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Reportable

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA         CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION          CRIMINAL     APPEAL     No.1834     of     2012   

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.569 of 2012) Satish Mehra     … Appellant  

Versus State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr.  …Respondents    

WITH CRIMINAL     APPEAL     No.1836     of     2012   

 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.3546 of 2012) WITH

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     No.1835     of     2012     (Arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.910 of 2012)

J      U      D      G      M      E      N     T   

RANJAN     GOGOI,     J   Leave granted.

2. In a proceeding registered as FIR case No. 110/94  (P.S. Connaught Place) charges under different  provisions of the Indian Penal Code were framed by the  

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learned Trial Court, inter-alia, against the accused  appellants G.K. Bhatt and R.K. Arora.  In the revision  petition filed before the High Court (Crl. Rev. P. No.  304/2003) for quashing of the charges framed, relief  has been denied to the two appellants.  However, part  relief had been granted to two other accused i.e. Anita  Mehra (petitioner in Crl. M.C. No. 2255/2003) and S.K.  Khosla (Petitioner in Crl. Rev.P. No.299/2003).  While  denial of relief by the High Court by the impugned  order dated 13th October, 2011 has been challenged in  the appeals filed by the accused R.K. Arora and G.K.  Bhatt, the grant of partial relief to one of the two  co-accused  i.e. S.K. Khosla has been challenged in the  appeal filed by the complainant/ first respondent,  Satish Mehra.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeals may  now be noted in some detail.   The appellant Satish Mehra and accused Anita Mehra  were married some time in the year 1980. At the  

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relevant point of time they were living in the USA.  From about October, 1992, the relations between husband  and wife became strained and both were locked in a  series of litigations including litigations pertaining  to custody of the children born out of the marriage.     4. On 06.01.1994, the appellant  Satish Mehra lodged a  complaint before the Additional Deputy Commissioner of  Police New Delhi that he along with his wife Anita  Mehra had opened five Foreign Currency Non-Resident  Fixed Deposits (FCNR FD) of the total value of about  Rs.20,00,000/- in their joint names.  According to the  complainant, accused S.K. Khosla who is his father-in-  law had forged his signatures on the F.D receipts  and  got the same renewed in the sole name of  Anita Mehra  who, thereafter, encashed the value thereof and  unauthorisedly  received the payments due. The details  of the FCNR FD, according to the complainant, are as  follows:

“i)  FCNR FD Nos.9/92 and 22/91 with Canara Bank;

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ii) FCNR FD Nos.103402 and 103403 with Punjab and  Sind Bank and ;

iii) FCNR FD No. 0756223 with Vyasa Bank.”

5. On receipt of the aforesaid complaint, FIR  No.110/94 was registered, on investigation whereof the  following facts appear to have come to light:

I) S.K. Khosla had made an endorsement on the  reverse of the receipt pertaining to FCNR FD  Nos.22/91 to the effect that the said FDR be  renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra; II) On 23.11.1992 and 12.03.1993 Canara Bank  renewed FCNR FD Nos.22/91 and 9/92 respectively on  the basis of the letters dated 09.10.1992 written  by Anita Mehra to the Bank requesting for the said  renewals. Pursuant to the said renewals made by the  Bank, Anita Mehra encashed FD No. 22/91; III)  Before FD No.9/92 could be encashed by Anita  Mehra the Bank cancelled the renewal of the said FD  in the sole name of Anita Mehra and re-renewed the  

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same in the joint names of Anita Mehra and Satish  Mehra; IV)  On 09.11.1992 Punjab and Sind Bank renewed FDs  Nos. 103402 and 103403 in the sole name of Anita  Mehra on the basis of an endorsement made by S.K.  Khosla on the reverse of the receipt of each of  the said FDs to the effect that the said FDs be  renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra; V) Punjab and Sind Bank claimed to have renewed  the FD Nos. 103402 and 103403 in the sole name of  Anita Mehra on the basis of a letter dated  09.10.1992 written by Anita Mehra to the Bank  requesting for such renewal but the said letter  seems to be a manipulated document as it was  received by the Bank on 09.11.1993 which was much  after the renewal of the said FDs; and VI) On 22.03.1993 Vyasa Bank renewed FCNR FD No.  0756223 on the basis of a Investment Renewal Form  dated 22.03.1993 signed by both Satish Mehra and  Anita Mehra;  however Satish Mehra claimed that he  

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had made no such request to Vyasa bank and that he  had misplaced a blank Investment Renewal Form of  Vyasa Bank which contained his signature. VII) There was an endorsement of the accused S.K.  Khosla in the Investment Renewal Form to the effect  that FD No. 0756223 of Vyasa Bank be renewed in the  sole name of accused Anita Mehra as against  the  joint names of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra. The  signatures of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra in the  Investment Renewal Form appear to be old and faded  whereas the endorsement made by S.K.Khosla on the  said form is a fresh one.  The passport number of  Satish Mehra entered in the said Form is the  old/surrendered passport of the said person.  

6. In the light of the aforesaid facts revealed in the  course of investigation of FIR No. 110/94, a  cancellation report was filed before the learned trial  court. The appellant Satish Mehra filed his objections  to the said cancellation report.  Thereafter, on a due  

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consideration, the learned trial court directed further  investigation in the matter in the course of which the  FD receipts in question;  the letters dated 09.10.1992  purportedly of accused Anita Mehra to the Canara and  Punjab and Sind Bank; the Investment Renewal Form dated  22.03.1993 submitted to Vyasa Bank and  the admitted  signatures of accused Anita Mehra, S.K. Khosla and the  complainant Satish Mehra were sent to the Central  Forensic Laboratory.  On receipt of the report of the  laboratory, charge sheet dated 28.08.1997 was filed by  the investigating agency against the accused S.K.  Khosla alone.

7. The learned trial court, however, directed summons  to be issued to the two appellants G.K. Bhat, Chief  Manager of the concerned Branch of Canara Bank and R.K.  Arora, Senior  Manager of the said Branch as well to  one A.P. Singhna, Manager of Punjab and Sind Bank and  also to the accused Anita Mehra (wife of the  complainant) for trial for offences punishable under  

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Sections 420, 468, 471 read with Section  120 B of the  Indian Penal Code.    

8. Against the aforesaid order of the learned trial  court, the High Court of Delhi was moved by the accused  for setting aside the order issuing summons and for  quashing the proceeding as a whole.  By order dated  

23.10.2002, the High Court took the view that as all  issues  and contentions raised  can be so raised before  the learned trial court at the time of framing of  charge, interference would not be justified.  Thereafter, by order dated 21.12.2002 and 08.01.2003,  the learned trial court framed charges against the  accused appellants, G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora under  Sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code  (in  respect of FD Nos. 22/91 and 9/92 of Canara Bank).  Charges were also framed against accused S.K. Khosla  and Anita Mehra under Sections 120 B, 420, 467, 468,  471 IPC in respect of all five FDs.

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9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the learned  trial court, all the accused moved the High Court of  Delhi for quashing of the charges framed against them  and also for interference with the Criminal proceedings  pending against the accused before the learned trial  court.  10. The High Court, by the impugned order dated  13.10.2011, while declining any relief to the  appellants G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora, set aside the  charges framed against accused S.K. Khosla under  Sections 120 B and 420 IPC in respect of FD Nos. 22/91  and 9/92 as well as the charges framed against the said  accused under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC read with  Section 120 B IPC.  In so far as the accused Anita  Mehra is concerned, the High Court interfered  with the  charges framed against the aforesaid accused under  Sections 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120 B.  The  rest of the charges in so far as the aforesaid two  accused S.K. Khosla and Anita Mehra is concerned were  maintained by the High Court.   

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 11. Aggrieved, the present appeals have been filed by  accused G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora in so far as FD Nos.  22/91 and 9/92 are concerned. While the other accused  have not challenged the order of the High Court  declining full and complete reliefs as prayed for by  them, it is the complainant/first informant, Satish  Mehra, who has instituted the connected appeal in so  far as the part relief granted to accused S.K. Khosla  is concerned.

12. We have heard S/Shri M.N. Krishnamani, Brijender  Chhahr, P.V.Shetty and Mukul Gupta, learned senior  counsel for the respective parties.

13. Learned counsel for the appellants G.K.Bhat and  R.K. Arora has argued that no material whatsoever has  been brought on record to, even prima facie, show the  involvement of either of the accused – appellants with  any of the offences alleged.  Mere holding of the  

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office of Chief Manager and Senior Manager of the  concerned Branch of the Canara Bank, by itself, will  not make the accused –  appellants liable unless the  positive role of either of the appellants in the  renewal of the FDs in the sole name of accused Anita  Mehra or in  the encashment of one of the FDs (FD  No.22/91) by the aforesaid accused is disclosed.  Learned counsel has also relied on the provisions of  the Regulations/Guidelines, relating to Fixed Deposit,  as in force in the Bank to contend that the action of  accused –  appellants has been in conformity with the  mandate of the Banking Norms even if it is to be  assumed that they had any role to play in the matter of  renewal of the FDs in the sole name of the accused  Anita Mehra and the subsequent encashment of FD  No.22/91.  On the other hand, learned counsel for the  first informant /appellant, Satish Mehra has contended  that the connivance of the Bank officials in the  fraudulent renewal of the FDs is ex facie apparent and  further that the endorsements made by accused S.K.  

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Khosla on the reverse of the FDs and in the Investment  Renewal Form of Vyasa Bank clearly attract the  ingredients of the offence of ‘forgery’  as defined  under Section 464 of the IPC.  It is, therefore,  submitted that the interference made by the High Court  with the charges framed under Sections 467, 468, 471  and 120B IPC against accused S.K. Khosla is not tenable  in law.   

14. Though a criminal complaint lodged before the court  under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of  Criminal Procedure or an FIR lodged in the police  station under Chapter XII of the Code has to be brought  to its logical conclusion in accordance with the  procedure prescribed, power has been conferred under  Section 482 of the Code to interdict such a proceeding  in the event the institution/continuance of the  criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process  of court.  An early discussion of the law in this  regard can be found in the decision of this court in  

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R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab1  wherein the parameters  of exercise of the inherent power vested by Section  561A of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,  (corresponding of Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973) had been  laid down in the following terms :

“ (i) Where institution/continuance of  criminal proceedings against an accused  may amount to the abuse of the process of  the court or that the quashing of the  impugned proceedings would secure the ends  of justice;

(ii) where it manifestly appears that  there is a legal bar against the  institution or continuance of the said  proceeding e.g. want of sanction;

(iii)  where the allegations in the  first information report or the complaint  taken at their face value and accepted in  their entirety, do not constitute the  offence alleged; and

(iv) where the allegations constitute  an offence alleged but there is either no  legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced  clearly or manifestly fails to prove the  charge.”    

15. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the  threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is  

1 AIR 1960 SC 866

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inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in  case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal  complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a  triable offence there can be reason as to why the  accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal  proceeding that more often than not gets protracted.  A  prosecution which is bound to become  lame or a sham  ought to interdicted in the interest of justice as  continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the  process of the law.  This is the core basis on which  the power to interfere with a pending criminal  proceeding has been recognized to be inherent in every  High Court. The power, though available, being extra  ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and  only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies  the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even  accepting all the  allegations  levelled by the  prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so  warranted, such  power would be available for exercise  not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but  

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also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely,  after framing of the charge against the accused.  In  fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of  charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that  stage, the materials revealed by the investigation  carried out usually comes on record and such materials  can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining  the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the  purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials,  even if accepted in its entirety, do not, in any  manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged  against the accused.

16. The above nature and extent of the power finds an  exhaustive enumeration in a judgment of this court in  State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others2  which  may be usefully extracted below :  

“ 7. The second limb of Mr Mookerjee's argument  is that in any event the High Court could not  take upon itself the task of assessing or  appreciating the weight of material on the record  in order to find whether any charges could be  legitimately framed against the respondents. So  

2 AIR 1977 SC 1489

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long as there is some material on the record to  connect the accused with the crime, says the  learned counsel, the case must go on and the High  Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or  premature end to the proceedings on the belief  that the prosecution is not likely to succeed.  This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition  to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that: . . . . .  This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called  “Trial Before a Court of Session”. It is clear  from the provision that the Sessions Court has  the power to discharge an accused if after  perusing the record and hearing the parties he  comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be  recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for  proceeding against the accused. The object of the  provision which requires the Sessions Judge to  record his reasons is to enable the superior  court to examine the correctness of the reasons  for which the Sessions Judge has held that there  is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding  against the accused. The High Court therefore is  entitled to go into the reasons given by the  Sessions Judge in support of his order and to  determine for itself whether the order is  justified by the facts and circumstances of the  case. Section 482 of the New Code, which  corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898,  provides that: . . . . . In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High  Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it  comes to the conclusion that allowing the  proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the  process of the Court or that the ends of justice  require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.  The saving of the High Court's inherent powers,  both in civil and criminal matters, is designed  to achieve a salutary public purpose which is  that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted  to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or  persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled  object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature  of the material on which the structure of the  

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prosecution rests and the like would justify the  High Court in quashing the proceeding in the  interest of justice. The ends of justice are  higher than the ends of mere law though justice  has got to be administered according to laws made  by the legislature. The compelling necessity for  making these observations is that without a  proper realisation of the object and purpose of  the provision which seeks to save the inherent  powers of the High Court to do justice, between  the State and its subjects, it would be  impossible to appreciate the width and contours  of that salient jurisdiction.”

It would also be worthwhile to recapitulate an  earlier decision of this court in Century Spinning &  Manufacturing Co. vs. State of Maharashtra3 noticed in  L. Muniswamy’s case (Supra) holding that the order  framing a charge affects a person’s liberty  substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court  to consider judicially whether the materials warrant  the framing of the charge. It was also held that the  court ought not to blindly accept the decision of the  prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial.

17. While dealing with contours of the inherent power  under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal  

3 AIR 1972 SC 545

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proceeding, another decision of this court in Padal  Venkata Rama Reddy alias Ramu vs. Kovvuri Satyanaryana  

Reddy and others  reported in (2011) 12 SCC 437 to  which one of us (Justice P.Sathasivam) was a party may  be usefully noticed.  In the said decision after an  exhaustive consideration of the principles governing  the exercise of the said power as laid down in several  earlier decisions this court held that:

31. . . . . When exercising jurisdiction under  Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not  ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the  evidence in question is reliable or not or  whether on reasonable appreciation of it  accusation would not be sustained. That is the  function of the trial Judge. The scope of  exercise of power under Section 482 and the  categories of cases where the High Court may  exercise its power under it relating to  cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process  of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of  justice were set out in detail in Bhajan     Lal  4  . The  powers possessed by the High Court under Section  482 are very wide and at the same time the power  requires great caution in its exercise. The Court  must be careful to see that its decision in  exercise of this power is based on sound  principles. The inherent power should not be  exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.”

18. In an earlier part of this order the allegations  made in the FIR and the facts disclosed upon  

4 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335

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investigation of the same have already been noticed.  The conclusions of the High Court in the petitions  filed by the accused for quashing of the charges framed  against them have also been taken note of along with  the fact that in the present appeals only a part of  said conclusions of the High Court is under challenge  and therefore, would be required to be gone into.  

19. The view expressed by this Court in Century  Spinning’s case (supra) and in L. Muniswamy’s case  (supra) to the effect that the framing of a charge  against an accused substantially affects the person’s  liberty would require a reiteration at this stage.  The  apparent and close proximity between the framing of a  charge in a criminal proceeding and the paramount  rights of a person arrayed as an accused under Article  21 of the Constitution can be ignored only with peril.  Any examination of the validity of a criminal charge  framed against an accused cannot overlook the  fundamental requirement laid down in the decisions  

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rendered in Century Spinning and Muniswamy (supra).  It  is from the aforesaid perspective that we must proceed  in the matter bearing in mind the cardinal principles  of law that have developed over the years as  fundamental to any  examination of the issue as to  whether the charges framed are justified or not. So  analysed, we find that in the present case neither in  the FIR nor in the charge sheet or in any of the  materials collected in the course of investigation any  positive role of either of the appellants, i.e., G.K.  Bhat and R.K. Arora has been disclosed in the matter of  renewal and encashment of the fixed deposits.  All that  appears against the aforesaid two accused is that one  was the Chief Manager of the Bank whereas the other  accused was at the relevant time working as the Senior  Manager.  What role, if any, either of the accused had  in renewing the two fixed deposits in the sole name of  Anita Mehra or the role that any of them may have had  in the  payment of the amount due against FD No. 21/91  to Anita Mehra or in cancelling the FD No.9/92 renewed  

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in the sole name of Anita Mehra and thereafter making a  fresh FD in the joint Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra, is  not disclosed either in the FIR filed or materials  collected during the  course of investigation or in the  charge sheet filed before the court.  There can be no  manner of doubt that some particular individual  connected with the Bank must have authorized the  aforesaid acts. However, the identity of the said  person does not appear from the materials on record. It  is certainly not the prosecution case that either of  the accused-appellants had authorised or even  facilitated any of the aforesaid action. In such a  situation to hold either of the accused-appellants to  be, even prima facie, liable for any of the alleged  wrongful acts would be a matter of conjecture as no  such conclusion can be reasonably and justifiably drawn  from the materials available on record. A criminal  trial cannot be allowed to assume the character of  fishing and roving enquiry. It would not be permissible  in law to permit a  prosecution to linger, limp and  

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continue on the basis of a mere hope and expectation  that in the trial some material may be found to  implicate the accused.  Such a course of action is not  contemplated in the system of criminal jurisprudence  that has been evolved by the courts over the years.  A  criminal trial, on the contrary, is contemplated only  on definite allegations, prima facie, establishing the  commission of an offence by the accused which fact has  to be proved by leading unimpeachable and acceptable  evidence in the course of the trial against the  accused.  We are, therefore, of the view that the  criminal proceeding in the present form and on the  allegations levelled is clearly not maintainable  against either of the accused – appellant G.K. Bhat and  R.K. Arora.

20. The next question that has to be addressed is  whether the criminal charges against accused S.K.  Khosla under Sections  120B  and 420 IPC in so far as  FD Nos. 22/91 and 9/92 are concerned along with the  

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charges under Sections 467, 468 and 471 read with  Section 120B of the IPC had been rightly quashed by the  High Court.  From the materials on record it appears  that in so far as FD No. 22/91 is concerned an  endorsement on the reverse of the FD was made by  accused S.K. Khosla that the said F.D. may be renewed  in the name of Anita Mehra.  However, renewal of the  said FD was made by the Bank on the basis of a letter  dated 09.10.1992 written by Anita Mehra to the Bank.  If the above fact has been revealed in the course of  investigation of the FIR no liability in respect of the  FD bearing No.22/91 can be fastened on the accused S.K.  Khosla.  Neither is there any allegation against S.K.  Khosla with regard to receipt of the money against the  aforesaid FD by Anita Mehra.  Similarly in respect of  FD bearing No.9/92 there is no allegation that renewal  of the said FD was made on the basis of any endorsement  or request made by S.K. Khosla.  In the light of above  facts it cannot be held that the High Court had  committed any error in quashing the charges under  

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Sections 120B and 420 IPC against the accused S.K.  Khosla in so far as the aforesaid two FDs, i.e. FD  Nos.22/91 and 9/92,  are concerned.      21. Coming to the charges under Sections 467, 468, 471  read with Section 120B IPC framed  against accused S.K.  Khosla, we do not find that FD Nos.22/91 and 9/92 of  Canara Bank and FDS Nos.103402 and 103403 of Punjab and  Sind Bank were renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra  on the basis of the endorsement made on the reverse of  the FD receipts by accused SK Khosla to the above  effect.   In fact, the said FDs were renewed on the  basis of the letters addressed to the Bank by accused –  Anita Mehra.  However, in respect of  FD No.0756223 of  Vyasa Bank  it appears that renewal of the aforesaid FD  in the sole name of Anita Mehra was made on the basis  of the Investment Renewal Form dated 22.03.1993 which  was signed by both Satish Mehra and Anita Mehra.  The  said form also contained an endorsement made under the  signature of accused SK Khosla to the effect that the  

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FD be renewed in the sole name of Anita Mehra.  It has  been found upon investigation of the FIR and it has  also been recorded by the learned trial court as well  as by the High Court that the signatures of Anita Mehra  and Satish Mehra on the aforesaid Investment Renewal  Form were old signatures and that the Investment  Renewal Form had been misplaced by Satish Mehra.  The  particulars of Satish Mehra entered in the said  Investment Renewal Form, i.e., Passport number etc.  being of the expired Passport can be understood to be  facts supporting the allegations made in the FIR and  the conclusion of the investigating agency that the  accused S.K. Khosla had used an Investment Renewal Form  signed by Satish Mehra which was misplaced by him.  The  signature and the endorsement made by S.K. Khosla on  the said form  had also been found, upon investigation,  to be relatively fresh in comparison to the signatures  of Anita Mehra and Satish Mehra on the said form. This  is an additional fact that has to receive due  consideration in the process of determination of the  

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prima facie liability of the accused S.K. Khosla under  Sections 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B of the  Indian Penal Code.

22. Section 464 of Indian Penal Code which defines the  offence of “forgery”  encompasses a dishonest or  fraudulent act of a person in making a document with  the intention of causing it to be believed that such  document was made, signed, sealed etc. by or by the  authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he  knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed  etc. If such an act of a person is covered by the  definition of “forgery” contained in Section 464 of the  Penal Code we do not see as to why the action of the  accused S.K. Khosla in making the endorsement in the  Investment Renewal Form dated 22.03.1993 of Vyasa Bank,  in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances  already noted, cannot, prima facie, amount to  making  of a document with an intention of causing it to be  believed that the same was made by or by the authority  

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of the joint account holder Satish Mehra. The said  document having contained an endorsement that the FD be  altered/renewed in the single name of accused Anita  Mehra and the Bank having so acted, prima facie, the  commission of offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471  read with Section 120B IPC, in our considered view, is  disclosed against the accused S.K. Khosla.  The order  of the High Court quashing the  charges framed against  S.K. Khosla under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC read  with Section 120B IPC  in so far as the Investment  Renewal Form dated 22.03.1993 and FD No.0756223 with  Vyasa Bank, therefore, is clearly unsustainable.  We  therefore interfere with the aforesaid part of the  order of the High Court in so far as the accused S.K.  Khosla is concerned.   

23. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing  discussions we allow the Criminal Appeals arising out  of Special Leave Petition (Crl) Nos. 3546 and 910 of  2012  and allow the Criminal appeal arising out of  

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Special Leave petition (Crl) No. 569 of 2012 in part  and to the extent indicated above.  

……………………………………J.    [P. SATHASIVAM]

 ……………………………………J.

    [RANJAN GOGOI] New Delhi, November 22, 2012

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