1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 366 OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5777 of 2017)

Shafin Jahan …Appellant(s)

Versus

Asokan K.M. & Ors.          …Respondent(s)

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.]

 Rainbow is described by some as the autograph of the

Almighty and lightning, albeit metaphorically, to be the

expression of cruelty of otherwise equanimous “Nature”.

Elaborating the comparison in conceptual essentiality, it can be

said that when the liberty of a person is illegally smothered and

strangulated and his/her choice  is throttled by the State  or a

private person, the signature of life melts and living becomes a

bare subsistence. That is fundamentally an expression of

acrimony which gives indecent  burial to the individuality  of  a

person  and refuses to recognize the  other’s identity.  That is

2

reflection of  cruelty  which  the  law does not  countenance.  The

exposé of facts in the present case depicts that story giving it a

colour of different narrative. It is different since the State that is

expected to facilitate the enjoyment of legal rights of a citizen has

also supported the cause of a father, an obstinate one, who has

endeavoured immensely in not allowing his daughter to make her

own choice in adhering to a faith and further making Everestine

effort to garrotte her desire to live with the man with whom she

has entered into wedlock.  The thought itself is a manifestation of

the idea of patriarchal autocracy and possibly self­obsession with

the feeling that a female is a chattel. It is also necessary to add

here that the High Court on some kind of assumption, as the

impugned judgment and order would reflect, has not been

appositely guided by the basic rule of the highly valued writ of

habeas corpus and has annulled the marriage.  And that is why

the order becomes a sanctuary of errors.

2. On 08.03.2018, this Court had allowed the appeal passing

the following order:­

“Leave granted.  

Heard Mr. Kapil Sibal and Ms. Indira Jaising, learned senior counsel along with Mr. Haris Beeran,

3

learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.  Maninder Singh,  learned Additional Solicitor General for the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel along with Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel for respondent No.1.  

The reasoned judgment will follow. The operative part of the order reads as follows:­  

Considering the arguments advanced on both sides, in the facts of the present case, we hold that the High Court should not have annulled the marriage between appellant No.1, Shafin Jahan and respondent No.9, Hadiya alias Akhila Asokan, in a Habeas  Corpus petition  under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  We say so because in the present appeal, by special leave, we had directed the personal  presence  of  Hadiya  alias  Akhila  Asokan; she appeared before this Court on 27th November, 2017, and admitted her  marriage with appellant No.1.  

In view of the aforesaid, the appeal stands allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court  is  set aside.  Respondent No.9,  Hadiya alias Akhila Asokan is at liberty to pursue her future endeavours according to law. We clarify that the investigations by the NIA in respect of any matter of criminality  may  continue in  accordance with law.”

3. Presently, we proceed to state the reasons.

4. The facts  which are  necessary to  be  stated  are that  Ms.

Akhila alias Hadiya, respondent No.9 herein, aged about 26 years

at present, the only child of Sh. Asokan K.M., respondent No.1

herein, and Smt. Ponnamma, had completed a degree in

4

Homeopathic Medicine, BHMS (Bachelor of Homeopathic

Medicine and Surgery) from Shivaraj Homeopathic Medical

College, Salem in Tamil Nadu. While pursuing the said course,

she  was initially residing in the college hostel and later she

started staying in a rented house near her college together with

five other students among  whom  were Jaseena and  Faseena,

daughters of one Aboobacker. During the college holidays, Hadiya

used  to  visit the  house of  Aboobacker  and  there  was  also  an

occasion when both Jaseena and Faseena came to reside with

Hadiya at the house of Asokan, respondent No.1 herein. On 6th

December, 2015, Hadiya’s paternal grandfather breathed his last.

Hadiya on that day came back to her house and it is alleged that

at that time, the family members and relatives of Asokan noticed

some changes in her behaviour as she was showing reluctance to

participate in the rituals performed in connection with the

funeral of her grandfather. Thereafter, she went to Salem for her

internship along  with Jaseena and  Faseena.  Till 5th  January,

2016, she was in constant touch with her family. Thereafter, on

the next day, i.e., 6th January, 2016, Asokan received a telephone

call from one of the friends of Hadiya informing that Hadiya had

gone to the college on that day wearing a ‘Pardah’. The

5

respondent No.1 was further informed that Hadiya was inspired

by someone to change her faith.

5. Upon receiving the information, Asokan fell ill. Smt.

Ponnamma, wife of Asokan, called Hadiya and informed her

about the illness of her father.  Jaseena and Hadiya left for Salem

about 8 p.m. on 6th January, 2016 but Hadiya did not reach her

father’s house. Later Asokan went in search of Hadiya and came

to  know from one Ms.  Archana  that  Hadiya  was living  at the

house of Aboobacker. Thereupon, Asokan contacted Aboobacker

for meeting his daughter Hadiya. Aboobacker promised Asokan

that he would bring Hadiya to the house of Ms. Archana, a friend

of Hadiya, but this never happened and later Asokan was

informed that Hadiya had escaped from the house of Aboobacker

and had run away somewhere. Disgusted and disgruntled, as he

was,  Asokan filed a complaint  before S.P.  Malapuram District,

but as there was no progress made by the police in the

investigation of the matter, Asokan filed a Writ Petition of Habeas

Corpus before the Division Bench of the High Court of  Kerala

being W.P. (Criminal) No. 25 of 2016.

6

6. On 14.01.2016, when the case came up for admission, the

Division Bench directed the Government pleader to get

instructions regarding the action, if any, taken on the aforesaid

complaint of Asokan. Thereafter, on 19.01.2016, when the case

was taken up for further consideration, Hadiya appeared through

a lawyer and filed an application for impleadment being I.A. No.

792 of 2016. The said application for impleadment was allowed

and Hadiya was impleaded as a respondent. An affidavit dated

26.11.2016 was filed on her behalf stating, inter alia, the facts

and circumstances  under  which she  had left her  house. The

aforesaid affidavit mentioned that she had communicated to her

father as well as Director General of Police by registered letter

regarding the actual state of affairs. Further, she along with one

Sainaba filed  Writ Petition being  W.P. (C) No. 1965 of 2016

seeking protection from police harassment.  

7. The Division Bench in W.P. (Criminal) No. 25 of 2016

persuaded Hadiya  to go along with her  father,  Asokan,  to her

parental house but the said persuasions  were all in vain as

Hadiya was not willing to go with her father. The Division Bench,

thereafter, interacted with Sainaba who expressed her

7

unequivocal willingness to the Division Bench to accommodate

Hadiya in “Satyasarani” institution and that Sainaba would

render all necessary help to Hadiya to pursue her internship in

BHMS degree course.  As  Hadiya  had taken  a stand that she

wanted to join Satyasarani and she was not, in any case, willing

to go back to her parental home along with Asokan, the Division

Bench permitted Hadiya to stay with Sainaba at her house till

she joined Satyasarani. The Division Bench thereafter adjourned

the case for further hearing directing to produce proof regarding

admission of Hadiya in Satyasarani.

8. The case  was  taken up  for  consideration by the Division

Bench where the counsel appearing on behalf of Hadiya produced

documents to show that Hadiya had got admission on

20.01.2016 in an institution, namely, ‘Markazul Hidaya

Sathyasarani Educational & Charitable Trust’ at Karuvambram,

Manjeri in  Malappuram District. The counsel for  Hadiya also

submitted before the writ court that Hadiya was staying in the

hostel of the said institution.

9. The Division Bench, vide judgment dated 25.01.2016,

directed as follows:­

8

“8. Under the above mentioned circumstances, we are convinced that the alleged detenue is not under any illegal confinement. She is at present staying in the above said institution on her own wish and will. She is not under illegal confinement. Therefore, there exists no circumstances warranting interference for issuance of any writ of Habeas Corpus. Hence the original petition is hereby disposed of  by  recording  the fact that the  alleged detenue is staying in the above said institution on her own free will. It will be left open to the petitioner and her family members to make visit to her at the above institution, subject to regulations if any regarding visiting time."

10. In view of the aforesaid order, the  writ petition filed by

Hadiya was withdrawn.

11. When the  matter stood thus, the 1st  respondent filed a

second Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 297 of 2016 alleging that his

daughter was likely to be transported out of the country and the

High Court, vide interim order, directed the respondent to keep

her under surveillance and to ensure that she was not taken out

of the country without further orders of the Court.   The

averments made by the father in the writ petition need not be

stated in detail. Suffice it to say that Hadiya alias Akhila

categorically declined to go with her parents and stated in the

affidavit filed by her that she was not being permitted to interact

with anyone.  Hadiya further stated that she wanted to reside at

9

a place of her choice and that she had not been issued a passport

and, therefore, there  was  no likelihood  of  her  being taken to

Syria.   The  High  Court, considering the affidavit, passed the

following order:­

“After hearing learned counsel on both sides, we are of the opinion that in the light of the finding entered by this court in the earlier round of litigation that this Court cannot compel the petitioner's daughter to go and reside with her parents and that she is not in the illegal custody of anyone, this court cannot any longer direct that the petitioner's daughter should continue to reside at Santhinikethan Hostel,  Pachalam. When we asked the petitioner's daughter as to whether she is willing to appear on another day, she submitted that she will appear on the next hearing date. Learned counsel for the detenue also submitted that the detenue will be present in person on the next hearing date. We accordingly permit the detenue to reside at a place of her choice. We also record the statement of Ms. Akhila that she proposes to reside with the seventh respondent, Smt. A.S.Sainaba, whose address is mentioned in the instant writ petition. Sri. P.K.Ibrahim, learned counsel appearing for the seventh respondent submitted that the seventh respondent will cause production of the petitioner's daughter on the next hearing date, if she proposes to reside with her. If the petitioner's daughter proposes to shift her residence and to reside elsewhere, we shall inform that fact to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Perinthalmanna in writing and furnish her full residential address and the telephone number if any over which she can be contacted. Call on 24.10.2016.  The Deputy Superintendent of  Police, Perinthalmanna shall cause production of the petitioner's daughter on that day. It will be open to

10

the parents of Ms. Akhila to meet and interact with her.”

12. On the basis of the aforesaid order passed  by the  High

Court, Hadiya was permitted to reside with the 7th  respondent.

On 14.11.2016, the counsel for the writ petitioner before the High

Court expressed serious apprehension regarding the continued

residence of  his  daughter in the  house of the  7th  respondent

therein.  On 19.12.2016, the High Court noted that she had not

completed her course and acquired competence to practise

homeopathy  and, accordingly, expressed the opinion that she

should complete her House Surgeoncy without delay and obtain

eligibility to practice.   A statement was made on her behalf that

she has to complete her House Surgeoncy at the Shivaraj

Homeopathic Medical College, Salem  which has a hostel for

women where she was willing to reside for the purpose of

completing her House Surgeoncy.  On the basis of the aforesaid,

the High Court passed the following order:­

“We have heard the learned Senior counsel Sri. S.Sreekumar, who appears for the detenue. We have perused the affidavit dated 26.11.2016 filed by the detenue producing documents, Exts. R8(d) and R8(e).  We are not prepared to rely on Ext.R8(d) which purports to make it clear as though a registered Homeopathic Medical Practitioner has

11

permitted the detenue to work as a trainee in Homeopathic Medicine on a remuneration of Rs.2000/­ per month for her day today expenses. We fail to understand how the detenue, who has not obtained a degree in Homeopathy can be permitted to train under him. The detenue has admittedly not completed her House Surgeoncy or obtained eligibility to practice. Therefore, it is only appropriate that she completes her House Surgeoncy without further delay and obtains eligibility to practice Homeopathic Medicine. Her Senior  counsel  Sri.  S.Sreekumar  informs us  that, the  detenue is  desirous  of completing  her  House Surgeoncy. However, we place on record our dissatisfaction at the continued residence of the detenue with the 7th respondent, who is a stranger. The counsel for the petitioner also expresses anxiety and  concern  at  her continued residence  with the 7th respondent. He is anxious about the safety and well being of the detenue. His anxiety and concern as the parent of an only daughter is understandable. Therefore, it is necessary that the detenue shifts her residence to a more acceptable place, without further delay. According to the learned Senior counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar, she has to complete her House Surgeoncy at the Shivaraj Homeopathic  Medical College, Salem. The college has a hostel for girl students where she is willing to reside and complete her House Surgeoncy. The petitioner offers to bear the expenses for her education and stay at  the Medical  College Hostel. He offers to escort her to the Medical College and to admit her into the Hostel there. The detenue is also, according to the learned Senior counsel, willing to accompany her.  

2.  In view of the above, there shall be a direction to the detenue to appear before this Court at 10.15 a.m. on  21.12.2016. The  petitioner shall also be present  in person  in Court on the said date.  The petitioner who is stated to be in possession of the

12

certificates of the detenue shall bring such certificates also to Court.  We shall pass further orders in the matter, regarding the manner in which the detenue is  to be taken to the Medical College and admitted to the ladies hostel, on 21.12.2016.  

Post on 21.12.2016.”

13. On 21.12.2016, Hadiya appeared before the High Court and

a statement was made that she had entered into marriage with

Shafin  Jahan, the  appellant  herein.  The  High Court,  at that

juncture, as the order would reflect, noted that her marriage was

totally an unexpected event and proceeded to ascertain the

veracity of the statement made.   It has recorded its displeasure

as to the manner in which the entire exercise was accomplished.

It passed a detailed order on 21.12.2016.   The relevant part of

the order reads thus:­

“This court exercising its Parens Patriae jurisdiction is  anxious and concerned about the safety of the detenue and her well being, viewed especially in the light of the allegations made in the Writ Petition and the continued obstinance of the detenue to return to her parents. The person who is stated to have got married to the detenue has appeared before us today, for the first time. He claims to be a graduate and  a  person  who is employed in the  Gulf. It is stated that, he is desirous of taking the detenue out of the country. It was precisely the said apprehension that was expressed by her father in the proceedings before this Court on the earlier occasion. This Court has on the said occasion recorded the fact that since she was not possessed

13

of a Passport, there was no likelihood of her being taken to Syria. The question that crops up now is whether the marriage that has been allegedly performed is not a device to transport her out of this country.  We  are  not  aware of the identity of the person who  is  alleged  to  have  got  married  to the detenue. We are not aware of the antecedents of the said person or his family background. The address mentioned in the marriage certificate produced shows that he is from Kollam. In what manner he has come into contact with detenue and under what circumstances, the detenue has agreed to get married to a stranger like him are  matters that require to be probed thoroughly. The marriage certificate shows that the marriage was performed by the Khazi at the house of  the 7th respondent, Srambikal  House,  Puthur.  Why  the  marriage  was conducted at her  house is not clear.  Unless the above questions are answered, it cannot be accepted that the  detenue is in  safe  hands.  This Court  exercising Parens Patriae  jurisdiction has a duty to ensure that young girls like the detenue are not exploited or transported out of the country. Though the learned Senior Counsel has vociferously contended  that the  detenue is  a  person who has attained majority, it is  necessary to bear  in mind the  fact that the  detenue who  is  a  female in  her twenties is at a vulnerable age. As per Indian tradition, the custody of an unmarried daughter is with the parents, until she is properly married. We consider it the duty of this Court to ensure that a person under such a vulnerable state is not exposed to  further danger,  especially in the circumstances noticed above where even her marriage is stated to have been performed with another person, in accordance  with Islamic religious rites. That too, with the connivance of the 7th respondent with whom she was permitted to reside, by this Court. 8. We place on record our absolute dissatisfaction at the manner in which the marriage if at all one has been performed, has been conducted. The 7th

14

respondent having been a party to these proceedings had a duty to at least inform this Court of the same, in advance. This Court had relying on her credentials and assurance, permitted the detenue to accompany her and to live with her. We would  have expected  a reasonable litigant,  which includes the detenue also who as we have noticed earlier, is represented through an eminent  Senior Counsel of this Court, to have informed this Court and obtained permission from this Court before such a drastic course was undertaken. Considering the manner in which the marriage has been conducted, the secrecy surrounding the said transaction and also the hurried manner in which the whole exercise was completed, the entire episode is shrouded in suspicion. Unless the suspicion is cleared the detenue cannot be permitted to go with the person who is seen to be accompanying her  now. In view of the above, the following directions are issued.  

1) The first respondent is directed to escort the detenue and to have her accommodated at the S.N.V.Sadanam Hostel, Chittoor Road, Ernakulam, until further orders. The first respondent shall ensure that she is not provided the facility of possessing or using a mobile phone. The petitioner and the  mother shall be at liberty to  meet her according to the rules and regulations of the hostel. No other person is permitted to meet her.

2) The first respondent shall cause an investigation to be conducted into the education, family background, antecedents and other relevant details of Sri. Shafin Jahan who is stated to be the bridegroom of the alleged marriage that is stated to have  been conducted on 19.12.2016 as evidenced by the certificate dated 20.12.2016 produced before us. The first respondent shall also enquire into the circumstances surrounding the conduct of such marriage, the persons who were involved in the

15

conduct of the same the organization that has issued the marriage certificate, as well as their antecedents. A report of such investigation shall be placed before us before the next posting date of this case. The 4th respondent shall oversee the investigation  and  see that  all relevant  details are unearthed and placed before us including any links with extremist organizations, of  which allegations are made in the Writ Petition.  

3) The Secretary, Othukkungal Grama Panchayat is directed not to issue the marriage certificate sought for by the applicants Shafine Jahan and Hadiya as per receipt dated 20.12.2016, without further orders from this Court. The petitioner shall bear the expenses for the accommodation of the detenue at the hostel.  

4) Post on 6.1.2017.”

14. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on various dates by the

High Court and eventually, by the impugned judgment and order,

it opined that a girl aged 24 years is weak and vulnerable and

capable of being exploited in  many  ways and thereafter, the

Court, exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction, observed that it

was concerned with the welfare of the girl of her age.  It has been

further observed by the High Court that the duty is cast on it to

ensure the safety of at least the girls who are brought before it

and the said duty can only be discharged by ensuring that the

16

custody of Akhila alias Hadiya should be given to her parents.

The High Court further directed to the following effect:­

“She shall be cared for, permitted to complete her House  Surgeoncy Course  and made professionally qualified so that she would be in a position to stand independently  on her  own two  legs.  Her  marriage being the most important decision in her life, can also be taken only with the active involvement of her parents. The marriage which is alleged to have been performed is a sham and is of no consequence in the eye of law. The 7th respondent and her husband had no authority or competence to act as the guardian of Ms. Akhila and to give her in marriage. Therefore, the alleged marriage is null and void. It is declared to be so.”

15. The High Court also directed that a police officer of the rank

of Sub­Inspector should escort Akhila alias Hadiya from the

hostel to  her father’s  house and the  Superintendent of  Police,

Respondent No.2 therein, should maintain surveillance over them

to ensure  their  continued safety.  That  apart, the  High Court

issued the following directions:­

“iii) The 4th respondent shall take over the investigation of Crime No. 21 of 2016 of Perinthalmanna Police Station and shall have a comprehensive investigation conducted co­ ordinating the investigation in Crime No.510 of 2016 of Cherpulassery Police Station which has been registered into the forcible conversion of Ms.Athira which is the subject matter of W.P.(Crl.) No. 235 of 2016 of this Court. The 4th respondent shall also investigate the  activities  of the organizations that

17

are involved in this case of which reference has been made by us above. Such investigation shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and the persons who are found to be guilty shall be brought to the book.  

iv) The 4th respondent shall conduct a full­fledged enquiry into the lapses on the part of the Investigating Officer in this case and shall, if necessary, pursue departmental proceedings against the Officer concerned.”

16. Against the aforesaid order, the present appeal, by special

leave, was filed by Shafin Jahan seeking permission to file the

special leave which is granted by this Court.

17. This Court, vide order dated 4.8.2017, asked Mr. Maninder

Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, to accept notice on

behalf of the Respondent No.6, the National Investigating Agency

(NIA).  Thereafter, various orders were passed by this Court with

regard to investigation which are not necessary to narrate.  It is

worthy to mention that on 30.10.2017, this Court directed the 1st

respondent to produce his daughter before this Court on

27.11.2017.  On the date fixed, Hadiya was produced before this

Court and a prayer was made to interact with Hadiya in camera

and not in  open Court  but  repelling  the  said submission, the

following order was passed:­

18

 “After due deliberation, we thought it appropriate to interact with Akhila @ Hadiya and we have accordingly interacted with her  in Court.  We were told that though she can communicate in English, she may not be able to effectively articulate in that language. Hence, we requested Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel, who also represents the State of Kerala to assist in translating the questions posed to her in Court and the answers given by her.  

 The range of questions that we posed basically pertained to her qualifications,  interest in studies, perception  of life and  what she intends to  do in future. In response to our queries, she responded by stating that  she  has  passed Class  X  from Higher Secondary School in K.V. Puram, Vaikom in Kottayam District and thereafter she was prosecuting her BHMS course in Shivaraj Homeopathy Medical College in Salem in the State of Tamil Nadu. She has also stated that she intends to continue  her internship/  housemanship  which she  had left because of certain reasons and  her ambition is to  become  a full­fledged  homeopathic doctor. She has expressed her desire to stay in the hostel and complete the course in the said college, if a seat is made available.

 In the above view, we direct, as desired by her, that she be taken to Salem so as to enable her to pursue her internship/housemanship. We also direct the college to admit her and to allow the facility of a room or a shared room in the hostel as per practice to enable her to continue her internship/housemanship afresh. Be it stated, she herself has stated that the duration of the internship/housemanship is likely to be for 11 months. If any formality is to be complied with, the college shall  communicate with the university and the university shall accede to the same. Our directions are to be followed in letter and spirit by all  concerned. Needless to say, when she stays in the hostel, she will be treated like any other student

19

and will be guided by the hostel rules. If necessary, the  expenses  for  pursuing the  course and  for the hostel  shall  be borne by  the  State  of  Kerala.  The Dean of the  College shall approach this  Court if there is any problem with regard to any aspect. 'Any problem' does not mean, admission in the hostel or continuance in the course.

 We direct the State of Kerala to make all necessary arrangements  so  that  she can travel to Salem at the earliest. She has made a request that she should be accompanied by policewomen in plainclothes.  The State  shall  attend  to the  prayer appropriately. If any security problem  arises, the State of Tamil Nadu shall make local arrangements for the same. We have been told that she is presently staying  in Kerala Bhawan at New Delhi. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel assures this Court that she shall be permitted to stay in Kerala Bhawan till she moves to Salem.  

 We  make it clear that the  NIA investigation shall continue in accordance with law.”

18. The aforesaid adumbration calls for restatement of the law

pertaining to writ of habeas corpus which has always been

considered as ‘a great constitutional privilege’ or ‘the first security

of civil liberty’.  The writ is meant to provide an expeditious and

effective remedy against illegal detention, for such detention

affects the liberty and freedom of the person who is in

confinement.

20

19. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon (1997 Edn.), while

defining “habeas corpus”, apart from other aspects, the following

has been stated:­

“The ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus takes its name from the two  mandatory  words habeas corpus, which it contained at the time when it, in common with all forms of legal process, was framed in Latin. The general purpose of these writs, as their name indicates, was to obtain the production of an individual.”

20. In Cox v. Hakes1, Lord Halsbury observed as under: ­

"For a  period extending  as far  back  as our legal history, the writ of habeas corpus has been regarded as one of the  most important safeguards of the liberty of the subject. If upon the return to that writ it was adjudged that no legal ground was made to appear justifying detention, the consequence  was immediate release from custody. If release was refused, a person detained might make a fresh application  to  every judge  or  every  court in turn, and each court or judge was bound to consider the question independently and not to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge. If discharge followed, the legality of that discharge could never be brought in question. No writ of error or demurrer was allowed."

21. In Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien2, it has

been observed that:­

“… It is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of  England, affording  as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of

1 (1890) 15 AC 506 2 [1923] AC 603 : [1923] ALL E.R. Rep. 442 (HL)

21

illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity,  an  instance  of its  use  occurring in the thirty­third year of  Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously maintained by the courts of law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the executive at the cost of the liege.”

22. In  Ranjit  Singh v.  State  of  Pepsu  (now Punjab)3,  after

referring to  Greene v. Secy. of States for Home Affairs4,  this

Court ruled:­

“4. … the whole object of proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus is to make them expeditious, to keep them as free from technicality  as  possible  and  to keep them as simple as possible.”

The Bench quoted Lord Wright who, in Greene’s case, had

stated:­  

“… The incalculable value of habeas corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the right to the applicant’s freedom.”

23. In  Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling and

Others5, a Constitution Bench, after adverting to the brief history

of the  writ of habeas corpus, opined that it is essentially a

procedural writ that deals with the machinery of justice and  not

a substantive law.  The object of the writ is to secure release of a

3 AIR 1959 SC 843 4 [1942] AC 284 : [1941] 3 All ER 388 (HL) 5 (1973) 2 SCC 674

22

person who is illegally restrained of his liberty.  The Court further

elaborated:­

“… The writ  of  habeas corpus  is  one of the most ancient writs known to the common law of England. It is  a  writ  of immemorial  antiquity  and  the first threads  of its origin  are  woven  deeply  within the “seamless  web of  history”  and  they  are  concealed and perhaps untraceable among countless incidents that constituted the total historical pattern.”

24. Tracing the history, the Court proceeded to explicate:­  

“The  writ of habeas corpus cum causa  made its appearance in the early years of the fourteenth century. It not  merely commanded the Sheriff to “have the body” of the person therein mentioned like its predecessor but added the words “with the cause of  the arrest and detention”.  The person who had the custody of a prisoner was required by this writ to produce him before the Court together with the ground for the detention. The writ  thus became a means of testing the legality of the detention and in this form it may be regarded as the immediate ancestor of the modern writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cum causa was utilised by the common law courts during the fifteenth century as an accompaniment of the  writs of certiorari and privilege to assert their jurisdiction against the local and franchise courts.”

25. In Ware v. Sanders6, a reference was made to the Law of

Habeas Corpus  by James A Scott  and Charles  C.  Roe of the

Chicago Bar (T.H. Flood & Company, Publishers, Chicago,

6 146 Iowa 233 : 124 NW 1081 (1910)

23

Illinois, 1923) where the authors have dealt with the aspect of

Habeas Corpus.  It reads as under:­

“A writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right of very ancient origin, and the preservation of its benefit is a matter  of the highest importance  to  the people, and the regulations provided for its employment against an alleged unlawful restraint are not to be construed or applied with over technical nicety, and when ambiguous or doubtful, should be interpreted liberally to promote the effectiveness of the proceeding.”

(See  Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala and Others7)

26. In  Ummu Sabeena, the Court further ruled that the

principle of habeas corpus has been incorporated in our

constitutional law and in a democratic republic like India where

judges function under a written Constitution and which has a

chapter of fundamental  rights to protect  individual  liberty,  the

judges owe a duty to safeguard the liberty not only of the citizens

but also of all persons within the territory of India; and the same

exercise of power can be done in the most effective manner by

issuing a writ of habeas corpus.

27. Thus, the pivotal purpose of the said writ is to see that no

one is deprived of his/her liberty without sanction of law. It is the

7 (2011) 10 SCC 781

24

primary duty of the State to see that the said right is not sullied

in any manner whatsoever and its sanctity is not affected by any

kind  of subterfuge.  The role of the  Court is to  see that the

detenue is produced before it, find out about his/her

independent choice and see to it that the person is released from

illegal restraint. The issue will be a different one when the

detention is not illegal. What is seminal is to remember that the

song of liberty is sung with sincerity and the choice of an

individual is appositely respected and conferred its esteemed

status as the Constitution guarantees.  It is so as the expression

of choice is a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 of the

Constitution, if the said choice does not transgress any valid legal

framework. Once that aspect is clear, the enquiry and

determination have to come to an end.  

28. In the instant case, the High Court, as is noticeable from

the impugned verdict, has been erroneously guided by some kind

of social phenomenon that was frescoed before it. The writ court

has taken  exception to the  marriage  of the respondent  No.  9

herein with the appellant. It felt perturbed. As we see, there was

nothing to be taken exception to. Initially, Hadiya had declined to

25

go  with  her father  and  expressed  her  desire to  stay  with the

respondent No.7 before the High Court and in the first writ it had

so directed. The adamantine attitude of the father, possibly

impelled by obsessive parental love, compelled him to knock at

the doors of the High Court in another Habeas Corpus petition

whereupon the High Court directed the production of Hadiya who

appeared on the given date along with the appellant herein whom

the High Court calls a stranger. But Hadiya would insist that she

had entered into marriage with him. True it is, she had gone with

the  respondent  No.7  before the  High Court  but that  does  not

mean and can never mean that she, as a major, could not enter

into a marital relationship. But, the High Court unwarrantably

took exception to the same forgetting that parental love or

concern cannot be allowed to  fluster  the right  of  choice of  an

adult in choosing a man to whom she gets married. And, that is

where the error has crept in. The High Court should have, after

an interaction as regards her choice, directed that she was free to

go where she wished to.  

29. The High Court further erred by reflecting upon the social

radicalization and certain other aspects. In a  writ of habeas

corpus, especially in the instant case, it was absolutely

26

unnecessary. If there was any criminality in any sphere, it is for

the law enforcing agency to do the needful but as long as the

detenue has not been booked under law to justify the detention

which is under challenge, the obligation of the Court is to

exercise the celebrated writ that breathes life into our

constitutional guarantee of  freedom. The approach of the High

Court on the said score is wholly fallacious.  

30. The High Court has been swayed away by the strategy, as it

thought, adopted by the respondent No.7 before it in connivance

with the present appellant and others to move Hadiya out of the

country. That is not  within the ambit of the  writ of  Habeas

Corpus. The future activity, if any, is required to be governed and

controlled by the State in accordance with law. The apprehension

was not within the arena of jurisdiction regard being had to the

lis before it.

31. Another aspect which calls for invalidating the order of the

High Court is the situation in which it has invoked the  parens

patriae  doctrine.   Parens Patriae  in Latin means “parent of the

nation”.   In law, it refers to the power of the State to intervene

against an abusive or negligent parent, legal guardian or informal

27

caretaker, and to act as the parent of any child or individual who

is in need of protection.   “The  parens patriae  jurisdiction is

sometimes spoken of as ‘supervisory’”8.

32. The doctrine of  Parens Patriae  has its origin in the United

Kingdom in  the 13th  century.   It implies that the King as  the

guardian of the nation is under obligation to look after the

interest of those who are unable to look after themselves. Lindley

L.J. in  Thomasset v. Thomasset9  pointed out that in the

exercise of the  Parens Patriae  jurisdiction, “the rights of fathers

and legal guardians were always respected, but controlled to an

extent unknown at common law by considering the real welfare.”

The duty of the King in feudal times to act as Parens Patriae has

been taken over in modern times by the State.

33. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘Parens Patriae’ as:­

“1. The State regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.

2. A doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.   The State ordinarily has no standing to sue on behalf of

8  P.W. Yong, C Croft and ML Smit, On Equity. 9  [1894] P 295

28

its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be served by the suit.”

34.  In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India10, the Constitution  

Bench, while delving upon the concept of parens patriae, stated:­  

“35. … In the “Words and Phrases” Permanent Edition, Vol. 33 at page 99, it is stated that  parens patriae  is the inherent  power and authority  of  a legislature to provide protection to the person and property of persons  non sui juris, such as  minor, insane, and incompetent persons, but the  words  parens patriae meaning thereby ‘the father of the country’, were applied originally to the King and are used to designate the State referring to its sovereign power of guardinaship over persons under disability. (emphasis supplied)  Parens patriae  jurisdiction, it has been explained, is the right of the sovereign and imposes a duty on sovereign, in public interest, to protect persons under disability who have no rightful protector. The connotation of the term parens patriae differs from country to country, for instance, in England it is the King, in America it is the people, etc. The Government  is within its duty to protect and to control persons under disability. Conceptually, the parens patriae  theory is the obligation of the State to protect and takes into custody the rights and the privileges of its citizens for dischargings its obligations. Our Constitution makes it imperative for the State to secure to all its citizens the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and where the citizens are not in a position to  assert  and secure their rights, the  State must come into picture and protect and fight for the rights of the citizens. …”  

10 (1990) 1 SCC 613

29

35. In  Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India

and others11, a two­Judge Bench, while dealing with the

constitutional validity  of  Section 30 of the  Punjab Excise  Act,

1914 prohibiting employment of “any man under the age of 25

years” or “any woman” in any part of  such premises  in which

liquor or intoxicating drug  is  consumed by  the  public,  opined

thus in the context of the parens patriae power of the State:­  

“29. One important justification to Section 30 of the Act is parens patriae power of State. It is a considered fact that use of parens patriae power is not entirely beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

30. Parens patriae power has only been able to gain definitive legalist orientation as it shifted its underpinning from being  merely  moralist  to a  more objective grounding i.e.  utility. The subject­matter of the parens patriae power can be adjudged on two counts:

(i) in terms of its necessity, and

(ii) assessment  of  any trade­off  or  adverse impact, if any.

This inquiry gives the doctrine an objective orientation and therefore prevents it from falling foul of due process challenge. (See  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center12)”

11 (2008) 3 SCC 1 12 473 US 432, 439-41: 105 S Ct 3249 : 87 L Ed 2d 313 (1985)

30

36. Analysing further, the Court ruled that the  parens patriae

power is  subject  to constitutional  challenge  on  the  ground of

right to privacy also. It took note of the fact that young men and

women know what would be the best offer for them in the service

sector and in the age of internet, they would know all pros and

cons of a profession.  The Court proceeded to state:­  

“31. … It is their life; subject to constitutional, statutory and social interdicts—a citizen of India should be allowed to live her life on her own terms.”

37. Emphasizing on the right of  self­determination,  the Court

held:­  

“34. The fundamental tension between autonomy and security is difficult to resolve. It is also a tricky jurisprudential issue. Right to self­determination is an important offshoot of gender justice discourse. At the same time,  security and protection  to carry out such choice or option specifically, and state of violence­free being generally is another tenet of the same movement. In fact, the latter is apparently a more basic value in comparison to right to options in the feminist matrix.”

38. In  Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India13,

the Court, after dealing with the decision  in State of Kerala v.

N.M. Thomas14  wherein it has been stated by Mathew, J. that

13 (2011) 4 SCC 454 14 (1976) 2 SCC 310

31

“the Court also is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 (of the

Constitution)  ...”, opined:­

“130.  In our opinion, in  the case of  an  incompetent person who  is  unable to  take a decision whether to withdraw life support or not, it is the Court alone, as parens patriae, which ultimately must take this decision, though, no doubt, the views of the near relatives, next friend and doctors must be given due weight.”

39.  Constitutional Courts in this country exercise  parens

patriae  jurisdiction in matters of child custody treating the

welfare of the child as the paramount concern.   There are

situations when the Court can invoke the parens patriae principle

and the same is required to be invoked only in exceptional

situations.   We may like to give some examples.   For example,

where a person is mentally ill and is produced before the court in

a  writ of habeas corpus, the court  may invoke the  aforesaid

doctrine.   On certain other occasions, when a girl who is not a

major  has eloped  with a person and she is produced at the

behest of habeas corpus filed by her parents and she expresses

fear of life in the custody of her parents, the court may exercise

the jurisdiction to send her to an appropriate home meant to give

32

shelter to women where her interest can be best taken care of till

she becomes a major.

40. In  Heller v. Doe15, Justice Kennedy, speaking for the U.S.

Supreme Court, observed:­

“The State has a legitimate interest under its Parens Patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves.”

41. The Supreme Court of Canada in E. (Mrs.) v. Eve16 observed

thus with regard to the doctrine of Parens Patriae:­

“The  Parens Patriae  jurisdiction for the care of the mentally incompetent is vested in the provincial superior courts.   Its exercise is founded on necessity.   The need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves.   The jurisdiction is broad.   Its scope cannot be defined. It applies to many and varied situations, and a court can act not only if injury has occurred but also if it is apprehended.   The jurisdiction is carefully guarded and the courts will not assume that it has been removed by legislation.

While the scope of the parens partiae jurisdiction is unlimited, the jurisdiction must nonetheless be exercised in accordance with its underlying principle.   The discretion given under this jurisdiction is to be exercised for the benefit of the person in need of protection and not for the benefit of  others.   It  must  at  all times be  exercised with great caution, a caution that must increase with the seriousness of the matter.  This is particularly so in cases where a court might be tempted to act

15 509 US 312 (1993) 16 [1986] 2 SCR 388

33

because failure to act would risk imposing an obviously heavy burden on another person.”

42. The High Court of Australia in  Secretary, Department of

Health and Community Service v. J.W.B. and S.M.B.17,

speaking through Mason C.J., Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.,

has made the following observations with regard to the doctrine:­

“71. No doubt the jurisdiction over infants is for the most part supervisory in the sense that the courts are supervising the exercise of care and control of infants by parents and guardians.  However, to say this is not to assert that the jurisdiction is essentially supervisory or that the courts are merely supervising or reviewing parental or guardian care and control.   As already explained, the  Parens Patriae  jurisdiction springs from the direct responsibility of the  Crown  for those  who  cannot look after themselves; it includes infants as well as those of unsound mind.”

43. Deane J. in the same case stated the following:­

“4… Indeed, in a modern context, it is preferable to refer to the traditional  Parens  Patriae  jurisdiction  as “the  welfare jurisdiction” and to the “first and paramount consideration” which underlies its exercise as “the welfare principle”.”

44. Recently,  the Supreme Court of  New South Wales,  in the

case of AC v. OC (a minor)18, has observed:­

17 [1992] HCA 15 (MARION’S Case) : (1992) 175 CLR 218 18 [2014] NSWSC 53

34

“36. That  jurisdiction,  protective of those who are not able to take care of themselves, embraces (via different historical routes)  minors, the mentally ill and those who, though not mentally ill, are unable to manage their own affairs:  Re Eve  [1986] 2 SCR 388  at 407­417;  Court of Australia in  Secretary, Department of  Health and  Community Services v. JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 258; PB v. BB [2013] NSWSC 1223 at [7]­[8], [40]­ [42], [57]­[58] and [64]­[65].

37. A key concept in the exercise of that jurisdiction is that it  must be exercised, both in what is done and what is left undone, for the benefit, and in the best interest, of the person (such as a minor) in need of protection.”

45. Thus, the  Constitutional  Courts  may  also act as  Parens

Patriae so as to meet the ends of justice.  But the said exercise of

power is not without limitation.  The courts cannot in every and

any case invoke the  Parens Patriae  doctrine.   The said doctrine

has to be  invoked only  in exceptional  cases where the parties

before it are either mentally incompetent or have not come of age

and  it is  proved to the  satisfaction of the  court that the  said

parties have either no parent/legal guardian or have an abusive

or negligent parent/legal guardian.  

46. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the first

respondent, has submitted that the said doctrine has been

35

expanded by the England and Wales Court of Appeal in a case DL

v. A Local Authority and others19. The case was in the context

of "elder abuse" wherein a man in his 50s behaved aggressively

towards his parents, physically and verbally, controlling access to

visitors and seeking to coerce his father into moving into a care

home against his wishes. While it was assumed that the elderly

parents did have capacity  within the  meaning of the  Mental

Capacity Act, 2005 in that neither was subject to "an impairment

of, or a disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain", it

was found that the interference with the process of their decision

making arose from undue influence and duress inflicted by their

son.  The Court  of  Appeal referred  to  the  judgment  in  Re:  SA

(Vulnerable Adult with Capacity : Marriage)20 to find that the

parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court existed in relation to

"vulnerable if 'capacitous' adults". The cited decision of the

England  and  Wales  High  Court (Family  Division)  affirmed the

existence of  a  "great safety net"  of  the  inherent  jurisdiction  in

relation to all vulnerable adults. The term "great safety net" was

coined by Lord Donaldson in the Court of Appeal judgment which

19 [2012] 3 All ER 1064 20 [2005] EWHC 2942 (FAM)

36

was later quoted with approval by the House of Lords in In Re F

(Mental Patient:  Sterilisation21. In paragraph  79 of  Re:  SA

(Vulnerable Adult with Capacity : Marriage),  Justice Munby

observes:­

“The inherent jurisdiction can be invoked wherever a vulnerable adult is, or is reasonably believed to be, for  some reason deprived of the capacity to make the relevant decision, or disabled from making a free choice, or incapacitated or disabled from giving or expressing a real and genuine consent. The cause may be, but is not for this purpose limited to, mental disorder or mental illness. A vulnerable adult who does not suffer from any kind of mental incapacity may nonetheless be entitled to the protection of the inherent jurisdiction if he is, or is reasonably believed to be, incapacitated from making the relevant decision by reason of such things as constraint,  coercion,  undue  influence or other vitiating factors.”

47. In relation to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human

Rights (ECHR), Justice Munby observes in paragraph 66:­

“In terms of the ECHR, the use of the inherent jurisdiction in this context is compatible with Article 8 in just the same manner as the MCA 2005 is compatible. Any interference with the right to respect for an individual's private or  family  life  is  justified to protect his health and or to protect his right to enjoy his Article 8 rights as he may choose without the undue influence (or other adverse intervention) of a third party.  Any  orders  made  by the  court in  a  particular case must be only those which are necessary and

21 [1990] 2 AC 1

37

proportionate to the facts  of that  case,  again in like manner to the approach under the MCA 2005.”

48. However, in paragraph 76, he qualifies the above principle

with the following comment:­

“It is, of course, of the essence of humanity that adults are entitled to be eccentric, entitled to be unorthodox, entitled to  be  obstinate, entitled to  be irrational. Many are.”

49. The judgment of  Re: SA (Vulnerable Adult with

Capacity : Marriage)  (supra) authored by Justice Munby and

cited in the above Court of Appeal case was in the context of the

exercise of parens patriae to protect an eighteen year old girl from

the risk of an unsuitable arranged marriage on the ground that

although the girl did not lack capacity, yet she was undoubtedly

a "vulnerable adult".

50. Interestingly, in another case, namely, A Local Authority

v.  HB, MB, ML and BL (By their Children's Guardian)22,  the

High Court's inherent jurisdiction was invoked to protect children

who were allegedly going to be taken by their mother to Syria

where they were at a risk of  radicalization.  Although the High

22 [2017] EWHC 1437 (Fam)

38

Court dismissed the applications on facts for want of evidence,

yet it made certain observations regarding extremism and

radicalization.

51. Mr. Divan has drawn our attention to the authority  in A

Local Authority v. Y23 wherein the High Court (Family Division)

invoked its inherent jurisdiction to protect a young person, the

defendant Y, from radicalization.  

52. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, he emphasized on the

concept that  when the  major is  a vulnerable adult, the  High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise

the  parens patriae  doctrine  which  has  been exercised in this

case. The aforesaid judgments, in our considered opinion, are not

applicable to the facts of the present case. We say so without any

hesitation as we have interacted with the respondent No. 9 and

there is  nothing to  suggest that  she  suffers from any kind of

mental incapacity or vulnerability. She was absolutely categorical

in  her submissions  and  unequivocal in the expression  of  her

choice.  

23 [2017] EWHC 968 (Fam)

39

53. It is  obligatory to  state  here that  expression of  choice in

accord with law is acceptance of individual identity. Curtailment

of that expression and the ultimate action emanating therefrom

on the conceptual structuralism of obeisance to the societal will

destroy the individualistic entity of a person.   The social values

and morals have their space but they are not above the

constitutionally guaranteed freedom.  The said freedom is both a

constitutional and a human right.   Deprivation of that freedom

which is ingrained in choice on the plea of faith is impermissible.

Faith of a person is intrinsic to his/her meaningful existence.  To

have the freedom of faith is essential to his/her autonomy; and it

strengthens the core norms of the Constitution.  Choosing a faith

is the substratum of individuality and sans it, the right of choice

becomes a shadow.  It has to be remembered that the realization

of  a right  is more important than the conferment of the right.

Such actualization indeed ostracises any kind of societal

notoriety and keeps at bay the patriarchal supremacy.   It is so

because the individualistic faith  and expression  of choice are

fundamental for the fructification of the right.   Thus, we would

like to call it indispensable preliminary condition.

40

54. Non­acceptance of her choice would simply mean creating

discomfort to the constitutional right by a Constitutional Court

which is meant to be the protector of fundamental rights. Such a

situation cannot remotely be conceived. The duty of the Court  is

to uphold the right and not to   abridge the sphere of the right

unless there is a valid authority of law. Sans lawful sanction, the

centripodal value of  liberty should allow an individual to write

his/her script.  The individual signature is the insignia  of the

concept.

55. In the case at hand, the father in his own stand and

perception may feel that there has been enormous transgression

of his right to protect the interest of his daughter but his view

point or position cannot be allowed to curtail  the fundamental

rights of his daughter who, out of her own volition, married the

appellant.  Therefore, the High Court  has completely  erred by

taking upon itself the burden of annulling the marriage between

the appellant and the respondent no.9 when both stood

embedded to their vow of matrimony.

56. Resultantly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned

order.  However, as  stated in the  order  dated  08.03.2018, the

41

investigation by the NIA in respect of any matter of criminality

may continue in accordance with law.   The investigation should

not encroach upon their marital status.

………………………………CJI (Dipak Misra)

……………………………….J. (A.M. Khanwilkar)

New Delhi; 09 April, 2018.

42

Reportable   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No 366 OF 2018     [Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5777 of 2017]

SHAFIN JAHAN      APPELLANT     

Versus  

ASOKAN K M AND OTHERS .....RESPONDENTS                            

J U D G M E N T

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1 While re-affirming the conclusions set out in the operative order, I agree

with the erudite judgment of the learned Chief Justice. I have added my own

thoughts on the judicial parchment to express my anguish with the grievous

miscarriage of justice which took place in the present case and to formulate

principles in the expectation that such an injustice shall not again be visited

either on Hadiya or any other citizen. The High Court of Kerala has committed

an error of jurisdiction. But what to my mind, is disconcerting, is the manner in

43

which the liberty and dignity of a citizen have been subjected to judicial affront.

The months which Hadiya lost, placed in the custody of her father and against

her will cannot be brought back. The reason for this concurring judgment is

that it is the duty of this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional functions to

formulate principles in order to ensure that the valued rights of citizens are not

subjugated at the altar of a paternalistic social structure.  

2  Asokan,  the  father  of  Akhila  alias Hadiya  moved  a  habeas  corpus

petition  before  the  High  Court  of  Kerala.  His  apprehension  was  that  his

daughter  was likely  to  be transported out  of  the country.  The Kerala  High

Court was informed during the course of the hearing that she had married

Shafin  Jahan.  The High Court  allowed the petition for  habeas corpus and

directed that Hadiya shall be escorted from a hostel in which she resided in

Ernakulam to the house of her father holding that:

“A girl  aged  24  years  is  weak  and  vulnerable,  capable  of being exploited in many ways. This Court exercising  parens patriae jurisdiction is concerned with the welfare of a girl of her age. The duty cast on this Court to ensure the safety of at least the girls who are brought before it can be discharged only by ensuring that Ms. Akhila is in safe hands.”

3 With  these  directions,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  Kerala  High  Court

declared that the marriage between Hadiya and Shafin Jahan is null and void

and ordered “a comprehensive investigation” by the police. Hadiya continued

to remain,  against  her  will,  in  compulsive confinement  at  the home of  her

father  in  pursuance  of  the  directions  of  the  Kerala  High  Court.  On  27

44

November 2017, this Court interacted with Hadiya and noted that she desires

to pursue and complete her studies as a student of Homeopathy at a college

where she was a student, in Salem. Accepting her request, this Court directed

the authorities of the State to permit her to travel to Salem in order to enable

her to pursue her studies.  

4 The appeal filed by Shafin Jahan has been heard finally. Hadiya is a

party to these proceedings.

5 This Bench of three judges pronounced the operative part of its order on

8 March 2018 and allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the

High Court  annulling the marriage between Shafin Jahan and Hadiya. The

Court has underscored that Hadiya is at liberty to pursue her endeavours in

accordance with her desires.  

6 Hadiya is a major. Twenty four years old, she is pursuing a course of

studies leading up to a degree in Homoeopathic medicine and surgery at a

college in Salem in Tamil Nadu. She was born to parents from the Ezhava

Community.   In  January  2016,  Asokan instituted a habeas corpus petition,

stating that Hadiya was missing. During the course of the proceedings, Hadiya

appeared before the Kerala High Court and asserted that she had accepted

Islam  as  a  faith  of  choice.  From  7  January  2016,  she  resided  at  the

establishment of Sathyasarani Education Charitable Trust at Malappuram. On

45

19 January 2016, the Kerala High Court categorically observed that Hadiya

was not under illegal confinement after interacting with her and permitted her

to  reside  at  the  Sathyasarani  Trust  premises.  Nearly  seven  months  later,

Asokan filed  another  petition  in  the  nature  of  habeas  corpus  alleging  that

Hadiya  had  been  subjected  to  forced  conversion  and  was  likely  to  be

transported out of India.  

7 During the course of the proceedings, the High Court interacted with

Hadiya.  She  appeared  in  the  proceedings  represented  by  an  advocate.

Hadiya, as the High Court records, declined to accompany her parents and

expressed a desire to continue to reside at  Sathyasarani.  The High Court

initially  issued  a  direction  that  she  should  be  “accommodated  in  a  ladies’

hostel at the expense of her father”. On 27 September 2016, Hadiya made a

serious  grievance of  being  in  the  custody  of  the  court  for  thirty  five  days

without  being  able  to  interact  with  anyone.  She  stated  that  she  had  no

passport and the allegation that she was likely to go to Syria was incorrect.

Based  on  her  request,  the  High  Court  directed  her  to  reside  at  the

Sathyasarani establishment. The High Court heard the case on 24 October

2016, 14 November 2016 and 19 December 2016. On 21 December 2016, the

High  Court  was  informed  that  Hadiya  had entered  into  a  marriage  on  19

December 2016. The High Court recorded its “absolute dissatisfaction at the

manner in  which the marriage if  at  all  one has been performed has been

conducted”.    

46

                 Confronted with the undisputed fact that Hadiya is a major, the High Court still  

observed:

“This Court exercising Parens Patriae jurisdiction has a duty to ensure that young girls like the detenue are not exploited or transported  out  of  the  country.  Though  the  learned  Senior Counsel  has  vociferously  contended that  the  detenue  is  a person who has attained majority, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the detenue who is a female in her twenties is at a vulnerable age.  As per Indian tradition, the custody of an  unmarried  daughter  is  with  the  parents,  until  she  is properly  married.  We consider  it  the  duty  of  this  Court  to ensure that  a  person under  such a vulnerable state is  not exposed to  further  danger,  especially  in  the  circumstances noticed  above where  even her  marriage is  stated  to  have been  performed  with  another  person,  in  accordance  with Islamic religious rites.  That too, with the connivance of the 7 th

respondent with whom she was permitted to reside, by this Court.”

Hadiya was under judicial order transported to a hostel at Ernakulam, with a  

direction that:

“she  is  not  provided  the  facility  of  possessing  or  using  a mobile phone.”  

Save  and  except  for  her  parents  no  one  was  allowed  to  meet  her.  An

investigation was ordered into the “education, family background, antecedents

and other relevant details” of Shafin Jahan together with others involved in the

‘conduct’ of the marriage. The High Court continued to monitor the case on 6

January 2017,  31 January 2017,  7 February 2017 and 22 February 2017.

Eventually,  by its judgment  and order dated 24 May 2017, the High Court

allowed the petition for habeas corpus and issued the directions noted above.

47

8 The principal  findings  which  have been recorded by  the  High  Court

need to be visited and are summarised below:

(i) This was “not a case of a girl  falling in love with a boy of a different

religion and wanting to get married to him” but an “arranged marriage”

where Hadiya had no previous acquaintance with Shafin Jahan; (ii) Hadiya met Shafin Jahan on an online portal called “Way to Nikah”; (iii) During the course of  the proceedings,  Hadiya had stated before the

court  that  she  desired  to  complete  her  studies  as  a  student  of

Homeopathy and “nobody had a case at that time that she wanted to

get married”; (iv) Though on 19 December 2016, the High Court adjourned the hearing to

21  December  2016  to  enable  her  to  proceed  to  her  college,  the

marriage took place on the same day; (v) The marriage was “only a make-believe intended to take the detenue

out of reach of the hands of this court”;  (vi) The conduct of the parties in conducting the marriage without informing

the court was unacceptable; (vii) There is no document evidencing the conversion of Hadiya to Islam; the

antecedents of Shafin Jahan and his Facebook posts show a radical

inclination; and  (viii) No prudent parent would decide to get his daughter married to a person

accused in a criminal case.

The High Court  concluded that  the marriage “is only a sham and is of  no

consequence”, a charade to force the hands of the court.

48

9 During the course of the present proceedings, this Court by its order

dated 30 October 2017 directed the First respondent to ensure the presence

of his daughter on 27 November 2017. On 27 November 2017, Hadiya stated

before this Court,  in the course of  the hearing, that she intends to pursue

further studies towards the BHMS degree course at Salem, where she was

admitted.  Directions  were  issued  by  the  Court  to  ensure  that  Hadiya  can

pursue her course of studies without obstruction. We clarified that while she

could stay in the hostel of the college as she desired, she would be “treated

like any other student”.  

10 Hadiya has filed an affidavit expressly affirming her conversion to Islam

and her marriage to Shafin Jahan.  

11 There are two serious concerns which emerge from the judgment of the

Kerala High Court. The first is that the High Court transgressed the limits of its

jurisdiction in issuing a declaration annulling the marriage of Shafin Jahan and

Hadiya in the course of the hearing of a habeas corpus petition.  

12 Undoubtedly, the powers of a constitutional court are wide, to enable it

to reach out to injustice. Mr Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of First respondent emphasised the plenitude of the inherent powers

of the High Court.  The width of the domain which is entrusted to the High

49

Court  as  a  constitutional  court  cannot  be  disputed.  Halsbury’s  Laws  of

England postulates:  

“In the ordinary way the Supreme Court, as a superior court of record, exercise the  full  plenitude of judicial power  in  all matters concerning the general administration of justice within its  territorial  limits,  and  enjoys  unrestricted  and  unlimited powers  in  all  matters  of  substantive  law,  both  civil  and criminal,  except  insofar  as  that  has  been  taken  away  in unequivocal terms by statutory enactment. The term “inherent jurisdiction” is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction of the court exercisable at common law or conferred on it by statute  or  rules  of  court,  for  the  court  may  exercise  its inherent  jurisdiction  even  in  respect  of  matters  which  are regulated by statute or rule of court. The jurisdiction of the court  which is  comprised within  the  term “inherent”  is  that which enables it to fulfil  itself, properly and effectively, as a court of law.”

Dealing with the ambit of the powers under Article 226, Gajendragadkar, CJ in

State  of  Orissa  v  Ram Chandra  Dev  and Mohan  Prasad  Singh  Deo24

observed thus:  

“Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued  by  the  High  Court  under  the  said  Article  even  for purposes  other  than  the  enforcement  of  the  fundamental rights  and  in  that  sense,  a  party  who  invokes  the  special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to case of illegal invasion of this fundamental right alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of that Article clearly indicate  that  before  a  writ  or  an  appropriate  order  can be issued in favour of  a party,  it  must  be established that  the party  has  a  right  and  the  said  right  is  illegally  invaded  or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226.”

While  dealing  with  the  powers  and  privileges  of  the  state  legislatures, in

Keshav Singh25, a Bench of seven learned judges held thus:  24 AIR (1964) SC 685 25 (1965) 1 SCR 413

50

“136…in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a Court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is  entitled  to  determine  for  itself  questions  about  its  own jurisdiction.  “Prima  facie”,  says  Halsbury,  “no  matter  is deemed  to  be  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  a  superior  court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court [Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 9, p. 349] ”.

The High Court is vested with an extra-ordinary jurisdiction in order to meet

unprecedented situations (T K Rangarajan v Government of T.N.26).  Several

decisions have noted the inherent and plenary powers of the High Court. Their

purpose is to advance substantial justice. (i) Roshan Deen v Preeti Lal27; (ii)

Dwarka Nath v ITO, Special Circle D-ward, Kanpur28; (iii) Naresh Shridhar

Nirajkar  v  State  of  Maharashtra29; and  (iv)  M  V  Elisabeth  v  Harwan

Investment and Trading (P) Ltd.30

13 These  principles  which  emerge  from the  precedent  are  well-settled.

Equally the exercise of all powers by a constitutional court must ensure justice

under and in accordance with law.  

14 The principles which underlie the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court in

a  habeas  corpus  petition  have been reiterated in  several  decisions  of  the

Court. In  Gian Devi  v Superintendent, Nari Niketan, Delhi31, a three-judge

26 (2003) 6 SCC 581 27 (2002) 1 SCC 100 28 (1965) 3 SCR 536  29 (1966) 3 SCR 744 30 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 433 31 (1976) 3 SCC 234

51

Bench observed that where an individual is over eighteen years of age, no

fetters could be placed on her choice on where to reside or about the person

with whom she could stay:

“…Whatever may be the date of birth of the petitioner, the fact remains that she is at present more than 18 years of age. As the petitioner is sui juris no fetters can be placed upon her choice of the person with whom she is to stay, nor can any restriction be imposed regarding the place where she should stay. The court or the relatives of the petitioner can also not substitute their opinion or preference for that of the petitioner in such a matter.”

The ambit of a habeas corpus petition is to trace an individual who is stated to

be missing. Once the individual appears before the court and asserts that as a

major, she or he is not under illegal confinement, which the court finds to be a

free expression of will, that would conclude the exercise of the jurisdiction. In

Girish v Radhamony K32 a two judge Bench of this Court observed thus:

“3…In a habeas corpus petition, all that is required is to find out  and  produce  in  court  the  person  who  is  stated  to  be missing. Once the person appeared and she stated that she had gone of her own free will, the High Court had no further jurisdiction to pass the impugned order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.”  

In Lata Singh v State of U P33, Bench of two judges took judicial notice of the

harassment, threat and violence meted out to young women and men who

marry  outside  their  caste  or  faith.  The  court  observed  that  our  society  is

32 (2009) 16 SCC 360 33 (2006) 5 SCC 475

52

emerging  through  a  crucial  transformational  period  and  the  court  cannot

remain silent upon such matters of grave concern. In the view of the court:

“17…This  is  a  free  and  democratic  country,  and  once  a person becomes a major  he or  she can marry  whosoever he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not approve of such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage the maximum they can do is that they can cut-off social relations with the son or the  daughter,  but  they  cannot  give  threats  or  commit  or instigate acts of violence and cannot harass the person who undergoes such inter-caste or  inter-religious  marriage.  We, therefore,  direct  that  the  administration/police  authorities throughout the country will see to it that if any boy or girl who is  a major  undergoes inter-caste or  inter-religious marriage with  a  woman  or  man  who  is  a  major,  the  couple  is  not harassed  by  anyone  nor  subjected  to  threats  or  acts  of violence, and anyone who gives such threats or harasses or commits acts of violence either himself or at his instigation, is taken to task by instituting criminal proceedings by the police against such persons and further stern action is taken against such persons as provided by law.”

Reiterating these principles in Bhagwan Dass v State (NCT OF DELHI)34, this

Court adverted to the social evil of honour killings as being but a reflection of a

feudal mindset which is a slur on the nation.  

In a more recent  decision of  a three judge Bench in  Soni Gerry  v  Gerry

Douglas35, this Court dealt with a case where the daughter of the appellant

and respondent, who was a major had expressed a desire to reside in Kuwait,

where she was pursuing her education, with her father. This Court observed

thus:

“9…She has, without any hesitation, clearly stated that she intends to go back to Kuwait to pursue her career. In such a situation, we are of the considered opinion that as a major, she is entitled to exercise her choice and freedom and the

34 (2011) 6 SCC 396 35 (2018) 2 SCC 197

53

Court cannot get into the aspect whether she has been forced by the father or  not.  There may be ample reasons on her behalf  to  go  back  to  her  father  in  Kuwait,  but  we are  not concerned with her reasons. What she has stated before the Court,  that  alone  matters  and  that  is  the  heart  of  the reasoning for this Court, which keeps all controversies at bay.

10. It  needs no special emphasis to state that attaining the age of majority in an individual's life has its own significance. She/He is entitled to make her/his choice. The courts cannot, as long as the choice remains, assume the role of  parens patriae. The daughter is entitled to enjoy her freedom as the law permits and the court should not assume the role of a super guardian being moved by any kind of sentiment of the mother or the egotism of the father. We say so without any reservation.”

These principles emerge from a succession of judicial decisions. Fundamental

to them is the judgment of a Constitution bench of this Court in Kanu Sanyal v

District Magistrate, Darjeeling36.  

15 The High Court was seized of the grievance of Asokan that his daughter

was under  illegal  confinement  and was likely  to  be transported out  of  the

country. In the course of the hearing of an earlier petition for habeas corpus,

the High Court  by its  order dated 19 January 2016 expressly  noticed that

Hadiya was not  willing to  return to  her  parental  home.  Taking note of  the

desire of Hadiya to reside at Sathyasarani, the High Court observed that “the

alleged  detenue  needs  to  be  given  liberty  to  take  her  own  decision  with

respect to her future life.”

36 (1973) 2 SCC 674

54

With the passing of that order the writ petition was withdrawn on 25 January

2016. Yet, again, when a second petition was filed, it was evident before the

High Court that Hadiya had no desire to stay with her parents. She is a major.

The Division Bench on this occasion paid scant regard to the earlier outcome

and  to  the  decision  of  a  coordinate  Bench.   The  High  Court  inexplicably

sought to deviate from the course adopted in the earlier proceeding.   

16 The schism between Hadiya and her father may be unfortunate. But it

was no part of the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide what it considered to

be a ‘just’ way of life or ‘correct’ course of living for Hadiya. She has absolute

autonomy over her person. Hadiya appeared before the High Court and stated

that she was not under illegal confinement. There was no warrant for the High

Court to proceed further in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226.

The purpose of the habeas corpus petition ended. It had to be closed as the

earlier Bench had done. The High Court has entered into a domain which is

alien to its jurisdiction in a habeas corpus petition. The High Court did not take

kindly  to  the  conduct  of  Hadiya,  noting  that  when  it  had  adjourned  the

proceedings to issue directions to enable her to pursue her studies, it was at

that stage that she appeared with Shafin Jahan only to inform the court of their

marriage.  How Hadiya chooses to  lead her  life  is  entirely  a matter  of  her

choice. The High Court’s view of her lack of candour with the court has no

bearing on the legality of her marriage or her right to decide for herself, whom

she desires to live with or marry.   

55

17 The exercise of the jurisdiction to declare the marriage null and void,

while entertaining a petition for habeas corpus, is plainly in excess of judicial

power.  The High  Court  has  transgressed the  limits  on  its  jurisdiction  in  a

habeas  corpus  petition.  In  the  process,  there  has  been  a  serious

transgression of constitutional  rights. That is the second facet to which we

now turn.  

18 Hadiya and Shafin Jahan are adults.  Under Muslim law, marriage or

Nikah is a contract. Muslim law recognises the right of adults to marry by their

own free will. The conditions for a valid Muslim marriage are:

(i) Both the individuals must profess Islam; (ii) Both should be of the age of puberty; (iii) There has to be an offer and acceptance and two witnesses must be

present; (iv) Dower and Mehar; and (v) Absence of a prohibited degree of relationship.

19 A marriage  can  be  dissolved  at  the  behest  of  parties  to  it,  by  a

competent court of law. Marital status is conferred through legislation or, as

the case may be, custom. Deprivation of marital status is a matter of serious

import  and must  be strictly  in  accordance with law.  The High Court  in  the

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 ought not to have embarked on the

course of annulling the marriage. The Constitution recognises the liberty and

autonomy which inheres in each individual. This includes the ability to take

decisions on aspects which define one’s personhood and identity. The choice

56

of  a  partner  whether  within  or  outside  marriage  lies  within  the  exclusive

domain of  each individual.  Intimacies of marriage lie within a core zone of

privacy, which is inviolable. The absolute right of an individual to choose a life

partner  is  not  in  the  least  affected  by  matters  of  faith.  The  Constitution

guarantees  to  each  individual  the  right  freely  to  practise,  profess  and

propagate religion. Choices of faith and belief as indeed choices in matters of

marriage lie within an area where individual autonomy is supreme. The law

prescribes  conditions  for  a  valid  marriage.  It  provides  remedies  when

relationships run aground. Neither the state nor the law can dictate a choice of

partners or limit the free ability of every person to decide on these matters.

They form the essence of personal liberty under the Constitution. In deciding

whether Shafin Jahan is a fit person for Hadiya to marry, the High Court has

entered into prohibited terrain. Our choices are respected because they are

ours.   Social  approval  for  intimate  personal  decisions  is  not  the  basis  for

recognising  them.   Indeed,  the  Constitution  protects  personal  liberty  from

disapproving audiences.  

20 Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights underscores the

fundamental importance of marriage as an incident of human liberty:  

“Article 16.  (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

57

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”

21 The right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21 of the

Constitution. The Constitution guarantees the right to life. This right cannot be

taken away except through a law which is substantively and procedurally fair,

just and reasonable. Intrinsic to the liberty which the Constitution guarantees

as a fundamental right is the ability of each individual to take decisions on

matters  central  to  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  Matters  of  belief  and  faith,

including  whether  to  believe  are  at  the  core  of  constitutional  liberty.  The

Constitution  exists  for  believers  as  well  as  for  agnostics.  The Constitution

protects the ability of each individual to pursue a way of life or faith to which

she  or  he  seeks  to  adhere.  Matters  of  dress  and  of  food,  of  ideas  and

ideologies, of love and partnership are within the central aspects of identity.

The law may regulate (subject to constitutional compliance) the conditions of a

valid marriage, as it may regulate the situations in which a marital tie can be

ended or annulled. These remedies are available to parties to a marriage for it

is  they who decide best  on whether they should accept  each other into a

marital  tie  or  continue  in  that  relationship.  Society  has  no  role  to  play  in

determining our choice of partners.

58

22 In Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India37, this Court in a decision

of nine judges held that the ability to make decisions on matters close to one’s

life is an inviolable aspect of the human personality:

“The  autonomy  of  the  individual  is  the  ability  to  make decisions on vital matters of concern to life… The intersection between  one’s  mental  integrity  and  privacy  entitles  the individual  to  freedom of  thought,  the  freedom to  believe  in what  is  right,  and  the  freedom of  self-determination… The family,  marriage,  procreation  and  sexual  orientation  are  all integral to the dignity of the individual.”

A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v

Union of India38, held:

“Our autonomy as persons is founded on the ability to decide: on what to wear and how to dress, on what to eat and on the food that we share, on when to speak and what we speak, on the right to believe or not to believe, on whom to love and whom to partner, and to freely decide on innumerable matters of consequence and detail to our daily lives.”

The  strength  of  the  Constitution,  therefore,  lies  in  the  guarantee  which  it

affords that each individual will have a protected entitlement in determining a

choice of partner to share intimacies within or outside marriage.  

23 The High Court,  in the present case,  has treaded on an area which

must be out of bounds for a constitutional court. The views of the High Court

have encroached into a private space reserved for women and men in which

neither law nor the judges can intrude. The High Court was of the view that at

37 2017 (10) SCC 1 38 Writ Petition(Civil) No. 215 of 2005

59

twenty four,  Hadiya “is weak and vulnerable,  capable of  being exploited in

many ways”. The High Court has lost sight of the fact that she is a major,

capable of taking her own decisions and is entitled to the right recognised by

the Constitution to lead her life exactly as she pleases. The concern of this

Court in intervening in this matter is as much about the miscarriage of justice

that has resulted in the High Court as much as about the paternalism which

underlies  the  approach  to  constitutional  interpretation  reflected  in  the

judgment in appeal. The superior courts, when they exercise their jurisdiction

parens patriae do so in the case of persons who are incapable of asserting a

free will  such as minors or persons of unsound mind. The exercise of that

jurisdiction should not transgress into the area of determining the suitability of

partners to a marital tie. That decision rests exclusively with the individuals

themselves. Neither the state nor society can intrude into that domain. The

strength of our Constitution lies in its acceptance of the plurality and diversity

of our culture. Intimacies of marriage, including the choices which individuals

make on whether or not to marry and on whom to marry, lie outside the control

of the state. Courts as upholders of constitutional freedoms must safeguard

these freedoms.  The cohesion  and stability  of  our  society  depend  on  our

syncretic culture. The Constitution protects it.  Courts are duty bound not to

swerve from the path of upholding our pluralism and diversity as a nation.  

24 Interference by the State in such matters has a seriously chilling effect

on the exercise of freedoms. Others are dissuaded to exercise their liberties

60

for fear of the reprisals which may result upon the free exercise of choice. The

chilling  effect  on  others  has  a  pernicious  tendency  to  prevent  them from

asserting their liberty. Public spectacles involving a harsh exercise of State

power prevent the exercise of freedom, by others in the same milieu. Nothing

can be as destructive of freedom and liberty. Fear silences freedom.   

25 We have not been impressed with the submission of Mr Shyam Divan,

learned senior counsel that it was necessary for the High Court to nullify, what

he describes as a fraud on the Court, as an incident of dealing with conduct

obstructing the administration of the justice. Whether or not Hadiya chose to

marry  Shafin  Jahan  was  irrelevant  to  the  outcome  of  the  habeas  corpus

petition. Even if she were not to be married to him, all that she was required to

clarify was whether she was in illegal confinement. If she was not, and desired

to pursue her own endeavours, that was the end of the matter in a habeas

corpus petition. The fact that she decided to get married during the pendency

of  the proceedings had no bearing on the outcome of  the habeas corpus

petition. Constitutionally it could have no bearing on the outcome.  

26 During the course of the proceedings, this Court by its interim order had

allowed the National Investigation Agency to assist the Court. Subsequently,

NIA was  permitted  to  carry  out  an  investigation.  We clarify  that  NIA may

exercise its  authority  in  accordance with  the law within  the bounds of  the

authority conferred upon it by statute. However, the validity of the marriage

61

between Shafin Jahan and Hadiya shall  not form the subject matter of the

investigation. Moreover, nothing contained in the interim order of this Court will

be construed as empowering the investigating agency to interfere in the lives

which the young couple seeks to lead as law abiding citizens.  

27 The appeal stands allowed in terms of our order dated 8 March 2018.

The judgment of the High Court is set aside.                              

                                                  ...…............................................J               [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi; April 09, 2018.