Sanjeev Kumar Gupta Vs The State of Uttar Pradesh

25 July 2019
Supreme Court
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SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Bench: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE
Judgment by: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001081-001081 / 2019
Diary number: 46214 / 2018
Advocates: DHANANJAY GARG Vs

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

Criminal Appeal No 1081 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Crl)No 156 of 2019)

Sanjeev Kumar Gupta ..Appellant

VERSUS

The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1 The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad allowed a claim of juvenility in a

decision of its Single Judge dated 14 November 2018. The judgment is challenged

in this appeal1 by the complainant.

2 On 28 October 2015, a First Information Report was lodged by the appellant

at PS Ekka in the district of Firozabad in Uttar Pradesh which was registered as

Case Crime 252 of 2016 under Section 364 A of the Penal Code. The allegation is

that the appellant received a call on his cell phone from an unknown number and

the caller wished to speak to his son, claiming to be his teacher. The appellant’s

1 Criminal Revision 2952 of 2017

REPORTABLE

son who was about thirteen years old was studying in the eighth standard in a

public school in Shikohabad. After calling back on the number, the appellant’s son

left his shop after a conversation, never to return. The victim is alleged to have

been murdered after a demand for ransom. His body was allegedly found in a

canal. The second respondent was arrested during the course of the investigation.

3 On 9 December 2015, the accused filed an application claiming to be a

juvenile on the date of the incident under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection

of Children) Act 20002. He submitted that on the date of the alleged offence he was

sixteen years ten months and eleven days old. In support of the claim, he relied on

a matriculation certificate issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education3,

Delhi reflecting his date of birth as 17 December 1998.

4 By an order dated 2 July 2016 the Juvenile Justice Board4 allowed the

application of the second respondent – accused and declared him to be a juvenile

on the date of the alleged offence. The appellant instituted a criminal appeal before

the Court of the Sessions Judge, Firozabad5. On 16 September 2016, the Sessions

Judge remanded the case to the JJB for determination of the age of the second

respondent upon medical examination. The Chief Medical Officer, Agra constituted

a Medical Board which in its report dated 19 November 2016 found that the age of

the second respondent was about nineteen years. Aggrieved by the order of the

2 Act of 2000 3 CBSE 4 JJB 5 Criminal Appeal 41 of 2016

Sessions Judge, the second respondent filed a revision6 before the High Court

which was dismissed as withdrawn on 4 January 2017. He instituted a petition7

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19738 which was disposed

of by the High Court on 17 April 2017 directing the early disposal of the pending

application of the second respondent. On 1 July 2017, the JJB rejected the claim

of juvenility on the basis of the medical report. The JJB also observed that the

second respondent had filed an application for obtaining a driving license and an

Aadhaar card in which he had declared his date of birth as 17 December 1995. On

this basis, the JJB held that the second respondent was an adult on the date of the

incident. The second respondent filed an appeal against the order of the JJB before

the Sessions Judge, Firozabad9. The Sessions Judge rejected the appeal by an

order dated 2 August 2017 observing, on the basis of the decision of this Court in

Prag Bhati v State of Uttar Pradesh10 that the credibility and authenticity of the

documents depends upon the circumstances of each case and that in a case

involving conflicting school certificates, a further inquiry would be required. The

Sessions Judge also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ramdeo

Chauhan alias Raj Nath v State of Assam11.

5 Aggrieved by the decision of the Sessions Judge, the second respondent

moved the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in a Criminal Revision. The High

Court allowed the revision and declared that on the date of the alleged offence, the

6 Revision Petition 3246 of 2016 7 Petition No 12801 of 2017 8 CrPC 9 Criminal Appeal 27 of 2017 10 (2016) 12 SCC 744 11 (2001) 5 SCC 714

second respondent was a minor. In coming to this conclusion, the High Court

adverted to the provisions contained in Section 7 A of the Act of 2000 and Rule 12

of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules 200712 as

interpreted by this Court in Ashwani Kumar Saxena v State of Madhya

Pradesh13. The High Court held that the matriculation certificate issued by the

CBSE would have to be given precedence over any other evidence of the date of

birth, having due regard to the provisions contained in Rule 12(3)(a). It held that

the validity of the matriculation certificate issued by the CBSE had not been

disputed but what was in dispute was the date of birth which was recorded in the

certificate. The Court took notice of the fact that during the course of the

investigation, the investigating officer had collected the driving licence, Aadhaar

card, voter’s ID and eighth standard mark sheets which indicated that the date of

birth of the second respondent was 27 December 1995. The matriculation

certificate indicated that the date of birth was 17 December 1998. According to the

medical report, the second respondent was about nineteen years of age on 9

November 2016. Ultimately, in the view of the High Court, precedence would have

to be given to the date of birth which was indicated in the matriculation certificate.

The decision of the JJB, as affirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge, was set

aside and the claim of juvenility was allowed.

6 Notice was issued in the Special Leave Petition was instituted before this

Court under Article 136 of the Constitution on 14 January 2019. On 16 April 2019,

12 Rules of 2007 13 (2012) 9 SCC 750

this Court issued notice to the CBSE and directed it to produce all necessary

records pertaining to the second respondent. CBSE was directed to file an affidavit

explaining the basis on which the date of birth was recorded in the matriculation

certificate. On 6 May 2019 after the records were produced before this Court an

affidavit was filed by CBSE. An opportunity was given to the parties to respond.

After the parties have filed their affidavits and responses, the proceedings have

been taken up for final disposal.

7 Ms Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

submitted that:

(i) There is a serious dispute in regard to the authenticity of the date of birth

recorded in the matriculation certificate issued by CBSE. Buttressing this

submission, the learned counsel submitted that:

(a) the date of birth in the school register of Saket Vidya Sthali, Jedajhal,

Ekka, Firozabad where the second respondent studied from Kindergarten to

the fourth standard is 17 December 1995;

(b) The date of birth in the learner’s driving license, driving licence and

Aadhaar card of the second respondent is reflected as 17 December 1995;

after the second respondent voluntarily disclosed the date of birth as 17

December 1995;

(d) During the course of the inquiry the Headmaster of Maa Anjani Public

School, Shikohabad deposed before the JJB on 22 January 2016 that the

date of birth of 17 December 1998 had been recorded on the information

given by the parent and though an affidavit is generally obtained at the time

of admission, this had not been done at the time of the admission of the

second respondent. Moreover, no record in respect of the date of birth had

been produced by the father of the second respondent at the time of

admission; and

(e) The affidavit which was filed in these proceedings by CBSE indicates

that the date of birth in its records was adopted only on the basis of the roll

submitted by the concerned school while sending up its students for the

matriculation examination without any further enquiry by CBSE;

(ii) In the present case, the material on the record, including the record which

was obtained by the investigating officer during the course of the investigation,

clearly indicates that the date of birth of the second respondent is 17 December

1995;

(iii) The decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) of a two judge Bench of

this Court cannot be considered in isolation in view of a subsequent decision of a

three judge Bench in Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain v State of West

Bengal14 and of a two judge Bench in Parag Bhati (supra). The last of the three

decisions considers both the earlier two decisions; and

14 (2012) 10 SCC 489

(iv) The Act of 2000 has been repealed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Act 201515. The Act of 2015 came into force on 31

December 2015. Section 94 of the Act of 2015 does not give precedence to the

matriculation certificate to determine the age of the person. Since Section 94 deals

with a matter of procedure. Hence, though the incident took place on 18 August

2015, the application filed by the second respondent claiming the benefit of

juvenility will have to be decided in terms of the provisions contained in Section 94

of the Act of 2015. Having regard to the incontrovertible material on the record, the

date of birth of the second respondent is 17 December 1995.

8 On the other hand, Mr Ravindra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the second respondent submitted that:

(i) The JJB after a detailed enquiry came to the conclusion that the date of birth

of the second respondent is 17 December 1998;

(ii) The date in the Aadhaar card or in the driving licence issued by the RTO

may have been given wrongly by the accused for seeking an undue advantage.

For this, he may face consequences under the law but that by itself does not negate

the claim of juvenility where, it is found to be substantiated in the date of birth

recorded in the matriculation certificate;

(iii) The date recorded in the matriculation certificate must prevail by virtue of

Rule 12(3); and

15 Act of 2015

(iv) The cross-examination of the witness, Dr Udayvir Singh Yadav, who was a

former Principal/Manager of Saket Vidya Sthali, Jedajhal contains several

inconsistencies consequent upon which, the certificate issued by the school cannot

be regarded as of any significance. Hence, it is urged that the judgment of the High

Court should not, in the facts of the present case, be interfered with.

9 The rival submissions fall for consideration.

10 Section 7 A of the Act of 2000 provides the procedure to be followed when

a claim of juvenility is raised before a court. Section 7 A provides thus:

“S.7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is

raised before any court.--(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is

raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an

accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of

the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take such

evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to

determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding

whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his

age as nearly as may be:

Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any

court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final

disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in

terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made

thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or

before the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of

commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall

forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders

and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to

have no effect.

Upon a claim being raised that an accused was a juvenile on the date of the

commission of the offence, the Court is required to make an enquiry, take evidence

and to determine the age of the person. The court has to record a finding whether

the person is a juvenile or a child, stating the age as nearly as may be. Rule 12(3)

of the Rules of 2007 contains a procedural provision governing the determination

of age by the Court or by the Board. Rule 12(3) stipulates thus:

“12 Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.

…

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with

law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the

court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by

seeking evidence by obtaining—

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available;

and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play

school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal

authority or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)

above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly

constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the

juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot

be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the

Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if

considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by

considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one

year.

and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into

consideration such evidence as may be available, or the

medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in

respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any

of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause

(b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such

child or the juvenile in conflict with law.”

Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) provides that for the purpose of seeking evidence in the

enquiry, the following documents would have to be obtained:

(i) matriculation or equivalent certificate if available;

(ii) in the absence of (i), the date of birth certificate from the school first

attended; and

(iii) in the absence; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation, municipal

authority or panchayat.

Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) contains a hierarchical ordering, evident from the use of

the language “in the absence whereof”. This indicates that where a matriculation

or equivalent certificate is available, the documents adverted to in (ii) and (iii)

cannot be relied upon. The matriculation certificate, in other words, is given

precedence. It is in the absence of a matriculation certificate that the date of birth

certificate of the school first attended, can be relied upon. It is in the absence of

both the matriculation and the birth certificates of the first school attended that a

birth certificate issued by the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat could

be obtained. This facet of Rule 12(3) was noticed in the two judge Bench decision

of this Court in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra). Justice KSP Radhakrishnan,

while holding that the procedures laid down in the CrPC cannot be imported while

making an enquiry in regard to a claim of juvenility under the Rules of 2007

observed:

“32. “Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section

7-A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the

court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain

the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in

the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the

court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the

school first attended other than a play school. Only in the

absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of

birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs

to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a

municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but

certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical

opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the

abovementioned documents are unavailable. In case exact

assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for

reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the

benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on

lower side within the margin of one year.”

The Court took notice of the fact that there could be situations in which the date of

birth recorded in the matriculation certificate, or for that matter in the other

certificates referred to in Rule 12(3)(a) may not be correct. The Court held that

where it was only when those documents are found to be fabricated or manipulated

could the date of birth as reflected be discarded. The Court held:

“34. ...There may be situations where the entry made in the

matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate

from the school first attended and even the birth certificate

given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat

may not be correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a

committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to

conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those

certificates to examine the correctness of those documents,

kept during the normal course of business. Only in cases

where those documents or certificates are found to be

fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board

or the committee need to go for medical report for age

determination.”

In the view of the Court, it was only if the above conditions were fulfilled, that a

medical report could be called.

11 The decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) was rendered on 13

September 2012. Soon thereafter, a three judge Bench of this Court considered

the provisions of Section 7 A and Rule 12 in Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam

Hossain (supra). Justice RM Lodha (as the learned Chief Justice then was),

speaking for himself and Justice Anil R Dave observed:

“39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court

and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be

catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be

given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to

raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in

Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima

facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent

necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement

recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and

may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the

claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the

documents like the school leaving certificate or the voters' list,

etc. obtained after conviction would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be

prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected.

In Akbar Sheikh [(2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431]

and Pawan [(2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522]

these documents were not found prima facie credible while

in Jitendra Singh [(2010) 13 SCC 523 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857]

the documents viz. school leaving certificate, marksheet and

the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an

inquiry and verification of the appellant's age. If such

documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the

court may act upon such documents for the purposes of

Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination of the age

of the delinquent.”

The above decision in Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain (supra) was

rendered on 10 October 2012. Though the earlier decision in Ashwani Kumar

Saxena (supra) was not cited before the Court, it appears from the above extract

that the three judge Bench observed that the credibility and acceptability of the

documents, including the school leaving certificate, would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule as such could be laid down.

Concurring with the judgment of Justice RM Lodha, Justice TS Thakur (as the

learned Chief Justice then was) observed that directing an inquiry is not the same

thing as declaring the accused to be a juvenile. In the former the Court simply

records a prima facie conclusion while in the latter a declaration is made on the

basis of evidence. Hence the approach at the stage of directing the inquiry has to

be more liberal:

“48. If one were to adopt a wooden approach, one could say

nothing short of a certificate, whether from the school or a

municipal authority would satisfy the court's conscience, before

directing an enquiry. But, then directing an enquiry is not the

same thing as declaring the accused to be a juvenile. The

standard of proof required is different for both. In the former,

the court simply records a prima facie conclusion. In the latter,

the court makes a declaration on evidence, that it scrutinises

and accepts only if it is worthy of such acceptance. The

approach at the stage of directing the enquiry has of necessity

to be more liberal, lest, there is avoidable miscarriage of

justice. Suffice it to say that while affidavits may not be

generally accepted as a good enough basis for directing an

enquiry, that they are not so accepted is not a rule of law but a

rule of prudence. The Court would, therefore, in each case

weigh the relevant factors, insist upon filing of better affidavits

if the need so arises, and even direct, any additional

information considered relevant including the information

regarding the age of the parents, the age of siblings and the

like, to be furnished before it decides on a case to case basis

whether or not an enquiry under Section 7-A ought to be

conducted. It will eventually depend on how the court evaluates

such material for a prima facie conclusion that the court may

or may not direct an enquiry.”

Both these judgments have since been considered by a two judge Bench of this

Court in Prag Bhati (supra), where it was observed:

“36. It is settled position of law that if the matriculation or

equivalent certificates are available and there is no other

material to prove the correctness of date of birth, the date of

birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate has to be treated

as a conclusive proof of the date of birth of the accused.

However, if there is any doubt or a contradictory stand is being

taken by the accused which raises a doubt on the correctness

of the date of birth then as laid down by this Court in Abuzar

Hossain[Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489

: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] , an enquiry for determination of the

age of the accused is permissible which has been done in the

present case.”

12 The Act of 2015 came into force on 15 January 2016. Section 111 repeals

the earlier Act of 2000 but stipulates that despite the repeal, anything done or any

action taken under the said Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken under

the corresponding provisions of the new legislation. Section 94 contains provisions

in regard to the determination of age, is in the following terms:

“94. Presumption and determination of age.- (1) Where, it is

obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the

appearance of the person brought before it under any of the

provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving

evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the

Board shall record such observation stating the age of the

child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under

section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting

for further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable

grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought

before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the

case may be, shall undertake the process of age

determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining —

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the

matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned

examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal

authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be

determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical

age determination test conducted on the orders of the

Committee or the Board:

Provided such age determination test conducted on the order

of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within

fifteen days from the date of such order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the

age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this

Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”

Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and

the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in

the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides

for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or

panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means

of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change

over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007

made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent

certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not

being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could

be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as

well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

13 Ms Jaiswal submitted that Section 94 deals with a matter of procedure.

Hence, it was urged that though the incident in the present case is alleged to have

taken place on 18 August 2015 and the application claiming the benefit of juvenility

was submitted on 9 December 2015, the application should be governed by the

provisions of Section 94 and not by Section 12(3) of the Rules of 2007. For the

purpose of the present case, we have proceeded to analyse the facts on the basis

of the provisions of Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007 (as was urged on behalf of

the second respondent). We have, as will be analysed hereafter, come to the

conclusion that even on that basis, the second respondent was not a juvenile on

the date of the incident. In other words, whether the case is approached from the

stand point of Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007 or Section 94(2) of the 2015 Act

does not ultimately make any difference to the conclusion.

14 Now it is in this background that it becomes necessary for the Court to

determine whether the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, was

justified in reversing the view of the learned Sessions Judge that the second

respondent was not a juvenile on the date of the incident. In seeking to place

reliance on the date of birth (17 December 1998) recorded in the CBSE

matriculation certificate, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second

respondent has submitted that under the provisions of Rule 12(3)(a) the said

certificate has precedence over any other evidentiary document. In the course of

the hearing of the appeal, we directed the CBSE to produce its records and to file

an affidavit indicating the basis on which the date of birth was recorded in the

matriculation certificate. The affidavit filed by the CBSE indicates that the date of

birth in the records maintained by the CBSE was recorded purely on the basis of

the final list of students forwarded by Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Etah

Road, Shikohabad. The affidavit of the Assistant Secretary, CBSE states:

“… Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Etah Road,

Shikohabad, sent Final list of Students registered for Class IX

(2011-12) as (Eligible for Class X Examination Year 2013) of

the School to the Central Board of Secondary Education,

Regional office, Allahabad. In the said Final List of Students

registered for Class IX (2011-12) (Eligible for Class X

Examination for year – 2013) at Serial No 00068 shows the

name of Puneet Yadav son of Shri Rameshwar Singh and Smt

Vishesh Devi and his date of birth has been shown as

17.12.1998 which contain the Signature and Photograph of

Puneet Yadav. The date of Entry has been shown as

08.09.2011.”

…

“... the Principal, Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School,

Shikohabad, vide letter dated 04.02.2013 sent Roll Number –

wise List of 248 candidates for class X-2013 to the Assistant

Secretary (Examination), C.B.S.E., Allahabad. Name of

Puneet Yadav son of Rameshwar Singh and Mrs Vishesh Devi,

Roll No 5156848 has been shown with date of birth as

17.12.1998 at page No 896 of the List, with the signature of

Puneet Yadav.”

…

“… the Certificate for Secondary School Examination (Session

2011-13) (true copy of which was been appended as Annexure

CA-1 received by the Central Board of Secondary Education

with the Order dated 16.04.2019 of this Hon’ble Court) showing

the Date of Birth of Puneet Yadav as 17.12.1998 was issued

on the basis of aforementioned records of the Central Board of

Secondary Education.”

CBSE has stated before this Court that the date recorded in the matriculation

certificate was purely on the basis of the final list of students forwarded by the

Headmaster of Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Shikohabad. The

Headmaster of the Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Shikohabad deposed

during the enquiry before the JJB, Firozabad. In the course of her examination,

Headmaster Dipti Solanki stated:

“...We note down the date of birth of the student at the time of

admission as per the information given by the parents and at

the same time we obtain an affidavit but we could not procure

an affidavit from this student. I have committed a mistake by

not procuring an Affidavit from this student. The date of birth

was entered on the basis of the information given by the

parent/father.”

The Headmaster further stated:

“...The father did not produce any record at the time of

admission in respect of the date of birth of the student. They

would have been asked to produce the record of class 4 at the

time of admission but they did not. I cannot tell the reason

thereof. The students are admitted without any document upto

class 5.”

The above deposition indicates that the second respondent was admitted to Maa

Anjani Senior Secondary School, Shikohabad in the fifth standard and was a

student of the school until he completed his matriculation. The second respondent

attended the Saket Vidyasthali, Jedajhal, Firozabad until the fourth standard. The

school register and transfer certificate form of that school specifically contains an

entry in regard to the date of birth of the second respondent as 17 December 1995.

Mr Ravindra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the second

respondent has urged that the discrepancies which have been brought out in the

course of the cross-examination of the former Manager of the school would

indicate that there is a doubt in regard to the authenticity of that certificate.

However, in our view, what must weigh against the second respondent’s

submission is that the date of birth which has been recorded in the certificate of

the Saket Vidya Sthali completely matches the date of birth which was voluntarily

disclosed by the second respondent both while obtaining his driving licence as well

as the Aadhaar card. In both those documents, the originals of which were seized

during the course of the investigation and have been produced before this Court,

the date of birth is reflected as 17 December 1995. The driving license and the

Aadhaar card are not standalone documents. The submission of the learned senior

counsel that the date of birth in those documents may have been furnished by the

accused to obtain an undue advantage cannot simply be accepted since it tallies

with the date of birth indicated in the school records of Saket Vidya Sthali school.

It is evident from the above analysis that the date of birth which was forwarded in

the roll of students of Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Shikohabad was the

sole basis of the date of birth which was recorded in the matriculation certificate.

The date of birth in the records of Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School where the

second respondent was a student from Class V to Class X is without any

underlying document, as stated by the Principal in the course of the enquiry before

the JJB. On the other hand, there is a clear and unimpeachable evidence in the

form of the date of birth which has been recorded in the records of Saket Vidya

Sthali school which is supported by the voluntary disclosure made by the second

respondent while obtaining both the Aadhaar card and the driving licence. The

High Court reversed the findings of the Sessions Judge purely on the basis of the

matriculation certificate. For the reasons which we have indicated, the date of birth

as reflected therein cannot be accepted as authentic or credible. Once we come

to the conclusion, as we have, that the date of birth of the second respondent is

17 December 1995, he was not entitled to the claim of juvenility as of the date of

the alleged incident which took place on 18 August 2015.

15 For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court dated 14 November 2018. Criminal Revision

2952 of 2017 shall in consequence stand dismissed. The order passed by the

Sessions Judge, confirming the decision of the JJB rejecting the claim of juvenility

is accordingly maintained. The second respondent shall accordingly be dealt with

in accordance with law on the basis of the finding recorded in the present judgment,

rejecting the claim of juvenility.

.....................................................J [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

.....................................................J [Indira Banerjee] New Delhi; July 25, 2019