SHASIDHAR Vs ASHWINI UMA MATHOD
Bench: FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-000324-000324 / 2015
Diary number: 10313 / 2013
Advocates: Vs
S. N. BHAT
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 324 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) No.14024/2013)
Shasidhar & Others Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Smt. Ashwini Uma Mathad & Anr. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the defendants against
the judgment and order dated 06.12.2012 passed
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by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in Regular
First Appeal No. 3052 of 2010, which in turn arises
out of the judgment and decree dated 10.02.2010
passed by the Ist Additional Civil Judge (Sr.
Division) at Hubli in Original Suit No. 73 of 2004.
3. In order to appreciate the short issue
involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state a
few relevant facts:
4. One Basavantayya Revanayya Mathad was
married to Shantakka Mathad (defendant no. 2).
Out of this wedlock, three children were born - one
son Shashidhar (defendant no.1) and two
daughters - Rajeshwari (Died in 2003) and -
Gayatri (Died in 2004) - defendant no.3.
Shashidhar was married to Uma and out of this
wedlock, three daughters were born - Ashwini
(plaintiff no. 1), Nivedita (plaintiff no.2) and Puja
who was given in adoption to Uma's sister.
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Shashidhar divorced to Uma and re-married to
Manjula (defendant no.4). Out of this second
marriage, two daughters were born - Aishwarya
(defendant no.5) and Vaishnavi (defendant no.6).
5. Basavantayya had extensive properties. On
21.07.1991, Basavantayya died leaving behind
him the aforementioned members of his family. On
his death and also on the death of his one
unmarried daughter Rajeshwari, disputes arose
between his legal representatives regarding their
respective shares in the properties and also
regarding ownership of some members of his
family in relation to certain properties standing in
the name of members of his family. The disputes
unfortunately could not be settled amicably which
led to filing of civil suit by the daughters of
defendant No.1 from his first wife-Uma (deceased)
against the other members of the family, i.e., their
father, step-mother and step-sisters for
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determination of their respective shares, partition
by meets and bounds and separate possession in
the suit properties held and possessed by the
members of the family of late Basavantayya . The
defendants contested the civil suit by denying the
plaintiffs’ claim. The trial Court framed issues.
Parties adduced evidence.
6. By judgment and decree dated 10.02.2010,
the trial Court partly decreed the plaintiffs’ suit
and accordingly passed preliminary decree in
relation to the suit properties. It was held that
plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate
possession of their 1/6th share each in some
properties specified in the decree whereas 1/10th
share each in other suit properties as specified in
the decree.
7. Dissatisfied with the preliminary decree, the
defendants filed first appeal being R.F.A. No. 3052
of 2010 and the plaintiffs filed cross objections
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being R.F.A. CROB No. 103 of 2011 under Order
XLI Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in
short “the Code”). This is how the entire
preliminary decree became the subject-matter of
first appeal filed by the defendants.
8. By impugned judgment and order dated
06.12.2012, the Division Bench of the High Court
disposed of the appeal and cross objections and
modified the judgment and decree of the trial
court to the detriment of the defendants. It is
against this judgment and order, the defendants
have filed this appeal by way of special leave.
9. Learned Counsel for the appellants, while
assailing the legality and correctness of the
impugned judgment, contended that the High
Court without adverting to all the factual details
and various grounds raised in the first appeal,
disposed of the same in a cryptic manner.
According to learned counsel, the High Court
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neither dealt with any issue nor appreciated the
ocular and documentary evidence adduced by the
parties nor examined the legal principles
applicable to the issues arising in the case and
nor rendered its findings on any contentious issues
though urged by the appellants herein in support
of the appeal. Learned counsel further contended
that it was the duty of the High Court being the
first appellate Court exercising its appellate power
under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 31 of
the Code to have dealt with the submissions,
which were urged by the appellants after
appreciating the entire evidence on facts,
independent of the findings recorded by the trial
Court and should have come to its own conclusion
keeping in view the legal principles governing the
issues and since it was not done by the High
Court, the impugned judgment is not legally
sustainable. Lastly, the learned counsel urged that
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in case his arguments are accepted, the remand of
the case to the High Court to decide the appeal on
merits afresh is inevitable.
10. In contra, learned counsel for the
respondents (plaintiffs) vehemently urged that no
interference in the impugned judgment is called
for because firstly, the first appellate Court
rendered the judgment on the appellants’
concession and hence, it was not necessary for the
High Court to record any elaborate finding on any
of the issues; secondly, the suit is pending since
two decades with no end and lastly, the
determination of the shares of the suit properties
made by the High Court, if examined on merits by
this Court, would be found to be in accordance
with law.
11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case and
examining the issue arising in this appeal, we find
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force in the submissions of the learned counsel for
the appellants.
12. The powers of the first appellate Court, while
deciding the first appeal under Section 96 read
with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code, are indeed well
defined by various judicial pronouncements of this
Court and are, therefore, no more res integra.
13. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge – V.R.
Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge
of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first
appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Kurian
Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala
316, reminded the first appellate Court of its duty
as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should
be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and
subtle power of expression, the learned judge held
as under:
“1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the
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plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation…..”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court in a number of cases while
affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid
principle has laid down the scope and powers of
the first appellate Court under Section 96 of the
Code.
15. We consider it apposite to refer to some of
the decisions.
16. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari
(Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179, this Court
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held (at pages 188-189) as under:
“.……..the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court……while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it…………”
17. The above view has been followed by a three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar &
Ors. v. Sangram & Ors.,(2001) 4 SCC 756,
wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of
first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal
with all the issues and the evidence led by the
parties before recording its findings.
18. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith,(2005)
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10 SCC 243, this Court (at p. 244) stated as under:
“3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.”
19. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr.,
(2005) 12 SCC 303, while considering the scope of
Section 96 of the Code this Court (at pp. 303-04)
observed as follows:
“2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion……...”
20. Again in B.V Nagesh & Anr. vs. H.V.
Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530, this
Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of
this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle
with these words:
“3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate
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court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state:
(a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is
reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 at p. 758, para 5.)
5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the
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obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.”
21. The aforementioned cases were relied upon
by this Court while reiterating the same principle
in State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Emmsons
International Ltd. & Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 174.
This Court has recently taken the same view on
similar facts arising in Vinod Kumar vs.
Gangadhar, 2014(12) Scale 171.
22. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts
of the case, we find that the High Court while
deciding the first appeal failed to keep the
aforesaid principle in consideration and rendered
the impugned decision. Indeed, it is clear by mere
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reading of the impugned order quoted below:
“The appellants are defendants in the suit. The plaintiffs are the respondents. The respondents are the children of 1st appellant born in the wedlock between 1st appellant and his divorced wife Smt. Uma Mathad. It is admitted fact that the 1st appellant has married the 2nd respondent after the divorce and in the wedlock he has two children and they are appellant Nos.3 and 4. The suit properties at item Nos.1 and 4 are admitted to be the ancestral properties. Item Nos.2 and 3 are the properties belonging to the mother of the 1st appellant and after her demise the said properties are bequeathed to 1st appellant. Therefore, the said properties acquired the status of self-acquired properties.
The respondents filed a suit for partition. The parties are governed by Bombay School of Hindu Law. In view of the provisions of Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to a share as co-parceners in the ancestral properties. The wife who is the second appellant also would be entitled to a share in the partition. In that view, the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 and respondent Nos.1 and 2 will have 1/4th share each in item Nos.1 and 4 of the suit properties.
The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants 2 to 4 would not claim any independent share in item Nos.1 and 4 of the suit properties, but they would take share in the 1/4th share allotted to their father.
In view of the said submissions, the appellant Nos.1 and 2 and respondent Nos.1 and 2 would be entitled to 1/4th
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share in item Nos.1 and 4 of the suit properties.
Accordingly, a preliminary decree to be drawn and the appeal and cross objections are disposed of in the terms indicated above.”
23. In our considered opinion, the High Court did
not deal with any of the submissions urged by the
appellants and/or respondents nor it took note of
the grounds taken by the appellants in grounds of
appeal nor took note of cross objections filed by
plaintiffs under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code and
nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence
adduced by the parties in the light of the settled
legal principles and decided case laws applicable
to the issues arising in the case with a view to find
out as to whether the judgment of the trial Court
can be sustained or not and if so, how, and if not,
why?
24. We may consider it apposite to state being a
well settled principle of law that in a suit filed by a
co-sharerer, coparcener, co-owner or joint owner,
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as the case may be, for partition and separate
possession of his/her share qua others, it is
necessary for the Court to examine, in the first
instance, the nature and character of the
properties in suit such as who was the original
owner of the suit properties, how and by which
source he/she acquired such properties, whether it
was his/her self-acquired property or ancestral
property, or joint property or coparcenery property
in his/her hand and, if so, who are/were the
coparceners or joint owners with him/her as the
case may be. Secondly, how the devolution of
his/her interest in the property took place
consequent upon his/her death on surviving
members of the family and in what proportion,
whether he/she died intestate or left behind any
testamentary succession in favour of any family
member or outsider to inherit his/her share in
properties and if so, its effect. Thirdly whether
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the properties in suit are capable of being
partitioned effectively and if so, in what manner?
Lastly, whether all properties are included in the
suit and all co-sharerers, coparceners, co-owners
or joint-owners, as the case may be, are made
parties to the suit? These issues, being material
for proper disposal of the partition suit, have to be
answered by the Court on the basis of family tree,
inter se relations of family members, evidence
adduced and the principles of law applicable to the
case. (see “Hindu Law” by Mulla 17th Edition,
Chapter XVI Partition and Reunion –
Mitakshara Law pages 493-547).
25. Being the first appellate Court, it was,
therefore, the duty of the High Court to decide the
first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers
conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order
XLI Rule 31 of the Code mentioned above. It was
unfortunately not done, thereby, causing prejudice
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to the appellants whose valuable right to
prosecute the first appeal on facts and law was
adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them
of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.
26. We are not inclined to accept the submission
of the learned counsel for the respondents when
he urged that the impugned judgment is based on
concession given by the appellants and hence no
discussion on merits on any of the issues was
called for. In the first place, the appellants did not
make any application for settlement of the dispute
in relation to any of the suit property in writing
and secondly, there is nothing on record to show
that the appellants wanted to give up their claim
or/and wished to settle the matter in relation to
some properties. In the light of this, we are of the
view that the High Court ought to have gone into
the merits of the claim of the respective parties in
its proper perspective and then recorded a finding
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regarding extent of shares received by each
coparcener/co-owner keeping in view the nature of
properties such as whether it was self acquired
property or ancestral property and, if so, in whose
hands, its source of acquisition by such person,
the manner of devolution on the legal
representatives of such person etc. As observed
supra, these findings were required to be recorded
after appreciating the evidence keeping in view
the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and
other related laws applicable to the issues arising
in the case.
27. It is for these reasons, we are unable to
uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court.
28. The appeal thus succeeds and is, accordingly,
allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and
the case is remanded to the High Court for
deciding the first appeal and cross-objections
afresh, keeping in view the principle of law laid
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down by this Court as mentioned above.
29. However, we make it clear that we have not
applied our mind to the merits of the issues
involved in the case and hence, the High Court
would decide the appeal strictly in accordance
with law on merits uninfluenced by any of our
observations, which we have refrained from
making on merits. Needless to observe, the High
Court will do so after affording an opportunity of
hearing to all the parties.
30. Since the case is quite old, we request the
High Court to expedite its hearing and dispose of
the case preferably within six months.
…………….…. ……...................................J.
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]
……….. ………………..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
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New Delhi; January 13, 2015.
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