SEBASTIAO LUIS FERNANDES(DEAD)BY LRS&ORS Vs K.V.P.SHASTRI .
Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,V. GOPALA GOWDA,C. NAGAPPAN
Case number: C.A. No.-006183-006183 / 2001
Diary number: 4476 / 1999
Advocates: V. D. KHANNA Vs
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6183 OF 2001
Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. … Appellants Vs.
K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
V. Gopala Gowda, J.
This civil appeal is filed by the appellants as
they are aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the
High Court of Bombay at Goa passed on 14.9.1998 by
the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 30 of
1986 raising various questions of law and grounds in
support of the same. In this judgment for the sake of
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convenience the rank of the parties is described
according to their position before the trial court.
The appellants are the legal representatives of the
plaintiff and the respondents are the legal
representatives of the defendants. The suit was
instituted by the original plaintiff in the Court of
Civil Judge, Sr. Division at Quepem (hereinafter
referred to as “the trial court”) in Civil Suit
No.14091 of 1948.
2. The relevant brief facts are stated for the
purpose of appreciating the rival legal
contentions with a view to examine and find out
as to whether the impugned judgment of the High
Court of Bombay warrants interference by this
Court in this appeal in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India.
The original plaintiff, Inacinha Fernandes filed
Civil Suit No. 14091 of 1948 on 1.1.1948 before the
trial court for declaration that she is the lawful
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owner in possession of 1/3rd of the property bearing
land registration No.16413 and consequential relief
for cancellation of registration in favour of the
defendants-respondents in respect of such 1/3rd share
in the suit schedule property and to register the
same in the name of the plaintiff. Presently the
legal representatives of the original plaintiff are
before us as appellants. It is the case of the
plaintiff-appellants that suit schedule property is
bearing land registration No.16413 and the claim of
the plaintiff-appellants is that it belonged to three
brothers namely, Francisco Fernandes (who was the
father-in-law of the original plaintiff), Francisco
Fernandes junior and Pedro Sebastiao Fernandes and
they owned and possessed the same jointly and in
equal shares. The defendant No. 2-Tereza is the
daughter of Francisco Fernandes junior and the
original plaintiff-Inacinha Fernandes is the wife of
Luis Fernandes, the son of Francisco Fernandes, the
first brother. It is their further case that on the
death of Francisco Fernandes, he was survived by the
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husband of the original plaintiff. It is their case
that on the death of said Francisco Fernandes, the
1/3rd share of the suit schedule property devolved
upon Luis the late husband of the original plaintiff
and it was accordingly enjoyed by the plaintiff.
Further case of the plaintiff is that on account of
a debt of Rs.198/- to one Naraina Panduronga Porobo,
the property was attached and thereafter the
liability was paid by way of subrogation of rights in
favour of the father of the first defendant, K.V.P.
Shastri who bought this property which was sold in
public auction on 26th April, 1935 and thereafter
granted aforementioned property in favour of the
husband of Tereza, namely, Tomas Fernandes vide
perpetual lease. It is the case of the plaintiff that
the right of subrogation in favour of the father of
the first defendant should have been granted by the
defendant No.2-Tereza only in respect of 1/3rd share
and not in relation to the entire property.
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3. The case of the plaintiff was sought to be
contested by the defendant No.1 inter alia
contending that the claim of the plaintiff is
false and ownership and possession of the suit
schedule property stands transferred in favour of
the defendant No.1 with effect from 26.4.1935 and
he had acquired right by way of prescription as
it has been enjoyed for 10 years, pursuant to the
registration of the suit schedule property in his
name. The defendant No.2 also denied the case of
the plaintiff and claimed to be in possession
pursuant to conveyance thereof by the defendant
No.1.
4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties
issues were framed and the matter went for trial
and both the parties adduced evidence. On
appreciation of evidence on record the trial
court decreed the suit vide its judgment dated
29.4.1978. The trial court decreed the suit
holding it to be tenable and directed the
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defendants to acknowledge that the plaintiff
along with her children is the lawful owner in
possession of 1/3rd share of the suit schedule
property and to release that 1/3rd share in favour
of the plaintiff, by declaring to be null and
void the inscription done in the Land
Registration Office in respect to the said
property which is described under No. 16413 in so
far as it covered the 1/3rd part of the plaintiff.
Further, the defendants were directed to pay
damages caused to the original plaintiff by
depriving her of the income corresponding to her
1/3rd portion. The trial court held that the
alleged prescription does not operate because the
defendant Shastri was never in the possession of
the property, much less in good faith. It was
also observed that it is proved from the
proceedings by a fact otherwise admitted that the
plaintiff has her residential house in the suit
schedule property with a common wall with the
house of the defendant-Tereza and this is one
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more important fact to corroborate the case of
the plaintiff, for being relatives descending
from the same common trunk having ancestral
house.
5. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree
the defendants preferred Civil Appeal No. 237 of
1981 before the District Court at Margao and the
same was disposed of by judgment dated 16.12.1985
by recording reasons. The first appellate court
held that the evidence on record shows that
neither the original plaintiff nor the original
defendants were able to produce any documentary
evidence to support their title to the suit
schedule property, besides the claim made by them
that the property was acquired from the common
ancestors. Further, it observed that the learned
trial judge rightly pointed out that the specific
claim made by the plaintiff with regard to the
common ownership to the suit schedule property
and the houses was not specifically denied by the
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defendants being a fact that only defendant No.1
namely, Venctexa Govinda Porobo Shastri took a
definite stand in this respect. It was thus held
that the trial Judge was justified in holding
that the common ownership of the suit schedule
property had been admitted by the defendants in
their written statement and that they could not
prove how the suit schedule property in view of
this fact this common ownership could
subsequently belong exclusively to the daughters
of one of the co-owners of the suit schedule
property who were the heirs of one of the sons of
the original title holder of the property.
Further, the circumstances of Tereza and
Conceicao having acquired their right through
the creditor Shastri who purchased their property
in a public auction after its attachment by the
court from the heirs of one of the co-owners are
certainly not binding on the respondents who were
not parties in the said proceedings being also a
fact that simply because the original plaintiff
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did not react either against the attachment or
the auction, it cannot be said that this
circumstance made her lose her right of the share
acquired by her husband through his father who
was one of the sons of the original owner of the
suit schedule property. Besides, the evidence on
record shows that the original plaintiff and her
family were residing in the house situated in the
suit schedule property even at the time of the
filing of the suit and subsequently they shifted
their residence after their ancestral house
collapsed having built another house in a
different property which had been acquired by the
plaintiff. It was further held by the first
appellate court that the trial Judge has
correctly assessed the evidence on record while
adjudicating the rights of the parties to the
suit in favour of the plaintiff, and the judgment
could not be said as having caused any grievance
to the defendants-respondents and must be fully
affirmed.
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6. Being aggrieved by the said judgment Second
Appeal No. 30 of 1986 was filed by the defendants
before the learned single Judge of the High Court
by urging certain substantial questions of law as
required under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 (for short “the CPC”). The High Court
admitted the appeal by framing the following
substantial questions of law :-
(1) The plaintiffs not having produced any document of title, could the courts below decree the suit?
(2) The decision is contrary to the pleadings. The courts below committed breach of procedure in holding that there was admission of original plaintiff, in the pleading when there is no such admission.
(3) The courts below failed to consider that the defendants had pleaded prescription and that Article 526(2) was fully attracted.
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties
and the translated pleadings from Portuguese
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language to English in the plaint with regard to
the claim of ownership of the plaintiff and the
pleadings of defendants, the learned single Judge
of the High Court has examined the rival legal
contentions urged with reference to the
substantial questions of law framed by it at the
time of admission of the second appeal and placed
reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the
case of Hira Lal and Anr. v. Gajjan and Ors.1
wherein this Court laid down the statement of law
regarding the substantial questions of law in the
second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The
relevant portion of paragraph 8 from the
aforesaid judgment reads thus :-
“8.…if in dealing with a question of fact that the lower appellate court has placed the onus on wrong party and its finding of fact is the result substantially of this wrong approach that may be regarded as a defect in procedure. When the first appellate court discarded the evidence as inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible that may introduce an error or defect in
1 (1990) 3 SCC 285
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procedure. So also in a case where the court below ignored the weight of evidence and allowed the judgment to be influenced by inconsequential matters, the High Court would be justified in reappreciating the evidence and coming to its own independent decision.”
With reference to the statement of law laid down by
this Court in the aforesaid case, the learned single
Judge of the High Court proceeded to answer the
substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 together by
recording its reasons in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the
impugned judgment. In the second appeal, the High
Court on the basis of the statement of law laid down
by this Court in Hira Lal case (supra) examined the correctness of the concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the first appellate court to answer the
substantial questions of law referred to supra. The
High Court has re-appreciated the evidence in the
backdrop of the statement of law laid down by this
Court after noticing the fact that the courts below
ignored the pleadings of the defendants-respondents
and the weight of their evidence and allowed its
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judgments to be influenced by inconsequential
matters, therefore, the High Court was of the view
that it is justified in re-appreciating the evidence
and coming to its independent decision and answered
the substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 in
favour of the defendants holding the findings of the
courts below on the relevant contentious issues as
perverse. In this regard, at paragraph 7, the High
Court considered the evidence on record and non-
appreciation of the same by the courts below,
particularly, the finding recorded by the first
appellate court that the plaintiff-appellants have
established their title in respect of the suit
schedule property, that the defendant Shastri had not
denied the claim of ownership of the plaintiff-
appellants and further that there is no specific
denial of the ownership by Tereza, holding that the
lower courts have erroneously recorded findings on
these aspects. The High Court has further proceeded
to hold that the fact remains that Tereza is not
claiming right independently herself but her claim to
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the property is through said Shastri. The case of the
defendants before the trial court is that the said
property was purchased by Shastri in a court auction
and subsequently conveyed to Tereza. Therefore, the
case of the defendants was accepted by the High
Court stating that the pleading of K.V.P. Shastri in
relation to the denial of ownership of the plaintiff
is more relevant and material rather than that of
Tereza. The High Court further made observation that
denial of Tereza without there being any such denial
by Shastri would have been of no consequence because
consequent to the auction to the property through
court, Tereza is claiming right to the property only
through Shastri and not independently. Therefore, the
High Court has arrived at valid finding on this
aspect of the matter that irrespective of the denial
of such claim of Tereza, had Shastri accepted the
claim of the plaintiff then such denial of Tereza
would have been of no consequence in the facts and
circumstances of the case. The High Court has arrived
at a conclusion on the basis of pleadings that
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undisputedly Shastri has denied the claim of the
ownership of the plaintiff-appellants in respect of
the suit schedule property, therefore, the findings
of both the courts below that there is no denial of
the plaintiff’s case regarding the ownership right of
the suit schedule property is not factually correct
and the said finding is held to be totally contrary
to the record and the same is arbitrary and perverse
and cannot be sustained. The High Court has also come
to the conclusion on the basis of the pleadings on
record that the claim of the plaintiff-appellants to
the suit schedule property is clearly in dispute and
plaintiff-appellants have not proved their title to
the suit schedule property and further rightly came
to the conclusion that the courts below have not
properly analyzed the material evidence on record
though plaintiff-appellants have failed to produce
documentary evidence in so far as the title of their
ownership of the suit schedule property is concerned
and further the finding recorded by the High Court in
its judgment at para 8 namely, to the effect that the
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challenge of the plaintiff with regard to the
acquisition of his right to the suit schedule
property by Shastri and Tereza is essentially and
solely based on the basis of the claim of ownership
of the plaintiff to the suit schedule property.
8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants
has submitted their legal and factual contentions
before us. It was contended that the High Court
failed to appreciate that under Section 100 of
the CPC, only a substantial question of law could
be framed for the purposes of examining the
contentions of parties and that a substantial
question of law is distinctly different from a
substantial question of fact.
9. Further the learned counsel contended that the
High Court failed to advert to the fact that
possession of the ancestral property continued
with the original plaintiff. It was contended
that the High Court should have considered the
fact that the two fact-finding courts had come to
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the conclusion on fact that the deceased-
plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule
property as a co-owner thereof, as 1/3rd of the
suit schedule property belonged to her father-in-
law Francisco Fernandes. It is submitted that the
learned single Judge of the High Court has
misread the evidence and pleadings in arriving at
the impugned findings. The learned counsel for
the plaintiff-appellants has relied on the
judgments of this Court in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya & Ors.2, Dollar Company, Madras v. Collector of Madras3 and Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu & Anr.4 to support the contention that in the facts and
circumstances of the present appeal the High
Court has tried to re-appreciate the evidence in
second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC which
cannot be done in the second appeal, in the
backdrop of the concurrent finding of facts by
2 AIR 1959 SC 57 3 (1975) 2 SCC 730 4 (1996) 3 SCC 392
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the lower courts on appreciation of pleadings
and evidence on record.
10. It is further contended by the learned counsel
that the High Court failed to appreciate that
defendant-Tereza was not claiming rights
independently and her claim to the suit schedule
property is through the said Shastri, when on the
contrary, the purported right and interest of
Shastri was in view of a purported public auction
of the property held to recover the debts of the
said Tereza and by an illegal means the said
Tereza obtained a perpetual lease of the suit
schedule property in her favour from the said
Shastri.
11. It was further contended that there was no
question of selling the entire property in the
public auction in pursuance to court decree when
the rights of the said Tereza was only to the
extent of 1/3rd of the entire property and the
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purported attachment of the same is null and void
and without any legal effect.
12. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention
towards the three points, which arise for
consideration by this Court:-
(1) In the absence of documentary proof, whether
oral evidence can be relied upon for granting a
decree declaring the rights of a party?
(2) Whether the High Court in a Second Appeal
should set-aside concurrent findings of fact upon
re-appreciating evidence?
(3) Whether improper admission or rejection of
evidence can be a ground for new trial or reversal
of any decision in any case?
13. He has further submitted that it is manifest that
a court is empowered to grant a decree of
declaration of title on the basis of only oral
evidence and further submitted that this Court
has settled the scope, limitation of jurisdiction
and power of a second appellate court under
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Section 100 of the CPC specifically after the
amendment in 1976. This Court has held that in
proceedings under Section 100 of the Code, power
to set aside concurrent finding of fact can be
exercised only when a substantial question of law
exists irrespective of the fact that the finding
of fact is erroneous.
14. The learned counsel has also stated that the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 creates a specific bar
against conducting a new trial merely on the
ground of improper admission or rejection of
evidence and that Section 167 of the Indian
Evidence Act is specific in this behalf.
15. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the
defendants-respondents contended that the present
appeal is misconceived and deserves to be
dismissed as the High Court has rightly exercised
its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. It
is evident from the extracts of the findings of
the courts below that the courts below have
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proceeded on the basis that there is an admission
of the claim of the plaintiff regarding 1/3rd
ownership of the suit schedule property as the
same has not been specifically denied by the
respondents. The said finding is not only
contrary to the pleadings on record but is also
contrary to the well-established principles of
law viz. (a) that the burden of proof is upon the
person who approaches the court, and (b) any
averment to be taken as an admission must be
clear and unambiguous. It is submitted that it is
an admitted fact that the plaintiff-appellants
could not produce any document before the trial
court to prove their title regarding the suit
schedule property.
16. It was further contended by the learned counsel
that Sections 101 and 102 of Evidence Act clearly
states that burden of proof lies on the person
who desires the court to give a judgment on a
legal right or liability and who would otherwise
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fail if no evidence was given on either side. In
the present case the plaintiffs-appellants would
have to satisfy that burden under the above said
sections of the Evidence Act, failing which the
suit would be liable to be dismissed. In this
regard, defendants placed reliance on the
judgments of this Court in Corporation of City of Bangalore v. Zulekha Bi & Ors.5, Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar & Ors. v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund & Ors.6 and Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh7, wherein it has been specifically held by this Court that
in a suit for disputed property the burden to
prove title to the land squarely falls on the
plaintiff.
17. The learned counsel further contended that the
trial court and the first appellate court have
erroneously discharged the burden of proof as
well as the onus of proof on the plaintiff-
appellants to prove (a) the title to the property
5 (2008) 11 SCC 306 6 (2007) 13 SCC 565 7 (2006) 5 SCC 558
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or for that matter (b) that the same was
ancestral, by referring to the written statements
of Tereza Fernandez and recording an erroneous
finding that the rights of the plaintiff was not
disputed by the defendants and, therefore, the
same amounted to an admission. In this regard the
pleadings of the parties become relevant which
have been reproduced at page 8 of the impugned
judgment and a perusal of which clearly show that
there was a clear and specific denial of the
right of the plaintiff over the said property as
well as the right of the ancestors of the said
plaintiff, by the auction purchaser/defendant No.
1. The relevant pleadings regarding the claim of
ownership as found on page 8 of the impugned
judgment are extracted below :-
“In the village of Loliem there exists a property known as ‘Bodquealem Tican’ now described in the Land Registry of this Judicial Division under No.sixteen thousand four hundred thirteen (16,413) and which belonged jointly to Francisco Fernandes, the father-in-law of the plaintiff and his brothers Francisco Fernandes junior, and Pedro Sebastiao Fernandes, who all three had been
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always holding possession the property jointly and in equal shares.
In answer to the said pleadings the defendant No.1 the predecessor of the appellant no.1 stated thus:-
‘The plaintiff her husband Luis or the father of this Francisco Fernandes Senior never held in possession the property- Bodquealem Tican-situate at Loliem and described in the Land Registry under No.16413, the boundaries of which and other details set out in the doc. of fls. 5 are deemed to have been reproduced herein for all purposes of law. The property at issue was always and originally in possession and ownership of the judgment debtors Tomas Fernandes his wife Tereza Fernandes, Santana deSouza and his wife Conceicao Fernandes of Loliem.’
The Other defendants, namely the other appellants stated thus :-
‘For neither she nor her husband held in possession any property and much less Bodquealem Tican-No.16413 the details of identification of which are borne out from Doc. of fls. 5 and are deemed to have been reproduced herein.”
18. It is further submitted that it is settled law
that for a decree to be passed on admission, the
admission should be clear and unambiguous. In
this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of
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this Court in Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha, (HUF) & Anr.8 Further, he has urged that so far as the written statement is
concerned, this Court in the case of Rachakonda Venkat Rao & Ors. v. R. Satya Bai & Anr.9 held that :
“20. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also tried to build argument based on the fact that the 1978 decree has been referred to as a preliminary decree by Defendant 1 in his reply to the plaintiff’s application under Order 26 Rules 13 and 14 CPC. According to him this shows that the defendant himself treated the said decree as a preliminary decree. This argument has no merit. We have to see the tenor of the entire reply and a word here or there cannot be taken out of context to build an argument. The reply by Defendant 1 seen as a whole makes it abundantly clear that the defendant was opposing the prayer in the application including the prayer for taking proceedings for passing a final decree.”
19. It was further submitted by the learned counsel
for the defendant-respondents that in any event
of the matter it is an admitted fact that there
8 (2010) 6 SCC 601 9 (2003 (7) SCC 452
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was clear and specific denial by the defendant
No.1/the auction purchaser and owner of the suit
schedule property and that the said finding is
concurrent vide trial court judgment (para 12)
and first appellate court judgment (para 8). The
relevant portions of which paragraphs are
extracted below:-
Trial Court judgment dated 29.4.1978 “12…On the other hand a careful perusal of the written statement of the defendant reveals that even though they might have denied that 1/3rd of that property had belonged to the couple of the plaintiff, only the defendant no.1 clearly stated that the same belonged entirely to the defendants Tereza and Conceica…”
First Appellate Court Judgment dated 16.12.1985
“8.However it was rightly pointed out by the learned Trial Judge, the specific claim taken by the respondents with regard to common ownership of the suit property and the houses was not specifically denied by the Appellants being a fact that only the original defendant no.1 Xastri took a definite stand in this respect…”
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It was further submitted that the owner of the
property having specifically denied title of the
plaintiffs as well as the fact that the said property
was ancestral; it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove the title as well as the fact that the said
property was ancestral. It was contended that even
assuming for the sake of argument that the other
defendant viz. Tereza who was in possession of the
property as a lessee does not deny the title, the
same would make no difference as the owner of the
property defendant No.1 had specifically denied the
title.
20. Learned counsel further argued that the High
Court has correctly exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 100 of the CPC. It is further
submitted that the findings rendered by the
courts below on no evidence or drawn on wrong
inference from the evidence, as well as casting
of onus on the wrong party, are admittedly
substantial questions of law.
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21. The submissions of both the learned counsel for
the parties with reference to the case law
referred to supra upon which reliance was placed,
are carefully examined by us with a view to find
out whether the substantial questions of law Nos.
1 and 2 framed and answered in favour of the
defendants-respondents and against the plaintiff-
appellants are correct or not. After having
heard learned counsel for the plaintiff-
appellants as well as defendants-respondents, we
have to hold that the High Court has rightly held
to the effect that it was primarily and
essentially necessary for the plaintiff-
appellants to establish their claim of ownership
before they could invite the court to address
itself to the issue of their challenge to the
title of the defendants-respondents to the suit
schedule property. The plaintiff-appellants
having failed to do so, their entire claim was
liable to be rejected. The High Court further
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recorded the finding, that the factum of
registration of the suit schedule property under
No.16413 in favour of the defendants-respondents
is not in dispute, yet the plaintiff-appellants
have not produced on the record any document of
inscription of the suit schedule property in
their name. Therefore, the High Court has rightly
come to the conclusion and held that the answer
to the first substantial question of law is to be
answered in the negative and held that since
plaintiff-appellants have not produced any
document of title in relation to the suit
schedule property, the grant of decree in favour
of them is erroneous in law. Further, on the
second substantial question of law, the High
Court has rightly answered in favour of the
defendants in the affirmative for the reason that
the courts below, without considering the denial
made by the defendant no.1 with regard to the
ownership claim made by the plaintiff-appellants
in respect of the suit schedule property, have
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come to the erroneous conclusion that there is no
pleading of fact by the defendants-respondents
and lack of evidence in favour of the plaintiff-
appellants to prove their title to the suit
schedule property. Therefore, the High Court has
arrived at the right conclusion and held that the
courts below committed serious error in holding
that there was admission of defendants in the
pleadings with respect to ownership of 1/3rd of
the suit schedule property by the plaintiff.
22. After careful scrutiny of the finding of fact and
reasons recorded by the courts below with
reference to the substantial questions of law
framed by the High Court at the time of admission
of the second appeal filed by the defendants, we
are satisfied that the ratio laid down by this
Court in Hira Lal’s case (supra) and other decisions referred to supra upon which
defendants’ counsel placed reliance in
justification of the findings and reasons
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recorded by the High Court in the impugned
judgment are applicable to the fact situation of
this case as the courts below have erred in
assuming certain facts which are not in existence
to come to the erroneous conclusion in the
absence of title document in justification of the
claim of the plaintiff in respect of the suit
schedule property and ignored the pleadings of
the defendants though they have specifically
denied the ownership right claimed by the
plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule
property and on wrong assumption of the facts
which are pleaded on the contentious issues,
they have been answered in favour of the
plaintiff, therefore, the High Court has rightly
exercised its appellate jurisdiction by framing
the correct substantial questions of law with
reference to the legal position and applied the
same to the fact situation of case on hand.
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23. In our considered view, the substantial questions
of law framed by the High Court at the time of
the admission of the second appeal is based on
law laid down by this Court in the above referred
case of Hira Lal which view is supported by other cases referred to supra. Therefore, answer to the
said substantial questions of law by the High
Court by recording cogent and valid reasons to
annul the concurrent findings that the non-
appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on
record by the courts below rendered their finding
on the contentious issues/points as perverse and
arbitrary, and therefore the same have been
rightly set aside by answering the substantial
questions of law in favour of the defendants.
24. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on
the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal10, wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para
24, which is extracted below : 10 (2006) 5 SCC 545
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“24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision
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rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.”
We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case
to hold that the High Court has framed substantial
questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and
there is no error in the judgment of the High Court
in this regard and therefore, there is no need for
this Court to interfere with the same.
25. In the matter of onus of proof and burden of
proof as per Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence
Act, we have to hold that it was upon the
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plaintiff-appellants to furnish proof regarding
ownership of 1/3rd share of the suit schedule
property and discharge their burden of proof as
per the afore-mentioned sections. The relevant
extract from Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh (supra) is reproduced below:-
“19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways: (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same.
20. In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple the law is stated in the following terms: (SCC p. 768, para 29)
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“29. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and satisfy the court that he, in law, is entitled to dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property and for the possession to be restored to him. However, as held in Addagada Raghavamma v. Addagada Chenchamma there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.”
We therefore do not find any reason whatsoever to
interfere with the impugned judgment and decree
passed by the High Court on this aspect of the case
as well.
26. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is
dismissed, there will be no order as to costs.
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Orders passed by this Court on 27.8.1999 and
3.9.2001 stand vacated.
…………………………………………J.
[G.S. SINGHVI]
…………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]
…………………………………………J. [C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi, December 10, 2013.
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