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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1358 of 2008

Satish Shetty …..Appellant   

Versus

State of Karnataka …..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

1. This  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  against  judgment  and

order dated 13.09.2007 passed by a Division Bench of High Court of

Karnataka  at  Bangalore  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  1409  of  2000

preferred by the State against judgment dated 16.09.2000 by First

Additional Sessions Judge, D.K. Mangalore in SC No. 150/94 whereby

the  appellant  and  both  his  parents  were  acquitted  for  offences

punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

and under Sections 498-A and 304-B of  the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

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By  the  impugned  order  High  Court  has  reversed  the  judgment  of

acquittal in part. It has convicted the appellant, the husband of the

victim lady, for the offence under Section 498-A with punishment of

rigorous imprisonment (RI) of three years and a fine of Rs.5000/- with

a default clause. The appellant has also been convicted for the offence

under  Section  306 of  the  IPC with  RI  for  five  years  and a fine  of

Rs.10,000/-, again with a default clause. Both the sentences are to

run concurrently. If realized, the fine amount is to be paid to PW-6

Gulabi, mother of the deceased, if she is alive.

2. Learned senior counsel Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty appearing for

the  appellant  has  raised  three  main  contentions  to  assail  the

judgment and order under appeal.  According to him, the judgment

and order of acquittal was not a perverse judgment and required no

interference  by  the  High  Court.  Secondly,  it  is  contended  that  in

absence of any charge framed under Section 306 of IPC by the trial

court the High Court should not have convicted the appellant under

that Section. Lastly but not the least, is the contention that there is

no evidence on record to justify the conviction of the appellant by the

High Court for any of the charges.

3. Mr. V. N. Raghupathy learned counsel for the respondent has, on

the  other  hand,  strenuously  refuted  all  the  aforesaid  three

submissions  and has  placed reliance  on  the relevant  materials  on

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record  as  well  as  the  discussions made by  the  High Court  in  the

impugned order to fully support that judgment and order reversing

the acquittal of the appellant to the extent indicated above.

4. Before  adverting  to  specific  contentions  for  deciding  the  main

issue  whether  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  requires

interference, it will be useful and relevant to take note of the factual

matrix of this case. The story of the deceased young lady, aged about

25  years  who  was  forced  to  commit  suicide  by  the  unfortunate

situation and circumstances surrounding her life, resembles the tale

of  so  many similar  young  ladies  who end  their  life  due  to  untold

miseries and hardships faced by them within the confines of the four

walls of their matrimonial home. All of them enter such home with

hope  of  leading  a  long  and  blissful  married  life  but  this  hope,

invariably, does not last long, nor their life. In the present case the

victim left behind a son then aged about ten months and she was also

mothering a life of twenty weeks in her womb. The deceased Rekha @

Baby was married with the appellant on 5.06.1991 and immediately

she  began  her  stay  in  matrimonial  home  with  her  husband  and

in-laws and a son was also born to them who on the date of her death

i.e.  19.11.1993  was  aged  about  ten  months.  There  is  no  dispute

regarding  her  death  and  even  as  per  the  Unnatural  Death  Report

(UDR) exhibit Ex.P.20, lodged by the appellant with the local police

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station on 19.11.1993 at 9.45 a.m, she died of some poison which she

had consumed allegedly because the appellant forbade her from going

to  her  mother’s  place  in  the  morning  hours  of  18.11.1993.  As

described in the said report, the victim had consumed a poison which

was kept for spray in the fields. She had been taken to hospital but

expired there at around 8 a.m. As per version of the occurrence given

by the appellant, the deceased and he were living a very happy life. He

was satisfied with the money and gold given at the time of marriage as

dowry and was apparently at a loss as to why the deceased consumed

poison.

5. The records have been carefully noticed by the High Court and

they  reveal  that  the  police/the  investigating  agency,  soon  after

learning  about  the  occurrence  made  a  request  to  the  Tehsildar

(Executive Magistrate), PW-15 to conduct inquest proceedings under

Section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court has rightly

condemned the Tehsildar’s action in causing undue delay and holding

the inquest two days later on 22.11.1993.  It was after the inquest

that the mother of the deceased, Gulabi, PW-6 lodged the complaint

with the police on 22.11.1993 and on that basis police registered a

Criminal Case No. 136/93 for offences under Section 498-A, 304-B of

the  IPC and Sections  3  and 4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act.  After

investigation police submitted chargesheet against the husband of the

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deceased and his  parents  only.  Subsequently  another  relation  was

summoned  as accused no. 4 under Section 319 of CrPC.

6. Dr. M.R. Shetty, PW-8 has proved the postmortem report. He has

deposed  that  he  conducted  the  autopsy  on  the  deceased  in  the

afternoon of  22.11.1993 along with  another  Doctor  and found the

following wounds on the dead body:

1. Transverse contusion across the lower part of the rt. Thigh 2”   

above the knee joint 2” in length.

2. Haematoma 6” x 3”  on the lower part  of  the left  thigh with   

abrasion of different sizes on it;

3. Abrasion on the rt. Lumbar region 2-1/2”;

4. Abrasion on the back of the rt. Thigh 2-1/2”;

5. Multiple small abrasions on the rt. Hand of different sizes; and

6. Blood strained fluid from the nostrils.

He  had  found  a  twenty  weeks  embryo  in  the  womb  of  the

deceased. He deposed that as per subsequent chemical lab report of

the  viscera,  the  death  was  because  of  consumption  of  Organo

phosphorous chemical. The Doctor has also deposed that the wounds

were ante-mortem caused by hard and blunt object but they did not

cause the death. The unnatural death of the victim within seven years

of marriage is not in dispute.

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7. The High Court has scrutinized the deposition of mother of the

deceased PW-6 and her two younger brothers PW-9 and PW-20 for

coming to a finding that at the time of marriage they had to arrange

money  to  meet  the  demand  of  the  husband  of  the  deceased  for

payment of dowry in cash and gold. The witnesses on this aspect were

found  trust-worthy  and  not  indulging  into  exaggeration  or  false

allegations. The trial court on the other hand went into unnecessary

details  to  discuss  this  issue  on  the  basis  of  capacity  of  the

complainant to pay, source of money arranged by her and whether

actually money had been paid at the professed place or not. Though

there  is  difference  in  the  amount  but  nonetheless  in  the  UDR

complaint in Ex.P20 the appellant has admitted of taking Rs.25,000/-

as dowry. The High Court has rightly held that the trial court should

not have gone into further details. The only relevant issue was initial

payment of dowry and not its quantum. But this aspect need not be

pursued further because the High Court has also, while relying on the

evidence of the prosecution that one year after the marriage during

her visit to her mother the deceased had informed that the accused

were harassing her by making a demand for additional dowry of 20

sovereigns of gold and Rs.1,00,000/- for investment by the appellant

in  a  wine  shop,  has  held  that  such  subsequent  demand  being

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unrelated to marriage, need not be accepted as demand for dowry and

therefore the offence under Section 304 of the IPC is not attracted. In

this regard it was noticed that in Section 304 of the IPC as per the

explanation, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

8. The High Court has considered the issue whether Section 498-A

and  306  of  the  IPC  are  attracted  or  not  and  after  extracting  the

relevant provisions as well as Section 113A of the Evidence Act, has

held the appellant guilty of the offences under Section 498-A and 306

of the IPC. For that the High Court has relied upon relevant materials

consisting of oral evidence available on record as well as documentary

evidence in the forms of letters. Before discussing whether the High

Court  has committed  any error  of  facts  or  law on this  issue,  it  is

useful  to  examine  the  first  contention  advanced  on  behalf  of  the

appellant  that  the  High Court  should not  have interfered  with  the

acquittal of appellant.  

9. As  already  noticed,  on  the  issue  whether  the  marriage  was

performed  after  demanding  and  accepting  dowry,  the  High  Court

found the approach of the trial court totally erroneous. The findings

were found to be vitiated on account of trial Judge ignoring the glaring

facts emerging from deposition of PW-6, 9 and 20 as well as PW 13

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and 16 and also by ignoring the admission of the accused in the UDR

complaint at Ex.P.20.

10. The High Court has further rightly held that the trial Judge failed

to look for the relevant documents already available on the record and

wrongly drew inference against the prosecution for not producing  the

statements of PW-6 and other relations of the deceased recorded by

Taluka  Executive  Magistrate  under  Section  174  CrPC proceedings.

Presently it is not disputed that those statements were/are available

on  record  along  with  the  inquest  report.  It  is  noted  that  such

erroneous  approach  of  the  trial  court  had  strong  influence  on  its

judgment rendering it perverse. In fact, had the trial court applied its

mind to the scope of Section 174 of the CrPc as explained by this

Court in the case of Pedda Narayana and others v. State of Andhra

Pradesh1,  such gross error  could have been avoided because such

statements  do not have much legal weight as they are beyond the

scope of inquest proceedings under Section 174 of CrPC.

11.  On the  basis  of  relevant  facts  the  High  Court  appears  to  be

justified  in holding that  there is  good explanation for  the  delay  in

lodging the FIR on 22.11.1993 because PW-15 delayed the inquest

proceedings without valid reasons leading to delay in the postmortem

examination as well  and only on knowledge of the injuries etc. the

1 (1975) 4 SCC 153 = AIR 1975 SC 1252  

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mother of the deceased gathered strength to lodge the FIR. When the

deceased  died  leaving  a  son  of  ten  months  old  the  mother  of  the

deceased had many other things to worry for, including cremation of

the dead body and in such circumstances the High Court was justified

in  criticizing  the  trial  court  for  its  hyper  technical  approach  in

blaming the mother of the deceased for lodging a delayed complaint. It

will be useful to remember that delay in lodging the FIR or complaint

is  not fatal  in  all  cases.  The Court  must  show some sensitivity  in

cases of present nature where the victim’s closest relation - mother is

a poor helpless lady. Even a well to do person may suffer a state of

mental confusion when struck by such a tragedy. The prosecution in

such cases  is  likely  to  be  delayed further  if  the  deceased has left

behind children. The issues relating to their safety and custody often

require  higher  priority.  Occurrences  of  the  present  nature  require

lodging  of  criminal  case  against  persons  who  are  already  in  the

category of relation by virtue of matrimonial ties through the deceased

and  it  is  not  always  easy  to  take  a  decision  whether  to  lodge  a

criminal  case  against  a  relation  or  not.  Hence  in  such  cases  the

factum of delay has to be dealt with sympathetically keeping in mind

the mental condition of the close relations of the victim. The trial court

miserably failed on this count too.

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12. The evidence of PW-6 mother of the deceased is well supported by

PW-7 Pratap, a cousin of the deceased who had visited the deceased

during Dushera holidays, a month prior to her death. He found that

the deceased was getting continuous ill-treatment by her husband. He

has deposed to the extent that the deceased requested PW-7 not to

disclose the ill-treatment to her mother because she would get upset.

The letters contained in Ex P-7 dated 27.9.1993 and exhibit D-3 dated

28.10.1993 have been discussed by both the Courts below. We are in

agreement with the views of the High Court that those letters written

respectively  by  the  deceased  to  her  mother  and  by  sister  of  the

deceased to the deceased, do not help the defence at all.  The trial

court had clearly adopted a perverse approach in appreciating those

letters as if they are in favour of the defence. Further, the correct and

logical  inferences  from these  documents  were  rejected  by  the  trial

court in paragraph 37 of the judgment by again resorting to adverse

inference on the incorrect ground that statements of PW-6 and PW-9

recorded by the Tehsildar at the time of conducting inquest were not

produced  before  the  Court.  As  already  noticed  earlier,  these

statements formed part of the inquest report and were available on

record.

13. In  view  of  aforesaid  discussions  we  find  no  merit  in  the  first

contention  that  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  acquittal  was  not

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perverse or that it required no interference of the High Court.  The

views  of  the  High  Court  on  this  issue  are  sound  and  we  are  in

agreement that the judgment of  the trial  court  suffered from such

gross errors in approach and appreciation that it could not be saved

on the principle that if  two views are possible,  there should be no

interference with a judgment and order of acquittal.  

14. So far as the second contention is concerned, the same needs to

be noticed only for rejection. To be fair to the learned counsel, he has

not dealt on this contention at any length nor has cited any judgment.

The High Court on the other hand dealt with the issue of conviction

under Section 306 of the IPC in absence of a charge under that head

in detail in paragraphs 44 and 45. It has also noticed some judgments

of the Karnataka High Court and this Court in paragraph 44. The

issue is definitely not res integra in view of judgment of this Court in

somewhat similar circumstances in the case of K. Prema S. Rao and

another  v.  Yadla  Srinivasa  Rao  and  others2.  In  that  case  the

acquittal of the husband of the deceased under 304-B IPC was not

reversed but this Court while upholding the conviction of the all the

three  accused  under  Section  498-A  IPC,  further  convicted  the

husband of the victim under Section 306 IPC after discussing issues

relating to absence of a charge under Section 306 IPC in a case of

2 (2003) 1 SCC 217

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suicide  when  the  relevant  and  material  facts  are  already  part  of

charge under Section 498-A and 304-B of  the IPC.  That judgment

rendered by a Bench of Three Judges in somewhat identical facts, in

our  view  leaves  no  scope  for  accepting  the  second  contention  on

behalf of the appellant.

15. The last contention on behalf of the appellant that there is no

evidence  to  justify  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  for  any  of  the

charges, indirectly stands negated by our discussions and findings in

respect of the first contention itself. However to consider the legality of

the view taken by the High Court we propose to deal with this issue

further after taking note of the relevant provisions of law i.e. Sections

498-A and 306 of the IPC as well as Section 113A of the Evidence Act

which are extracted below:

“Section  498-A.  Husband  or  relative  of  husband  of  a woman  subjecting  her  to  cruelty.—Whoever,  being  the husband  or  the  relative  of  the  husband  of  a  woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall  be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For  the  purpose  of  this  section,  ‘cruelty’ means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to  drive  the woman to  commit  suicide or to  cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable

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security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

Section 306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide,  whoever abets  the  commission of  such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married  woman.—When  the  question  is  whether  the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her  husband  or  any  relative  of  her  husband  and  it  is shown that  she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband  had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.”

16. On a plain reading of Section 498-A it transpires that if a married

woman is  subjected  to  cruelty  by the husband or  his  relative,  the

offender is liable to be punished with the sentence indicated in the

Section. But cruelty can be of different types and therefore what kind

of  cruelty  would  constitute  offence  has  been  defined  under  the

explanation. As per first definition contained in clause (a) – it means a

willful  conduct of such a nature which is likely to drive the victim

woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injuries to health and life,

limb or health (mental or physical). The other definition of cruelty is in

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clause (b) and is attracted when a woman is harassed with a view to

coercing her or any of her relation to meet any unlawful demand for

any property or valuable security or is on account of failure to meet

such demand.

17. In the present case after noticing the injuries on the person of

victim  which  is  not  at  all  explained  by  the  appellant  husband

although in the fateful night he and the deceased slept together in the

same room before she consumed poison, the High Court has come to

a well considered finding in paragraph 42 of the impugned judgment

that the deceased was being harassed both physically and mentally

and in direct as well  as indirect ways for non compliance with the

demand of the accused for Rs.1,00,000/- for investment in his wine

business. The High Court found that such harassment falls squarely

under clause (b) of the explanation of Section 498-A of the IPC. We

find no good reason to take a different view.

18. The High Court after recording the aforesaid finding proceeded to

consider whether Section 306 of the IPC is also attracted against the

appellant  or  not.  Since  the  High  Court  had,  on  relevant  material

returned  a finding of guilt under Section 498-A of the IPC, it found

the circumstances of the case right and proper for resorting to Section

113A of the Evidence Act which permits raising of presumption as to

abetment  to  suicide  by  a  married  woman.  Such  a  statutory

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presumption though discretionary, may be presumed by the Court in

appropriate  cases  where  the  question  of  abetment  of  suicide  by  a

woman is under consideration in respect of her husband or any of his

relative and if the suicide has been committed within seven years of

marriage, provided the husband or such relative had subjected her to

cruelty.  

19. Since the High Court had recorded a finding against the appellant

of causing cruelty to the deceased for his conviction under Section

498-A, all the essential ingredients for raising of presumption under

Section 113A of the Evidence Act were clearly made out. But the issue

raised before us is whether the High Court was justified in resorting to

exercise such a discretion as was available to it under Section 113A or

not.

20. That  the  Court  has  a  discretion  in  the  matter  of  resorting  to

presumption is clear from the plain words used in that Section – “the

Court  may presume” (emphasis supplied).  The law on this issue is

also well settled and therefore needs no elaborate discussion but at

this stage the relevant case laws cited by learned senior counsel for

the appellant need to be taken note of.  

21. Reliance has been placed on behalf of appellant on the judgment

of this Court in the case of  Hans Raj v. State of Haryana3.  In this

3 (2004) 12 SCC 257

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case it was reiterated that Section 113A of the Evidence Act vests a

discretion in the Court to raise such a presumption having regard to

all the other circumstances of the case. On evidence and facts of that

case it was found that the nature of cruelty proved in that case was

not such as is likely to drive the women to commit suicide or to cause

grievous  injury  etc.  Reliance  was  also  placed  upon  the  case  of

Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh4. The facts of

that  case  were  entirely  different  and required  interpretation  of  the

term “abetment” as defined under Section 107 of the IPC. In that case

the victim was a servant of the accused and the case did not require

any examination of inter-dependence and inter-connectivity of Section

498A and 306 of the IPC or of Section 113A of the Evidence Act.

22. Reliance was also placed upon case of M. Mohan v. State5. The

Court followed the general law with regard to ingredients of abetment

in the context of Section 306 of the IPC and quashed the prosecution

of some of the relations of the husband on the peculiar facts of the

case  which  disclosed  that  there  was  no  allegation  of  any  dowry

demand or instigation against those appellants although they were

relatives  of  the  husband.  In the  case  of  Mangat Ram v.  State of

Haryana6, this Court acquitted the appellant who was husband of the

deceased for the offences under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC on 4 (2010) 1 SCC 750 5 (2011) 3 SCC 626 6 (2014) 12 SCC 595

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the ground that the prosecution had not succeeded in establishing the

offences.  The  accused  had  merely  left  the  deceased  wife  in  the

matrimonial home in the company of his parents while proceeding to

report for duty as a constable to another place. This Court held that

such action would not amount to abetment to commit suicide.

23. The aforesaid case laws do not lay down any proposition of law

which may warrant interference with the views of the High Court in

the impugned judgment. In the case of Narayanamurthy v. State of

Karnataka7 the law was reiterated that if on appreciation of evidence

two views are possible then the appellate court should not interfere

with the judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. There is no

quarrel with the said proposition. The High Court was aware of such

legal principle and keeping the same in mind, it has discussed the

evidence for coming to a conclusion that the findings of the trial court

leading to acquittal were fully unwarranted and it is not a case where

two views are possible. Hence the High Court proceeded to convict the

appellant for the offences under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.

24.  Once the prosecution succeeds in establishing the component of

cruelty leading to conviction under Section 498A, in our view only in a

rare  case,  the  Court  can  refuse  to  invoke  the  presumption  of

abetment, if other requirements of Section 113A of the Evidence Act

7 (2008) 16 SCC 512

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stand  satisfied.   This  proposition  is  amply  supported  by  the  view

taken by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of K. Prema

S. Rao and Anr.  (Supra).  Further,  the High Court  has given good

reasons on the basis of facts brought on record through evidence for

exercising the discretion of invoking the presumption under Section

113A of the Evidence Act and thereafter it has discussed in detail the

explanations given by the appellant in the initial  version by way of

Unnatural Death Report as well as the later explanations. The High

Court  found  the  later  explanations  unacceptable  and  the  initial

explanation that the deceased committed suicide because she was not

permitted to go to her mother’s place does not inspire confidence and

has rightly been rejected by the High Court. Only for such a trivial

matter, a hale and hearty young woman having a ten months old son

and a pregnancy of twenty weeks is not at all expected to take her life.

The appellant not only gave absolutely no explanation for the injuries

on the person of the deceased, rather he chose to conceal them by

keeping mum. Clearly the appellant failed to rebut the presumptions

raised against him under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. Having

gone through the relevant facts and the reasonings of the trial court

we are not persuaded to take a different view.

25. In  the result  the appeal  must fail.  We order accordingly.  As a

consequence,  the  bail  bonds of  the  appellant  are  cancelled.  He be

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Crl.A. No.1358 of 2008

taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the

sentence as per law.

 .…………………………………….J.                          [DIPAK MISRA]

        ……………………………………..J.                     [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]

New Delhi. June 03, 2016.

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