SANJEEV KR. SAMRAT Vs NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. .
Bench: K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: C.A. No.-008925-008925 / 2012
Diary number: 16772 / 2006
Advocates: K J JOHN AND CO Vs
M. K. DUA
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8925 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17272 of 2006)
Sanjeev Kumar Samrat ... Appellant
Versus
National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others ... Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8926 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17273 of 2006)
Sanjeev Kumar Samrat ... Appellant
Versus
National Insurance Co. Ltd. ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. The centripodal issue that emanates for
consideration in these appeals is whether the insurer
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is obliged under law to indemnify the owner of a
goods vehicle when the employees engaged by the
hirer of the vehicle travel with the owner of the goods
on the foundation that they should be treated as
“employees” covered under the policy issued in
accordance with the provision contained under
Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for
brevity “the Act”).
3. The expose’ of facts are that a truck bearing
HP/10/0821 was hired on 12.4.2000 for carrying iron
rod and cement by one Durga Singh who was
travelling with the goods along with two of his
labourers. When the vehicle was moving through
Khara Patthar to Malethi, 1.5 KM ahead of Khara
Patthar, about 4.30 p.m., it met with an accident as a
consequence of which the labourers, namely, Nagru
Ram and Desh Raj and also Durga Singh, sustained
injuries and eventually succumbed to the same.
4. The legal heirs of all the deceased persons filed
separate claim petitions under Section 166 of the Act
before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (II),
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Shimla (for short “the tribunal”). Before the tribunal,
respondent No. 3, namely, National Insurance
Company Ltd., apart from taking other pleas,
principally took the stand that it was not liable to
indemnify the labourers employed by the hirer. The
owner of the truck, the present appellant, admitted
the fact of hiring the truck but advanced the plea
that the insurer was under legal obligation to
indemnify the owner.
5. On consideration of the evidence brought on record,
the tribunal came to hold that the legal
representatives of Nagru Ram and Desh Raj were
covered as per the insurance policy, exhibit RW-
2/3/A, as the policy covered six employees and
accordingly fixed the liability on the insurer. As far
as the legal representative of Desh Raj is concerned,
the tribunal treated him as the owner of the goods
who was travelling along with the goods and
accordingly saddled the liability on the 3rd respondent
therein.
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6. Being grieved by the awards passed by the tribunal,
the insurer preferred FAO (MBA) Nos. 175, 176 and
178 of 2003 before the High Court of Himachal
Pradesh at Shimla. In appeal, the learned single
Judge, by order dated 13.1.2006, allowed FAO Nos.
175 and 176 of 2003 wherein the legal
representatives of the deceased employees were the
claimants. As far as FAO No. 178 of 2003 is
concerned, the High Court concurred with the finding
recorded by the tribunal that Durga Singh was the
owner of the goods and travelling along with the
goods and, therefore, the insurer was liable to pay
compensation to his legal representatives. It is
worthy to note that as the insurance company had
already deposited the amount of compensation, the
High Court, placing reliance on the decision in
National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur
and others1, directed that the insurance company
having satisfied the award shall be entitled to recover
the same along with interest from the owner-insured
by initiating execution proceedings before the
1 (2004) 2 SCC 1
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tribunal. Hence, the present appeals at the instance
of the owner of the vehicle.
7. We have heard Mr. Rajesh Gupta, learned counsel for
the appellant, and Mr. M. K Dua, learned counsel for
respondent No. 1.
8. It is submitted by Mr. Gupta that the High Court has
committed serious error in coming to hold that an
employee of the hirer is not covered without
appreciating the terms of the policy which covers the
driver and six employees. Learned Counsel has laid
emphasis on the words “any person” used in Section
147 of the Act. Referring to the said provision, it is
urged by him that the term “employee” has to be
given a broader meaning keeping in view the
language employed in the policy and also in view of
the fact that the Act is a piece of beneficial
legislation. It is his further submission that there is a
distinction between “passenger” in a goods vehicle
and an “employee” of the hirer of the vehicle but the
High Court has gravely erred by not appreciating the
said distinction in proper perspective.
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9. Mr. M.K. Dua, learned counsel for the first
respondent, combating the aforesaid proponements,
contended that the decision rendered by the High
Court is absolutely flawless inasmuch as the entire
controversy is covered by many a dictum of this
Court some of which have been appositely referred to
by the High Court. It is urged by him that the
extended meaning which is argued to be given to the
term “employee” by the appellant is not legally
acceptable as the employee has to be that of the
insurer. It is canvassed by him that there is a
manifest fallacy in the argument propounded on
behalf of the appellant that the policy covers such
kinds of employees though on the plainest reading of
the policy, it would be vivid that the same does not
cover such categories of employees. It is his further
submission that the policy in question is an “Act
Policy” and in the absence of any additional terms in
the contract of insurance, the same can be
broadened to travel beyond the language employed
in the policy to cover the employees of the owner of
the goods making the insurer liable.
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10. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to
refer to certain statutory provisions. Section 146 of
the Act provides for the necessity for injuries against
third party risk. On a reading of the said provision,
there can be no trace of doubt that the owner of the
vehicle is statutorily obliged to obtain an insurance
for the vehicle to cover the third party risk, apart
from the exceptions which have been carved out in
the said provision. Section 147 of the Act deals with
requirements of policies and limits of liability. The
relevant part of Section 147 (1) is reproduced below:-
“147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.- (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; or
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)—
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily [injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle] or damage to any property of a third party caused
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by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:
Provided that a policy shall not be required—
(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee—
(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or
(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or
(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or
(ii) to cover any contractual liability.”
11. Be it noted, before Section 147(1)(b)(i) came into
existence in the present incarnation, it stipulated
that a policy of insurance must be a policy which
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insured the person or classes of persons to the
extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liability
incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily
injury to any person or damage to any property or
third party caused by or arising out of the use of the
vehicle in public place.
12. Regard being had to the earlier provision and the
amendment, this Court in New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh2, scanned the anatomy of
the provision and also of Section 149 of the Act and
expressed the view that under the new Act, an
insurance policy covering the third party risk does
not exclude gratuitous passenger in a vehicle, no
matter that the vehicle is of any type or class. It was
further opined that the decisions rendered under the
1939 Act in respect of gratuitous passengers were of
no avail while considering the liability of the insurer
after the new Act came into force.
13. The correctness of the said decision came up for
consideration before a three-Judge Bench in New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani and
2 (2000) 1 SCC 237
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Others3. The learned Chief Justice, speaking for
himself and H.K. Sema, J. took note of Section 147(1)
prior to the amendment and the amended provision
and the objects and reasons behind the said
provision and came to hold as follows:-
“The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression “including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” which was added to the pre- existing expression “injury to any person” is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers
3 (2003) 2 SCC 223
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bodily injury.” [Emphasis supplied]
14. S.B. Sinha, J., in his concurring opinion, stated thus: -
“Furthermore, sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas sub-clause (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place.
An owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers. If a liability other than the limited liability provided for under the Act is to be enhanced under an insurance policy, additional premium is required to be paid. But if the ratio of this Court's decision in New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh4 is taken to its logical conclusion, although for such passengers, the owner of a goods carriage need not take out an insurance policy, they would be deemed to have been covered under the policy wherefor even no premium is required to be paid.”
[Emphasis supplied] Being of the aforesaid view, the three-Judge Bench
overruled the decision in Satpal Singh (supra).
4 (2000) 1 SCC 237
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15. In Baljit Kaur (supra) and National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Bommithi Subbhayamma and Others5, the
aforesaid view was reiterated.
16. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vedwati and
Others6, after referring to the scheme of the Act and the
earlier pronouncements, it has been held that the
provisions of the Act do not enjoin any statutory liability
on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any
passenger travelling in a goods carrier and the insurer
would have no liability therefor.
17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Cholleti
Bharatamma and Others7, the Court laid down that the
provisions engrafted under Section 147 of the Act do not
enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to
get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a
goods vehicle and hence, any injury to any person in
Section 147(1)(b) would only mean a third party and not a
passenger travelling in a goods carriage, whether
gratuitous or otherwise.
5 (2005) 12 SCC 243 6 (2007) 9 SCC 486 7 (2008) 1 SCC 423
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18. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to the
decision of a three-Judge Bench in National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Prembati Patel and Others8 wherein the
legal representatives of the driver of the truck had
succeeded before the High Court and were granted
compensation of Rs.2,10,000/- repelling the contention of
the insurer that the liability was restricted as provided
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short
“the 1923 Act”). After discussing the schematic
postulates of the provision, the Court ruled that where a
policy is taken by the owner of the goods vehicle, the
liability of the insurance company would be confined to
that arising under the 1923 Act in case of an employer. It
further observed that the insurance policy being in the
nature of a contract, it is permissible for an owner to take
such a policy whereunder the entire liability in respect of
the death of or bodily injury to any such employee as is
described in Sub-Sections (a), (b) or (c) of the proviso to
Section 147(1)(b) may be fastened upon the insurance
company and the insurer may become liable to satisfy the
entire award. But for the said purpose, he may be
8 (2005) 6 SCC 172
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required to pay additional premium and the policy must
clearly show that the liability of the insurance company is
unlimited.
19. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is
to be seen how the term “employee” used in Section 147
is required to be understood. Prior to that, it is necessary
to state that as per Section 147(1)(b)(i), the policy is
required to cover a person including the owner of the
goods or his authorised representative carried in the
vehicle. As has been interpreted by this Court, an owner
of the goods or his authorised agent is covered under the
policy. That is the statutory requirement. It does not
cover any passenger. We are absolutely conscious that
the authorities to which we have referred to hereinbefore
lay down the principle regarding non-coverage of
passengers. The other principle that has been stated is
that the insurer’s liability as regards employee is
restricted to the compensation payable under the 1923
Act. In this context, the question that has been posed in
the beginning to the effect whether the employees of the
owner of goods would come within the ambit and sweep
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of the term “employee” as used in Section 147(1), is to be
answered. In this context, the proviso to Section 147(1)
(b) gains significance. The categories of employees which
have been enumerated in the sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of the proviso (i) to Section 147(1) are the driver of a
vehicle, or the conductor of the vehicle if it is a public
service vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, if it
is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle. It is
submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that
sub-clause (c) is of wide import as it covers employees in
a goods carriage being carried in a vehicle. The learned
counsel for the insurer would submit that it should be read
in the context of the entire proviso, regard being had to
the schematic concept of the 1923 Act and the restricted
liability of the insurer. It is further urged that contextually
read, the meaning becomes absolutely plain and clear
that employee which is statutorily mandated to be taken
by the insured only covers the employees employed or
engaged by the employer as per the policy.
20. It is the settled principle of law that the liability of an
insurer for payment of compensation either could be
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statutory or contractual. On a reading of the proviso to
Sub-Section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, it is
demonstrable that the insurer is required to cover the risk
of certain categories of employees of the insured stated
therein. The insurance company is not under statutory
obligation to cover all kinds of employees of the insurer as
the statute does not show command. That apart, the
liability of the insurer in respect of the said covered
category of employees is limited to the extent of the
liability that arises under the 1923 Act. There is also a
stipulation in Section 147 that the owner of the vehicle is
free to secure a policy of insurance providing wider
coverage. In that event, needless to say, the liability
would travel beyond the requirement of Section 147 of the
Act, regard being had to its contractual nature. But, a
pregnant one, the amount of premium would be different.
21. At this stage, we may usefully refer to Section 167 of
the Act which reads as follows: -
“167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily
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injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.”
From the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that where a
death or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim
under the Act as well as under the 1923 Act, the said
person is entitled to compensation under either of the
Acts, but not under both.
22. Coming to the scheme of the 1923 Act, it is worth
noticing that under Section 3 of the said Act, the employer
is liable to pay compensation to the workman in respect of
personal injury or death caused by an accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment. Section 4 provides
the procedure how the amount of compensation is to be
determined. In this context, we may usefully quote a
passage from Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Devireddy Konda Reddy and Others9: -
“....Section 147 of the Act mandates compulsory coverage against death of or bodily injury to any passenger of “public service vehicle”. The proviso makes it
9 (2003) 2 SCC 339
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further clear that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited to liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (in short “the WC Act”). There is no reference to any passenger in “goods carriage.” [Underlining is ours]
23. In Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi and
Others10, after referring to the scheme of the 1923 Act in
the context of payment of penalty for default by the
insurer under Section 4-A of the Act, this Court held thus: -
“On a conjoint operation of the relevant schemes of the aforesaid twin Acts, in our view, there is no escape from the conclusion that the insurance companies will be liable to make good not only the principal amounts of compensation payable by insured employers but also interest thereon, if ordered by the Commissioner to be paid by the insured employers. Reason for this conclusion is obvious. As we have noted earlier the liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act gets foisted on the employer provided it is shown that the workman concerned suffered from personal injury, fatal or otherwise, by any motor accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Such an accident is also covered by the statutory coverage contemplated by Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with the identical provisions under the very contracts of insurance reflected by the
10 (1997) 8 SCC 1
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policy which would make the insurance company liable to cover all such claims for compensation for which statutory liability is imposed on the employer under Section 3 read with Section 4-A of the Compensation Act.” [Emphasis supplied]
Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus:-
“So far as interest is concerned it is almost automatic once default, on the part of the employer in paying the compensation due, takes place beyond the permissible limit of one month. No element of penalty is involved therein. It is a statutory elongation of the liability of the employer to make good the principal amount of compensation within permissible time-limit during which interest may not run but otherwise liability of paying interest on delayed compensation will ipso facto follow.”
Though the said decision was rendered in a different
context, yet we have referred to the same only to
highlight the liability of the insurer in respect of certain
classes of employees.
24. It is worthy to note that sub-clause (i)(c) refers to an
employee who is being carried in the vehicle covered by
the policy. Such vehicle being a goods carriage, an
employee has to be covered by the statutory policy. On
an apposite reading of Sections 147 and 167 the
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intendment of the Legislature, as it appears to us, is to
cover the injury to any person including the owner of the
goods or his authorised representative carried in a vehicle
and an employee who is carried in the said vehicle. It is
apt to state here that the proviso commences in a
different way. A policy is not required to cover the liability
of the employee except an employee covered under the
1923 Act and that too in respect of an employee carried in
a vehicle. To put it differently, it does not cover all kinds
of employees. Thus, on a contextual reading of the
provision, schematic analysis of the Act and the 1923 Act,
it is quite limpid that the statutory policy only covers the
employees of the insured, either employed or engaged by
him in a goods carriage. It does not cover any other kind
of employee and therefore, someone who travels not
being an authorised agent in place of the owner of goods,
and claims to be an employee of the owner of goods,
cannot be covered by the statutory policy and to hold
otherwise would tantamount to causing violence to the
language employed in the Statute. Therefore, we
conclude that the insurer would not be liable to indemnify
the insured.
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25. Presently, for the sake of completeness, we shall
refer to the policy. The policy, exhibit R-2/3/A, clearly
states that insurance is only for carriage of goods and
does not cover use of carrying passengers other than
employees not more than six in number coming under the
purview of the 1923 Act. The language used in the policy
reads as follows:-
“The Policy does not cover :
1. Use for organized racing, pace- making reliability trial or speed testing
2. Use whilst dwaing a trailer except the towing (other then for reward) or any one disabled mechanically propelled vehicle.
3. Use for varying passengers in the vehicle except employees (other than driver) not exceeding six in number coming under the purview of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.”
On a bare reading of the aforesaid policy, there can
be no iota of doubt that the policy relates to the insured
and it covers six employees (other than the driver, not
exceeding six in number) and it is statutory in nature. It
neither covers any other category of person nor does it
increase any further liability in relation to quantum.
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26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we repel the
contentions raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant and as a fall-out of the same, the appeals,
being sans merit, stand dismissed without any order
as to costs.
……………………............J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J. [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi; December 11, 2012.
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