer, coparcener, co-owner or joint owner,  

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as  the  case  may  be,  for  partition  and  separate  

possession  of  his/her  share  qua others,  it  is  

necessary  for  the  Court  to  examine,  in  the  first  

instance,  the  nature  and  character  of  the  

properties  in  suit  such  as  who  was  the  original  

owner  of  the suit  properties,  how and by  which  

source he/she acquired such properties, whether it  

was  his/her  self-acquired  property  or  ancestral  

property, or joint property or coparcenery property  

in  his/her  hand  and,  if  so,  who  are/were  the  

coparceners or  joint owners with him/her as the  

case  may  be.   Secondly,  how the  devolution  of  

his/her  interest  in  the  property  took  place  

consequent  upon  his/her  death  on  surviving  

members  of  the  family  and  in  what  proportion,  

whether he/she died intestate or left behind any  

testamentary  succession in  favour  of  any  family  

member  or  outsider  to  inherit  his/her  share  in  

properties and if so, its effect.    Thirdly whether  

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the  properties  in  suit  are  capable  of  being  

partitioned effectively and if so, in what manner?  

Lastly, whether all properties are included in the  

suit and all  co-sharerers,  coparceners,  co-owners  

or  joint-owners,  as  the  case  may  be,  are  made  

parties to the suit?  These issues,  being material  

for proper disposal of the partition suit, have to be  

answered by the Court on the basis of family tree,  

inter  se relations  of  family  members,  evidence  

adduced and the principles of law applicable to the  

case. (see “Hindu Law” by Mulla 17th Edition,  

Chapter  XVI  Partition  and  Reunion  –  

Mitakshara Law pages 493-547).      

25. Being  the  first  appellate  Court,  it  was,  

therefore, the duty of the High Court to decide the  

first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers  

conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order  

XLI Rule 31 of the Code mentioned above. It was  

unfortunately not done, thereby, causing prejudice  

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to  the  appellants  whose  valuable  right  to  

prosecute the first  appeal  on facts  and law was  

adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them  

of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.

26. We are not inclined to accept the submission  

of the learned counsel for the respondents when  

he urged that the impugned judgment is based on  

concession given by the appellants and hence no  

discussion  on  merits  on  any  of  the  issues  was  

called for. In the first place, the appellants did not  

make any application for settlement of the dispute  

in  relation to any of  the suit  property in  writing  

and secondly, there is nothing on record to show  

that the appellants wanted to give up their claim  

or/and wished to settle the matter in relation to  

some properties.  In the light of this, we are of the  

view that the High Court ought to have gone into  

the merits of the claim of the respective parties in  

its proper perspective and then recorded a finding  

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regarding  extent  of  shares  received  by  each  

coparcener/co-owner keeping in view the nature of  

properties  such  as  whether  it  was  self  acquired  

property or ancestral property and, if so, in whose  

hands,  its  source  of  acquisition  by  such  person,  

the  manner  of  devolution  on  the  legal  

representatives of such person etc.  As observed  

supra, these findings were required to be recorded  

after  appreciating  the  evidence  keeping  in  view  

the  provisions  of  the  Hindu  Succession  Act  and  

other related laws applicable to the issues arising  

in the case.  

27. It  is  for  these  reasons,  we  are  unable  to  

uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court.  

28. The appeal thus succeeds and is, accordingly,  

allowed.  The impugned judgment is set aside and  

the  case  is  remanded  to  the  High  Court  for  

deciding  the  first  appeal  and  cross-objections  

afresh,  keeping in  view the principle  of  law laid  

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down by this Court as mentioned above.

29. However, we make it clear that we have not  

applied  our  mind  to  the  merits  of  the  issues  

involved in  the  case  and hence,  the  High  Court  

would  decide  the  appeal  strictly  in  accordance  

with  law  on  merits  uninfluenced  by  any  of  our  

observations,  which  we  have  refrained  from  

making on merits. Needless to observe, the High  

Court will do so after affording an opportunity of  

hearing to all the parties.

30. Since the case is  quite old,  we request the  

High Court to expedite its hearing and dispose of  

the case preferably within six months.

               …………….…. ……...................................J.

[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]

                                ……….. ………………..................................J.

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

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New Delhi; January 13, 2015.

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