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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6284                       OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5100 of 2011)

Sham Lal and others          …Appellants

versus

State of Punjab and others …Respondents

with

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6285           OF  2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 10669 of 2011)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6286                     OF  2013  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17956 of 2011)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6287                     OF  2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 21292 of 2011)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6288                       OF  2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 15313 of 2011)

J U D G M E N T

G. S. Singhvi, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against order dated 19.01.2011 of the  

Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby the writ petitions filed by the  

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appellants questioning the acquisition of their land for implementation of  

Ring Road Phase-I Development Scheme (for short, ‘the scheme’) were  

dismissed.  

3. The appellants own small plots of land within the municipal limits  

of Bhatinda.  They constructed houses on their respective plots.  Some  

did  so  after  getting  the  building  plans  sanctioned  by  the  competent  

authority while others did that after depositing the development charges.  

The Municipal Council (now the Municipal Corporation), Bhatinda has  

provided  civic  amenities  like  electricity,  water,  sewerage,  etc.,  in  the  

localities where the appellants have constructed their houses.   

4. By resolution dated 12.12.2000, Improvement Trust, Bhatinda (for  

short, ‘the Trust’) framed the scheme covering an area measuring 45.57  

acres.  Thereafter,  notice  under  Section  36  of  the  Punjab  Town  

Improvement Act, 1922 (for short, ‘the Act’) was issued to enable the  

interested  persons  to  file  objections.  Some  of  the  appellants  filed  

objections and prayed that their plots may not be acquired because they  

had already constructed houses after getting the plans sanctioned from the  

competent  authority.  After  hearing the  objectors,  the  Chairman of  the  

Trust passed the following order:

“The objectors whose construction is of ‘A’ category as  per survey plan,  are adjusted and exempted as per  

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Government instructions subject to the condition that  no structure falls in the roads.

So far exemption and adjustment of small plot-holders, the  matter will be taken up in the Trust meeting. Hon’ble Lo- cal Bodies Minister and Local Minister have also desired  that small plot-holder be adjusted and exempted on pay- ment of requisite fee/charge. I recommend that small plot- holders be adjusted and exempted while taking up the mat- ter in the Trust meeting for approval of the scheme. It will  not affect the scheme, rather will minimize the litigation.

Rest  of  the objections carry no weight  and are  rejected,  further proceedings be done for completion of the scheme  and STP be requested accordingly.”

5. The layout plan of the area was approved by STP (South).  The  

Trust also passed resolution dated 1.1.2002 and approved the lay out plan.  

Simultaneously, the concerned officers were directed to take action for  

getting  the  scheme  approved  from  the  State  Government.  In  the  

resolution,  it  was  specifically  mentioned  that  ‘A’  class  buildings  be  

adjusted in the scheme and, as per the policy of the State Government,  

small plot holders may also be adjusted on `as is where is’ basis subject  

to the payment of development and exemption charges. For the sake of  

reference, the resolution passed by the Trust is reproduced below:  

“The  layout  plan  is  passed  unanimously.  Action  be  taken to get approval from the Government in time.  “A” class building marked in the Survey Plan and the  Layout Plan are adjusted. As per Government public  welfare  policy,  the  lands  of  small-plot-holders  which  are  shown  in  the  plan  as  shaded in  cross-lines  are  adjusted  as  is  where  is.  However,  the  owners  of  adjusted  buildings  and  plots  shall  be  liable  to  pay  development  and  exemption  charges.  The  above  

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decision  is  taken  unanimously  keeping  in  view  the  interest of the public as well as of the Trust. This shall  not affect the Scheme of the Trust and the important  project  of  the  Ring  Road  shall  be  completed  which  shall  decreases the traffic and pollution in the town.  Shri Gulzar Singh, DTP, got a note written that there  are no rules for adjustment has been written to earlier  about this and the adjustment of  the plots  is  in the  interest of the public as well as the Trust. This shall  not hinder the planned development which is the main  object of the Trust.”

6. Thereafter,  the  District  Town Planner  inspected  the  area  of  the  

scheme by associating the trustees and the officers of the Trust and sent  

letter dated 3.1.2002 to the Chairman of the Trust pointing out several  

deficiencies in the layout plan, including the following:

(i) The existing streets situated in and around the scheme area  

were not shown in the layout plan.

(ii) The proposal for closure of a large number of streets was  

technically faulty and was contrary to public interest.

(iii) The closure of gates of private houses opening to the streets  

was not warranted.

(v) The categorisation of the constructions as ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’  

classes had not been shown in the plan.    

7. The  District  Town  Planner  suggested  that  the  layout  plan  be  

redrawn  keeping  in  view  the  ground  situation  and  the  link  roads  be  

integrated in the new plan.  It is not clear from the record whether the  

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deficiencies pointed out by the District Town Planner were rectified and  

the suggestions made by him were accepted.

8. By an order dated 15.01.2002, the Secretary,  Local Government  

Department, Punjab partially annulled the resolution passed by the Trust.  

For the sake of reference that order is reproduced below:

“Government of Punjab Department of Local Government  

(L.G. 2 Branch)

ORDER

Whereas Improvement Trust, Bhatinda passed a resolution  No.8/2002,  dated  1.1.2002.  In  this  resolution,  it  was  decided to adjust as per site small plot holders failing in  45.57 acre Development Scheme ring road Phase-1.

2. Whereas the resolution No.8/2002 passed by the trust is  not as per provisions of the Govt. instructions No. 5051- 2C.I/76./ 32537, dated 8.9.1976.

3. After considering all aspects of the case I, B.C. Gupta,  I.A.S.  Secretary  to  Government  of  Punjab,  Local  Government  Department  exercising  the  powers  under  Section  72-E  of  Punjab  Town  Improvement  Act,  annul  partially  the  resolution  No.8/2002,  dated  1.1.2002  of  Improvement Trust, Bhatinda.

Dated: 15.1.2002 B.C. Gupta, I.A.S.  

Secretary, Government of Punjab  Local Government Department,

Punjab”

9. Thereafter,  the  State  Government  issued  notification  dated  

17.1.2002 under Section 42(1) of the Act and sanctioned the scheme not  

only for the construction of ring road but also for development of area for  

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residential, commercial and public buildings. The State Government also  

rejected  the  recommendation  of  the  Trust  to  adjust  the  vacant  plots  

coming within the boundaries of the scheme.  

10. The residents of Khasra Nos.2399 and 2356 and members of Jujhar  

Singh Nagar Welfare Society,  Bhatinda submitted representation dated  

25.12.2002 to the  Administrator/Chairman of  the  Trust  and Secretary,  

Local Self Government Department for release of their plots by pointing  

out that while preparing the scheme and notifying the same, the Trust and  

the State Government ignored the fact that a large number of houses had  

already been constructed.  The concerned authority  partly  accepted the  

representation and changed the boundaries of the scheme so as to exclude  

some portions of the properties of the representationists.   

11. As a sequel to the issue of final notification under Section 42(1) of  

the Act, Land Acquisition Collector, Improvement Trust, Bhatinda passed  

award dated 16.1.2004 whereby he fixed market value of the acquired  

land at the rate of Rs.600/- per sq. yard.

12. Since the appellants  could not  persuade the Trust  and the State  

Government to exempt/release their land, they filed Writ Petition Nos.  

2570/2004,  4272/2004,  10823/2004,  12439/2004,  15187/2004  and  

19700/2006 and prayed for quashing the notice issued under Section 36  

and the notification issued under Section 42 of the Act.  This prayer was  

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founded on the following assertions:

i) The  scheme  was  framed  by  the  Trust  without  considering  the  

relevant parameters.  

ii) Those  who  had  filed  objections  were  not  given  effective  

opportunity of hearing.

iii)   The  decision  to  release  only  ‘A’  class  constructions  was  

discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

iv) The  State  Government  arbitrarily  rejected  the  recommendations  

made by the Trust  for  adjusting the small  plots  on which houses  had  

already been constructed.  

v) The order passed by the Secretary to the Government is vitiated  

due to violation of the principles of natural justice in as much as the plot  

owners were not given effective opportunity of  hearing and no reason  

was assigned for modification of resolution dated 1.1.2002 passed by the  

Trust.

13. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, it was  

claimed  that  the  scheme  had  been  framed  in  accordance  with  the  

provisions of the Act and the plots of the writ petitioners could not be  

exempted/adjusted  because  they  were  within  the  boundaries  of  the  

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scheme. It was also pleaded that the scheme was sanctioned after hearing  

the objectors and no discrimination had been practised in releasing the  

plots or granting exemption to the particular parcels of land. According to  

the respondents, a total of 46 constructions (34 ‘A’ class constructions  

and 12 ‘C’ class constructions) were in existence at the time of issue of  

notice under Section 36 and all ‘A’ class constructions were exempted in  

accordance with the policy of the State Government.

14. During the  pendency of  the  writ  petitions,  the  Chairman of  the  

Trust Shri Jagroop Singh submitted report dated 27.12.2005 to the State  

Government  mentioning  therein  that  the  record  of  the  Trust  does  not  

contain any indication about the issuance of notice under Section 9 of the  

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the 1894 Act’) and the award was  

not  pronounced  on  16.1.2004  at  Bhatinda.   Shri  Jagroop  Singh  also  

pointed out that the award was incomplete because assessment of houses,  

trees, tubewell, etc., had not been done.   He suggested that the plots on  

which construction had already been raised may be left out so that the  

Trust  will  not  be  required  to  contest  unnecessary  litigation.   Deputy  

Commissioner,  Bhatinda  also  sent  letter  dated  22.7.2006  to  the  State  

Government stating that 5222 sq. yards land should be acquired for the  

scheme and the remaining 2278 sq. yards should be released.        

15. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petitions  

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by recording the following reasons:

a) The  writ  petitioners  cannot  complain  that  they  were  not  given  

opportunity of hearing because most of them had not filed objections in  

response to the notice issued by the Trust under Section 36 of the Act.

b) The recommendations made by the Trust for release of the plots  

was  not  binding  on  the  State  Government  and  no  illegality  was  

committed by invoking the provisions of  Section 72-E  for the purpose of  

modification of resolution dated 1.1.2002.  

c) The report of the District Town Planner could not be relied upon  

for recording a finding that there were factual errors in the layout plan,  

and, in any case, the deficiencies pointed out by him were not relevant for  

deciding the legality of the notification issued under Section 42 of the  

Act.

d) No evidence was produced by the writ petitioners to show that they  

had constructed houses prior to the issue of notice under Section 36 of the  

Act.

e) The  satisfaction  recorded  by  the  competent  authorities  on  the  

necessity and justification of framing the scheme and approving the same  

cannot be subjected to judicial review.

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16. S/Shri Pinaki Misra, Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel and Shri  

Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that  

the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the High Court has  

not assigned cogent reasons for negating their clients’ challenge to the  

acquisition  of  land.   Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  most  of  the  

appellants had constructed residential houses much before the issue of  

notice  under  Section  36 and the State  Government  committed  serious  

error by not exempting their plots on the ground that the constructions  

were not ‘A’ class.  They relied upon the judgments of this Court in Sube  

Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) 7 SCC 545 and Hari Ram v. State of  

Haryana (2010)  3 SCC 621 and argued that  the  State  cannot  practise  

discrimination in the matter of grant of exemption from acquisition or  

releasing the acquired land on which construction had already been raised  

merely because the quality of construction is different.  Learned counsel  

emphasized  that  the  Trust,  which  had framed the  scheme,   had itself  

recommended  exemption  of  the  small  plots,  and  the  Secretary  to  the  

Government illegally modified the resolution of the Trust by exercising  

the power vested in the State Government under Section 72-E of the Act.  

Learned counsel then argued that the High Court committed serious error  

by refusing to quash the order passed by the Secretary despite the fact  

that he did not assigned any reason for modification of resolution dated  

01.01.2002. Learned counsel referred to the report of the  District Town  

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Planner to show that the scheme framed by the Trust was deficient in  

several  aspects  and  argued  that  such  a  defective  scheme  cannot  be  

effectively  implemented  and  the  plots  of  the  appellants  cannot  be  

acquired to give benefit to private developers, who are likely to grab the  

acquired  land  by  the  methodology  of  allotment  through  lottery  or  by  

auction. Learned counsel submitted that the scheme framed by the Trust  

is  not  only for  the ring road,  but  also  for  residential  and commercial  

purposes and there is absolutely no justification to demolish the houses of  

the appellants for providing plots to others.  In support of this argument,  

the learned counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in Dev Sharan  

v. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769, Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development  

Authority  (2002)  4  SCC 666 and Tulsi  Cooperative  Housing Society,  

Hyderabad v.  State of  A.P. (2000) 1 SCC 533.  Learned counsel  also  

relied upon additional affidavit dated 26.11.2009 filed by Shri Gora Lal,  

Executive Officer of the Trust before the High Court and the statement  

made by the Additional Advocate General, Punjab on 16.9.2009 that the  

State Government will have no objection to the release of the land except  

the area falling under the proposed ring road and the berms appurtenant  

thereto  and  argued  that  in  view  of  the  stand  taken  by  the  State  

Government,  the  High  Court  was  not  at  all  justified  in  rejecting  the  

appellants’ prayer for ordering release of their plots. Learned counsel also  

criticised  the  High  Court’s  view that  the  writ  petitions  were  belated.  

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They pointed out that the appellants had approached the Court soon after  

finalisation of the scheme by the State Government and they cannot be  

accused of being guilty of delay because notice under Section 9 of the  

1894 Act had not been served upon them and they had no knowledge  

about the award passed on 16.1.2004.    

17. Shri Salil Sagar, learned senior counsel for the Trust supported the  

impugned order and argued that this Court may not entertain the prayer of  

the appellants because that will result in frustration of ring road scheme.  

He pointed out that the State Government had sanctioned the scheme not  

only for construction of ring road, but also for residential and commercial  

purposes and submitted that a portion of the ring road has already been  

completed  after  taking  possession  of  the  acquired  land  from  other  

landowners and obtaining loan from the financial institutions.  Shri Sagar  

emphasized that the plots on which ‘A’ class construction had been raised  

prior to the issue of notification under Section 36 were exempted from the  

scheme and the appellants cannot claim parity because they constructed  

houses after the issue of notice under Section 36 or their constructions  

were not of ‘A’ class.  Learned senior counsel argued that if smaller plots  

are exempted then the scheme will be jeopardized and the people of the  

area will suffer serious injury inasmuch as they will be deprived of the  

benefit of planned development of residential and commercial area.  Shri  

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Sagar submitted that the additional affidavit filed by the then Chairman of  

the Trust, Shri Jagroop Singh was rightly discarded by the High Court  

because one of his relatives was the writ petitioner and the sole object of  

the additional affidavit was to help him.  

18. We have considered the respective submissions. Before examining  

the  appellants’  challenge  to  the  scheme,  we  may  notice  order  dated  

16.09.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court.  The same  

reads as under:

“IN  THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  PUNJAB  &  HARYANA  AT  CHANDIGARH

C.W.P. NO. 2570 OF 2004

Arun Kumar and others     v. State of Punjab and others

Present: Mr. Ashok Singla, Advocate for the petitioner.     Ms. Rita Kohli, Addl. A.G. Punjab, for the respondent      No.1.     Mr. C.M. Munjal, Advocate, for respondent No.2 and      4.     None for respondent No.3

Learned  counsel  for  Respondent  No.1  submits  that  she  has  obtained instructions to state that the State Government would  have no objection to the release of land which is subject matter  of acquisition other than the land falling under the purported  ring road and the berms appurtenant thereto.

In  view  of  the  above  Mr.  C.M.  Munjal  learned  counsel  representing respondents No.2 and 4 states that he would obtain  instructions  based  on  the  statement  made  on  behalf  of  respondent No.1.

Adjourned to 22.10.2009 so as to enable the learned counsel for  respondents No.2 to 4 to obtain instructions.

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16.9.2009.”

19. We may also  mention that  during the  course  of  arguments,  the  

learned counsel appearing for the appellants categorically stated that their  

clients do not want to question the acquisition of land for the ring road  

and  that  their  objection  is  mainly  directed  against  utilization  of  the  

acquired land for commercial, residential and institutional purposes.

20. The question whether the policy framed by the State Government  

to grant exemption only to ‘A’ class constructions is constitutional is no  

longer res integra and must be treated as concluded by the judgments of  

this Court in Sube Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) and Hari Ram v.  

State of Haryana (supra).  In Sube Singh’s case, the Court considered the  

appellant’s plea that the decision of the State Government not to exclude  

their property from acquisition was arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch  

as the State Government had, in terms of the policy decision taken by it,  

excluded from acquisition ‘A’ class constructions.  The State Government  

justified the exclusion only of ‘A’ class construction by asserting that the  

nature  of  construction  constituted  a  rational  ground  for  making  a  

distinction between various parcels of land for the purpose of grant of  

exemption.  While rejecting the plea of the State, this Court observed:

“It remains to be seen whether the purported classifica- tion of existing structures into A, B and C Classes is a  

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reasonable classification having an intelligible differentia  and a rational basis germane to the purpose. If the State  Government fails to support its action on the touchstone  of the above principle, then this decision has to be held as  arbitrary and discriminatory. It  is  relevant to note here  that  the  acquisition  of  the  lands  is  for  the  purpose  of  planned development of the area which includes both res- idential  and commercial  purposes.  That  being the pur- pose of acquisition, it is difficult to accept the case of the  State Government that certain types of structures which  according to its own classification are of A Class can be  allowed to remain while other structures situated in close  vicinity and being used for same purposes (residential or  commercial) should be demolished. At the cost of repeti- tion, it may be stated here that no material was placed be- fore us to show the basis of classification of the existing  structures on the lands proposed to be acquired. This as- sumes  importance  in  view  of  the  specific  contention  raised on behalf of the appellants that they have pucca  structures with RC roofing, mosaic flooring, etc. No at- tempt was also made from the side of the State Govern- ment to place any architectural plan of different types of  structures proposed to be constructed on the land notified  for acquisition in support of its contention that the struc- tures which exist on the lands of the appellants could not  be amalgamated into the plan.

On the facts and circumstances of the case revealed from  the records,  we are persuaded to accept  the contention  raised on behalf of the appellants that the rejection of the  request of the appellants for exclusion of their land hav- ing structures on them was not based on a fair and reas- onable consideration of the matter. We are of the view  that such action of the Government is arbitrary and dis- criminatory.”

21. In Hari Ram’s case, the Court noted that prior to 26.10.2007, the  

Government  did  not  have  a  uniform  policy  for  withdrawal  from  

acquisition and observed:

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“As regards the guidelines provided in the Letter dated 26-6- 1991, this Court has already held that classification on the basis  of  nature  of  construction  cannot  be  validly  made  and  such  policy  is  not  based  on  intelligible  differentia  and  a  rational  basis. What appears from the available material is that for re- lease of the lands under the subject acquisition, no policy has  been adhered to. This leads to an irresistible conclusion that no  firm policy with regard to release of land from acquisition exis- ted.

It is true that any action or order contrary to law does not confer  any right upon any person for similar treatment. It is equally  true that a landowner whose land has been acquired for public  purpose by following the prescribed procedure cannot claim as  a matter of right for release of his/her land from acquisition but  where the State Government exercises its power under Section  48 of the Act for withdrawal from acquisition in respect of a  particular land, the landowners who are similarly situated have  a right of similar treatment by the State Government. Equality  of citizens' rights is one of the fundamental pillars on which the  edifice of the rule of law rests. All actions of the State have to  be fair and for legitimate reasons.

The Government has obligation of acting with substantial fair- ness and consistency in considering the representations of the  landowners for withdrawal from acquisition whose lands have  been  acquired  under  the  same  acquisition  proceedings.  The  State  Government  cannot  pick  and  choose  some  landowners  and release their land from acquisition and deny the same bene- fit to other landowners by creating artificial distinction. Passing  different orders in exercise of its power under Section 48 of the  Act in respect of persons similarly situated relating to the same  acquisition proceedings and for the same public purpose is def- initely violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and must be  held to be discriminatory.”

22. By applying the ratio of the above noted judgments to the facts of  

these  cases,  we  hold  that  one  of  the  reasons  assigned  by  the  State  

Government  for  not  excluding  the  appellants’  land  from  acquisition,  

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namely, the quality of construction was irrelevant and extraneous and the  

High Court committed serious error by rejecting the appellants’ plea that  

the  respondents  had  discriminated  them  in  the  matter  of  grant  of  

exemption from acquisition.

23. We shall now consider whether the State Government was justified  

in rejecting the recommendations made by the Trust for adjustment of the  

small plots subject to payment of the requisite fee/charges.  Section 72-E  

of the Act which was invoked by the Secretary for partial annulment of  

resolution dated 1.1.2002 reads as under:

“72-E   Power of State Government and its officers  over trust -  

(1) The State Government and Deputy Commissioners acting  under the orders of the State Government,  shall  be bound to  require  that  the  proceedings  of  trusts  shall  be  in  conformity  with law and with the rules in force under any enactment for the  time  being  applicable  to  Punjab  generally  or  the  areas  over  which the trusts have authority.

(2) The State Government may exercise all powers necessary  for the performance of this duty and may among other things,  by order in writing, annul or modify any proceeding which it  may consider not to be in conformity with law or with such  rules as aforesaid, or for the reasons, which would in its opinion  justify an order by the Deputy Commissioner under section 72- B.

(3) The Deputy Commissioner may, within his jurisdiction for  the same purpose, exercise such powers as may be conferred  upon  him  by  rules  made  in  this  behalf  by  the  State  Government.”

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24. A reading of the above reproduced provision makes it clear that in  

terms of Section 72-E(1), the State Government is duty bound to ensure  

that the proceedings of the Trusts remain within the bounds of law. The  

Deputy Commissioners, on being ordered by the State Government are  

also  under  an  obligation  to  ensure  that  the  proceedings  of  the  Trusts  

coming within their jurisdiction are in conformity with the law and the  

rules made under various enactments.  Section 72-E (2) lays down that  

for performance of its duty under Section 72-E (1), the State Government  

can exercise all the powers including annulment or modification of any  

proceeding of the Trust which may, in its opinion, be not in conformity  

with law or the rules framed thereunder or which would in its opinion  

justify an order by the Deputy Commissioner by virtue of  exercise of  

such power  as  may be conferred upon him by the rules  made in  this  

behalf by the State Government.   

25. Though the plain language of Section 72-E does not postulate grant  

of hearing by the State Government or the Deputy Commissioner, as the  

case may be, to those who may be affected by modification or annulment  

of the resolution passed by the Trust, but the rules of fairness require that  

while modifying or setting aside the resolution passed by the Trust, the  

State Government or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, must  

give some indication of  the application of  mind by recording reasons,  

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howsoever,  briefly.  If  the order passed under Section 72-E represents  

inscrutable  face  of  the  sphinx,  the  Court  is  entitled  to  infer  that  the  

concerned authority had either not considered the relevant records or not  

applied mind to the rationale of the decision taken by the Trust or the  

recommendations made by it.

26. A reading of order dated 15.1.2002 passed by the Secretary does  

not show that the concerned officer had considered the pros and cons of  

the resolution passed by the Trust for adjustment of the smaller plots and  

then  decided  to  partially  annul  the  same.   Therefore,  the  High  Court  

should have quashed the order passed under Section 72-E of the Act and  

directed the State Government to decide the matter afresh.  Its failure to  

adopt that course has resulted in manifest injustice and adversely affected  

the the appellants    

27. If the recommendations made by the Trust are considered in the  

light of the fact that the appellants had already constructed their houses  

and a statement was made on behalf of the State Government before the  

High Court that it has no objection to the release of the plots other than  

those falling under the ring road and the  berms appurtenant thereto, it  

becomes clear that the Secretary had arbitrarily cancelled that part of the  

resolution of the Trust.   

28. An additional fact of which cognizance deserves to be taken is that  

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the scheme framed by the Trust was not only for construction of ring road  

but  also  for  development  of  commercial,  residential  and  institutional  

plots.   It  is  difficult,  if  not impossible,  to fathom any reason why the  

Secretary to the Government rejected the recommendations made by the  

President  for  exemption  of  the  land  belonging  to  small  plot  holders  

despite the fact that the acquired land was intended to be utilised not only  

for  construction of  ring road but also for  development of commercial,  

residential  and  institutional  plots,  which  would  have  been  ultimately  

allotted to other persons by draw of lots or by auction. How could there  

be a justification to demolish the residential houses of the appellants for  

providing commercial, residential and institutional plots to others?  In our  

considered  opinion,  the  decision  taken  by  the  Secretary  was  wholly  

arbitrary,  unreasonable  and unjustified  and the  High Court  committed  

grave error by refusing to quash the same.

29. In view of the above conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to  

deal with the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties on  

the basis of the report submitted by the District Town Planner.

30. As a sequel to the above discussion, the appeals are partly allowed,  

the impugned order is set aside and the State Government and the Trust  

are directed to exclude the appellants’ land from the scheme except to the  

extent the same is required for constructing the  ring road.  The concerned  

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officers of the Trust are directed to take appropriate action in this regard  

within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a  

copy of this order.  

   ...….……..…..………………..J.      [G.S. SINGHVI]   

                                             ...….……..…..………………..J.                 [GYAN SUDHA MISRA]   

New Delhi, August 6, 2013.                   

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