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  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1315  OF 2015      (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) NO. 7954 of 2014)

SATYA PAL SINGH                     …… APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.             …… RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

   Leave granted.

2. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed  

against  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

04.03.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2013  

by the High Court of M.P. at Gwalior whereby the High  

Court has upheld the decision of the Sessions Court,  

Bhind, M.P. (the trial court) in Sessions Case No.  

293/2010  by  acquitting  all  the  accused  i.e.  

REPORTABLE

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respondent nos. 2 to 6 herein.  

3. The  appellant  herein  made  a  written  complaint  

dated 19.07.2010 regarding the death of his daughter,  

Ranjana (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”)  

to the Addl. Superintendent of Police, Bhind, M.P.  

The FIR was registered on 27.07.2010. The trial court  

after the examination of evidence on record passed  

the judgment and order dated 13.06.2013 acquitting  

all the accused of the charges levelled against them  

for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and  

304B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and  

Section  4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  and  

alternatively  for  the  offence  punishable  under  

Section 302 of IPC. Being aggrieved of the decision  

of the trial court, the appellant approached the High  

Court against the order of acquittal of respondent  

nos. 2 to 6. The High Court vide its judgment and  

order dated 04.03.2014 has upheld the trial court’s  

decision  of  acquittal  of  all  the  accused  persons.  

The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is  

challenged  in  this  appeal  before  this  Court  

questioning its correctness.

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4. Being  aggrieved  of  the  impugned  judgment  and  

order  the  appellant  being  the  legal  heir  of  the  

deceased filed an appeal before the High Court under  

proviso  to  Section  372  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Cr.P.C.”). The High  

Court,  however,  has  mechanically  disposed  of  the  

appeal by passing a cryptic order without examining  

as to whether the leave to file an appeal filed by  

the appellant as provided under sub-Section (3) to  

Section 378 of Cr.P.C. can be granted or not. The  

correctness  of  the  same  is  questioned  by  the  

appellant in this appeal  inter alia  urging various  

grounds.  

5. Mr.  Prashant  Shukla,  the  learned  counsel  on  

behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance upon  

the judgment rendered by Delhi High Court in Ram Phal  

v.  State  &  Ors.1 wherein  the  Full  Bench,  after  

interpreting  the  proviso  to  Section  372  read  with  

Section  2(wa)  of  the  Cr.P.C.,  has  held  that  the  

father of the victim has  locus standi to prefer an  

appeal,  being  a  private  party  coming  under  the  1

 221 (2015) DLT 1

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definition  of  victim  under  Section  2(wa)  of  the  

Cr.P.C. It was contended by him that in the instant  

case, the appellant, being father of the deceased,  

has  locus standi to file an appeal before the High  

Court against the order of acquittal under proviso to  

Section 372 without seeking the leave of the High  

Court as required under sub-Section (3) of Section  

378  of  Cr.P.C.  Thus,  the  appeal  filed  by  the  

appellant was maintainable before the High Court of  

M.P.  under  the  abovesaid  provisions  of  Cr.P.C.  He  

further urged that undoubtedly, the said legal aspect  

of the matter has not been dealt with by the High  

Court  and  the  appeal  was  decided  on  merits  but  

without examining as to whether the leave to file an  

appeal by the appellant is required to be granted or  

not under the above provisions of Cr.P.C.

 6. The learned counsel for the appellant drew the  

attention of this Court towards the decision rendered  

by Delhi High Court in the case referred to supra,  

wherein it has elaborately adverted to the definition  

of victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C.  

and  proviso  to  Section  372  of  Cr.P.C.  and  has

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examined  them  in  the  light  of  their  legislative  

history. It has also adverted to 154th Law Commission  

Report  of  1996  in  connection  with  the  said  legal  

provision  of  Cr.P.C.  and  has  succinctly  held  that  

where the victim is unable to prefer an appeal then  

the  appeal  can  be  preferred  by  persons  -  such  as  

relatives,  foster  children,  guardians,  fiancé  or  

live-in partners, etc. of the victim, who are in a  

position to do so in his/her behalf. He urged that in  

the instant case, there is no need for the appellant,  

being the father of the deceased, to seek leave of  

the High Court as provided under sub-Section (3) to  

Section 378 of Cr.P.C. to maintain the appeal before  

it as it is his statutory right to prefer an appeal  

against the order of acquittal of all accused persons  

in view of proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C.

7. It was further urged by him that the High Court  

ought to have granted the leave to the appellant to  

file an appeal by the appellant as required under  

sub-Section  (3)  of  Section  378  of  Cr.P.C.  and  

thereafter it ought to have examined and disposed of  

the appeal on merits.

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8. He further vehemently contended that the appeal  

before  the  High  Court  was  filed  by  the  appellant  

challenging the acquittal order passed by the trial  

court  but  the  High  Court  has  concurred  with  the  

decision of the trial court mechanically without re-

appreciating  the  evidence  on  record.  He  further  

submitted that the decision of the High Court suffers  

from  error  in  law  as  the  High  Court,  being  the  

Appellate Court, was required to re-appreciate the  

evidence  on  record  to  exercise  its  appellate  

jurisdiction  in  the  appeal  filed  by  the  appellant  

with reference to the legal contentions urged in the  

memorandum of appeal but it has failed to do so. The  

High Court in a very cursory and casual manner has  

held that after a perusal of evidence on record it  

found no reason to interfere with the decision of the  

trial  court  as  the  prosecution  has  failed  to  

establish beyond reasonable doubt that the charges  

levelled against all the accused are proved and it  

has dismissed the appeal by passing a cryptic order,  

which  amounts  to  non-exercise  of  appellate  

jurisdiction properly by the High Court. Thus, the

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impugned  judgment  and  order  of  the  High  Court  is  

vitiated in law and therefore, the same is required  

to be set aside by this Court. He further requested  

this Court to remand the matter to the High Court for  

re-appreciation of the evidence on record and pass  

appropriate order on merits of the case after hearing  

both the parties.

 9. We have carefully examined the above mentioned  

provisions of Cr.P.C. and the Full Bench decision of  

Delhi High Court referred to supra upon which strong  

reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the  

appellant.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  appellant,  

being the father of the deceased, has locus standi to  

prefer an appeal before the High Court under proviso  

to  Section  372  of  Cr.P.C.  as  he  falls  within  the  

definition of victim as defined under Section 2(wa)  

of  Cr.P.C.  to  question  the  correctness  of  the  

judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial  

court in favour of respondent nos. 2 to 6 in Sessions  

Case No. 293/2010.  

10. The proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was amended  

by  Act  No.5  of  2009.  The  said  proviso  confers  a

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statutory  right  upon  the  victim,  as  defined  under  

Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal against  

an order passed by the trial court either acquitting  

the  accused  or  convicting  him/her  for  a  lesser  

offence or imposing inadequate compensation. In this  

regard, the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the  

case referred to supra has elaborately dealt with the  

legislative history of insertion of the proviso to  

Section 372 of Cr.P.C. by Act No. 5 of 2009 with  

effect  from  31.12.2009.  The  relevant  provision  of  

Section 372 of Cr.P.C. reads thus:

“372. No appeal shall lie from any judgment or  order of a Criminal Court except as provided  for by this Code or by any other law for the  time being in force:

Provided that the victim shall have a right to  prefer an appeal against any order passed by  the Court acquitting the accused or convicting  for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate  compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the  Court  to  which  an  appeal  ordinarily  lies  against  the  order  of  conviction  of  such  Court.”

The said amendment to the provision of Section 372 of  

Cr.P.C. was prompted by 154th Law Commission Report.  

The  said  Law  Commission  Report  has  undertaken  a  

comprehensive  review  of  Cr.P.C.  and  its

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recommendations were found to be very appropriate in  

amending  the  Cr.P.C.  particularly  in  relation  to  

provisions  concerning  arrest,  custody  and  remand,  

procedure  to  be  followed  in  summons  and  warrant-

cases, compounding of offences and special protection  

in respect of women and inquiry and trial of persons  

of unsound mind. Further, the Law Commission in its  

report has noted the relevant aspect of the matter  

namely that the victims are the worst sufferers in a  

crime and they do not have much role in the Court  

proceedings. They need to be given certain rights and  

compensation so that there is no distortion of the  

criminal justice system. The said report of the Law  

Commission has also taken note of the views of the  

criminologist, penologist and reformers of criminal  

justice  system  at  length  and  has  focused  on  

victimology, control of victimization and protection  

of  the  victims  of  crimes  and  the  issues  of  

compensation  to  be  awarded  in  favour  of  them.  

Therefore,  the  Parliament  on  the  basis  of  the  

aforesaid  Report  of  the  Law  Commission,  which  is  

victim  oriented  in  approach,  has  amended  certain  

provisions of the Cr.P.C. and in that amendment the

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proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was added to confer  

the  statutory  right  upon  the  victim  to  prefer  an  

appeal before the High Court against acquittal order,  

or an order convicting the accused for the lesser  

offence  or  against  the  order  imposing  inadequate  

compensation.

 11. The Full Bench of the High Court of Delhi after  

examining the relevant provisions under Section 2(wa)  

and proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., in the light  

of their legislative history has held that the right  

to  prefer  an  appeal  conferred  upon  the  victim  or  

relatives  of  the  victim  by  virtue  of  proviso  to  

Section  372  is  an  independent  statutory  right.  

Therefore, it has held that there is no need for the  

victim in terms of definition under Section 2(wa) of  

Cr.P.C.  to  seek  the  leave  of  the  High  Court  as  

required  under  sub-Section  (3)  of  Section  378  of  

Cr.P.C. to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section  

372 of Cr.P.C. The said view of the High Court is not  

legally correct for the reason that the substantive  

provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C. clearly provides  

that no appeal shall lie from any judgment and order

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of a Criminal Court except as provided for by Cr.P.C.  

Further, sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C.  

provides that for preferring an appeal to the High  

Court against an order of acquittal it is necessary  

to obtain its leave. We have to refer to the rules of  

interpretation of statutes to find out what is the  

effect of the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., it  

is well established that the proviso of a statute  

must  be  given  an  interpretation  limited  to  the  

subject-matter of the enacting provision. Reliance is  

placed on the decision of this Court rendered by four  

Judge Bench in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf2, the  

relevant para 18 of which reads thus:

“18. …  A  proviso  must  be  limited  to  the  subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a  settled  rule  of  construction  that  a  proviso  must  prima  facie  be  read  and  considered  in  relation to the principal matter to which it is  a proviso. It is not a separate or independent  enactment.  “Words  are  dependent  on  the  principal  enacting  words  to  which  they  are  tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as  divorced  from  their  context” (Thompson v.  Dibdin,  1912  AC  533).  If  the  rule  of  construction  is  that  prima  facie  a  proviso  should  be  limited  in  its  operation  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  enacting  clause,  the  stand we have taken is sound. To expand the  enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins  against  the  fundamental  rule  of  construction  

2   (1976) 1 SCC 128

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that a proviso must be considered in relation  to the principal matter to which it stands as a  proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso,  although the golden rule is to read the whole  section,  inclusive  of  the  proviso,  in  such  manner that they mutually throw light on each  other and result in a harmonious construction.”

         (emphasis laid by this Court)

12.  Further, a three Judge Bench of this Court by  

majority of 2:1 in the case of S. Sundaram Pillai v.  

V.R. Pattabiraman3 has elaborately examined the scope  

of  proviso  to  the  substantive  provision  of  the  

Section and rules of its interpretation. The relevant  

paras are reproduced hereunder:

“30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at  pages  294-295  has  collected  the  following  principles in regard to a proviso: (a)When one finds a proviso to a section  

the  natural  presumption  is  that,  but  for the proviso, the enacting part of  the  section  would  have  included  the  subject-matter of the proviso.

(b)A  proviso  must  be  construed  with  reference to the preceding parts of the  clause to which it is appended.

(c)Where  the  proviso  is  directly  repugnant  to  a  section,  the  proviso  shall stand and be held a repeal of the  section  as  the  proviso  speaks  the  latter intention of the makers.

(d)Where  the  section  is  doubtful,  a  proviso may be used as a guide to its  

3   (1985) 1 SCC 591

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interpretation: but when it is clear, a  proviso cannot imply the existence of  words of which there is no trace in the  section.

(e)The proviso is subordinate to the main  section.

(f)A  proviso  does  not  enlarge  an  enactment  except  for  compelling  reasons.

(g)Sometimes  an  unnecessary  proviso  is  inserted by way of abundant caution.

(h)A construction placed upon a proviso  which  brings  it  into  general  harmony  with  the  terms  of  section  should  prevail.

(i)When  a  proviso  is  repugnant  to  the  enacting  part,  the  proviso  will  not  prevail  over  the  absolute  terms  of  a  later  Act  directed  to  be  read  as  supplemental to the earlier one.

(j)A  proviso  may  sometimes  contain  a  substantive provision.

XXX            XXX                 XXX  32. In  Ishverlal  Thakorelal  Almaula v.  Motibhai Nagjibhai it was held that the main  object of a proviso is merely to qualify the  main  enactment.  In  Madras  and  Southern  Mahrata  Railway  Co.  Ltd. v.  Bezwada  Municipality Lord Macmillan observed thus:

“The proper function of a proviso  is to except and deal with a case  which would otherwise fall within  the general language of the main  enactment,  and  its  effect  is

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confined to that case.”

33. The above case was approved by this Court  in  CIT v.  Indo  Mercantile  Bank  Ltd. where  Kapur, J. held that the proper function of a  proviso was merely to qualify the generality  of  the  main  enactment  by  providing  an  exception and taking out, as it were, from  the main enactment a portion which, but for  the  proviso,  would  fall  within  the  main  enactment. In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills  and Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj  Sinha Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, very  aptly and succinctly indicated the parameters  of a proviso thus:

“As a general rule, a proviso is  added to an enactment to qualify  or create an exception to what is  in the enactment, and ordinarily,  a  proviso  is  not  interpreted  as  stating a general rule.”            

XXX               XXX                XXX

36. While interpreting a proviso care must be  taken that it is used to remove special cases  from the general enactment and provide for  them separately.

37. In short, generally speaking, a proviso  is intended to limit the enacted provision so  as  to  except  something  which  would  have  otherwise been within it or in some measure  to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a  proviso may be embedded in the main provision  and becomes an integral part of it so as to  amount to a substantive provision itself.”                       (emphasis supplied)

Thus, from a reading of the abovesaid legal position  

laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the  cases  referred  to

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supra, it is abundantly clear that the proviso to  

Section 372 of Cr.P.C. must be read along with its  

main enactment i.e., Section 372 itself and together  

with  sub-Section  (3)  to  Section  378  of  Cr.P.C.  

otherwise the substantive provision of Section 372 of  

Cr.P.C.  will  be  rendered  nugatory,  as  it  clearly  

states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or  

order  of  a  Criminal  Court  except  as  provided  by  

Cr.P.C.

13. Thus, to conclude on the legal issue:  

“whether the appellant herein, being the father  

of the deceased, has statutory right to prefer an  

appeal  to  the  High  Court  against  the  order  of  

acquittal  under  proviso  to  Section  372  of  Cr.P.C.  

without  obtaining  the  leave  of  the  High  Court  as  

required  under  sub-Section  (3)  to  Section  378  of  

Cr.P.C.”, this Court is of the view that the right of  

questioning the correctness of the judgment and order  

of  acquittal  by  preferring  an  appeal  to  the  High  

Court  is  conferred  upon  the  victim  including  the  

legal heir and others, as defined under Section 2(wa)  

of Cr.P.C., under proviso to Section 372, but only

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after  obtaining  the  leave  of  the  High  Court  as  

required  under  sub-Section  (3)  to  Section  378  of  

Cr.P.C.  The High Court of M.P. has failed to deal  

with this important legal aspect of the matter while  

passing the impugned judgment and order.  

14. Adverting to another contention of the learned  

counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  regarding  the  

failure  on  the  part  of  the  High  Court  to  re-

appreciate the evidence it is clear from a perusal of  

the impugned judgment and order passed by the High  

Court that it has dealt with the appeal in a very  

cursory and casual manner, without adverting to the  

legal contentions and evidence on record. The High  

Court in a very mechanical way has stated that after  

a  perusal  of  the  evidence  on  record  it  found  no  

reason to interfere with the decision of the trial  

court as the prosecution has failed to establish the  

charges  levelled  against  the  accused  beyond  

reasonable doubt and it has dismissed the appeal by  

passing a cryptic order. This Court is of the view  

that the High Court, being the Appellate Court, has  

to  exercise  its  appellate  jurisdiction  keeping  in

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view  the  serious  nature  of  the  charges  levelled  

against the accused. The High Court has failed to  

exercise its appellate jurisdiction properly in the  

appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment  

and order of acquittal passed by the trial court.

15.  Hence, the impugned judgment and order of the  

High Court is not sustainable in law and the same is  

liable to be set aside by this Court and the case is  

required to be remanded to the High Court to consider  

for grant of leave to file an appeal by the appellant  

as required under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of  

Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceed in the matter  

16.  For the reasons stated supra, this appeal is  

allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and  

order of the High Court. The case is remanded to the  

High Court to hear the appellant with regard to grant  

of leave to file an appeal as the appellant is legal  

heir of the victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of  

Cr.P.C. and dispose of the appeal in accordance with  

law in the light of observations made in this order  

as expeditiously as possible.  

                            …………………………………………………………J.

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                            [T.S. THAKUR]                                 …………………………………………………………J.   

         [V. GOPALA GOWDA] New Delhi, October 6, 2015