SHAILESHBHAI @ PAPPU BALUBHAI CHUNARA&AN Vs STATE OF GUJARAT
Bench: DIPAK MISRA,V. GOPALA GOWDA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001974-001974 / 2012
Diary number: 21851 / 2012
Advocates: MRIDULA RAY BHARADWAJ Vs
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1974 OF 2012
Shaileshbhai @ Pappu Balubhai Chunara & Anr. ….. Appellants
Versus
State of Gujrat … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
In this appeal, by special leave, the assail is to the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 02/05/2012 passed by the High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 1644 of 2005,
whereby the Division Bench, placing reliance on the dying declaration of
the deceased Champaben, has affirmed the decision of the learned Trial
Judge, who had found the accused-appellants guilty of offence
punishable under Section 302/34, 332 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code,
Digitally signed by Chetan Kumar Date: 2015.08.27 14:06:12 IST Reason: This file is signed by using the card of Mr. Chetan Kumar, Court Master, by Naveen Kumar, Court Master
Signature Not Verified
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1860 (for short, “the IPC”).
2. The broad essential facts, which need to be stated for the
adjudication of this appeal, are that the deceased, Champaben, was
staying with her mother-in-law, brother-in-law and children in a hut near
the Water Tank, Macchipir Area, Baalvatika, Ahmedabad and the said
hut was sold off by her mother-in-law. The said transaction had brought
the deceased Champaben and her children to a miserable state of penury
and eventually they were forced to live on the footpath. As alleged, the
mother-in-law and brother-in-law had left them in the lurch and went to
live elsewhere. On 13.12.2001, as per the case of the prosecution, the
accused-appellants attacked her and gave her fist and kick blows and
then A-3, namely, Chinabhai caught hold of her and Balubhai Hemabhai
Chunara poured kerosene and set her ablaze. A-2, Shailesbhai @ Pappu
Balubhai Chunara, aided and abetted the offence. On the basis of the
statement made by the deceased on 13.12.2001, the criminal law was set
in motion and accused persons were arrested. The dying declarations of
Champaben were recorded regard being had to her sinking condition.
Eventually, she succumbed to her injuries on 22.12.2001.
3. After completing the investigation, the prosecution laid the
chargesheet under Sections 302/34, 323 and 114 of the IPC before the
competent Court which in turn committed the matter to the Court of
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Session. The learned Sessions Judge, on the basis of the evidence
brought on record and placing reliance on the dying declarations of
Champaben, convicted the accused persons and imposed the sentence.
Suffice it to say, all of them were convicted under Section 302/34 IPC,
apart from separate sentence imposed under Sections 323 and 114 of the
IPC. The learned trial Judge repelled the plea of the defence that there
were three dying declarations and there was manifest inconsistency and
hence, they did not deserve acceptance.
4. On an appeal being preferred, the High Court adverted at length
to the legal acceptability of the dying declarations and found that there
was actually no inconsistency and accordingly affirmed the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence.
5. We have heard Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj learned counsel for the
appellants and Ms. Hemantika Wahi learned counsel for the State.
6. There is no dispute that the conviction has been recorded on the
sole basis of the dying declaration. As the material brought record woule
reveal, on the date of occurrence, the deceased was immediately taken to
L.G. Hospital, where initially she was treated by Dr. Sandip, PW-2, and
there is an endorsement in the case papers that “alleged history of burns
over body by Shailesbhai Chunara’s friends at Water tank, Baalvatika.”
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After the said endorsement, the treatment commenced and about 3.15
p.m. she was taken to Dr. Kunjan Patel, who recorded the history of
injuries and noted that she had suffered severe burn injuries being burnt
by three persons, namely, Balubhai Hemabhai, Shailesbhai Balubhai and
Chinabhai Balubhai. Thereafter, a dying declaration was recorded after
the investigating agency requisitioned the presence of Executive
Magistrate, namely, Binodbhai Mafatbhai Patel (PW-3). On a perusal of
the said dying declaration, we find that Dr Kunjan Patel had certified that
patient was conscious and fit for making a dying declaration. The
Executive Magistrate has recorded the dying declaration in the
questionnaire form wherein the deceased had clearly stated that she had
a quarrel with the accused-appellants and they had caused burn injuries
on her legs, chest and other part of the body. The learned Magistrate has
also deposed that he had taken care that no one else was present at the
time of recording of the dying declaration.
7. Mr. Bharadwaj learned counsel for the appellant attacking the
acceptability of the dying declaration has urged that when there are more
than one dying declaration, and inconsistency is perceptible, the Court
should be extremely careful before placing reliance on it. To bolster the
said submission he has drawn inspiration from the decisions in Lella
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Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P 1, Amol Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh2, Sharda v. State of Rajasthan 3 and State of Rajasthan v.
Sharavan Ram & Anr.4.
8. In Lella Srinivasa Rao (supra) the Court, appreciating the
evidence on record, noticed that there was inconsistency between the two
dying declarations and, therefore, thought it unsafe to base the conviction
on the basis of the second dying declaration. It is apt to state here that in
the said case, in the first dying declaration there was no mention about
the appellant having treated the deceased with cruelty or of his having
caused harassment to the deceased. That apart, the Court noticed that
his name did not find place in the relevant portion of the first dying
declaration though the said dying declaration was recorded by a
Magistrate after taking all precautions.
9. In Amol Singh (supra) the Court noticed certain inconsistencies
between one dying declaration and the other. In that context, it was
opined that the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies,
namely, whether they are material or not and while scrutinizing the
contents of various dying declarations it becomes the duty of the court to
examine the same in the light of various surrounding facts and
1 (2004) 9 SCC 713 2 (2008) 5 SCC 469 3 (2010) 2 SCC 85 4 (2013) 12 SCC 255
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circumstances. In the said case the Court found several discrepancies
even as regards the manner in which the kerosene was sprinkled and on
facts did not find the dying declaration inspiring credence.
10. In the case of Sharda (supra) the Court observed that a dying
declaration to deserve acceptance should inspire full confidence of the
court of its correctness and the court is required to see that such
statement of the deceased is not a result of either tutoring, prompting or
product of imagination. Emphasis was also laid on the satisfaction of the
fact that the deceased was in a fit state of mind.
11. In Shravan Ram and another (supra) the Court referred to the
decisions in Kamla v. State of Punjab 5, Kishan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan6, Lella Srinivasa Rao (supra), Amol Singh (supra) and
State of A.P. v. P. Khaja Hussain 7, and, eventually, came to hold that
there were discrepancies and contradictions between the two dying
declarations and, therefore, the conviction could not be based on such
dying declaration.
12. In Laxmi (Smt) v. Om Prakash and others 8, the Court after
referring to the maxim “ Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” which
means, “No one at the point of the death is presumed to lie”, opined that: 5 (1993) 1 SCC 1 6 (2000) 1 SCC 310 7 (2009) 15 SCC 120 8 (2001) 6 SCC 118
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-
“If in a given case a particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmities, either of its own or as disclosed by other evidence adduced in the case or circumstances coming to its notice, the court may as a rule of prudence look for corroboration and if the infirmities be such as render the dying declaration so infirm as to prick the conscience of the court, the same may be refused to be accepted as forming a safe basis for conviction.”
13. At this juncture, we may also fruitfully refer to a two-Judge
Bench decision in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and another v.
State of Andhra Pradesh9 where the Court observed that: -
“A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration. If there are more than one dying declarations then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy. The Court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same.”
14. Keeping mind the aforesaid principles, we shall scrutinize 9 (1993) 2 SCC 684
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whether the dying declarations withstand the attack made by the learned
counsel for the appellant or they survive the assault to stand erect on the
pedestal of credibility. To appreciate the controversy, as raised, we
required the learned counsel for the State to read out the statements in
original to us. That apart, the learned counsel for the State has
translated the same for better appreciation. On a keen scrutiny of the
same we find that Dr. Sandip had only made an endorsement at the time
of admission. Dr. Kunjan Patel also had made an endorsement and at
that time he had recorded the three names and thereafter the Executive
Magistrate had recorded the dying declaration. Emphasis of Dr.
Bharadwaj, learned counsel is that the deceased should have mentioned
all the names to Dr. Sandip. As is perceivable, Dr. Sandip has not
recorded the dying declaration. He, at the time of entry to the hospital,
only mentioned the same as a requisite endorsement. In any case, we do
not see any inconsistency in all the recordings, namely, by Dr. Sandip,
Ext. 20, Dr. Kunjan Patel, Ext. 13, and Mr. Vinodbhai Mafatbhai Patel,
Executive Magistrate, Ext. 16.
15. We are disposed to hold so, as from the endorsement it is
manifest that the deceased had, while availing treatment, said that the
accused persons were totally hostile to her and in order to extinguish her
life spark had poured kerosene on her. It is also reflectible from the
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hospital records tendered in evidence that the patient was conscious and
well oriented and was in a position to follow the instructions. While the
patient was in that condition, the Magistrate was called to record the
dying declaration. About the fitness of the patient Dr. Kunjan Patel had
examined the patient and clearly stated that she was in a fit and
conscious condition to give a dying declaration. The Executive Magistrate
had taken precautions by removing all the relatives of the injured from
the room and approached the doctor to verify about the fitness of the
patient, and after being satisfied that she was fit enough to give dying
declaration, recorded the same in a questionnaire form. The deceased
during recording of the statement has categorically stated that she had a
quarrel on the date of occurrence with Balu Hema, Shailesh Balu and
China Balu and, therefore, Balu Hema poured kerosene on her and China
Balu caught hold of her and Shailesh Balu burnt her by igniting a match
stick. It is submitted by Mr. Bhardwaj that the deceased should have
mentioned all the names before the doctor at the first instance. The said
submission suffers from fundamental fallacy inasmuch as Dr. Sandip was
only making an endorsement at the time of entry into the hospital. He
was not recording any dying declaration. It was only an endorsement
which was required for the hospital record. As is evident, she has
mentioned the names before Dr. Kunjan Patel who really treated her.
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Nothing has been brought on the evidence to discredit the testimony of
the Executive Magistrate who has recorded the dying declaration in
questionnaire form. There is no circumstance from which it can remotely
be inferred that she was tutored or her statement was embellished by any
kind of influence. On the contrary, her testimony has been consistent
and, therefore, the reliance placed on the same by the learned trial Judge
as well as by the High Court is absolutely impeccable and, therefore, we
do not find flaw in the judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
16. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands
dismissed.
....................................J. [Dipak Misra]
....................................J. [S.A. Bobde]
New Delhi; August 07, 2014.
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ITEM NO.103 COURT NO.8 SECTION IIB S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 1974/2012 SHAILESHBHAI @ PAPPU BALUBHAI CHUNARA& ANR Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT Respondent(s)
Date : 07/08/2014 This appeal was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE For Appellant(s) Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Adv.
Dr. Sushil Kr. Gupta, Adv. Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Adv.
Mr. Manoj Kumar, Adv. For Respondent(s) Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Adv. Ms. Jesal, Adv.
Ms. Puja Singh, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
Appeal is dismissed in terms of the reportable signed judgment.
(NAVEEN KUMAR) (RENUKA SADANA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)