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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.  9871    OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. [C] NO.23292 OF 2008)

SATLUJ JAL VIDYUT NIGAM  …  APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAJ KUMAR RAJINDER SINGH (DEAD)  THROUGH LRS. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH     C.A. NO.9874 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9281

OF 2014 C.A. NO. 9875 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9284

OF 2014 C.A. NO.9876 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9288

OF 2014 C.A. NO. 9877 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9289

OF 2014 C.A. NO. 9878 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9287

OF 2014 C.A. NO. 9879  OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9285

OF 2014 C.A. NO. 9880 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.9283

OF 2014 AND

C.A. NOS. 9872­73 OF 2018 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NOS. 22539­22540 OF 2008

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J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The question involved is whether after the abolition of Jagirs by

virtue of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and

Land Reforms Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Abolition Act’),

the late Jagirdar or his legal representatives could have claimed the

compensation on the land acquisition being made particularly when

land has vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh, the land was not

under the personal cultivation, and particularly when they have

received the compensation under the Abolition Act,  apart from that

had also received the compensation under the provisions of H.P.

Ceiling on Land Holdings Act,  1972 (hereinafter  referred to as “the

Ceiling Act”).  

3. The facts project how a litigant has filed a slew of litigations one

after the  other  and  faced  with  a  situation  that it  was likely to  be

dismissed,  he would withdraw  it;  again, file it  on new grounds,  or

having lost it, would withdraw it again at appellate stage, and in the

meantime, in different proceedings by playing  fraud, getting unjust

enrichment by receiving compensation at the expense of public

exchequer.

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4. The facts in the instant case reveal that Late Rajinder Singh, son

of  erstwhile ruler  Late  Maharaja  Padam Singh was Jagirdar  of the

land, and thus was recorded as owner of thousands of bighas of land

in Tehsil Rampur, Sub­Tehsil Nankhari and Tehsil Rohru of erstwhile

Mohasu district which is presently a part of Shimla district and Tehsil

Nichhar of district Kinnaur of State of Himachal Pradesh.

5. The land in village ‘Jhakri’ of 393 khasra numbers admeasuring

1011 bighas, 6 Biswas was declared to have vested in the State under

section 27 of the Abolition Act and the intermediary Rajinder Singh as

per order dated 14.11.1962 was permitted to retain only 64.12 bighas

of land which was under his personal cultivation. In Himachal

Pradesh, one acre comprises 5 bighas of land. Vide order dated

19.9.1964 passed by the Assistant Collector, the order of vesting was

modified to the extent that he was given 13 bighas 12 Biswas of land

comprised in Khatauni No.1 out of 14 Khasra numbers, i.e., 14, 122,

125, 142, 143, 165, 212, 238, 241, 288, 423, 494, 511 and 512. Some

of the aforesaid survey numbers were unmeasured. However, the fact

remains that the total  area which was found to be under personal

cultivation, was 13 bighas, 12 Biswas.

6. Late Jagirdar Rajinder Singh assailed the order of vesting dated

14.11.1962 by filing W.P. [C] No. 15/1962. Before the Judicial

Commissioner who used to hear writ petitions at the relevant time,

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held that the land which was not under personal cultivation, would

not vest in the State unless and until compensation was paid.  

7. Pursuant to the order of vesting, the competent authority under

the Abolition Act i.e. Compensation Officer, Mahasu, vide order dated

12.4.1966 determined the compensation of  Rs.28,019.45.  Since the

Zamindar had already received an amount of Rs.1,703.25 in excess

from the tenants who had acquired proprietary rights under section

11 of the Abolition Act, same was deducted from the amount and the

amount payable was found to be Rs.26,316.20 and  it  was actually

paid on 6.5.1966.

8. As against the order passed by the Compensation Officer dated

12.4.1966, the appeal was preferred before the District Judge,

Mahasu. The appeal was partly allowed and the direction which was

made of deduction of Rs.1703.25 was set aside and the payment of

entire Rs.28,019.45 was ordered without aforesaid deduction.

9. As against the decision of the Judicial Commissioner dated

14.11.1962, the  matter travelled to this Court in C.A. Nos.1186­

1191/1966. This Court held that vesting under section 27, the right,

title and interest of the owner in landholding in case land revenue of

the holding exceed Rs.125 per year, would vest free from all

encumbrances in the State Government and the vesting is automatic

and without being contingent on the happening of any other event.

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Compensation and rehabilitation grant can be determined and paid

later.  This  Court in the  order  dated  17.9.1969 made  the following

observations:

“It is apparent that S.27 deals with lands the annual land revenue of  which exceeds  Rs.125 per year. It says in unequivocal terms that the right. title and interest of the owner in such lands shall be deemed to have been transferred land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. This essentially means that on the enforcement of the Act the vesting takes  place  automatically and  without being contingent on the happening of any other event. The  High  Court in the full  Bench  decision referred to above took the same view and was right in observing that wherever the  legislature  intended to defer the date of vesting such as in S.11 and 15 clear provisions were made to that effect and the reasons thereof were obvious. In 8.11 the tenant had to exercise the option to acquire the right. title and interest of the landowner. The vesting of such rights­ would necessary depends on the time of the exercise of such option. Similarly in 8.15. a future date had to be provided in view of its special provisions. We do not consider that the provisions of sub S.53 (3) and (4) of S.27 contain any indication that the vesting of rights of ownership in the  Government  would be dependent on the determination of compensation. The vesting takes place under sub­S. (1) immediately on the enforcement of the Act. Thereafter, under sub­S. (3) compensation has to be paid to the landowner in accordance with the provisions mentioned therein. Under sub 8(4) the State Government shall transfer the rights of ownership to a tenant who cultivates the land only on payment of compensation. That cannot prevent or have any bearing on the vesting which takes place under sub S(1).  The  payment  of rehabilitation grant  which  is provided by sub 8(5) to a small landowner strengthens the reasoning in favour of vesting being automatic and immediate under sub S(1). There can

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be no manner of doubt that in respect of land which falls within the ambit of S.27(1) transfer and vesting of the rights of ownership to and in the Government takes  place      immediately  on  the  enforcement  of the Act and thereafter compensation and rehabilitation grant are payable.

For all these reasons, the appeals are allowed and the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner is set aside. The cases are remanded to the High Court for disposal of the questions which were not decided. In view of the entire circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.”

(emphasis supplied)

This Court remitted the matter to the High Court for disposal of

the questions which were not decided. In particular, the question of

personal cultivation  of Jagirdar  as that land  was  only saved from

vesting.

10. Faced with the observation made by this Court  that  the  land

which is not under personal cultivation vested automatically  in the

State and as after remand the High Court was required to decide the

matter in view of the said observations of this Court, Rajinder Singh

prayed for withdrawal of W.P. No.15/1962 with permission to file a

civil suit. The  High  Court vide order dated 9.7.1970 permitted to

withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a civil  suit. Thus, the

mandate  of this  Court in the  order  dated  17.9.1969 to  decide the

question of personal cultivation was avoided by the withdrawal of writ

petition.  

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11. Late Rajinder Singh then filed Civil Suit No.15/1970 in which he

took a somersault and prayed for a declaration of title and sought a

declaration that the suit property was not the ‘land’ under Section 2(5)

of the Abolition Act and as such it did not vest in the State of

Himachal Pradesh. The case of personal cultivation was abandoned by

him. The trial court framed the issues; whether the plaintiff was in

possession of the land in dispute and whether the disputed land, in

whole or in part, vested in the State Government? The issue was also

framed whether the land in dispute is covered under the definition of

‘land’ in the Abolition Act.  What  is the effect  of  the decision dated

12.4.1966? The issue was also framed with respect to the finality of

the decision of the Compensation Officer dated 12.4.1966, and

whether the suit was barred as the order had attained finality. The

trial court also framed the issue with respect to the aspect whether the

plaintiff had received compensation of the part of the area in dispute

and, as such, estopped from filing the suit.

12. The suit 15/1970 filed in the  High  Court  was  dismissed on

26.6.1973. The High Court has held that the suit land was within the

purview of the term  ‘land'  as  defined  in the  Abolition Act  and the

plaintiff was not in the personal cultivation of the said land. Hence,

the entire land had vested in the State Government under section 27

of the Act on 26.1.1955, the date on which the Abolition Act came into

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force. It was held that the plaintiff was not the owner of the said land.

The High Court has recorded the following findings:

"25.  In this view of the matter I hold, that the land in dispute is decidedly land as defined in the Abolition Act and the plaintiff not being in the personal cultivation of such land, the entire of it has vested in the State Government  under section  27 of the  Act.   The two issues are thus decided against the plaintiff.

41.   In view of my decision given above for respective issues, the relief of declaration cannot be granted.  The disputed land  has  automatically vested in the  State Government under section 27 on 26th  January 1955, when the Abolition Act came into force.   As such the plaintiff is not the owner of such land.   Since the plaintiff  has not proved his  "personal  cultivation" for such land, the same is not exempt from vestment under sub­section (2) of section 27.   The executive instructions issued by the defendants, for this reason, cannot be considered to be wrong or illegal.   The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief."  

The High Court in C.S. No.15 of 1970 also decided issue Nos.5,

11 and 12 and held that the suit was expressly barred by estoppel and

also by res judicata. The suit being for the mere declaration was not

maintainable and was barred under section 34 of the Specific Relief

Act, 1963.

13. Rajinder Singh filed the appeal before Division Bench of the High

Court as against the judgment and decree dated 26.6.1973 of Single

Judge. The first appeal was ultimately withdrawn by making a

statement by his counsel that the disputed land had been acquired

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under the provisions of section 8 of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings

Act, and the compensation had been paid to the appellant. In view of

the  subsequent event,  prayer  was  made to  withdraw  the  suit and

appeal  as it  had become  infructuous.  However, the  High Court  on

23.6.1986 permitted the appellant to withdraw the suit with

permission to file a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the

suit on the same cause of action in case there was any necessity to file

such a subsequent suit, and the appeal was dismissed as infructuous.

It is apparent that the appellant has accepted the factual position that

land was declared surplus and he has received compensation of the

disputed land under the  provisions of the  Ceiling  Act,  1972.  From

which actual factual position and admission, he has tried to wriggle

out falsely in the instant matter.

14. The withdrawal of suit C.S. No.15 of 1970 was aimed at

defrauding the court as the trial court has held that the suit land was

not personally cultivated as such, it had vested automatically in the

State Government and it was the ‘land’ as defined in the Abolition Act

and the plaintiff was estopped from filing a suit. During the pendency

of the aforesaid matter in spite of the land having been vested in the

State,  under Abolition Act  compensation was obtained second time

under the provisions of the Ceiling Act, though the compensation was

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earlier too paid to him as determined by the Compensation Officer in

1966.  

15. The Ceiling Act was enacted in the year 1972 and it provided for

consolidation of holding and amend the laws relating to ceiling on land

holdings. Section 11 of the Act of 1972 provided that the surplus land

would vest in the State, and would be deemed to have been acquired

by the  State  Government free from all encumbrances for a  public

purpose on payment of a certain amount.  

16. On 10.6.1980 the Collector (Ceiling) that is the Sub­Divisional

Officer declared 10,027.5 bighas of land as surplus. It was not

questioned by Rajinder Singh. Compensation was determined and also

paid. The reference was made by the department that the additional

land was required to be declared as surplus. On 5.9.1985, Financial

Commissioner (Appeals) decided references and did not interfere in the

aforesaid declaration of land as surplus,  however conclusively  held

that additional land was required to be declared surplus.   The

declaration of  10,027.5 bighas of land as surplus vide  order  dated

10.6.1980  was  not sufficient.  The  case  was  accordingly remanded.

The limited remand order also attained finality. Ultimately order was

passed by the Collector, Rampur Bushahr, Distt. Shimla, on

10.11.1993. It was observed that the compensation of Rs.57,888.80

had been received for the land that had already been declared surplus

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i.e. 10027.5 bighas. It was also held that in the order dated 10.6.1980,

two units of permissible area to the landowner and his minor son were

erroneously allowed, therefore, the additional area of one unit given to

minor son was declared as surplus. It was held that family of Rajinder

Singh was entitled only for one unit and the final draft statement was

accordingly published.  

17. The area in question has also declared a surplus in 1980 and

acquired  by  State  under section  11  of  Ceiling  Act  before the land

acquisition was started in 1987 and the order dated 10.6.1980

declaring 10,027.5 Bighas of land as surplus so far as Rajinder Singh

was concerned attained finality as it was not questioned by him.  

18. As against the order dated 10.11.1993 declaring additional

approximately 9000 bighas of land as surplus, the appeal was filed,

the same was dismissed by the Commissioner on 30.8.1996. Against

the said appellate order revision was filed before the Financial

Commissioner and the same was dismissed on 18.1.2002. On

1.8.2013 the Commissioner passed an order upholding the mutation

order against which revision was filed before the Financial

Commissioner. Ultimately the review petition was also dismissed as

not maintainable which the appellant is stated to have questioned.

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19. With respect to the present acquisition proceedings out of which

appeal arises, notification under section 4 was issued on 9.1.1987 for

the acquisition of land for H.P. State Electricity Board for construction

of  an approach road at  Jhakri.  The  Electricity  Board  was  later  on

replaced by Nathpa Jhakri Power Corporation (NJPC) and later on by

the appellant Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam. The Land Acquisition Collector

passed an award on 24.2.1989 determining the rate of compensation

at the rate of Rs.20,000 per bigha. However, it was observed in the

award that there  was a dispute about the ownership of Rajinder

Singh. Hence, it was ordered that compensation should not be

disbursed in view of the pendency of ceiling proceedings. It be

deposited in a bank instead of court. A reference was sought under

section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the LA Act’). The Reference Court vide award dated 23.7.1991

determined the compensation at the rate of Rs.1 lakh per bigha.

20. Another acquisition proceeding was initiated by issuance of

notification under section 4 which was published in the Official

Gazette for the acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of

residential colony for the Jhakri Hydel Power Project. On 11.7.1988

amended notification under section 4 was issued. On 27.2.1991 award

was passed according to the classification of the land. On 4.7.1991, a

supplementary award was passed. The references were made to the

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Court. The Reference Court awarded Rs.1 lakh per bigha vide award

dated 27.3.1997.  

21. As  against the  award passed by  the  Reference  Court  appeals

were preferred before the High Court. It was contended that the land

acquisition proceedings were commenced in collusion with the

Government officials. The land stood vested in the Government under

the Abolition Act.  There  was  no question of  acquiring  the same.  A

prayer was made in the appeals to file additional documents under

Order 41 Rule XXVII and to amend the written statement. The High

Court dismissed the said applications along with appeals.  

22. As  against the  dismissal  of the  appeals  and the applications,

C.A. Nos.3741­52 and 3753­57 of 2001 were filed in this Court by the

appellant. They were decided on 3.5.2001. The judgment of the High

Court was set aside. The applications under Order 41 Rule XXVII and

Order 6 Rule XVII were allowed. This Court in the final order dated

3.5.2001 observed:

    “In course of hearing of the appeals it was fairly agreed by learned counsel for the parties that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the contentions raised it will be apt and proper to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal taking into consideration the averments in the amendment petition and the documents filed as additional evidence.   Such an order in the fact situation of  the case will serve the ends of justice.

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     In view  of the  agreed  position fairly stated  by learned counsel for the parties and in our view, rightly, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High court which is under challenge; allow the petitions  filed by  the appellants  under Order 6  Rule XVII  CPC and under  Order 41  Rule  XXVII  CPC and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.”

23. After the case was remitted to the High Court, appeals have been

dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 25.2.2008.

Aggrieved thereby the appeals have been preferred by Satluj Jal Vidyut

Nigam.

24. The Reference Court decided 72 land reference cases wherein it

was held that the respondents were neither the owner nor in

possession of  the  land under acquisition, and the  land in question

stood vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The award was

challenged by way of Regular First Appeal and the same is stated to be

pending in the High Court.

25. Civil Appeals arising out of SLP [C] No.9281/2014 arise out of a

common judgment dated 18.9.2013 passed by the High Court. Writ

petitions were filed before the High Court by one of them by Sita Devi

& Ors. being CWP No.2931/2010 with respect to a redetermination of

compensation. They were decided by a common judgment and order

dated 18.9.2013 and it has been held that notwithstanding the fact

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that Rajinder Singh may not have a title, the status of the appellants

had been held to be that of bona fide transferees earlier and that order

has attained finality and was not questioned in appropriate

proceedings. Thus, they were entitled to the re­determination of

compensation  under section  28A of the LA  Act. Satluj Jal  Vidyut

Nigam has filed the appeals impugning the judgment in the year 2014.

26. It  was  urged  on  behalf of the appellant that the respondent

Rajinder Singh has received compensation 3 times with respect to the

same land. Firstly, in 1966­67 he had received a sum of Rs.28,019 as

compensation due to the vesting of entire land in the State

Government and the Compensation Officer had determined the same

under the Abolition Act.  The  land, in any event,  had vested  in the

State.  The second time  the compensation of  Rs.57,388/­ had been

received in the year 1980­81 under the Ceiling Act, 1972.   For the

third  time, the respondent has received compensation  in a sum of

Rs.60 lakhs. The respondent has committed a serious fraud. It was

also urged that Rajinder Singh has filed W.P. No.256/1979, the High

Court dismissed the writ petition and observed that the respondent

has acted unfairly knowing fully well that the land had already vested

in the State and made other observations regarding successive

litigations  preferred  by the respondent  and the  withdrawal of  RFA

No.9/1973.

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27. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the

appellants further urged that as per the principle, fraud vitiates, the

respondents are not entitled to any compensation. They could not be

permitted to take advantage of the continuance of wrong entry. There

was no title left with Rajinder Singh as the land had vested

automatically in the State under the Abolition Act. The LAO had also

directed  not to  pay the  compensation  owing to the  ceiling  case in

which Late Rajinder Singh has already received the compensation and

land had been declared surplus. The question involved is not of

determination of title under sections 18 and 30 of the LA Act but the

title stood extinguished is apparent from Section 27 and ceiling

proceedings of which evidence has been permitted to be adduced by

this Court. Even the LAO and the Reference Court have ordered that

there was no title with Rajinder Singh, as such, compensation was not

to be paid. The effect of previous proceedings and the overall conduct

of Rajinder Singh ought to have been taken into consideration by the

High Court. The observation made by the High Court that it could not

go into the question of the title of Rajinder Singh in the proceedings is

wholly incorrect as it is the serious case of fraud, the title has already

been adjudicated conclusively and lost in other proceedings. It was not

a case of an adjudication of title in the present proceedings. The effect

of Section 27 proceeding and that of ceiling Act case was required to

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be considered. The High Court could not have permitted the

perpetuation of fraud while dismissing the first appeal after this Court

has remitted the matter to it.  

28. It was further urged that the observation made by the LAC in his

award in 1989 not to make payment of compensation, due to ceiling

case was wholly legal and valid. Even the Reference Court has held in

the cases that there was no title with the respondents and the appeal

against the same R.F.A. is pending in the High Court. The High Court

ought to have exercised the supervisory power as there was an error

apparent on the face of the record and to prevent abuse of process of

law.  When the principle  of ‘fraud vitiates’ is  attracted, the  label  of

proceedings is not material and the court is bound to look into same

and relegation to a remedy of the civil suit could not be said to be

appropriate in the facts of the instant case.  

29. It was contended by learned senior counsel on behalf of LRs. of

Late Rajinder Singh that the question of the pre­existing right of the

State cannot be gone into in these proceedings. The land in question

did not vest in the State under the Abolition Act. Even if the

amendment of pleadings and additional evidence had been allowed by

this Court, the pre­existing right of the State over the property cannot

be gone into in proceedings under section 18 or 30 of the LA Act. It

was not open to the State Government to question the title of the land­

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owners in reference proceedings. The State had filed an appeal against

the reference order which was dismissed on 3.6.2004 as barred by

limitation. It was also contended that the land did not vest in the State

as it was under personal cultivation. Under the Abolition Act, there

was vesting of land which was under tenancy only. Land in question

was not within the purview of the term ‘land' as defined in section 2(5)

in the Abolition Act, as such, there was no vesting of the same in the

State.  Though, 1011 bighas and 6 Biswas of land in village Jhakri

vested in the State and  mutation­order was  made on 27.2.1962.

However, certain other lands which were under personal cultivation

had been excluded, later on, the Compensation Officer also passed an

order determining compensation on 12.4.1966 which was in respect of

tenancy land and not in respect of land under personal cultivation or

the land not assessed to land revenue. Tenants have been given the

rights over the land mentioned in the order dated 12.4.1966 passed by

the Compensation Officer.  

30. It was also contended that the land under personal cultivation

was mentioned in the revenue records as ‘Banjar Kadim’ which could

not be said to  be  ‘land’  within the meaning of  Abolition Act  nor  it

vested in the State Government. The area of Village Jhakri which was

left with Rajinder Singh was 2119 bighas and 19 Biswas. The said

land did not vest in the State. After remand of the case from this Court

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under Section 27 of Abolition Act, the writ petition was withdrawn and

civil suit No.15/1970 was filed and the same was dismissed by the

High Court. The suit was also withdrawn in appeal as such there was

no adjudication of the rights in the previous rounds of proceedings.  

31. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondents further contended

that at the time of land acquisition neither the land was finally

declared surplus nor possession was taken under the Ceiling Act, as

such it did not vest in the State unless the possession was taken. The

acquisition of land under the LA Act is protected under the Ceiling

Act.  The statement made by the counsel  on behalf  of  the Power of

Attorney­holder of Rajinder Singh during the course of the first appeal

withdrawing Suit No.15/1970 was incorrect. As the order passed by

the Collector in ceiling case declaring the land surplus had been set

aside by the Financial Commissioner. As such an incorrect statement

was made before the High Court; maybe it was made in ignorance of

the facts. Earlier vide order dated 10.6.1980, 10027.5 bighas of land

was  declared surplus and vide order  dated  10.11.1993, additional

9679 bighas total 19706.5 bighas was declared as surplus. Even if

compensation was collected, it would not make any difference as the

land did not vest in the State unless possession was taken.

32. Following questions arise for consideration:

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(i) whether land has vested in State under the Abolition Act, and effect

of acceptance of compensation under the said Act?

(ii) Effect of the proceedings under the Ceiling Act?

(iii) Effect of withdrawal of Civil Suit No.15/1970 in appeal.

(iv) Whether the question of right, title or interest of Late Rajinder

Singh or his successors to obtain compensation can be considered in

the proceedings under sections 18 and 30 of the LA Act? Particularly,

on the basis of the principle “fraud vitiates”.

(v) Whether the respondents who are claiming on the basis of

patta /transfer made by Rajinder Singh, are bona fide transferees and

entitled to compensation?  

Question  No.1: In  Re. the effect of the  H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates, Act, 1953

33. After Independence was achieved, in order to bring the agrarian

reforms, the Abolition Act was enacted in the State of Himachal

Pradesh which came into force on Republic Day w.e.f. 26.1.1955. The

Abolition Act has been enacted to provide for the abolition of the big

landed estates and to reform the law relating to tenancies and to make

provisions for matters connected therewith in Himachal Pradesh.

‘Estate’, ‘land­owner’ and ‘holdings’ have been defined in section 2(3)

of the Abolition Act and have the meanings respectively assigned to

these words  in  the Punjab Land Revenue Act,  1887 as  in  force in

Himachal Pradesh immediately before 26.1.1950.

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34. The terms ‘estate', ‘land­owner' and ‘holding' have been defined

under sections 3(1), 3(2) and 3(3) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act,

1867are extracted hereunder:

“3.        Definition: ­ In this  Act,  unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context; (1) “estate” means any area— (a)            for which a separate record­of­rights has been made; or (b) which has been separately assessed to land revenue, or would have been so assessed if the land­revenue  had  not been released, compounded for or redeemed; or (c) which the   State Government may, by general rule or special order, declare to be an estate;   (2) “land­owner” does not include a tenant or an assignee of land­revenue, but does not include a person to whom a holding  has been transferred, or an estate or holding has been let in farm, under this Act for the recovery of an arrear   of land­revenue or of a sum recoverable   as such an arrear and every other person not hereinbefore in this clause mentioned  who is in possession of an estate or any share or portion thereof , or in the enjoyment of any part of the profits of an estate;              (3) “holding” means a share or portion of an estate held by the land­owner or jointly by two or more land­owners.”

35. Estate means any area for which a separate record of rights has

been made; or which has been separately assessed to land revenue or

would have been so assessed if the land revenue had not been

released, compounded for or redeemed. Definition of ‘land­owner’ does

not include  a tenant  or  an  assignee  of land revenue,  and  holding

22

means a share or portion of an estate held by the landowner or jointly

by two or more persons.

36. The word ‘holding’ as defined in the Punjab Land Revenue Act,

1887  would  mean an estate which  means any area for which a

separate record of rights has been made or which has been separately

assessed to land revenue,  or would have been so assessed to  land

revenue in case it had not been released, compounded for or

redeemed, or has been declared to be an estate by the State

Government. Thus, expression ‘holding’ would include the area of an

estate also if it is assessed or  would  have  been  assessed  but for

release, compounding or redeeming of land revenue. As per the

definition of the estate in section 3(1) of the Punjab Act, estate means

any  area for  which separate record  of rights  has  been  made.  The

expression land­owner used in Section 27 has to be understood as

defined in section 3(2) of the Punjab Act. Similarly, the definitions of

‘estate’ and ‘holding’ in the Punjab Act assume significance.

37. The ‘land’ has been defined in section 2(5) of the Abolition Act

thus:

“(5) “land” means land which is not occupied  as the site of any  building in  a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for  pasture, and includes –  (a)   the sites of buildings and other structures on such land,

23

(b)  orchards, (c)  ghasnies;”

38. The ‘landlord’ has been defined in section 2(6) of Abolition Act to

mean a person under whom a tenant holds land, and to whom the

tenant is or but for a contract to the contrary, would be liable to pay

rent for the land. Chapter II of the Abolition Act deals with the rights

of occupancy of a tenant. Acquisition of proprietary rights by tenants

has been dealt with in Chapter III from sections 9 to 27. Section 9

provides for the appointment of  Compensation  Officer. Section 11

deals  with the right of the tenant to acquire the interests of the

landowner. A tenant other than a sub­tenant can apply under section

11 for the acquisition of right, title, and interest of the landowner in

the land of tenancy held by him under the landowner.  Section 12

deals with the determination of the amount of compensation payable

by a tenant for the acquisition of the right, title and interest of the

landowner. Section 15 deals with the acquisition by the State

Government of the rights of the landowner. Same is extracted

hereunder:

“15.   (1)   Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter but subject to the provisions of clause (d) and clause (g) of sub­section (1) of Section 54, the State Government may by notification in the  Gazette  declare that  as from such date and in respect of such area as may be specified in the notification, the

24

right, title and interest of the landowner in the lands of any tenancy held under him by a tenant shall stand transferred to and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances created in such lands by the landowner.

(2)  With effect from the aforesaid date –  (a)   the landowner shall cease to have any right to collect or to receive any rent or any share of the land revenue in respect of such lands and his liability to pay the land revenue  in  respect  of the lands  shall  also cease;

(b)   the tenant shall pay direct to the State Government the rent he was liable to pay to the landowners before the date of the notification; and  

(c)   the consequences mentioned in clauses (b) to (f) of section 84 shall  mutatis mutandis ensue.”

39. Section 16 of Abolition Act deals with payment of compensation

to the  landowners  for the  acquisition of their rights.  Section 16  is

extracted hereunder:  

“16.   The landowner whose right, title and interest in lands have been acquired by the State Government under Section 15 shall be entitled to compensation which shall be calculated as far as practicable according to the provisions of sections 12 and 13.”

40. Interest on compensation is payable under section 18 of

Abolition Act. Section 19 deals with the claims for compensation and

determination of such claims and in case of a dispute, it has to be

25

referred to civil court under section 20. Where the landowner is minor,

it has to be deposited with the Collector or in any bank selected in this

behalf by the State Government as provided in section 22. The

Compensation Officer shall have the powers of a civil court under the

Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes enumerated therein. Section

26 deals with the power to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the

Chapter.

41. Section 27 of the Abolition Act deals with the vesting of rights of

ownership in the  Government. The right of the landowner  whose

landholding exceeds the annual land revenue of Rs.125 per year, the

right, title and interest of such owner shall be deemed to be

transferred and vested in the State Government free from all

encumbrances. The vesting of such holding of the landowner is

automatic in case revenue of the landholding is exceeded by Rs.125

per year.  However, the only saving grace  is  provided under section

27(2) to the extent the land is under the personal cultivation of the

landowner. The rights of intermediaries get automatically vested in the

State Government under section 27(1), the  landowner  is entitled to

receive compensation  under  section  27(3) to  be  determined  by the

Compensation Officer having regard to the provisions of sections 17

and 18 of the Abolition Act. Section 27 is extracted hereunder:

“27.   (1)   Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this

26

Chapter, a landowner who holds land, the annual land revenue of which exceeds Rs.125 per year, the right, title and interest of such owner in such land shall be deemed to have been transferred and vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

(2)   Nothing contained in sub­section (1) shall apply in respect of such land which is under the personal cultivation of the landowner.

(3)   The landowner whose rights are acquired under sub­section (1) by the State Government, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be determined by the Compensation Officer having regard to Sections 17 and 18 of this Act, in accordance with the provisions of Schedule II, but in the case of such occupancy tenant who is liable to pay rent  in terms of land revenue or the multiple of land revenue, the compensation payable to his landowner shall be computed in accordance with Schedule I.

(4)  The right, title and interest of the land­ owner acquired under sub­section (1) or (2) shall be transferred by the State Government on the payment of compensation in accordance with Schedule I to such tenant who cultivates such land.

(5)   The State Government shall give rehabilitation grant  according to the rules framed under this Act, to such small landowner whose right, title and interest have been extinguished and who does not have any other means of livelihood.”

It is apparent from  section  27 that it contains  non­obstante

clause and it is applicable to the land as defined in section 2(5) which

27

is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is

occupied  or  has  been  let for  agricultural  purposes  or for  purposes

subservient to agriculture, or for pasture. The definition is inclusive

and wide and it covers the sites of buildings and other structures on

such land, orchards, and ghasnies too. Thus, the definition of land

being inclusive is very  wide and in case the land revenue of the

holding of Zamindar exceeds  Rs.125 per year except for the land

under personal cultivation, entire land holding would vest in the State

Government and such vesting is automatic.

42. A reading of section 27 makes it clear that on the abolition of

estates except for the land which is under personal cultivation of the

landowner,  vests in the State.  Vesting is  automatic  and would not

depend upon the payment of compensation and this has already been

held by this Court vide order dated 17.9.1969 in the case filed by Late

Rajinder Singh. It is crystal clear that vesting of the land is not

confined  to the land held  under the  tenancy  right.  The  expression

used in section 27 is “landowner” who holds the land. Thus, there is

no scope for the submission that section 27 is applicable only to a

land held by the tenant in tenancy. It is applicable to all kinds of land

as defined in the Abolition Act held by the landowner and the

definition of the land in Abolition Act is inclusive and would include all

kinds of land in a town or village which is not occupied by any site of

28

the building.  Thus,  all land which  is  not occupied by any building

situated  in a town or building would vest in  the State and a  land

which has been let for agricultural purpose or for purposes

subservient to agriculture or for pasture including the sites of building

and other structure of the land, orchard, and ghasnies would vest in

the State. Thus, it is apparent that the land which is Banjar, Abadi,

Gharat, Kalhu, and Gair­Mumkin are all covered under the definition

of land.  

43. The big estates were sought to be abolished by the H.P. Abolition

Act. When section 27 of the Abolition Act and definition of land is read

with  ‘holding’ and  ‘estate’  and  ‘landowner’ as defined in the Punjab

Land Revenue Act, 1887 it is clear that the land held by late Rajinder

Singh definitely exceeded revenue of Rs.125 per year as is apparent

from documents and various orders passed in the case. The object of

the Abolition Act is to provide for the abolition of big landed estates

and to bring land reform in the law relating to tenancies and to make

provisions for matters connected therewith. The land holding of Late

Rajinder Singh was a big estate and was definitely covered under the

purview of the Act and in particular under section 27 and all the lands

vested in the State except the land under his personal cultivation.

44. Thus,  we are of the considered opinion that the area  under

personal cultivation which was saved in favour of Rajinder Singh was

29

64 bighas 12 Biswas only as specified. It is apparent from the order

dated 27.2.1962 Khata No.1 Kita measuring 1011 bighas 6 Biswas

vested in the ownership of Government of Himachal Pradesh in village

Jhakri. In the review on 19.9.1964, there was only partial modification

with respect to area 14 bighas 12 Biswas.  The land revenue of land at

Jakhri as apparent from Jamabandi of 1955­56 at the time when the

Abolition Act came into force was Rs.155.58 it was more than Rs.125

as such the  land which was Banjar  kadim or otherwise not  under

personal cultivation had vested in the State.

45. Under the Abolition Act compensation was determined under the

provisions of section 27(1) and was ordered to be paid by the

Compensation  Officer,  Mahasu  District,  Kasumpti vide  order  dated

12.4.1966. Sum of Rs.28,019 had been paid to Rajinder Singh.

Though payment of compensation was not a condition precedent for

vesting of land it was automatic, Rajinder Singh was paid

compensation also for the land mentioned in the order of

Compensation Officer. Even if the compensation was not paid for some

land, as that was not under personal cultivation had also

automatically vested free from all encumbrances in the State.  

46. The subsequent attempt made by Rajinder Singh to claim that

the land was  not  covered under  the  definition of land,  was  wholly

frivolous, unacceptable and was rightly rejected in C.S. No.15/1970

30

filed by Rajinder Singh. This Court in proceedings under section 27 of

Abolition Act vide order dated 17.9.1969 ordered that the land only

under personal  cultivation was saved and not  any other  land.  The

finding recorded in the remand order on the question of law is binding

otherwise also the position of law is what was held by this Court in the

aforesaid decision. After this Court remitted the matter for

examination of the question which was the land under personal

cultivation that would only be saved from vesting. To avoid rigor of the

order the writ  petition was withdrawn by Late Rajinder Singh with

liberty to file a civil suit and Suit No.15/1970 was filed. The stand

taken was that the said land was Banjar, Abadi, Gharat, Kohlu, and

Gair­Mumkin. The stand taken that the land  was  Ghasni that is

wasteland and  Banjar land itself indicated that the land  was  not

under personal cultivation and thus as per the case set up in Civil

Suit by the plaintiff, Rajinder Singh it was clear that he has

abandoned the stand that the land was under personal cultivation and

took the aforesaid stand. The said stand itself made clear that the land

was not under personal cultivation, at the time of abolition and had

vested in the State and we have no hesitation to arrive at the said

conclusion based on the case set up by the plaintiff in the course of

civil suit No.15/1970.

31

47. The  Banjar land or  Banjar  Kadim  is  nonetheless the  land as

defined in section 2(5) of the Abolition Act. Apart from that, it is clear

that ghasni land is also included in the definition of land, no doubt

about it that growing of grass is for agriculture purpose. However, the

pasture or grassland cannot be said to be under personal cultivation

and such land would also vest in the State. The expression used is

personal cultivation i.e. the cultivation by dint of his own labour. The

agriculture is a wider term than personal cultivation and would

include several aspects such  as  dairy­farming, the  use of land  as

grazing,  meadow  or pasture land or orchard or other land or for

market gardens or nursery grounds. The fructus naturales is the

outcome of nature alone but such land cannot be said to be under

personal cultivation as envisaged in the Abolition Act.    

48. In Jadab Singh & Ors. v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration &

Ors.  AIR 1960 SC 1008,  this Court  considered the question of the

abolition of estates which was declared invalid as having been passed

by the State legislature which was not duly constituted. A validating

Act was passed by the Parliament. This Court considered the

legislature competence and constitutional validity of the Abolition Act.

It was held that in view of Article 240 as it stood before its amendment

by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the Parliament

was competent to enact the validating Act. The provisions of the

32

Abolition Act did not infringe Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution of

India and the Abolition Act fell within the protection of Article 31A of

the Constitution and it was not open to challenge on the ground that

it infringed Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The intent of the

Abolition Act is that the agrarian reforms by Abolition of Big Landed

Estates have to be given the full effect. Once land has vested in the

State, it was not open to Rajinder Singh on the basis of continuation

of wrong entries in revenue records, to claim any right, title or interest

much less compensation under the Ceiling Act as well as under the

provisions of the LA Act. Thus, the entire land on the condition being

satisfied  with the  landed holdings of  a landowner  the  annual land

revenue of which is Rs.125 or more, land vested in the State and not

excess part over and above the land to which the said land revenue is

ascribed, with the saving of personally cultivated land.

2. In Re effect of proceedings under the Ceiling Act:

49. We advert to the question as it has relevance though it is not

necessary, in view of the findings recorded that land had vested in the

State under the provisions of the Abolition Act.

50. The Ceiling Act came into force in 1972 providing a ceiling on

agricultural holdings. Section 11 of the Ceiling Act is extracted

hereunder:

33

“11. Vesting of surplus area in the State  Government­ The surplus area of a person shall, on the date on which possession thereof  is taken by or on behalf  of the State Government,  be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government for a public purpose on payment of amount hereafter provided and all rights, title, and interests (including the contingent interest, if any), recognised by any law, custom or usage for the time being in force, of all persons in such area shall stand extinguished and such rights, title and interests shall vest in the State Government free from any encumbrance:

Provided that where any land within the permissible area of the mortgagor is mortgaged with possession and falls within the surplus area of the mortgagee, only the mortgagee rights shall  be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest in it.”

51. Section 4 deals with the permissible ceiling area and section 6

defines a ceiling area in excess of the permissible area. The provisions

of sections 4 and 6 are extracted hereunder:  

“4. Permissible area­ (1) The  permissible area of a landowner or a tenant or a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another of person or a family consisting of husband, wife and up to three minor children shall be in respect of­ (a) land under assured irrigation capable of growing two crops in a year­ 10 acres. (b) land under assured irrigation capable of growing one crop in a year­ 15 acres. (c) land of classes other than described in clauses (a) and (b) above including land under orchards­30 acres.

34

(2) The permissible area for the purposes of clause (c)  of  sub­section (1)  for the districts of Kinnaur and Lahaul and Spiti, Tehsil Pangi and Sub­Tehsil  Bharmaur of  Chamba district,  area of Chhota Bhangal and Bara Bhangal of Baijnath Kanungo Circle of Tehsil Palampur of Kangra district, and area of Dodra Kowar Patwar Circle of Rohru Tehsil and Pandrabis Pargana of Rampur Tehsil of Shimla district shall be 70 acres.

(3) The permissible area of a family under sub­ section (1) shall be increased by one­fifth of the permissible area under sub­sections (1) and (2) for each  additional  minor  member  of  a family subject to the condition that the aggregate permissible area shall not exceed twice the permissible area of family under sub­sections (1) and (2).

(4) Every adult son of a person shall be treated as a separate unit and he shall be entitled to the land  up to the extent  permissible to a family under sub­sections (1) and (2) subject to the condition that the aggregate land of the family and that of the separate units put together shall not exceed twice the area permissible under the said sub­sections: Provided that where the separate unit owns any land, the same shall be taken into account for calculating the permissible area for that unit.

(5) If a person holds land of two or more categories described in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub­section (1) and sub­section (2) of this section then the permissible area shall be determined on the following basis: ­

(i) in the areas mentioned in sub­section (2) of this section, one acre of land mentioned in clause (a) of sub­section (1) shall count as one and a half acres of land mentioned in clause (b) of sub­section (1) and seven acres of land mentioned in clause (c) of sub­section (1); 1976.

35

(ii) in the areas other than the areas mentioned in sub­section (2) of this section, one  acre of land mentioned in clause (a) of sub­section (1) shall count as one and a half acres of land mentioned in clause (b) of sub­section (1), and three acres  of land mentioned  in  clause (c)  of sub­section (1):

Provided that on the basis of ratio prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii), the permissible area shall be converted into the category of land mentioned in sub­section (2) and in clause (c) of sub­section (1)  as  the case may be,  and the  total  area so converted shall not exceed 70 acres in case of clause (i) and 30 acres in case of clause (ii)].

(6) Where a person is a member of the family, the land held by such person together with the land held by all the members of the family shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the permissible area.”

“6. Ceiling on land­ Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement, no person shall  be entitled to hold whether as a landowner or a tenant or a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity and partly in another, the land within the State of Himachal Pradesh exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day.”

52. The proceedings were initiated under the Ceiling Act and order

was passed by Collector (Ceiling) on 10.6.1980 declaring 10,027

bighas 5 Biswas of land as surplus. It was mentioned in the order that

the owner had taken compensation of Rs.57,888.80 which was

36

calculated  under  section 14 of the  Act.  Voucher  details  have  been

given as follows:

“ V.No. Amount Date of receiving compensation 61 18620­60 3.11.80 62 10900­00 5.11.80 63 15000­00 29.1.81 64 3935­65 20.3.81 65 9600­00 31.3.81

53. Now, the factum of withdrawal of the amount of compensation

was disputed before us by contending that the compensation under

the Ceiling Act had not been received. It passes comprehension that

how it lies in the mouth to even contend in view of the clear statement

made in the order passed by the competent authority and voucher

numbers with the date on which payment had been made. Rajinder

Singh did not question order dated 30.6.1980. On the contrary,

reference was made by the Settlement Officer with respect to the order

of  the Competent Authority  on the ground that his minor son was

illegally allotted one unit. Financial Commissioner has taken the

matter  in Revision No.224/1982 against the aforesaid order.  It  was

pointed out  by  the Settlement  Officer that  Rajeshwar Singh son of

Rajinder Singh was minor and was not entitled to any land

independently but was allotted one unit by the Collector (Ceiling). He

was minor on the appointed day i.e.  24.1.1971 and Rajinder Singh

and his family consisting of children including minor Rajeshwar Singh

37

were entitled to only one unit of permissible area. The Financial

Commissioner in the order dated 5.9.1985 has held against Rajinder

Singh that his  minor son Rajeshwar Singh could not have been

allotted one unit vide order of competent authority dated 10.6.1980,

as such  one  unit  more land  has  been  allotted to the family than

permissible under the ceiling law. It was also held that without

enquiry transfers were held to be bona fide. Thus, the order passed by

the SDO was set aside and the case was remanded to pass fresh order

to declare the additional land as surplus than the one determined in

the earlier order. The order of Competent Authority dated 10.6.1980

was not questioned by Late Rajinder Singh or his family members nor

the order of Financial Commissioner passed on 5.9.1985 was

questioned. It was not an order in favour of Rajinder Singh as

contended on behalf of the respondents but was against his interest

and remand order of 5.9.1985 directing additional land to be declared

surplus also has attained finality. After remand, Collector (Ceiling) has

declared additional land as surplus and total 19706 bighas 5 Biswas

had been declared as surplus. As against the order passed by

Collector (Ceiling) dated 10.11.1993, the appeal was preferred to the

Commissioner which was dismissed on 30.8.1996. Revision filed

against the said order was also dismissed on 18.1.2002 by the

Financial Commissioner.

38

54. The fact  is conclusively established that  land in question had

been declared as surplus and compensation under the Ceiling Act had

also been received, even though the land had already vested in the

State under the Abolition Act. Once the disputed land had been

admittedly declared surplus in Ceiling Act vide order dated 30.6.1980,

there was no question of payment of compensation to Rajinder Singh

or to his legal representatives in proceedings initiated later on in the

year 1987 under the L.A. Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in 1989

was justified  in directing that  the compensation determined should

not be paid due to the effect of the Ceiling Act and that question was

raised in the Reference Court also, it was incumbent upon the

Reference  Court to go into the aforesaid aspects. It was not fact

situation that question of the title has been disputed and decided in

reference proceedings but whether Rajinder Singh or his LRs.  were

entitled to claim compensation in view of  the proceedings and that

orders passed under the Abolition Act and Ceiling Act were definitely

required to be gone into. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that

once land  has  been  declared surplus  and compensation  has  been

received. It was not open to receive it again in the land acquisition

case.

(iii) In Re: Effect of withdrawal of C.S. No.15/1970 in appeal

39

55. Civil Suit No.15/1970 was dismissed on merits. Thereafter in the

first appeal, it was withdrawn by Rajinder Singh before the Division

Bench on 23.6.1986. Order dated 23.6.1986 passed by the High Court

of  withdrawal of  C.S.  No.15 of 1970 in first appeal  No.9/1973 is

extracted hereunder:

     “In the present appeal, the learned counsel for

the appellant has given the statement that by an order  dated  10.06.1980  passed  by the  Collector Rampur Bushahar in case State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Rajkumar Rajender Singh, under section 8 of  Himachal Pradesh Land Ceiling Act, the disputed land has been acquired by the Respondent and the Appellant has been paid compensation for the same. He has further stated that in the view of this subsequent event he may be permitted to withdraw the suit and the appeal may be dismissed as having become infructuous.

It is not disputed that the land in dispute in this appeal is also the subject matter of dispute in the order  dated  10.06.1980  passed  by the  Collector Rampur  Bushahar. As the land in dispute has been acquired and the appellant has been paid the compensation  for the  same, therefore,  we  are  of the view that due to the subsequent events there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter and on the same cause of action. As a result, we allow the Plaintiff to  withdraw the suit  with permission  to file a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the suit on the same cause of action in case there is any necessity to file such a subsequent suit. The suit is  dismissed  as  withdrawn and  the  present appeal is dismissed as having become infructuous. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this appeal."

40

It was stated by the counsel for Late Rajinder Singh before the

High Court in RFA No.9/1973 that compensation had been received

by Rajinder Singh and order had been passed on 10.6.1980 by the

Collector, Rampur under the Ceiling Act. The disputed land had been

acquired by the State as such, the permission was sought to withdraw

the suit and it was prayed that appeal be dismissed as infructuous. In

our opinion,  factually  it  was not an incorrect statement but  it  was

correctly made in the High Court that land had been declared surplus

and   compensation  had  been received, the fact  was supported  by

vouchers mentioned in the order dated 10.6.1980, and it was totally

frivolous contention to the contrary raised by the respondents that

compensation had not been received. It appears that the respondents

have no respect for the truth and have tried to hoodwink the court at

several stages by making false averments and statements to perpetrate

fraud.

56. In essence, after this Court has remitted the matter to the High

Court in the proceedings under the Abolition Act this Court has clearly

held as per order dated 17.9.1969 in the case of Rajinder Singh that

only the land under personal cultivation would be saved. Thereafter he

has withdrawn the writ application of 1962, on the ground that

disputed question of fact was raised in the writ application. It was in

order to avoid adjudication  in view observation of this Court  made

41

against interest of Rajinder Singh in aforesaid order and the fact that

as the land was not under personal cultivation, the writ petition was

withdrawn and thereafter in C.S. No.15/1970 that was filed in which,

Rajinder Singh had abandoned the case of land being under personal

cultivation. On the contrary, raised the plea that it was not the “land”

at all and as such it was not within the clutches of the Abolition Act.

57. A Single Bench of the High Court dismissed the suit on merits

and has recorded the finding that the land was not under personal

cultivation and it had vested in the State and it was the “land” as

defined in section 2(5) of the Abolition Act. Thereafter Regular First

Appeal which was preferred before the Division Bench was dismissed

as infructuous and suit was  withdrawn by aforesaid order dated

23.6.1986 on the ground that compensation had been received under

the Ceiling Act, and land has been declared surplus. It is clear that

once land has been declared surplus and compensation had been paid

under the Ceiling Act. It was not the reason for withdrawal of Civil

Suit  No.15/1970 by  the plaintiff  Rajinder  Singh that the  land was

personally cultivated by him. It was not at all open to Rajinder Singh

or his LRs. to take inconsistent stands and contend in the present

proceedings that land was under personal cultivation. They are

estopped from doing it not only by conduct but by way of

abandonment of the plea, having not taken it in C.S. No.15/1970. It

42

was not the ground made for withdrawal of suit that land was under

personal cultivation. The effect is that order of vesting has attained

finality even otherwise withdrawal of suit does not check running of

limitation as provided in Order 23 Rule 2 CPC.  It is futile and too late

in the day to allow the respondent to lay such a claim.  

58. As a matter of fact, the withdrawal of civil suit No.15/1970 was

made on the statement of learned counsel on behalf of plaintiff

Rajinder Singh that disputed land had been declared as surplus in the

ceiling proceedings, compensation had been received and under the

provisions of the Ceiling Act. The suit was permitted to be withdrawn

with liberty to file fresh suit whereas there was no such formal defect.

Be that as it may. Once suit has been withdrawn on the ground that

land had been declared surplus and compensation had been received

it would create estoppel against the plaintiff  to contend to contrary

and from claiming compensation under the LA Act notwithstanding

permission to file suit because as a matter of fact also, the disputed

land had been declared surplus on 30.6.1980 and additional land in

1993. The land declared as surplus in 1980 attained finality, as well

as order of the Financial Commissioner on 5.9.1985. Both the orders

also attained finality. Thus, the order of remand dated 5.9.1985

having attained finality, and it would not be possible to reopen it at

any subsequent stage. Thus, the orders dated 30.6.1980 and 5.9.1985

43

having attained finality vis a vis to Rajinder Singh and compensation

having been received, as the land in question was declared surplus

under the Ceiling Act. No right, title or interest survived with Rajinder

Singh or his successors to claim compensation under Land

Acquisition Act.

59. The proceedings were initiated in the year 1987 for the

acquisition of land whereas the order of ceiling was passed earlier in

1980 and 1985 and subsequently the surplus area was increased in

1993. By no stretch of any principle of law, Late Rajinder Singh or his

successors  could have claimed compensation  in  the proceedings  in

question initiated under the LA Act in the year 1987. In our

considered  opinion the respondents  Rajinder  Singh  and  his family

were not entitled to claim any monetary compensation under the LA

Act for the said land. The amount that had been withdrawn under the

LA Act,  was wholly  impermissible and tantamount to playing fraud

upon the legal system. As a matter of  fact, compensation has been

taken for the land in the proceedings under the Abolition Act. Even if

compensation in respect of certain land  was  not payable or paid,

vesting would not depend upon the same. Land not under personal

cultivation of Jagirdars had vested in the State, as such it was not

open even to obtain compensation for the very same land either under

the provisions of the Ceiling Act which has been received or under the

44

provisions of the LA Act. It was wholly impermissible and illegal and

tantamount to scam committed by fraudsters. The cases were

withdrawn one after the other just to perpetuate the fraud on the legal

system by raising the inconsistent pleas and taking unfair and undue

advantage of the wrong continuation of entries in the revenue papers.

(iv) In Re: Question of title under sections 18 and 30 of LA Act and effect of fraud :  

60. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondents contended that the

existing right of the State cannot be decided in the proceedings under

section  18 or  30  of the  LA Act.  Even if the  amendment  has  been

allowed, it  will  not prohibit the respondents to raise untenability of

such an objection.  Even if amendment along with additional evidence

had been allowed, it will not prohibit the raising of the plea that State

cannot challenge the title in such proceedings.  Reliance has been

placed on the decisions of this Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar,

(2002) 3 SCC 705,  Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India, (2004) 7 SCC

362, Ahad Brothers v. State of M.P., (2005) 1 SCC 545, and U.P. Awas

Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326, to contend that

only the quantum of compensation can be questioned by local bodies

and not the title of the landowners.

61. In the instant case, as already discussed, the LAO in the award

dated 24.2.1989 has ordered compensation not to be paid as the land

45

has been declared surplus in the ceiling matter and further

proceedings were pending after remand of the case in which additional

land was declared surplus which was allotted illegally to minor son

Rajeshwar Singh.  The position further worsened in 1993.  

62. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, (2003) 3 SCC 128, the question

arose whether Reference under Section 30 of  Land Acquisition Act,

1894 was maintainable at the instance of the State of Bihar as it was

the owner of the land and the land vested in the State.   It was held

that the State is not a person interested as defined under Section 3(b)

of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  This Court observed:

“26. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy of reference under Section 18 is  intended to be available only to a  'person interested'. A person present either personally or through representative or on whom a notice is served under Section 12(2) is obliged, subject to his specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to make a reference to the Court. The basis of title on which the reference would be sought for under Section 18 would obviously be a pre­existing title by reference to the date of the award. So is Section 29, which speaks of  'person interested'.  Finality to the award spoken of by Section 12(1) of the Act is between the Collector on one hand and the 'person interested' on the other hand and attaches to the issues relating to (i) the true area i.e. measurement of the land, (ii) the value of the land, i.e. the quantum of compensation, and (iii) apportionment of the compensation among the 'persons interested'. The 'persons interested' would be bound by the award without regard to the fact whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not. The finality to the award spoken of by Section 29 is as between the  'persons interested' interse and is confined to the issue as to the correctness of the apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its operation only to 'persons interested'. It would, therefore, be available for being invoked by the 'persons interested' if they were neither present nor represented in proceedings before the Collector, nor were served with a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the basis of

46

a title coming into existence post award. The definition of 'person interested' speaks of 'an interest in compensation to be made'. An interest coming into existence post­award gives rise to a claim in compensation which has already been determined. Such a person can also have recourse to Section 30. In any case, the dispute for which Section 30 can be invoked shall remain confined only (i) as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation (already determined) or any part thereof is payable. The State claiming on the basis of a pre­existing right would not be a 'person interested', as already pointed out hereinabove and on account of its right being pre­existing, the State, in such a case, would not be entitled to invoke either Section 18 or Section 30 seeking determination of its alleged  pre­existing right.  A right  accrued or  devolved  post­ award may be determined in a reference under Section 30 depending on Collector's discretion to show indulgence, without any bar as to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be left open by the Collector to be adjudicated upon in any independent legal proceedings. This view is just, sound and logical as a title post­award could not have been canvassed up to the date of the award and should also not  be  left  without remedy by denying access to Section 30. Viewed from this angle, Section 18 and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to operate independent of each other.”           (emphasis supplied)

63. The question in the instant case is as to whether an incumbent

can be permitted to play blatant fraud time and again and court has to

be silent spectator under the guise of label of the various legal

proceedings at different stages by taking different untenable stands

whether compensation can be claimed several times as done in the

instant case  and its effect.  Before the land  acquisition  had  been

commenced in 1987, the land  more than 1000 bighas had been

declared a surplus in ceiling case and compensation collected, which

indeed disputed land at Jhakari, it would be a perpetuating fraud in

case such a person is permitted to claim compensation for same very

47

land. Fraud vitiates the solemn proceedings; such plea can be set up

even in collateral proceedings.  The label on the petition is not much

material and this Court has already permitted the plea of fraud to be

raised. Moreover, Appeal arising out of 72 awards is still pending in

the High Court in which Reference Court has declined compensation

on the aforesaid ground.

64. Reliance has also been placed on the observations  made in

Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India, (2004) 7 SCC 362, in which this

Court has dealt with the issue of apportionment of compensation for

which claim was raised by the Union of India, not in the capacity of

the owner but as a protected tenant.   The claim of tenancy was not

put forth before the LAO, though represented in the acquisition

proceedings.   This Court observed that in such a case it could

reasonably be inferred that no right was being claimed and it ought to

have been made before the LAO if it had any such claim in respect of

pre­existing right.  The LAO was not under a duty to make an enquiry.

The claim  of tenancy  at the  belated stage  was  an  afterthought to

frustrate the payment.  The decision has no application to the instant

case as the LAO in the awards passed, noted the factum of ceiling

proceedings as such the effects of the same can always be considered.

48

65. In Ahad Brothers v. State of M.P.,  (2005) 1 SCC 545, this Court

observed that question of the title of the State over the acquired land,

cannot be decided under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

This Court considered that when an award has been passed and the

appellant was recorded as owner in the revenue papers, he was

entitled to receive compensation.  There is no dispute in the aforesaid

proposition,  however, in the instant case facts  are  different  and  a

person cannot be permitted to receive the compensation of vested land

in State under the Abolition Act and when the land had been declared

surplus and compensation paid on wrong entry continued.  The same

wrong entry could not have been permitted to be utilised for award of

compensation to a person under the LA Act.  In the instant case, there

had been earlier proceedings which makes it clear that Rajinder Singh

was not entitled to claim compensation under the LA Act.   It is

apparent that there was no subsisting right, title or interest left with

Rajinder Singh or his LRs., thus, they could not be permitted to obtain

the compensation.

66. Fraud vitiates every solemn  proceeding and  no right can be

claimed by a fraudster on the ground of technicalities. On behalf of

appellants, reliance  has  been  placed on the  definition  of fraud  as

defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, which is as under:

49

“Fraud means: (1) A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.   Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.   (2) A misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another person to act.   (3) A tort arising from a knowing misrepresentation, concealment of material fact, or reckless misrepresentation made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.  (4) Unconscionable dealing; esp., in contract law, the unconscientious use of the power arising out of the parties’ relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain.”

Halsbury’s Law of England has defined fraud as follows:

“Whenever a person makes a false statement which he does not actually and honestly believe to be true, for purpose of civil liability, the statement is as fraudulent as if he had stated that which he did know to be true, or know or believed to be false. Proof of absence of actual and honest belief is all that is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the law,  whether the representation has been made recklessly or deliberately, indifference  or reckless  on the  part of the representor  as the truth or falsity of the representation affords merely an instance of absence of such a belief.”

In KERR on the Law of Fraud and Mistake, fraud has been defined

thus:

"It is not easy to give a definition of what constitutes fraud in the extensive significance in which that term is understood by Civil Courts of Justice.   The Courts have always avoided hampering themselves by defining or laying down as a general proposition what shall be held to constitute fraud.   Fraud is infinite in variety… Courts have always declined to define it, … reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it under whatever form it may present itself.  Fraud … may be said to include property all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken of another.   Al surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair way that is used to cheat anyone is considered as fraud.   Fraud in all cases implies a willful act on the part of anyone, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by illegal or inequitable means, of what he is entitled too."  

67. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319, wherein

it  was observed that fraud vitiates every solemn act.   Fraud and

50

justice never dwell together and it cannot be perpetuated or saved by

the application of any equitable doctrine including res­judicata.  This

Court observed as under:

“15.  Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters.   Fraud, as is well­known, vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together.

16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person,  or authority to  take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by word or letter.

17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.

18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.

*** *** ***

23. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.

*** *** ***

25.  Although  in a  given case a deception may not  amount  to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res­judicata.”

(emphasis supplied)

68. In Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 6

SCC 557, this Court observed that fraud had been played by showing

the records and the orders obtained unlawfully by the declarant,

51

would be a nullity in the eye of law though such orders have attained

finality.  Following observations were made:

“27.   The said order is passed by the State Government only to enquire into the landholding records with a view to find out as to whether original land revenue records have been destroyed and fabricated to substantiate their unjustifiable claim  by playing fraud upon the Tehsildar and appellate authorities to obtain the orders  unlawfully in their favour  by  showing that there is  no surplus land with the Company and its shareholders as the valid subleases are  made and they are accepted by them in the proceedings  Under  Section  21 of the  Act,  on  the basis  of the alleged false declarations filed by the shareholders and sub­ lessees Under Section 6 of the Act. The plea urged on behalf of the State Government and the de­facto complainants­owners, at whose instance the orders are passed by the State Government on the alleged ground of fraud played by the declarants upon the Tehsildar and appellate authorities to get the illegal orders obtained  by them  to come  out from  the clutches  of the land ceiling  provisions  of the  Act by creating the revenue records, which is the fraudulent act on their part which unravels everything  and  therefore, the  question  of limitation  under the provisions to exercise power by the State Government does not arise at all. For this purpose, the Deputy Commissioner of Pune Division was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to hold such an enquiry to enquire into the  matter and  submit  his report for consideration of the Government to take  further  action  in  the matter.  The legal contentions urged by Mr. Naphade, in justification of the impugned judgment and order prima facie at this stage, we are satisfied that the allegation of fraud in relation to getting the land holdings of the villages referred to supra by the declarants on the alleged ground of destroying original revenue  records  and  fabricating revenue  records to  show  that there are 384 sub­leases of the land involved in the proceedings to retain the surplus  land  illegally as alleged, to  the extent of more than 3000 acres of land and the orders are obtained unlawfully  by the declarants in the  land ceiling limits  will  be nullity in the eye of law though such orders have attained finality, if it is found in the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer that they are tainted with fraud, the same can be interfered with by the State Government and its officers to pass appropriate orders. The landowners are also aggrieved parties to agitate their rights to get the orders which are obtained by the declarants as they are vitiated in law on account of nullity is the tenable submission and the same is well founded and therefore, we accept the submission to  justify the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

52

69. In Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, (2006) 7 SCC

756, this Court observed that fraud vitiates every solemn act.   Any

order or decree obtained by practicing fraud is a nullity.   This Court

held as under:

“55. It is now well settled that fraud vitiated all solemn act. Any order or decree obtained by practicing fraud is a nullity. [See ­ (1) Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319 followed  in (2)  Vice  Chairman,  Kendriya  Vidyalaya Sangathan, and Anr. v. Girdhari Lal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325; (3) State of A.P.  and Anr.  v.  T.  Suryachandra Rao, (2005)  6 SCC 149;  (4) Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 190; (5) Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 283; (6) Chief Engineer, M.S.E.B. and Anr. v. Suresh Raghunath Bhokare, (2005) 10 SCC 465; (7) Smt. Satya v. Shri Teja Singh, (1975) 1 SCC  120; (8)  Mahboob  Sahab v. Sayed Ismail, (1995) 3 SCC 693; and (9) Asharfi Lal v. Koili, (1995) 4 SCC 163.]”

(emphasis supplied)

70. In State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149, it was

observed that where land which was offered for surrender had already

been acquired by the State and the same had vested in it.  It was held

that  merely because an enquiry  was  made, the Tribunal  was  not

divested of the power to correct the error when the respondent had

clearly committed a fraud.  Following observations were made:

“7. The order of the High Court is clearly erroneous. There is no dispute that the land which  was offered for  surrender  by the respondent had already been acquired by the State and the same had vested in it. This was clearly a case of fraud. Merely because an enquiry was made, Tribunal was not divested of the power to correct the error when the respondent had clearly committed a fraud.

8. By "fraud" is meant an intention to deceive; whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from the ill will towards the other is immaterial. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit, and injury to the person deceived.

53

The injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property,  whether  movable or immovable or of money and it will include and any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non­economic or non­pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the  deceiver,  will almost always call loss or detriment to the deceived. Even  in those rare cases where there is a benefit  or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. [See Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, 1963  Supp (2) SCR  585 and Indian  Bank v. Satyam Febres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550]

9. A "fraud" is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain  by  another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (See S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1.)

10. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which  includes the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is also  well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also  give reason to  claim relief  against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury enures therefrom although the  motive from  which the representations  proceeded  may  not  have  been  bad.  An  act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy  with a view to  deprive the rights of the  others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not  amount  to fraud, fraud  is  anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319.)

*** *** ***

13. This aspect of the matter has been considered recently by this Court in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100, Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, (2003)  8  SCC 311,  Ram Chandra  Singh  v.  Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. and Anr., (2004) 3 SCC 1.

14. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court, (see Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar

54

Family Trust, (1996) 3 SCC 310 and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1).

15. "Fraud" is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the  other  person  or  authority to take  a  definite  determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud it can be evidence of fraud; as observed in Ram Preeti Yadav, (2003) 8 SCC 311.

16.  In Lazarus Estate Ltd.  v.  Beasley (1956)  1 QB 702, Lord Denning observed at pages 712 & 713: (All ER p. 345C)

"No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."

In the same judgment, Lord Parker LJ observed that fraud “vitiates  all transactions  known  to the law of  however  high  a degree of solemnity”.

(emphasis supplied)

71. In  A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221, this

Court as to the effect of fraud on the judgment or order observed thus:

19. Now, it is well­settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed;

Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.

*** *** ***

22.  It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or  order  obtained by  playing fraud on  the  Court,  Tribunal  or Authority is a  nullity  and  non­est in the eye  of law.  Such  a judgment,  decree or  order ­­by the  first  Court  or  by the  final Court­­ has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.

*** *** ***

38.   The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including the final Court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss Special Leave Petition but after granting leave decides the

55

appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise,  the doctrine of merger also gets attracted.  All  orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.

39.   The above  principle,  however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it  is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by  practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non­existent and nonest and cannot be allowed to stand. This  is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as nonest by every Court, superior or inferior.

Supervisory jurisdiction of the court can be exercised in case of

error apparent on the face of the record, abuse of process and if the

issue goes to the root of the matter.   

72. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, this

Court noted that the issue of fraud goes to the root of the matter and

it exercised powers under Article 136 to cure the defect.   The Court

observed:

“5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether, in  the  facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to  come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence".  The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot  be  pressed to the  extent  of such  an  absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of  law are meant for  imparting justice between the parties.  One  who comes to the court  must come  with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, the process of the court is being abused. Property­grabbers, tax­ evaders, bank­loan­dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court ­ process a convenient lever to retain the illegal­gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say

56

that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach  the court.  He  can be  summarily thrown out  at  any stage of the litigation.

6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court.  A fraud  is  an act  of  deliberate  deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.   Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Exhibit B­1S) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non­production and even non­ mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants­defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Exhibit B­15 and non­ suited the  plaintiff.   A litigant,  who  approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation.  If  he withholds a vital  document  in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.”

73. In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573, it was observed that

one of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is re­

litigation.   It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to

justice and public policy for a party to re­litigate the same issue which

has already been tried and decided earlier against him.

74. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the

decision rendered in Ujjagar Singh v. Collector, Bhatinda, (1996) 5 SCC

14,  wherein  this  Court  examined the effect  of  coming  into force  of

Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 and vesting of the surplus area in the

State.   In this case, the area in possession of landlord was declared

57

surplus under the Pepsu Act, but possession had not been taken by

the State.  It was held that area did not vest finally as the surplus area

under the Pepsu Act, owing to coming into force of the new Act, the

ceiling area must be determined afresh under the new Punjab Act.  In

the instant case, the order was passed in ceiling matter in the year

1980 and the adjudication order of Collector (Ceiling) was not

questioned nor the order of remand to declare land as surplus and

then the additional land was declared surplus in 1993.  It was not the

case of re­opening of the case. In fact, the land has vested in the State

under the Abolition Act.  Thereafter, compensation has been obtained,

obviously once land has vested in the State, the possession of such

land/open land is deemed to be that of the owner.  In any view of the

matter, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case,

compensation could not have been claimed.   

75. In  State of  H.P. v.  Harnama,  (2004)  13  SCC 534, this  Court

observed that possession of land was not taken and the tenant was in

occupation of the land and had acquired ownership rights before the

land was declared surplus as against  the  landlord.   It  was  further

observed that the land in question had been notified as surplus and

the fact that the original owner of the land had been paid

compensation, would be of no avail to the State if before the date of

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actual vesting  non­occupant tenant in  possession  of the land  had

acquired ownership rights.  It is totally distinguishable and cannot be

applied to the instant case.  

76. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent has referred to the

decision rendered in  Madan Kishore v. Major Sudhir Sewal, (2008) 8

SCC 744, wherein question arose with respect to entitlement of sub­

tenant to apply under Section 27(4).  It was held that the expression in

Section 27(4), such tenant who cultivates such land, does not entitle a

sub­tenant either  to claim proprietary rights  or apply  for the same

under Section 27(4).   It was held that he was not a sub­tenant.  The

decision is  of  no  help to the  cause  espoused  on  behalf  of  LRs.  of

Rajinder Singh.

In the peculiar  facts projected in the case the principle  fraud

vitiates is clearly applicable it cannot be ignored and overlooked under

the guise of the scope of proceedings under Section 18/30 of the LA

Act.

In Re Q. No.5 Bona fide Transferees :    

77. With respect  to the appeals filed by SJVN Ltd.  arising out of

judgment and order of 2013 in the matter of bona fide transferees,

filed in the year 2014, the High Court has held that the respondents

are bona fide transferees from Rajinder Singh. However, it was pointed

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out on behalf of the appellants that in 72 reference cases, the regular

first appeal is still pending in the High Court. It has been held by the

Reference Court that the claimants are not entitled to any

compensation. In case regular first appeal is  pending in the  High

Court as against the order of reference court against the respondents

who claim to be bona fide transferees, obviously, the question of bona

fide transferee has to be decided finally in the pending regular first

appeal before the High Court. In case appeal has not been filed or has

been  decided, the compensation to follow the  decision.  We  do  not

propose to give final verdict on issue at this stage.  We leave the

question open to the  High  Court to adjudicate.  However, in case

compensation has been paid to transferees, the compensation paid

shall not be recovered till  such time pending appeal is decided.   In

case no matter against transferees is pending and appeal has been

decided in favour of land owners, obviously they have to be paid and

this Order will not come in the way.

78. Resultantly, we allow the appeals and direct that the

compensation that has been withdrawn by Late Rajinder Singh or his

LRs. in the case of land acquisition, in original proceedings or under

section 28­A shall be refunded along with interest at the rate of 12

percent per annum within 3 months from today to the

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appellants/State, as the case may be, and compliance be reported to

this Court. The appeals are accordingly allowed. We leave the parties

to bear their own costs.

…………………………. J. (Arun Mishra)

New Delhi; …………………………. J. September 24, 2018. (S. Abdul Nazeer)