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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.             OF 2017  (CC 4339/2017)

Sasi (D) Through Lrs.  Petitioner (s)

Versus

Aravindakshan Nair and Others     Respondent(s)  

J U D G M E N T  

Dipak Misra, J.

In  this  special  leave  petition,  the  challenge  is  to  the

order dated 9th March, 2012, passed by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in R.S.A.

No.345  of  2012  and  the  order  dated  26th October,  2016,

passed in Review Petition No.886 of 2012.

2. Ordinarily, we would have passed a short order in the

matter  dismissing  the  special  leave  petition  which  would

have paved the path for extinction for the litigation, for it is

devoid  of  any  merit  warranting  any  interference  but,  an

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eloquent one, the circumstances impel us to state something

more.

3. A Regular Second Appeal was preferred before the High

Court  under  Section  100  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure

challenging the judgment and decree passed in Appeal Suit

No.149 of 2008, which had given the stamp of approval to

the  judgment  and  decree  passed  by  the  learned  Munsiff,

Alappuzha in O.S. No.518 of 2003.  The learned Single Judge

of the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal on 9th March,

2012.   The appellant  therein filed a  review petition under

Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. on 20th September, 2012.  The review

was barred by limitation and eventually, the same was not

entertained on merits.   

4. We are really not concerned with the entertaining of an

application  for  review  with  some  delay,  but  what  is

perplexing is that the review petition preferred in 2012, was

kept pending for almost four years and, thereafter, the High

Court has dismissed the same by observing that an effort has

been made to seek review of the main judgment as if the High

Court was expected to exercise appellate  jurisdiction while

dealing with an application for review.  

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5. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as

follows:-  

“1. Application for review of judgment.-  (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved -  

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,  but  from  which  no  appeal  has  been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and  who,  from  the  discovery  of  new  and important  matter  or  evidence  which,  after  the exercise  of  due  diligence  was  not  within  his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the  time when the  decree was passed or  order made,  or  on account  of  some mistake or  error apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record,  or  for  any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or  order  may  apply  for  a  review  of  judgment notwithstanding  the  pendency  of  an  appeal  by some  other  party  except  where  the  ground  of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant,  or  when,  being  respondent,  he  can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

Explanation.-  The  fact  that  the  decision  on  a question  of  law  on  which  the  judgment  of  the Court is based has been reversed or modified by

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the subsequent decision of  a  superior  Court  in any  other  case,  shall  not  be  a  ground  for  the review of such judgment.

6. The  grounds  enumerated  therein  are  specific.   The

principles for  interference in exercise of  review jurisdiction

are well settled.  The Court passing the order is entitled to

review  the  order,  if  any  of  the  grounds  specified  in  the

aforesaid provision are satisfied.

7. In  Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt.  of A.P.1,

the Court while dealing with the scope of review had opined:-

“What,  however,  we are  now concerned with  is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substan- tial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’).  The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts  that  a  substantial  question  of  law  arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier or- der itself  might  be erroneous.  Similarly,  even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it  was  an  ‘error  apparent  on  the  face  of  the record’,  for  there is  a distinction which is  real, though it might not always be capable of exposi- tion,  between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’.  A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.”

8. In  Parsion  Devi  v.  Sumitri  Devi2,  the  Court  after 1  AIR 1964 SC 1372 2  (1997) 8 SCC 715

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referring to Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (supra),  Meera

Bhanja  v.  Nirmala  Kumari  Choudhury3 and  Aribam

Tuleshwar  Sharma  v.  Aribam  Pishak  Sharma4,  held

thus:-  

“Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be de- tected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard  and  corrected”.  A  review  petition,  it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise””.

9. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell  out the nature,

scope and ambit of power to be exercised.  The error has to

be self-evident and is not to be found out by a process of

reasoning.  We have adverted to the aforesaid aspects only to

highlight the nature of review proceedings.  

10. In the case at hand, be it clearly stated, we are really

not concerned with the exercise of the power of review and its

limitation by the court.  We are concerned with the delay in

disposal of the application for review which was kept pending

3  (1995) 1 SCC 170 4  (1979) 4 SCC 389

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for a span of four years.   

11. An application for review, regard being had to its limited

scope,  has  to  be  disposed of  as  expeditiously  as  possible.

Though we do not intend to fix any time limit, it has to be the

duty of the Registry of every High Court to place the matter

before  the  concerned  Judge/Bench  so  that  the  review

application  can  be  dealt  with  in  quite  promptitude.   If  a

notice is required to be issued to the opposite party in the

application for review, a specific date can be given on which

day the matter can be dealt with in accordance with law.  A

reasonable period can be spent for disposal of the review, but

definitely not four years.  We are compelled to say so as the

learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is

a delay of 1700 days in preferring the special leave petition

against the principal order as he was prosecuting the remedy

of  review  before  the  High  Court.  The  situation  is  not

acceptable.   

12. We  are  obliged  to  observe  certain  aspects.   An

endeavour has to be made by the High Courts to dispose of

the applications for review with expediency.  It is the duty

and obligation of a litigant to file a review and not to keep it

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defective as if a defective petition can be allowed to remain on

life  support,  as  per  his  desire.   It  is  the  obligation of  the

counsel filing an application for review to cure or remove the

defects at the earliest.  The prescription of limitation for filing

an application for review has its own sanctity.  The Registry

of the High Courts has a duty to place the matter before the

Judge/Bench with defects so that there can be pre-emptory

orders for removal of defects.  An adroit method cannot be

adopted  to  file  an  application  for  review  and  wait  till  its

rejection and, thereafter, challenge the orders in the special

leave petition and take specious and mercurial plea asserting

that  delay  had  occurred  because  the  petitioner  was

prosecuting  the  application  for  review.   There  may  be

absence  of  diligence  on  the  part  of  the  litigant,  but  the

Registry  of  the  High  Courts  is  required  to  be  vigilant.

Procrastination of litigation in this manner is nothing but a

subterfuge taken recourse to in a manner that can epitomize

“cleverness” in its conventional sense.  We say no more in

this regard.  

13. We request the High Courts not to keep the applications

for review pending as that is  likely to delay the matter  in

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every court and also embolden the likes of the petitioner to

take  a  stand  intelligently  depicting  the  same  in  the

application for condonation of delay.

14. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Registrar General

of each of the High Courts so that it can be placed before the

learned Chief Justice/Acting Chief Justice of the High Court

to do the needful in the matter.

15. As  earlier  indicated,  the  special  leave  petition  has  to

pave  the  path  of  dismissal  and  accordingly  it  stands

dismissed, both on the ground of delay, as well as also on

merits.

.........................................J.    (Dipak Misra)

.........................................J.    (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

New Delhi; March 03, 2017.